Jersey Lee Welcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with Dr. Gabriela Bernal. She is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a non-resident fellow at the European Center for North Korean Studies. She is also an associated research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy. She has a PhD from the University of North Korean Studies and has published work in various media and online outlets. Dr. Bernal, great to have you on. Gabriela Bernal Thanks for having me. Jersey Lee The major recent news—part of the reason why we’re even speaking at this moment—was Trump’s Truth Social announcement last month, stating that due to his great relationship with Kim Jong-un, as well as South Korea’s lack of help against Iran, America scaled down the joint Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with South Koreans. Was this intended as an olive branch towards North Korea leverage against South Korea, or something else, or some mix of that, what’s the mix in your mind? Gabriela Bernal I think definitely Trump is trying to get back on Kim Jong-un’s good side. I think it was relevant for a few reasons. Because Trump has said since he came back to office, he said on multiple occasions that he’s interested in meeting Kim Jong-un and that he’s open to talking with him, and he’s spoken a lot about their good relationship. But this is the first time that Trump really backed up those words with some kind of action, with something tangible beyond just words. So I think in that sense, it is notable. It sends a message to North Korea, yes, that Trump is interested in keeping the tensions lower. And specifically, I thought it was interesting that he mentioned how the drills are seen are a hostile signal to Pyongyang; because he didn’t have to say that, he could have just ended it with, “South Korea didn’t help us with Iran and they’re not helping us, and therefore why should we help, why should we invest so much money with you guys in terms of these joint military exercises”, he could have just ended it in terms of criticizing South Korea and left that way. But the fact that he brought in North Korea specifically, and pretty much echoed what Kim Jong-un and North Korean leaders have been saying for so many years about the drills being exercises for war and very hostile—he used that same kind of vocabulary that North Korea uses. And I thought that’s very notable because that shows definitely it’s not just about perhaps punishing Seoul for not cooperating so much on Ukraine or Iran; that’s partly it, but it is more a message to North Korea, so yeah, an olive branch, I think it is. Now, whether North Korea will accept that olive branch, that remains to be seen. But, yeah, I do think Trump, especially seeing how things are not going his way in the Middle East, in Europe, with Ukraine, maybe North Korea could be his last kind of hope for a major foreign policy achievement before he leaves office. So he might really switch his focus more on North Korea in the near future. Jersey Lee Like the Nobel Peace Prize, you mean? Gabriela Bernal I’m sure he would love that. He tried during his first term. In practice, I don’t think that’s going to happen. But we’ll see. Because really, it’s not that much up to Trump now, unlike last time. Last time was very different. The tables have turned significantly since his first term. I think Trump or the US, they don’t hold all the cards anymore. Now, North Korea is not nearly as vulnerable or weak or isolated as it was back in 2017, 2018. So even if Trump shouts and screams that he wants to have diplomacy with North Korea and resume talks with Kim or even hold a summit, it doesn’t mean that North Korea is going to accept it. Jersey Lee As someone who only casually observes peninsula affairs—I’m referring to myself—it seems that no matter what South Korea or the US does or says, North Korea has over the past few decades remained implacably hostile, at least in its public statements. Could anything, including President Trump or South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s efforts change this dynamic and get North Korea to show some more diplomatic flexibility than they have previously? Gabriela Bernal I think from the outside, that is how it usually looks, because North Korea always has these very dramatic rhetoric and statements that they make, with the vocabulary that they use, it’s always very extreme. But in practice, in the past, North Korea has been diplomatically flexible on multiple occasions. We’ve seen it during the 90s. We’ve seen it during the six party talks and we’ve seen it during inter-Korean talks under multiple administrations, and most recently under Trump’s first term. The very fact that they would engage in in such diplomacy, and really they did bring concessions to the table to the US. So it’s hard to say that they have not been completely—that they have not been flexible at all. But of course, they hold their cards closely, because again, the Korean Peninsula is technically still at war. So the war is still ongoing. The United States is on paper still North Korea’s main enemy, and it represents a real existential threat to North Korea. So they can’t afford to be too flexible or open, unlike maybe other countries, because—this thinking has been reconfirmed again and again over the decades by the U.S.’s foreign policy, and especially its wars in the Middle East and deposing of dictators and all of that. And most recently in Iran, it’s been confirmed to North Korea repeatedly that they can’t fully trust the U.S. and they cannot afford to just negotiate away their nuclear weapons without getting a significant concrete security guarantee in exchange. To your point about what could make them more flexible, or make them resume diplomacy in a serious way, I think it’s the same thing that they’ve been looking for since the beginning. North Korea has always been looking for the same things. That has not changed. Their goals have remained much the same for over the decades. Namely, they need a security guarantee to guarantee the survival of the regime. And I think for them, they concluded early on that the only way this would be possible is if they had nuclear weapons. History has proven them quite correct, if we look at so many examples of other countries. So I think for now, in the current context, the main thing for the beginning—what would make Kim Jong-un want to go back to talks—it would have to be a significant change in the U.S. position, because the U.S. position on North Korea has remained much the same across administrations, despite there having been attempts at diplomacy here and there, attempts under Trump last time, under Obama, under Bush, during the six-party talks. But overall, the position on CVID, Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization, that issue—and it has softened a bit in recent years because of how things have changed so rapidly. I think the U.S. knows that in practice it is not possible to start negotiations on that basis, from that footing of CVID, it is not going to work anymore. I mean, it wasn’t going to work in the past; it’s definitely not going to work now. So I think the first thing would be to put that to the side. It doesn’t mean to abandon denuclearization, because ultimately the goal should remain a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the whole peninsula, for the safety and security, not just of the Koreas, but of the region and the wider world, and to prevent further nuclear proliferation, which is already a threat in the region and beyond. I think for those reasons, that’s very important. And whether the US, mainly, is willing to change its position publicly on deferring denuclearization in favor of an arms control centered approach, and also somehow, somewhat, in some way recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. Now, does that mean officially making a giant speech and saying that, OK, we, as the United States, we recognize North Korea as a nuclear state? No, no, no. But we can see that it’s kind of already going in that direction. If we look at Russia and China, China has been, of course, very silent, but that silence speaks volumes. Unlike Russia, which has said North Korea is not going to give up its weapons, it shouldn’t be a bargaining chip and pretty much de facto recognizing its nuclear status, China has not gone that far, but they have also not brought up the issue in recent meetings or in recent documents, which is also very noteworthy, because historically China has been very supportive of denuclearization and consistently mentioned it always in public statements. Trump has said multiple times already in during the second term, referring to North Korea as a nuclear state in passing. So not in an official statement kind of way. But I think by now, since 2006, since the first nuclear test and now we’re 20 years after that first nuclear test, is it not time now for us to finally reckon with the reality that, yeah, North Korea is a nuclear weapons state? That’s not ideal and we don’t want that; ideally, they would give up their nuclear weapons. But for many, many reasons, they won’t. So the only way I think negotiations can take place in a way that has actual hope of being sustainable and for long term cooperation and progress to be made—and not just very easily reversible progress like in the past, for something to actually stick and to be able to be carried on across administrations and worked on—I think the basis of that needs to be a de facto recognition that, yeah, North Korea is a nuclear state, and now how are we going to deal with it, instead of how are we going to get them to give up their nuclear weapons. Because that premise is—I think it’s too late for that. Jersey Lee Going back to the statement we started off with, South Korean President Lee’s response was pret
