I. The Strip That Was Never Meant to Become a Country There are places created by geography, places created by conquest, and places created because history ran out of somewhere else to put people. Gaza belongs largely to the third category. In 1948, as the war that accompanied the birth of Israel spread across Mandatory Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes. Some moved east toward what became Jordan. Some went north toward Lebanon and Syria. Others moved south, carrying children, blankets, deeds, cooking pots, family photographs, keys. Many of those who fled south ended up in the narrow coastal territory that came under Egyptian control after the war: the Gaza Strip. It was not designed as the territorial seed of a Palestinian state. It was not an autonomous homeland patiently waiting for a parliament and a flag. It was a remnant left behind by an armistice line, suddenly burdened with a refugee population far larger than the territory had been built to sustain. The villages from which many of these people came were often only a few miles away. This is one of the obscene tricks geography can play. A man could remain close enough to the orange grove his family once cultivated to recognize the weather above it, and yet politically farther from it than if it had been on another continent. Gaza’s population swelled. Its old economic connections were severed. Egypt administered the territory, but did not annex it or incorporate its inhabitants as Egyptian citizens. What had begun as emergency displacement hardened into a permanent political condition. History has a peculiar habit of creating temporary arrangements and then forgetting to come back for them. And so Gaza became a waiting room in which generations were born. The first generation waited for return. The second inherited the waiting. The third inherited the memory of the waiting. Eventually the waiting itself became part of identity. There is a temptation, especially in moral narratives about Palestine, to imagine a simple geography of villain and refuge: Palestinians expelled by Israel, received by an Arab world that regarded them as brothers. The actual history is less convenient. Arab states treated Palestinian refugees differently. Jordan granted citizenship to large numbers of Palestinians, although the relationship later became violently strained. Lebanon imposed far harsher restrictions and preserved generations of Palestinians in a condition of legal and economic exclusion. Egypt administered Gaza without absorbing its population into Egypt. These were not identical policies, and reducing them to one Arab betrayal would be lazy. But a broader truth survives the differences. Palestine was often easier for Arab governments to embrace as a cause than Palestinians were to absorb as citizens. Palestine could be invoked in speeches. It could be printed on posters. It could stand for Arab dignity, anti-colonial struggle, Islamic obligation, revolutionary virtue. Actual refugees required schools, jobs, housing, legal status, political rights. They were less symbolic and therefore more difficult. Everybody loved Palestine. Palestinians were another matter. The same problem appears far beyond the Arab world. The Palestinian has become one of the most symbolically overburdened people on Earth: required to embody dispossession, colonialism, resistance, Islam, revolution, Western hypocrisy, Arab failure, and sometimes the entire moral condition of mankind. It is a tremendous amount of metaphysics for someone who may simply want electricity. A child born in Gaza in 1950 could grow up hearing about a village his parents had left only a few years before. There might be a key to a house. There might be a deed. There might be an uncle who remembered the fig tree. The child could grow old inside the refugee camp, have children of his own, and tell them stories about a place that by then existed more securely in memory than in geography. That is how dispossession becomes larger than a property dispute. It becomes inheritance. And inheritance, when it cannot be redeemed, becomes political memory. But the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948 did not occur in an empty moral universe. It collided with another people carrying another inheritance, another archive of catastrophe, another set of ghosts. To understand how a movement formed in response to Jewish vulnerability could become implicated in the dispossession of another people, one has to move backward. Before Gaza. Before 1948. Before Europe was finished teaching Jews what statelessness could cost. II. Never Again Is Not a Foreign Policy Jewish history has an unusual relationship with catastrophe because catastrophe repeatedly became architecture. A temple was destroyed, and Judaism reorganized itself. Political sovereignty disappeared, and civilization survived through text. Exile became portable. The lost land never entirely stopped being present. Jerusalem survived inside ritual. Destruction survived inside the calendar. Exile survived inside prayer. A Jew living in Baghdad or Kraków could inhabit one country physically while addressing another in liturgy. Then Europe added another inheritance: expulsions, ghettos, legal disabilities, pogroms, conspiracy theories, racial antisemitism, political movements built around the proposition that Jews were simultaneously too foreign and too cosmopolitan, too capitalist and too communist, secretly all-powerful and contemptibly weak. Antisemitism rarely suffered from excessive concern for internal consistency. Then came the Holocaust, and with it the transformation of historical fear into historical proof. The conclusion many Jews drew was not difficult to understand: never depend entirely upon another people’s mercy again. That sentence contains much of the emotional force of Zionism. Not all of it. Zionism was secular, religious, socialist, liberal, revisionist, romantic, practical, and often internally contradictory. But beneath its competing forms lay an increasingly persuasive proposition: a people without sovereign power can discover very suddenly that legal rights are only as durable as the institutions willing to enforce them. After Auschwitz, that argument became almost unbearable in its simplicity. The Jews needed somewhere from which they could not be expelled because the army at the border would be theirs. One does not need to endorse every political consequence of that idea to understand why it became sacred. The trouble with sacred political ideas is not usually that they are false. It is that they contain no obvious stopping rule. Never again what? Never again Auschwitz, certainly. Never again pogroms, of course. Never again political helplessness, understandably. But never again military vulnerability? Never again losing strategic depth? Never again relinquishing territory that might someday be used against you? Never again allowing a hostile population meaningful sovereignty nearby? Never again permitting an adversary enough freedom to become dangerous? The distance between “never again Auschwitz” and “therefore we must indefinitely dominate another population” is vast. History can nevertheless build bridges across very large distances. This is the dangerous mutation of memory: not remembering catastrophe, but allowing catastrophe to become the universal grammar through which the present is interpreted. When every enemy may contain Hitler, every concession may contain Munich. When every vulnerability is imagined as the first movement of annihilation, domination can begin to appear as prudence. And the difficulty is that Jewish fear is not invented. There really were pogroms. There really was Auschwitz. There really were wars in which Israelis feared national destruction. There really are movements that speak openly about the end of Israel. A fantasy can be corrected by evidence. A fear built from genuine catastrophe is harder, because history keeps whispering: remember what happened the last time you believed you were safe. But a state cannot indefinitely govern another people from inside the emotional atmosphere of an emergency room. At some point survival becomes sovereignty, sovereignty becomes domination, and domination is defended as survival. The movement that concluded from Jewish history that landlessness could mean death sought sovereignty in a land where another people were already living. That is the contradiction. Jewish connection to the land is ancient and real. Jerusalem did not suddenly become important to Jews in the nineteenth century. Jewish civilization did not originate in Warsaw. But ancestral connection is not the same thing as political vacancy. The land was inhabited. There were towns, villages, farmers, merchants, mosques, churches, synagogues, harvests, debts, weddings, family feuds, and all the other evidence that human beings had already made lives there. Before 1948, Zionist institutions acquired substantial land through purchase. The war then transformed the demographic and territorial collision into something much larger: conquest, flight, expulsion, abandoned villages, confiscated property, and the creation of a new state alongside the mass dispossession of Palestinians. The Zionist answer to Jewish historical vulnerability helped produce another people’s catastrophe. This does not make those catastrophes identical. History does not become more truthful when we flatten it. It makes them entangled. The Israeli looks backward and sees the consequences of Jewish powerlessness. The Palestinian looks backward and sees the consequences of Israeli power. Each therefore finds historical evidence for the political instinct the other fears most. The Israeli says: look what happens when Jews cannot defend themselves. The Palestinian says: look what happens when Israel can. And between those two memories lies a land neither can imagine without inheritance. III. The Religio