The Taliban - Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group - Podcast

Mark Silinsky

The Taliban offer an unrelenting dedication to conquer Afghanistan, an unconstrained use of terror, and solidarity with important fragments of global Islam. The Taliban leverages deeply ingrained Afghan skepticism of Western promises for a better future. Foreign men have come and gone from Afghanistan, and, despite promises, only the poverty remains. Taliban leaders boast that Afghans are armed with religious fervor, honor, and resolve.  “Such weapons are neither available in the arsenal of America nor in the warehouse of her allies." In January 2013, the Taliban crowed, “No sooner will the foreigners quit than the Afghans will start living under the cover of an Islamic government and in the environment of Islamic brotherhood."             Perhaps, but pro-government forces also have centers of gravity. Most Afghans fear the Taliban and remember the misery and brutality of its 6-year rule. The Taliban’s world is a phantasmagoria of savagery. Women are stoned for promiscuity, and men are beheaded for trivial offenses. Boys are raised to blow themselves up in bazaars, where other children and their mothers' shop. There is no music or television in Taliban territory, and no kites soar above the orchards and towns. There is a poverty of empathy and compassion.             The American-led Coalition is determined to prevent the Taliban’s triumph. Today’s soldiers on both sides of the struggle have known only war. The sons of Taliban fighters, who were 10 when the group was scattered into Pakistan, are now in their early 20s. Many are hardened fighters and will undoubtedly face the sons of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban are tough, but so are many other Afghans.

  1. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Thirteen

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. This reading will conclude chapter six and introduce Jihad Johnny Walker and Adam Gahdahn.   Profile 20: Jihad “Johnny” Lind Walker and Adam Gahdahn The Taliban are mostly Afghan, but there are exceptions. In October 2001, an estimated 150 British-born Muslims fought alongside the Taliban. James McLinton was nicknamed the Tartan Taliban because the Scottish-born, Catholic-raised Briton moved to Pakistan and became involved in the insurgency. The British Tipton Taliban, or Tipton Five, were captured on Afghan battlefields. Raised in the English Midlands and committed to jihad in Afghanistan, they were sent to Guantanamo Bay for interrogation. There were other Westerners as well, but only one was known as Jihad Johnny. Intelligent and self-motivated, the California boy John Phillip Walker Lindh converted to Islam at age 16 after reading Malcolm X’s autobiography. Coming from an upper-middle-class background with parents who described themselves as progressive and divorced when he was young, he wanted to learn to speak and read Koranic Arabic. This was unusual for a boy raised in the leafy suburbs of Washington, D.C. Few who knew Walker as a teenager would have predicted he’d join any militant organization. His father said, “John is a very sweet kid, devoted, and religious.” Walker moved to Pakistan, enrolled in a madrassa, and immersed himself in Urdu, Pashto, and Islamic studies. He became valuable to Islamist groups because he understood American customs, ceremonies, and sensitivities, and his open dedication to Salafist Islam impressed fellow Muslims. His mother told Newsweek that his son was not “totally streetwise.” In a broad understatement, his father acknowledged that his boy “made a bad decision going to Afghanistan,” but added, “we love him unconditionally.” Few Americans were sympathetic to him when he was caught, wet, simpering, and hiding in a cave. A December 2001 poll showed that 70 percent of respondents believed Walker should be jailed or executed. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison, where he remains today. While John Walker is introspective and intellectual, his fellow Californian, Adam Gadahn, displays a foolish persona. Like Walker, he converted to Islam to find spirituality lacking in his countercultural lifestyle. His early religious background was eclectic and confusing. His grandfather was Jewish and married a Presbyterian, and his father is a self-described atheist. His mother is nominally Roman Catholic. Adam spent part of his childhood living with family on a California goat farm. Dissatisfied with farm life, he searched online for employment and found Islam instead. He embraced Islam after seeing videotapes of Muslims killing Americans and others. He joined al-Qaeda and acts as a propagandist of questionable effectiveness. For his numerous calls to kill Americans, Adam Gadahn is wanted for treason. However, he is mostly regarded as an embarrassment to al-Qaeda. Few non-Muslim Americans see his Jihadist bombast as anything more than tired chatter. **Summary** The Taliban’s fighting capabilities have significantly improved. They employ infiltration, ambushes, hit-and-run tactics, sniper strategies, roadside bombs, and other methods. Advocating a narrow, militaristic ideology, they are well-organized and often ruthless. Since 2001, the Taliban’s tactics and abilities have steadily grown, despite many international observers initially believing they had been defeated. Their more effective tactics include assassinations, roadside bombs, infiltration, impersonation, and suicide attacks. The Taliban are also skilled in offensive and counterintelligence operations. Two of the more colorful, if unbalanced, figures linked to the Taliban and al-Qaeda-supported insurgency are the Californians John “Taliban Johnny” Walker and Adam “Azzam the American” Gahdahn. Thank you for listening to this reading from “The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group.” If you enjoyed it, please consider subscribing and liking it. Nothing in this book represents the official position of any person or agency of the United States government. On behalf of Kensington Security Consulting, thank you for listening.

    5 min
  2. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Twelve

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. There are many attacks that are difficult to thwart. For example, in Herat Province in April 2007, Taliban fighters dressed in fake ANP police uniforms set up an illegal checkpoint and tried to ambush a combined ANA and Coalition patrol as they approached. Afghan and Coalition forces seized over 100 fake uniforms and recovered more than a dozen false ID documents in a single raid. The Taliban might have acted alone or received the uniforms and IDs from inside sources. Another example of a carefully planned, multi-tactic attack was against the Defense Ministry in Kabul in 2011. The attacker had a special pass allowing him entry. Once inside, a man in an army uniform jumped from a car and stormed the main office building, shooting and killing two soldiers before he was shot. This attack involved pre-operation surveillance, understanding the security system and staff schedule, predicting when a high-ranking official would be present, obtaining the necessary passes, possibly securing inside agents, and training at least two operatives for what was almost certainly a suicide mission. The Taliban may have had insiders involved. The police are heavily targeted by infiltrators. Since 2006, infiltration efforts have steadily increased. By 2010, concerns arose about a potential plot to assassinate British Prime Minister David Cameron during his visit. Since then, infiltration techniques have become more advanced and widespread. One of the most notorious infiltration operations was the assassination of President Karzai’s brother in July 2011. A trusted bodyguard, a longtime family friend, shot him after asking to speak privately with Karzai. The Taliban claimed responsibility, and it’s likely they had a hand in the operation, which was almost certainly a suicide attack. The bodyguard was quickly killed and did not reveal his motives. Successful Taliban infiltration has also enabled large-scale, theatrical escapes. Similar to the famous World War II “Great Escape,” in June 2008, 480 inmates escaped from Kandahar prison by tunneling for over five months, constructing a 1,050-foot tunnel to the main prison, bypassing checkpoints, watchtowers, and razor-wire-topped barriers. In August 2011, the U.S. announced it would keep control of Afghanistan’s high-profile prison indefinitely, citing concerns about the rule of law. Profile 19: Three Bullets and One Leg - The Life and Death of the Taliban’s “al-Zarqawi” – Mullah Dadullah Akhund Born in Kandahar Province, Daduallah Akhund, known as Mullah Dadullah, was educated in a madrassa in Balochistan. He fought against the Soviets and lost a leg to a landmine. Despite this, he continued fighting the Soviets, the Northern Alliance, the Karzai government, and Coalition forces. Using contacts with Pakistani leaders, he helped the Taliban protect supply convoys from Turkmenistan to Pakistan traveling through Herat. He made his mark. He fought the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s and helped capture Mazar-e Sharif. He was captured by Adul Rashid Dostum’s forces but escaped despite his missing leg. He became a hero among his tribesmen. Most accounts say Dadullah had many lives on his hands. He was closely linked to atrocities against the Hazarra. After 2001, he became a leading field commander for Mullah Omar but was disliked by his associates because of kidnappings, beheadings, his ego, and unpredictable violent fits. In his final years, he earned the nickname the “al Zarqawi” of Afghanistan because of his bloodthirsty zeal for beheading hostages. He’s also credited with creating the “kamikaze tactic” discussed earlier. Feared by enemies and peers alike, he produced ghastly propaganda films. One showed him and others slitting six men’s throats, accused of spying for the Americans. Dadullah was most active in FATA, where he helped build the Taliban to about 20,000 fighters, with help from Pakistani agencies. In 2005, a Pakistani court sentenced him to life for trying to kill a politician, but he still moved freely in Quetta. When he was killed in May 2007 at age 39, his body—with one leg and three bullet wounds—was shown to journalists to prove he was truly dead and hadn’t once again dodged Coalition forces. Once a prolific killer, he had been on the coalition’s most-wanted list for years, and eventually, he was taken off. Now, lying motionless on a stainless-steel table, Dadullah was truly dead, having stopped his violent ways.no more.

    6 min
  3. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Nine

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. Profile 17: Best Friends and Broken Hearts in the Afghan Hurt Locker Two Britons, Liam and Theo, were partners in a particularly dangerous assignment. They were counter-IED specialists whose mission was to find hidden IEDs planted by the Taliban. This required steady nerves and precision. The two had undergone rigorous, specialized training before serving together. Although they shared much beyond their courage, they were also physically quite different. Lance Cpl. Liam Tasker was a Scottish-born soldier in the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, and Theo was a Springer Spaniel. They were also best friends. The two were inseparable, hunting for roadside bombs in Helmand province. Once, Theo discovered a Taliban underground facility where IEDs were probably made. They set a record for finding the most weapons and bombs in Afghanistan. They loved each other. Tasker’s father recalled, "Theo would sleep at the bottom of his (Tasker’s) bed, but he would wait until he thought Liam was asleep and then get in beside him." They slept together, lived together, and worked together. They both died on the same day in Afghanistan. The UK Ministry of Defence issued the following statement: “On 1 March 2011, LCpl Tasker was participating in a patrol with his dog, Theo, when they were engaged by small arms fire, during which LCpl Tasker was struck and died from his injuries. Sadly, on return to Camp Bastion, Theo suffered a seizure and died. Earlier, Liam had nominated his partner for a special medal of valor for combat animals. Liam’s mother said, "Liam was so proud of Theo. He was his world. I treasure the letter he wrote recommending him for the medal." Their remains returned to Britain together on the same flight. Theo’s ashes were handed to Liam’s girlfriend, Leah. Both Liam and Theo were remembered with love and respect by their unit’s soldiers. One soldier said, “Theo and LCpl Tasker did a brave job together in Afghanistan and … saved a lot of lives.” British Defence Secretary Dr. Liam Fox added that Britain will be “eternally grateful.” Liam’s mother expressed her gratitude for the love Theo gave her son, but she remains unsure whether her boy’s best friend died of a seizure. “He and Theo had a very special bond. They worked together and died together.” Tasker’s mother believes Theo “died of a broken heart.” Unlike Theo, most dogs deployed in Afghanistan come home safely. Courageous canines, like their human comrades, are recognized for valor in Britain. Treo, not to be confused with Theo from Profile 17, is an 8-year-old black Labrador who received the animal equivalent of the Victoria Cross for bravery in Afghanistan on February 25, 2010. Her Royal Highness Princess Alexandra presented Treo with the medal at the Imperial War Museum. The citation praised Treo “for his gallantry in saving countless human lives. He continued his duties despite the dangers and, in the process, saved many lives." Treo is also the subject of a biography written by his owner.   Since 2012, American and British forces have increased their use of dogs to detect explosives. As one handler said, “If something is not supposed to be in the ground, a dog will find it." The U.S. Army also uses dogs in Afghanistan. The “Houn Dawg,” 203rd Engineer Battalion, Missouri National Guard’s explosive detection team, has cleared about 75 percent of the IEDs in their area. They sometimes receive K9 support, but often rely on route clearance equipment and ground troops.   Profile 18: Collin J. Bowen—“He Went to Afghanistan to Protect the Land”   “It's been 3 yrs, Bud… you will never be forgotten.” — SFC Carl Olney   If he hadn’t been in his vehicle on Khost Road on January 2, 2008, he probably would have been home, safe, two weeks later. His wife and children eagerly awaited his return. His home was in Maryland, where the 38-year-old Staff Sgt. Collin J. Bowen had earned his computer science degree, hunted, fished, and raised his family. He loved the Army, especially teaching computer skills to eager Afghan soldiers. A natural teacher and a warm man, he completed his first combat deployment and signed up for another. Very popular with children, Collin loved giving out candy, pencils, and trinkets to street kids, who would smile and rush along with their gifts.     He finished his last mission and was 6 miles from his base when his vehicle was blown up by a roadside bomb. He sustained burns over 50% of his body, but was expected to survive. With a breathing tube in his throat, he was sent home. After the attack, he couldn’t talk, but on good days he could lift his fingers to signal that he understood some words. Unfortunately, his injuries were too severe, and multiple infections proved lethal. He passed away after 13 surgeries in March 2008 and was buried at Arlington. Posthumously, he was promoted to E7. His sacrifice was honored by the People’s Burn Foundation, which awarded him the True Blue Award for loyalty after his death. They quoted the Greeks: "all men have fears… but the brave put down their fears and go forward… sometimes to death… but always to victory."

    6 min
  4. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Eight

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. Roadside Bombs and “Pink Mist”             Roadside bombs continue to terrorize soldiers and hinder movement. Like ambushes hidden among the greenery of the Afghan spring, roadside bombs have a devastating psychological impact on Coalition Forces. About 70% of attacks on Coalition Forces are caused by roadside bombs, and their sophistication has increased over the past 11 years. Many bombs are still quite simple but remain powerful, deadly, and difficult to detect.  `           Afghanistan was heavily mined during the war against the Soviets. In farms, footpaths, and roads, landmines injured and killed Afghans for generations. The so-called “butterfly bomb" was the weapon, frequently planted in areas suspected of harboring mujahedin, designed to maim insurgents. These munitions could not tell the difference between fighters and civilians and were triggered by the weight of an average person. Hundreds of thousands of these bombs were dropped by helicopters. As they fell, their small wings fluttered, earning them their seemingly gentle nickname.             The dread of landmines became a dramatic theme for journalists and dramatists. In David Edgar's play, Black Tulips, Soviet soldiers are briefed by a sapper on the profusion and lethality of their own landmines, which were retrieved by the mujahedin and used against Soviet armor resourcefully. The mujahedin would place an anti-personnel mine on top of other mines, and the blast power would destroy armor. The Taliban used this tactic effectively against ISAF forces.  The tactic still works.             The Soviets left stockpiles of munitions for the Afghans, but there are many other sources of weapons. Today, bombs and bomb components pour into Afghanistan from other countries, namely Pakistan, Iran, and China. British diplomats claimed that advanced anti-aircraft missiles, components for armor-piercing roadside bombs, and land mines were discovered and traced back to Chinese factories. But Pakistan is, by far, the major source of munitions and chemical elements needed to fabricate improvised bombs. Particularly threatening has been the stream of ammonium nitrate.  Senator Richard Blumenthal has demanded, "The Pakistanis need to prove that they are stopping and stemming the flow of fertilizer." His is not a lone voice.             Much of the ammonium nitrate is imported from Pakistan, but most of the bombs are fabricated in Afghanistan. In one raid in 2009, Coalition Forces uncovered 225,000 kilograms, or half a million pounds, of ammonium nitrate. This single haul could have powered thousands of bombs. A typical improvised bomb weighs less than 30 kilograms.   Seizures of ammonium-nitrate fertilizer in Afghanistan doubled in the first 7 months of 2012 compared to the same period last year in 2011. According to a senior U.S. advisor, “We are sweeping ammonium nitrate fertilizer off the battlefield at historic rates. But the bombs are going up at historic rates, too, and it is directly related. It is a supply issue."             Roadside bombs are very difficult to detect. For this reason, Coalition Forces have experimented with both offensive and defensive tactics and vehicles. Transportation vehicles have become more rugged. Mine-protected troop carriers have been developed to withstand direct hits from roadside bombs, with personnel escaping with relatively minor injuries. Mini-flails have become much more effective than the traditional flails, attached in front of armored anti-mine vehicles.  But there is the constant dread by soldiers and Marines on patrol. U.S. Marine Cpl. Matt Bowman explained, “We were on patrol.  We ran into an IED. I was the one who got hit by it.” The high school wrestler from Indiana lost both legs above the knee and most of his left hand.

    5 min
  5. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Seven

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security Murder Holes and Snipers             Ambushes in Afghanistan happen both in the countryside and within the 'green hell.' A senior NATO official compared these tactics to those used by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In cities, Taliban disguise themselves in many outfits, including women’s clothing. "This kind of strategy is very, very difficult not only for NATO in Afghanistan but also in other parts of the world." The city Taliban have created their own hell for Coalition and Afghan security forces within urban areas. They cleverly hide sniper fire inside buildings, often with remarkable precision. In towns and cities, Taliban gunmen bored holes in the homes of sympathizers or hostages that provide a sniper with a direct shot up to 400 meters. The Taliban use camouflage and keep the holes small enough to go unnoticed from a distance.             The Taliban’s marksmanship has grown sharper. Although U.S. trainers have had difficulty improving the overall accuracy of ANA marksmen, the Taliban have developed outstanding sharpshooters. The Taliban’s use of camouflage, stealth, high-powered optics, and coordinated attacks has made them tough marksmen.             One Taliban sniper was particularly deadly. In 2009, an intense battle began that resembled the famous sniper duel in Stalingrad, where elite snipers from the Red Army and Wehrmacht faced off in a deadly contest. A British officer was determined to find and eliminate the Taliban’s top shooter. By April 2010, the Taliban sniper had killed seven British troops over five months. The youngest victim was 19. “Their sniper is giving us real problems, and we’ve not yet figured out how to take him out,” said a British officer. Three of the sniper’s victims were British sharpshooters. Coalition leaders believe Taliban snipers are being trained outside of Afghanistan. The snipers kill and wound civilians. One was a middle-aged, part-time postman in England, who previously served in elite British units like the SAS. An official combat artist deployed to Afghanistan, Graeme Lothian was photographing military operations when a Taliban sniper shot him in his left hand in late June 2013. “The tragic thing is that he was a fine artist—his painting is his life—and he is left-handed," said his physician girlfriend.             There is one case of a Taliban sniper killing two British soldiers with one bullet. These victims had the mission of finding and killing Taliban snipers, but it was they who became prey. Taliban snipers are effective in cities where they can hide more easily.  Sometimes, Taliban snipers reveal their positions, which proves to be a lethal mistake. A British lieutenant explained that the Taliban place wet leaves around their murder hole so dust does not emerge. But sometimes it doesn’t work. “One of these guys (Taliban) used a murder hole to shoot one of my guys, so we used a guided missile to take him out.              But Coalition snipers are often the match of their Taliban counterparts. Like the best Taliban snipers, Coalition snipers frequently hit their targets at long distances and sometimes lie in wait for days to kill their prey. In 2009, British Corporal Christopher Reynolds killed his 33rd suspected Taliban. Firing from a tiny hole at a target over 2,000 yards away, “Crackshot Christopher” shot a man carrying an AK-47 who collapsed in the arms of the Taliban behind him. “Crackshot” guffawed as he delivered a “lead sleeping pill.” “I was quite proud of that – it is the longest record kill in Afghanistan. I am going to use that fact as a chat-up line in the pub when I get back home.” He did, and it scored him a girlfriend.

    5 min
  6. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Six

    Murder Holes and Snipers             Ambushes in Afghanistan happen inside and outside the “green hell” of the countryside. A senior NATO official compared the tactics to those used by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the cities, Taliban disguise themselves in many outfits, including women’s clothing. "This kind of strategy is very, very difficult not only for NATO in Afghanistan but also in other parts of the world." The city Taliban have created their own nightmare for Coalition and Afghan security forces in urban areas. Cleverly hidden Taliban snipers fire from inside buildings, often with impressive accuracy. In towns and cities, Taliban gunmen bored holes in the homes of sympathizers or hostages, giving snipers a direct line of fire up to 400 meters. The Taliban use camouflage and keep the holes small enough to go unnoticed from a distance. The Taliban’s marksmanship has improved. Although U.S. trainers have struggled to increase the accuracy of ANA marksmen, the Taliban have produced excellent sharpshooters. Their use of camouflage, effective stalking, high-powered optics, and coordinated attacks have made them formidable marksmen.             One Taliban sniper was particularly deadly. In 2009, an intense struggle began, reminiscent of the famous sniper duel in Stalingrad, where elite Red Army and Wehrmacht snipers faced off in a deadly contest. A British officer was determined to find and eliminate the Taliban’s top shooter. By April 2010, this Taliban sniper had killed seven British troops over five months. The youngest among his victims was 19. “Their sniper is giving us real problems and we’ve not yet figured out how to take him out,” said a British officer. Three of the sniper's victims were British sharpshooters. Coalition leaders are convinced that Taliban snipers are being trained outside Afghanistan.              The snipers kill and wound non-combatants. One was a middle-aged, part-time postman in England who had earlier served in elite British units like the SAS. An official combat artist stationed in Afghanistan, Graeme Lothian was taking photos of military operations when a Taliban sniper shot him in his left hand in late June 2013. "The tragic thing is that he was a fine artist—his painting is his life—and he is left-handed," said his physician girlfriend. There is one case of a Taliban sniper killing two British soldiers with a single bullet. These soldiers were on a mission to find and kill Taliban snipers, but instead, they became prey. Taliban snipers are effective in cities where they can hide more easily. Sometimes, Taliban snipers reveal their positions, which proves to be deadly mistakes. A British lieutenant explained that the Taliban place wet leaves around their firing holes so dust doesn’t escape, but sometimes it doesn’t work. “One of these guys (Taliban) used a firing hole to shoot one of my guys, so we used a guided missile to take him out.              But Coalition snipers are often the match of their Taliban counterparts. Like the best of the Taliban snipers, Coalition snipers often hit their mark at long distances and often lie in wait for days to kill their prey. In 2009, British Corporal Christopher Reynolds killed his 33rd suspected Taliban. Firing from a tiny hole at a target over 2,000 yards away, “Crackshot Christopher” shot a man who was carrying an AK-47 and who collapsed in the arms of the Taliban behind him. “Crackshot,” guffawed, he delivered a “lead sleeping pill.”  “I was quite proud of that – it is the longest record kill in Afghanistan. I am going to use that fact as a chat-up line in the pub when I get back home.” He did, and it scored him a girlfriend.

    5 min
  7. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Five

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security.   Profile 16: Juma and Sameena - A Boy and a Girl He said he was 4, but he was probably about 6 or 7. He was too tall for a 4-year-old. Like the other boys in Ghazni Province with whom he played, rag-clad and hair-mussed Juma Gul collected scraps of metal to help his family eat. Juma enjoyed watching soccer. In June 2007, the Taliban grabbed the boy off the streets and placed a suicide vest on him. They told him to hurl himself against U.S. soldiers and pull a magic cord. But Juma thought the better of it and decided to deliver himself to Afghan soldiers, saving his life and probably that of several Afghan and U.S. troops. "When they first put the vest on my body, I didn't know what to think, but then I felt the bomb. After I figured out it was a bomb, I went to the Afghan soldiers for help." The Taliban denied the story, adding that they did not involve small children in suicide operations. They did not, however, explain how a suicide belt managed to fasten itself to the torso of a 6-year-old boy. Juma did not walk away empty-handed from his decision not to blow himself up among American soldiers. U.S. forces in the area passed the hat for Juma, and the boy was given ample money to feed his family without having to collect scrap metal for months. He had plenty of time to watch soccer. Sameena was 13 in 2008 when she and another schoolgirl were ensnared in a suicide-bombing training program run by teachers at a madrassa in North Waziristan. When she went missing, her mother contacted local police, who began a search. In the program, Sameena was indoctrinated into the jihadist cause. “We saw thousands of video clips showing the atrocities of the U.S. forces against Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. We were ready to act as suicide bombers, kill pro-U.S. forces, and win the blessings of God." She was rescued by police, one of whom said, “The situation is extremely bad. We have saved the two girls from becoming suicide bombers, but indications are that the trend of women training as suicide bombers has gained currency." Ambush Attacks - “Green Hell” and “Omar’s Bed” Suicide bombs are dreaded for their unpredictability and lethality. So are ambushes, a common Taliban tactic. Ambushes rely on stealth, preparation, and coordination. They are intended to outmaneuver the superior military capabilities of the Afghan and Coalition Forces. The Taliban will attack government patrols in teams, often firing volleys of two or three RPGs from multiple firing positions, followed by light and heavy machinegun fire. Sometimes the order is reversed, with bursts of machinegun fire preceding RPG and mortar attacks. The Taliban often attack from mutually supporting fields of fire. The Taliban will often fire from trenches that adjoin the roads. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, they will hide in the nearby mountains, open fire, and then retreat into the mountains. One U.S. soldier said, “This is what they do. They come out of their hideouts and fire at the troops and then disappear.” The Taliban also taunt patrolling soldiers by wrapping white ribbons around trees, demonstrating their ability to attack at will. One U.S. soldier explained that the Taliban signal, 'we're here and we're watching you.’ This causes anxiety among U.S. forces because "It's the way the Taliban operate that makes the war so terrifying and so difficult. You can't even see the enemy before they open fire.” Ambush is a daily fear for soldiers and Marines, and bullets and munitions appear from nowhere and everywhere. In 2010, Marine LCPL Kyle Carpenter, shown in figure 11, saw a hand grenade tossed from a rooftop during the battle of Marjah. It landed near a fellow Marine, and Carpenter shielded the Marine, absorbing much of the blast and shrapnel. As a result, he lost an eye and the use of an arm. His face was permanently and severely scarred. Carpenter has been nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor. Throughout the year, the Taliban ambushed the government and Coalition Forces. But springtime gives the Taliban a strong tactical advantage because parts of Afghanistan are draped in thick vegetation. As with the foliage and canopy exploited by insurgents in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Central America, Afghanistan’s green belts give the Taliban concealment. Snipers have become adept at using foliage to screen their movements and to lure Afghan patrols. One American officer explained, “They've watched us all winter, seeing how we work." The green grasses and balmy nights of springtime draw fighters from Waziristan and Swat in Pakistan, as well as from Afghan provinces, to sleep outdoors. One tribal elder referred to the masses of Taliban sleeping under the stars as “Mullah Omar’s beds.” The lush spring vegetation makes it easier to conceal and plant roadside bombs. As one American soldier explained, “Everywhere we walk out there could be our last step. Guys are very meticulous about what they do. They're scared, I hate to use that term, but they're just very aware of what they're doing.” The Taliban have improvised and shifted their tactics. Their military capabilities continue to improve. In 2007, a group of 75 Taliban tried to overrun a US-led Coalition base in southern Afghanistan in a rare frontal assault. They attacked from three sides, firing their weapons and supported by mortar fire and 107mm rockets. The capability for these large-scale, coordinated attacks increased. By summer 2010, some Taliban fighters were using tactics similar to Coalition Forces. The Taliban have also adapted to urban surveillance and sniping.

    8 min
  8. Mar 8

    The Taliban - Chapter Six Episode Four

    Hello and welcome to a reading from The Taliban – Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgent Group, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Praeger, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing in New York, New York. This reading is brought to you by Kensington Security Consulting, where we bring education to national security. We begin with Chapter One: The Landscape, The People, and Islamism. Suicide Attacks "Children taliban leaders say they are tools to achieve God’s will, and whatever comes your way, you sacrifice it," a Taliban commander told a Western journalist. The first Taliban suicide attack happened in 2004, and these attacks continue. Volunteers for suicide missions are sometimes mentally ill, developmentally disabled, addicted to drugs, or too young to make their own decisions. Others seek martyrdom. Incentives include money given to families of suicide bombers, often from foreign supporters, and the lure of an Islamic paradise filled with virgins. Additionally, they receive praise from insurgent leaders, who often act as father figures. However, many boys and young men forced into these attacks are neither naive nor slow-witted. They are simply held captive. Usually, boys are taken from their families and placed in madrassas, where they are educated, sheltered, and fed at no cost to their families. In return, they are expected to kill themselves and others when ordered. While many madrassas deny involvement in violence, some do support it. It is estimated that there are between 10,000 and 20,000 madrassas in Pakistan. To prepare for these attacks, boys are isolated from their families. This process mirrors techniques used by cults in Western societies to cut ties to the past. In the madrassa system, boys are gradually and gently groomed to kill and sacrifice themselves. If they hesitate, they are shamed, mocked, and compared to girls. When they show enthusiasm for cruelty, the boys are praised. They are also filled with hatred toward Westerners, Jews, and Americans with particular zeal. There may be an underground, informal trade in abandoned children. Some American journalists have claimed that there is a trade in children destined to become suicide bombers, with some children costing up to $14,000 each. One example of an attempted child suicide bombing was the arrest of two 10-year-old boys wearing suicide vests in southern Afghanistan. They were caught and, given their age, pardoned. One of the boys, Azizulah, explained that the Taliban had assured him that when “the Americans fire at you (they) cannot hit you.” “They taught me how to blow my vest; they showed me how to press the button in my hand.” They ordered him to sit by the road and wait for foreign forces to come, but the police arrested him. Back in school as of early 2012, Azizulah does not want to repeat the experience. “I ask all my madrassa teachers not to teach kids to become suicide bombers.”             Almost anyone in Afghanistan can become a victim of a suicide attack. Many victims are civilians, completely disconnected from the insurgency. Suicide bombings often target broad, opportunistic targets. Hotels, such as Kabul's Serena, which cater to foreign workers, are prime targets. The Taliban considers that since all non-Muslim foreigners are the enemy, they are all vulnerable to violent attacks. The Taliban faces a challenge in public opinion. Suicide bombings alienate some Afghans who might otherwise support the Taliban. Many see the forcing of captive, mentally disturbed, or brainwashed young men and schoolchildren—sometimes called “Omar's missiles”—as clearly un-Islamic and an unacceptable form of warfare. Before the Taliban's rise, suicide attacks in Afghanistan were almost unknown. Some tactics have become gruesome, such as booby-trapping bodies and storing the bodies of killed Coalition soldiers to exchange for money or munitions. Attacks in bazaars and marketplaces are random. It is often unclear why the Taliban targets public gatherings that are unlikely to attract government or foreign workers. Children, adults, brides, grooms, widows, and widowers are possible targets. At the funeral of a former provincial governor, a suicide bomber disguised as a mourner killed those paying their last respects as the governor was laid to rest. While many attacks are random, others are carefully planned and narrowly targeted. For example, an attack on the Defense Ministry in 2011 was sophisticated and involved several Taliban tactics. It included at least four planning steps. First, there was pre-operational surveillance. The Taliban has strong human intelligence capabilities. Second, there was infiltration of the ministry to gain access and information. Third, there was an attempt to impersonate Afghan government personnel. Finally, there was the suicide blast. The attacker, who was not an employee of the Ministry, gained access past the first barriers. This was one of the most heavily guarded facilities in Afghanistan. Some suicide bombings are both narrowly targeted and indiscriminate in killing. They aim to hit a specific target while also killing innocent people. For example, a suicide attack at a wedding in Samagon Province killed top officials—a provincial member of parliament and a security director—but also killed up to 15 others attending, most with no political role. Among the dead were the bride and her father. Not all attacks go as planned. Some children are fortunate and never hurt themselves or others. This was the case with a 9-year-old schoolgirl who was kidnapped, drugged, armed with a suicide vest, and then escaped. In a common kidnapping method, adults abduct helpless children they have never seen before. However, most girls are not abducted; instead, they are groomed to become suicide bombers. These girls are guided by trusted individuals, making them easier to manipulate and kill. The motives behind some attacks remain unclear. For example, in mid-September 2012 in Kabul, a woman carried out a suicide bombing. Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami explained that a car bombing, which killed 12 people, was the trigger for a low-budget, amateurish film, “Innocence of the Muslims.” The bomber, identified as Fatima, detonated herself in a car near a wedding hall. Many of the victims were foreigners, which might explain the specific targeting. Suicide bombings also occur in Pakistan. A major attack took place at the Punjab Regiment Centre in northwestern Pakistan. A young teenager, disguised as a cadet in a new blue uniform, slipped past several security checkpoints—probably with assistance from Taliban operatives. He surged into a crowd, killing 31 Army cadets and young men, and injuring more than 40 others. This was the deadliest attack in Pakistan since a Christmas Day 2010 suicide bombing, when a woman killed 43 people at a UN food distribution point in the tribal district of Bajaur.

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About

The Taliban offer an unrelenting dedication to conquer Afghanistan, an unconstrained use of terror, and solidarity with important fragments of global Islam. The Taliban leverages deeply ingrained Afghan skepticism of Western promises for a better future. Foreign men have come and gone from Afghanistan, and, despite promises, only the poverty remains. Taliban leaders boast that Afghans are armed with religious fervor, honor, and resolve.  “Such weapons are neither available in the arsenal of America nor in the warehouse of her allies." In January 2013, the Taliban crowed, “No sooner will the foreigners quit than the Afghans will start living under the cover of an Islamic government and in the environment of Islamic brotherhood."             Perhaps, but pro-government forces also have centers of gravity. Most Afghans fear the Taliban and remember the misery and brutality of its 6-year rule. The Taliban’s world is a phantasmagoria of savagery. Women are stoned for promiscuity, and men are beheaded for trivial offenses. Boys are raised to blow themselves up in bazaars, where other children and their mothers' shop. There is no music or television in Taliban territory, and no kites soar above the orchards and towns. There is a poverty of empathy and compassion.             The American-led Coalition is determined to prevent the Taliban’s triumph. Today’s soldiers on both sides of the struggle have known only war. The sons of Taliban fighters, who were 10 when the group was scattered into Pakistan, are now in their early 20s. Many are hardened fighters and will undoubtedly face the sons of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban are tough, but so are many other Afghans.