Welcome to the final excerpt of Empire of Terror, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, written by Mark Silinsky and published by Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press. This is presented by Kensington Security Consulting, which brings education to national security. This excerpt comes from chapter eight and concludes Empire of Terror. The Mullahs’ Enemies at Home As of this writing, Major General Salami commands the Guards and boasts that the organization can meet any domestic threat. The claim is dubious. Protests shook the streets in 2019 and early 2020. Moreover, this “sedition” is deeply rooted in grinding poverty and the fatalism of today’s generation. Some Iranians feel they have little to lose by trying to dismantle an Islamic regime under which they have known little but gloom. The persecution of Christians remains rampant, though a handful of imprisoned believers sentenced for holding illegal church meetings have been released. According to a Christian advocacy group, Iran ranks among the top ten worst nations for Christians, where they experience extreme abuse. The 2,500-year-old Jewish community has shrunk to about twelve thousand members, down 90 percent from its prerevolutionary size. Some Iranian Jews emphasize, “We’re not an entity outside of the Iranian nation. We are part of it.” Others fear fetishized anti-Semitism and being whisked away to prison on false charges of espionage for Israel. They pray in the shadows, as do Christians and Baha’i. Khamenei calls for a “new Islamic-Iranian civilization,” and his blueprint for achieving it is similar to Khomeini’s. Once state institutions are firmly Islamized, the duty of citizens and government agents alike is to foster the creation of an “Islamic country,” which will then serve as a template for a broader “Islamic civilization.” In March 2017, Major General Jafari promised, “We are on the path that leads to the rule of Islam worldwide.” His successor, Major General Salami, has reiterated Iran’s goal of exterminating Israel, promising to destroy both Israel and the United States if either country makes the “slightest mistake.” Personal Reflections The following comments are the views of this author and not the official or unofficial views of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or any other agency or department of the United States government. The twentieth century saw states with totalitarian ideologies built to last indefinitely. Among them were the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Only one of the three remains. That is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which will be judged on the cold dais of history. Is it likely that Iranians will overturn their government in the next five years? This author has no reason to believe the current regime will lose power in the next five years. As of late 2020, the Guards are firmly in control, and there are no signs of large-scale, sustained, coordinated, externally supported, and active resistance capable of overthrowing the government. The fate of the Guards is inextricably tied to the mullahs’ influence in Tehran; they need each other to survive. It is likely that if the mullahs are driven from power, the Guards will follow. If the Guards are substantially weakened, the mullahs’ rule will falter and possibly collapse. Some observers are optimistic about change. Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi has opined, “It seems to me that we are witnessing the beginning of a big protest movement that can go well beyond the Green wave of 2009. It would not surprise me if it becomes something bigger.” Perhaps she is right, but other observers of Iran are less optimistic. Sanam Vakil and Hossein Rassam noted that for thirty years, Khamenei has been building a vast intelligence and military structure and has larded the foreign bank accounts of the Guards leadership to keep them fiercely loyal. He has developed a “deep state.” They note, “When Khamenei dies, the deep state will ensure that whoever replaces him shares its hardline views.” As of 2020, the Iranian regime has restricted mobile internet access in several provinces. The Guards still kill protesters openly in the streets, secretly in the shadows, and in the prisons. Some observers have speculated that in late 2019, the Guards and police killed over two hundred protesters. Many unpopular and despotic regimes have survived for decades, despite catastrophic collapses in living standards and widespread despair. For example, the Soviet economy could not generate enough revenue to sustain government operations. However, this did not prompt a national uprising. Cuba and North Korea hold their citizens in desperate conditions, yet their leadership remains in power. Many Iranians would be delighted to rid themselves of the Guards, but they understand the risks of organizing to do so. Organized and effective resistance is unlikely for years. However, anecdotal and passive resistance to the Basij sporadically occurs. If public sentiment against the regime escalates, what will be the likely direction of the Guards? History offers a confusing predictive picture. There have been instances in which palace guards switched sides and took up arms against the ruling regime. This occurred in earlier revolutions, such as in France in 1789, Russia in 1917, and Iran in 1979. Much has been written about the defections of leading Iranian military personnel to Khomeini. In the desperate final days of the shah, some military and intelligence personnel defected to the revolution, and in a future revolution, the Guards could switch sides. Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin argue that “much to the chagrin of the ruling clerics they (Iranians) root their national identity in their pre-Islamic past.” The Guards might follow the ss’s ride or the KGB’s path. Many Germans fought a “Death Ride” for Hitler. Defeat was all but certain after summer 1944, but Germany fought tenaciously for nine more months. Of Hitler’s closest lieutenants, only Albert Speer refused to enforce the “Nero Order,” to torch Germany to deny it to the Red Army. In the Battle of Berlin, virtually every street was contested, and the ss put up a particularly stiff defense. The ss fighters, particularly the foreign divisions, feared retribution by the Red Army and were driven by devotion to Hitler and what remained of his cratered Nazi empire. They were dead-enders with little to lose by fighting to the end. If Iran’s regime is pressed for survival, its Guards could follow this near-certain suicidal devotion to their national leadership. However, there is another model. The Soviet Union was never militarily defeated. Instead, it decommissioned itself and transitioned into a temporary, quasi-democratic state. Many KGB leaders positioned themselves to benefit from privatization, and some moved into criminal activities. It is possible that today’s Guards will continue to engage themselves in the business world and relinquish their security role. However, there is currently no evidence that this will occur soon. Are Iran’s leaders sincere when they hint at Western-style reform? There is no reason to believe Iranian leaders will moderate their rule. Many of the current reforms are temporary and anodyne. There have been few enduring, liberalizing, and meaningful reforms over the forty years of the mullahs’ rule. Most changes, such as the 2019 declaration that women can attend soccer matches, have been cosmetic. Only months earlier, a young woman was sentenced to prison for waving her hijab on top of a stick: “My sentence has been issued—twenty years for protesting against an unjust law.” Philip Luther, Amnesty International’s Middle East research and advocacy director, remarked that “2018 will go down in history as a year of shame for” Iran.” ““The staggering scale of arrests, imprisonments, and flogging sentences reveals the extreme lengths the authorities have gone to suppress peaceful dissent.” In December 2019, a Tehran revolutionary court sentenced nine Christians to prison for practicing their faith. Prisoners are still tortured on the blood-slicked floors of Evin prison. Iranian leaders are adept at information operations and taqiyya, or deception. Khamenei approved the presidential candidacy of Mohammad Khatami, a supposed moderate, in June 1997. Khatami’s charm offensive emphasized a “dialogue of civilizations” at a time when many intellectuals were concerned about a clash of civilizations. Iranian leaders temporarily toned down their sharp anti-Western rhetoric and smiled in conversation with the Clinton administration. The president lifted some sanctions, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright formally apologized for the 1953 coup. This did not lead to enduring reforms, and Iran is still developing nuclear weapons. It did not liberalize its politics or economy. The privatization of the economy was driven less by market forces than by the Guards’ opportunism. For years, Western observers have highlighted the rift between the traditionalists and reformers among the political and religious leadership. Iran’s bureaucracies are riven by infighting and backbiting. Yet the leadership has not signaled any intention to liberalize Iran’s economy or culture. All those in power today adhere to the basic principles of Khomeinism, just as all Nazi leaders followed Hitlerism to the end. Hitler’s inner circle had diverse backgrounds and priorities. Some were professional soldiers and capable planners. There was an economist, a career diplomat, a vulgar propagandist, and several theoreticians and lawyers. Nonetheless, they were all committed Nazis, ideologically bound together by the principles of National Socialism and by devotion to Adolf Hitler. In contrast, the Soviet Union experienced reforms. Pronounced doctrinal and