Liberia: Remembering the Future

LiberiaRTF Podcast

Liberia: Remembering the Future is an independently produced podcast in which co-hosts Aaron Weah and Gerry Naughton explore how Liberia’s past shapes its present – from history, culture and politics to war, peace, and everyday life. The podcast is not funded by New Narratives or the Swedish Government; New Narratives facilitates the syndication of selected episodes on Liberian radio. liberiartf.substack.com

  1. Oct 28

    Reconciliation Deferred – The Liberian TRC

    Reconciliation Deferred – Liberia’s TRC After fourteen years of civil war, Liberians faced the task of confronting the past and finding a way to live together again. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to document what had happened, hear testimony from victims and perpetrators, and recommend measures to promote accountability, reconciliation and lasting peace. But how much could one such commission realistically achieve? In this episode of Liberia: Remembering the Future, Gerry Naughton and Aaron Weah examine the origins, work and contested legacy of Liberia’s TRC. Drawing on his personal experience of attending the Commission’s hearings, Aaron recalls the testimony of victims and perpetrators, the reactions of those listening, and the difficult questions raised by attempts to establish a shared historical record. We also explore the tensions between the Commission and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s administration, the controversy surrounding its final recommendations, and the distinction between establishing the truth, delivering justice and achieving reconciliation. The TRC left an extraordinary record of testimony. But its wider ambitions remain unfinished, and questions of accountability and reconciliation continue to shape Liberia’s political life. Truth was heard. Reconciliation is still awaited. Liberia: Remembering the Future is presented by Aaron Weah and Gerry Naughton. Follow or subscribe for more conversations exploring Liberia’s history and its continuing influence on the country’s future. Transcript Welcome to Liberia: Remembering the Future, with me, Gerry Naughton, and Dr Aaron Weah. After fourteen years of civil war, it was time for the Liberian people to reckon with what had happened – the violence, the suffering, the trauma – and find a way to live together again. One response was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The TRC was given the task of establishing a historical record, hearing from victims and perpetrators, and recommending measures to prevent a return to conflict. But not all such commissions are created equal. Can a single process establish the truth, deliver justice and bring about reconciliation? And what happens when the search for a historical record runs up against the realities of political power? In this episode, Aaron draws on his own experience of the Commission’s hearings, and we examine both the scale of the TRC’s ambition and the controversy surrounding its eventual recommendations. What did Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission achieve – and what remains unresolved? GerryYou know, let’s just start with a broad — a broad question. And I know you’ve got so much background and so much, you know, time in your life that’s gone into thinking about this, but if you could sum it up, the answer to this question, I’d be grateful. What was the TRC supposed to do? What did Liberians hope it might achieve before it started? AaronSo the TRC, and my response may be — my response to this question may come from the place of someone who’s been involved with it, and it may not be shared, it may not be the expectations that were shared with everyone. AaronBut I would say the centralmost purpose of the TRC was to create a historical account of what had happened, and to be able to recommend actions that would evolve a repeat of what happened between 1979 or earlier, up to 2003. AaronSo that was essentially what the TRC was set up to do, to create a historical record, and by way of investigating the antecedent to the Liberian conflict and recommending concrete actions that evolve a repeat or a potential relapse into the Liberian conflict. AaronDid we achieve that? That’s the big question that we can discuss. GerryWe’ve got an hour to get there, or so. AaronThat’s it. GerryDo you think that’s how the people of Liberia saw it? Were they happy that it was coming, did they welcome it, were they frustrated, or did they see it as a diversion? AaronSo let’s — let’s go back a little and say, let’s go back, because everything began at the Accra Peace Agreement, the way the agreement — remember now, the Accra Agreement was just one of the many peace agreements that were signed. GerryYeah. AaronAnd the question here is, why did the Accra Agreement succeed and why others fail? In lots of different ways, it’s because — for a couple of reasons. One was the subregion had changed considerably, and then leaders within the subregion were now transitioning from the era of military rule to civilian rule. Democracy was now invoked, and everyone was trying to get along, or get on, get on that bandwagon. AaronAnd the third point about why I think Accra succeeded was it happened at a time where it overlapped with the success of the South African Truth Commission. We know South Africa was at the brink of its own collapse with the violent crime that we saw happening after — before the elections of Mandela, and after that, how the TRC process was used to engineer a setting change that was almost unthinkable because the country was very close to some fear of collapse. So why did Accra achieve? The combination of these factors. AaronSo specifically on Liberia, you see how after the peace agreement and the compromise that was reached, that instead of establishing a war crimes court — because that was a major point of bargaining and point of contention during the Accra Peace Agreement — and eventually there was a compromise reached between establishing a war crimes court and the TRC, and so it was agreed that we need — if you see the fine prints of the Accra Agreement, you will see in there the language is, “We need a South African-style Truth Commission.” Now, at that point, it wasn’t really clear what are the powers of a Truth Commission, to what extent can the enabling legislation of a TRC be massaged, or be given the powers that resemble — if not entirely, but that resembles that, in part, that of a tribunal or war crimes court. At the point in Accra, it wasn’t obvious. AaronSo when the Accra Agreement ended, for some of the actors who were familiar with how the previous agreements have always played out, for them it was yet another power-sharing arrangement. And so they went back to Monrovia to carry on with business as usual. Others thought that there was some unfinished business in Accra that needed to quickly be adjusted in Monrovia. And so this is how the TRC Act came about, and the sweeping powers — if you read the Act, that talks about the Act should prevent the use of amnesty, or that amnesty is declared — I mean, for international crimes, you cannot — amnesty cannot be amnestyed. War crimes and crimes against humanity cannot be amnestyed. AaronSo what that meant is that the TRC Act went straight into the process of designing a law that enabled the Commission to — in dealing with the mandate of providing — the purpose of providing a historical record that established clearly why we went to war and to recommend a set of actions that prevents a relapse or a repeat of that. In that framing, in that particular framing, it was envisioned that prosecution and issues of war crimes and crimes against humanity be a major part of how we envision preventing a relapse — a relapse to war. And creating a historical record, dealing with a historical antecedent, it was almost seen as inexplicable that dealing with war crimes was also an integral part of it. AaronSo, and the thing about the TRC, when the TRC Act was being drafted, there was a consultation done across the country. In different regions of the country, there were different aspirations, some wanted reparations, lots called for memorialization, other called for prosecution, and so all of that aspiration went into the design and the design of the TRC Act. It would be unfair to say that across the board everyone had the same sort of aspirations here and there in terms of — so Liberians wanted, essentially wanted to understand why we went to war and to establish an accurate historical picture of what happened. AaronAnd so that was on the overall, but in terms of criminal accountability, there were still some misgivings. Not everyone, there was not a full consensus about should we pursue criminal accountability, because Liberians were wary that that particular measure might rock the boat. Some others were quite emphatic that we should — there should be — we should pursue criminal accountability as an adequate measure of trying to prevent a future relapse to conflict, or trying to discourage, or that would serve as a deterrent measure to future conflict. GerryAnd just fill in a little bit of the date — the date line here. What were the dates of the Accra Accord, the drafting of the TRC resolution, and the actual holding of the TRC? What were the dates, and what was the kind of context in the country at that time? Because we’re going back a few episodes with, you know, to when we talked about this, so just to make sure that everybody can catch up. AaronSo the timeline here is that in August, on August 18th, the Accra Agreement was signed. GerryWait, which — AaronIn June — GerryWhich year? Aaron2023. GerryYeah. AaronSo — Gerry2000, 2003. Aaron2003, I’m sorry, I’m sorry. 2003, yes, that’s about 23 years ago today. GerryYeah. AaronAnd then two years later, in 2005, in June, the TRC Act was passed into law. The TRC Act was passed into law, and then three years later, in 2009, the final report was released with all of its recommendations. So it’s important to see these timelines. GerryYeah. Aaron2003, the Accra Agreement was signed on the 18th of August, 2003. Two years after that, in June Aaron2005, the law, the enabling legislation of the TRC, was also passed, granting the TRC at least three years to collect its data and to do public hearings and talk with Liberians in the diaspora and in the homeland, on the

  2. Oct 7

    Liberia’s Iron Lady – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf

    After 14 years of conflict, Liberia finally had peace. Then came the job of putting the country back together. In 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf defeated George Weah to become Liberia’s first post-war president – and Africa’s first elected female head of state. For Aaron, this was the first election in which he voted, and the beginning of his own professional life working on Liberia’s post-war reconstruction. We talk about the excitement surrounding Ellen’s election; the international reputation she brought to the presidency; her ability to speak to Liberians in both formal speeches and Liberian English; and the promise that there would be “no business as usual”. We also look at what happened once the expectations of 2005 met the reality of governing a country emerging from war. What did Ellen actually rebuild? Why did some Liberians feel that 12 years should have produced more? And how much of the stability Liberia has enjoyed since the war can be traced back to those first post-war years? Aaron also remembers seeing the newly elected Ellen on the streets of Monrovia – and Gerry remembers a rather different assessment of her presidency from a Liberian colleague, involving a road that she failed to build. And we begin to reach the issue that leads into our next episode: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s difficult relationship with Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Liberia: Remembering the Future — the conversation shaping the understanding of Liberia’s history. * If you know anyone who is interested in Liberia or African history, feel free to share this post with them. * And if you want to subscribe, and receive updates on everything we post direct to your inbox, you can do so below. * You can also follow the podcast on Apple or Spotify, as well as on podcast apps like Pocket Casts and Podcast Addict. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit liberiartf.substack.com/subscribe

  3. Sep 16

    The End of the Road for Charles Taylor

    By 2003, Charles Taylor was running out of options. Rebel forces were advancing on Monrovia. His standing across West Africa had collapsed. An indictment from the Special Court for Sierra Leone was hanging over him. And inside Liberia, a remarkable movement of women was demanding an end to the war. In this episode, Aaron Weah remembers those final months from inside Monrovia – including waking up to 78 missed calls to discover that LURD rebels had crossed the bridge and he was effectively behind their lines. His response was to flee through the fighting carrying one possession he wasn’t prepared to abandon: his guitar. Aaron and Gerry also discuss the international pressure building around Taylor, the Liberian women’s peace movement and its cultural significance, the Accra negotiations, and Taylor’s eventual departure for exile in Nigeria. Finally, they ask what became of the armed factions that had dominated more than a decade of Liberian history – and how some of their political and ethnic constituencies survived the transition from war to peace. In this episode: * LURD’s advance into Monrovia * Aaron behind rebel lines – with his guitar * The international isolation of Charles Taylor * The Special Court for Sierra Leone indictment * Liberia’s women’s peace movement * Taylor’s departure for Nigeria in August 2003 * ECOMIL, UNMIL and the beginning of Liberia’s transition * What happened to Liberia’s wartime factions? Liberia: Remembering the Future is presented by Gerry Naughton and Dr Aaron Weah. --- In the next episode, we’ll turn our attention to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the woman who became Africa’s first elected female president. We are Aaron Weah and Gerry Naughton. Thanks for listening. You can find Liberia Remembering the Future on Substack and wherever you get your podcasts. Search for Liberia Remembering the Future to hear the whole series. * If you know anyone who is interested in Liberia or African history, feel free to share this post with them. * And if you want to subscribe, and receive updates on everything we post direct to your inbox, you can do so below. * You can also follow the podcast on Apple or Spotify, as well as on podcast apps like Pocket Casts and Podcast Addict. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit liberiartf.substack.com/subscribe

  4. Aug 5

    He Killed My Ma, He Killed My Pa

    Why Liberians Voted for Charles Taylor In 1997, Liberia held elections after seven years of devastating civil war. The result shocked the world. Charles Taylor, the rebel leader whose forces had helped plunge the country into conflict, won an overwhelming 75% of the vote. How could that happen? Was it fear? Intimidation? A desire for revenge? Or something else, something more complicated? In this episode, Dr Aaron Weah explores one of the most debated questions in modern Liberian history. Drawing on decades of research, his own experience growing up during the war, and insights from political science, anthropology and Liberian culture, he argues that the answer cannot be understood through Western political assumptions alone. Together, Gerry Naughton and Aaron Weah examine: * Why many Liberians believed only Taylor could prevent another war. * The famous campaign slogan: “He killed my ma, he killed my pa... but I’ll vote for him.” * The difference between fear, coercion and strategic choice. * The idea of Liberia’s civic and primordial public - as a concept and an important factor in understanding 1997. * Why Taylor’s election represented both hope and a profound missed opportunity. By the end of the episode, Taylor has been given one of the strongest democratic mandates in Liberian history. The question is: what did he do with it? That’s in our next episode… TranscriptHello and welcome to LRTF Last time, Liberia finally emerged from seven years of civil war. Under the interim leadership of Ruth Perry, the country held elections that many hoped would mark a new beginning. But the result stunned the world. Charles Taylor – the man whose rebellion had helped plunge Liberia into war – won a landslide victory. So why did people make that choice? In this episode, Aaron Weah argues that the answer lies far deeper than fear or intimidation. To understand the election of 1997, we have to understand how Liberians were trying to rebuild a shattered society. Charles Taylor won three-quarters of the 1997 vote. He controlled the presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate. The war was over. The country desperately wanted peace. And hundreds of thousands of Liberians had made what they believed was the only choice ... that could finally end the conflict. The question now was simple. What would Charles Taylor do with that extraordinary opportunity? That’s next time on Liberia Remembering the Future. * If you know anyone who is interested in Liberia or African history, feel free to share this post with them. * And if you want to subscribe, and receive updates on everything we post direct to your inbox, you can do so below. * You can also follow the podcast on Apple or Spotify, as well as on podcast apps like Pocket Casts and Podcast Addict. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit liberiartf.substack.com/subscribe

  5. Jul 15

    Let the Fighters Bring Peace

    By 1996, Liberia’s civil war had already survived numerous peace agreements. In a final attempt to end the fighting, the country’s main warlords were brought together into a shared transitional government. The hope was simple: hold the peace long enough to organise democratic elections. Instead, the experiment collapsed. In this episode, Ged Naughton and Dr Aaron Weah examine the events that led to the Battle for Monrovia in April 1996—one of the most destructive episodes of Liberia’s first civil war. They explore why the power-sharing arrangement failed, how old rivalries quickly resurfaced, and why the fighting became known for “Operation Pay Yourself”, as thousands of fighters looted a city already exhausted by years of conflict. Drawing on Aaron’s own research in Impunity Under Attack, they reconstruct the chain of events that turned political tension into open warfare and consider what the battle revealed about Liberia’s fractured politics. They also discuss the role of the transitional government, the appointment of Ruth Perry, and why many historians now see the exclusion of women from earlier peace negotiations as a major missed opportunity. In this episode * Why the Council of State was created—and why it failed. * How a single incident triggered the Battle for Monrovia. * “Operation Pay Yourself” and the looting of the capital. * The role of Charles Taylor, Roosevelt Johnson and the rival factions. * Why Ruth Perry’s appointment marked an important turning point. * Lessons from Liberia’s final failed attempt to negotiate peace between warlords. Transcript Intro Over the last few episodes, we took a side road that led us away from the front lines of Liberia’s civil war to something just as important: how do ordinary people carry on living during such times. We followed Aaron’s own journey through music, friendship and survival. Now we return to the highway. By 1996, Liberia’s latest attempt at peace had brought the country’s rival warlords into a shared government. It was an extraordinary experiment—but one that would end in catastrophe. This is the Battle for Monrovia. 00:00:00 Aaron So I would say the impasses—uh, war—was not, not so different from previous episodes of violence in Liberia, but this was just yet another peace agreement that had failed. It’s a seeder in bringing together—in an arrangement—something that appeared like a collective co-presidency that had Charles Taylor, George Boley, Alhaji Kromah, and other warlords together in an arrangement that was meant to carry Liberia through a certain patch of stability and then transition through elections. 00:00:43 Aaron But then that arrangement collapsed, and it happened so much so that, for the first time since the war started, there were so many warm factions that were initially located in different parts of the country. But because of the collective arrangement—and this was really what made the April 6 War perhaps one of the most destructive in Liberia—because much of the war factions had converged on the city center. In fact, we’re all living there because they now had the head, the different head of the warm factions were now giving power through power-sharing arrangement, and so they were there. 00:01:22 Aaron And because the agreement failed and Liberia went to conflict, and so you have all of these soldiers who were milling around in town, so in this collapse of yet another peace agreement, an opportunity to loot, and an opportunity to—to—to seek a revenge, you know, on so many different levels. And so part of the TRC report finding was that revenge killings in the Liberian conflict—so people who had personal ice to grind with each other—used that occasion to go at different people. And there were still, even though it was 6 years into the conflict, but there was still killing on based on tribal grounds, based on ethnic grounds, those who were of certain ethnic—perceived to be of some rival ethnic group, you were hounded and you were killed. And there was much looting. There were—the UN was there, there were vehicles, and I mean, it was—it was—it was a very violent, violent episode. 00:02:30 Aaron And Stephen Ellis and other Liberian—and other Liberian academia refer to this period as the Battle for Monrovia, you know, where Monrovia became that single space that, in a way, had not been captured. It was occupied briefly before in 1990, but then because of Ecomog, because of the AFL, rebel forces who converged on the capitals were quickly—were quickly repelled. I mean, they were driven out. But April 6 became an occasion where every other warm factions who had previously been confined to the rural parts of Liberia were now physically present in Liberia. And because historically Monrovia has always been Liberia, it was a big deal. 00:03:14 Aaron People wanted to go to some of these plush places, break it down, take out the loot, and pay themselves. And paying yourself was an important phenomenon in the Iprasis War because many of the fighters took on arms for different reasons. They were not being paid. Occasionally, maybe they and their commanders went out on a particular operation and they got some spoils. They got some spoils from whatsoever the operation was. But April 6 War represented the rare opportunity for Monrovia to be torn apart and people could make a way with whatever they had. 00:03:51 Aaron I mean, that was really the sad part of the conflict. And you can’t—you can’t miss an opportunity to act, based on a close assessment of the April 6, to say, “What was the Liberian Civil War really about?” If fighters, senior official military officials, saw in Monrovia an opportunity to—an op—and that’s a part of April 6 that is referred to as Operations Pay Yourself. Operation Pay—yeah, Pay Yourself. 00:05:47 Ged Before we continue, I asked Erin to go back to something he wrote more than 15 years ago. This is his account, and the account of the book Impunity Under Attack, of how the Battle for Monrovia unfolded. 00:06:01 Aaron “One Ulimo-J forces in Kakata heard that Johnson’s home had been searched by Ecomog. Some of the forces, largely loyal to Johnson, saw it as an humiliation of the leader. In protest, they went wild in the city, which lies some 45 km from Monrovia, placing roadblocks along the Kakata Highway, the main route connecting Monrovia to the interior of Liberia, including the NPFL stronghold of Gbarnga. Taylor had found his opportunity. On March—on 8 March 1996, NPFL forces launched a massive attack on Ulimo-J positions in Kakata, Bong Mines, and Todee, with the stated aim of keeping the Kakata Highway open. There is strong suggestion that Charles Tiller brought over some high-ranking Ulimo-J officers in Kakata, who were not loyal to Johnson, and induced them to surrender territory to the NPFL forces. With the acquiescence of these officers, NPFL began a move—NPFL began to move their men and heavy guns into positions previously controlled by Ulimo-J forces, easily routing those who resisted. 00:07:15 Aaron At the same time, Ulimo-K forces were launching renewed attacks against Tubmanburg and other places in Bomi and lower Liberia, now in Gbarpolu County, which were under the control of Ulimo-J. But these attacks did not lead to significant shifts in the territorial control. All these attacks provoked strong protests from Roosevelt Johnson and his loyalists, but probably because of the poor standing with Ecomog, the peacekeepers practically ignored his position. In the midst of all this, elements of K5, a Ulimo-J unit commanded by Ama Yulo went around the vicinity of Roosevelt Johnson Beach House residence in the Sinkor district of Monrovia during the night of the 19th to 20th of March 1996. It is not clear why the fighters wandered around Johnson’s house, but in the altercation that ensued between them and Johnson loyalists, one of the K5 men was killed, identified later as Due Bowo. He was found dead the next morning, a few blocks up the road from Johnson’s house. Charles Taylor seized the moment, invoking this authority as a member of the presidency, and enlisting the support of the Ulimo-K’s Alhaji Kromah, who had his own axe to grind with Roosevelt Johnson. 00:08:40 Aaron Taylor urged on the police to arrest Johnson on murder charges. Incidentally, the director of police, Joe Tate, was an NPFL appointee and cousin to Charles Taylor, and lived on the same block with Johnson. Under the guise of providing protection to Joe Tate’s home, schools of NPFL militiamen now recycled as police special forces began to deploy in the vicinity of Johnson’s home, practically setting up a command post in advance of their move to arrest the Ulimo-J leader. Seeing the situation their leader was in, Ulimo-J fighters began a rapid mobilization at his home to prevent his arrest. The stage was now set for a showdown. Around this time, George Boley, LPC leader and member of the presidency, boarded a plane at the Spruce Fin Airfield in Monrovia on his way out of the country. Before the plane could take off, Charles Taylor arrived at the airfield at the head of a train of heavily armed followers. 00:09:45 Aaron He ordered the plane not to take off until he had inspected the occupants. Incensed by this, LPC fighters, who had gone to escort Boley, surrounded the entrance of the plane. Guns at the ready, and they fired anybody to go on board. Boley himself intervened to end a standoff by ordering his men to allow Taylor to board the plane. Taylor went on the plane, took a closer look around, and disembarked. He left—he left when the plane took off shortly afterward, but some of his men stayed at the airfield. As Boley’s LPC escorts were leaving the airfield, they entered into a row with Taylor’s men, who had stayed behind. 00:10:32 Aaron Within moments, heavy gunfire erupted. The brief firefight that ensued since the violence i

  6. Jun 24

    Trust Me, I Played with Papa Wemba

    In April 1996, sixteen-year-old Aaron Weah was caught in the fighting that engulfed Monrovia. With no more than a guitar and a photo album, he joined friends Peter Cole and Jonathan Vawah on a journey into exile. What followed was a story of hunger, prison cells, military checkpoints, unstable soldiers, refugee life and unexpected kindness. Along the way, music kept opening doors when things looked to be at their worst. In this episode, Aaron recalls: * Being caught in the crossfire that erupted on 6 April 1996. * Saving a guitar and leaving everything else behind. * Surviving on mangoes in Gbarnga. * Being arrested and accused of being a child soldier. * Escaping military checkpoints on the road to Côte d’Ivoire. * How photographs with Papa Wemba won the trust of a taxi driver when they had nothing else. * Life as refugee musicians in Côte d’Ivoire. * Secret work in a UNHCR swamp farming project. * The joyful reunion with John Dayen in exile. * Returning to Liberia in 1997 believing the war was finally over. Featuring stories of Peter Cole, Jonathan Vawah, Franklin Siakor and the musicians of Bosco Beat. Liberia: Remembering the Future is a podcast hosted by Dr Aaron Weah and Ged Naughton. Aaron Weah is a Liberian academic and Executive Director of the Ducor Institute for Social and Economic Research. Ged Naughton is a writer, journalist and former communications adviser who lived and worked in Liberia. Together they explore Liberia’s history through memory, conversation and personal experience. 🎧 Available on Substack, Spotify and Apple Podcasts. 💬 Comments and memories are always welcome. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit liberiartf.substack.com/subscribe

About

Liberia: Remembering the Future is an independently produced podcast in which co-hosts Aaron Weah and Gerry Naughton explore how Liberia’s past shapes its present – from history, culture and politics to war, peace, and everyday life. The podcast is not funded by New Narratives or the Swedish Government; New Narratives facilitates the syndication of selected episodes on Liberian radio. liberiartf.substack.com