EconWorks Podcast

EconWorks

Industrial organization insights on antitrust, digital platforms, and competition in ecosystem markets. blog.econworks.com

  1. 6d ago

    One Merger, Three Verdicts: Market Definition, Box-Office Shares, and Bargaining Power

    The Paramount–Warner merger produced three sharply different regulatory responses. The Department of Justice cleared it. The European Commission cleared it with one narrow remedy. A coalition of states sued to stop it. The apparent disagreement concerns market definition: should competition be measured among anticipated blockbusters, all wide-release films, or a broader group that includes independents and newer theatrical suppliers? But even if the states establish a narrow blockbuster market, another question remains. What should each studio’s market share measure? Historical box-office receipts capture commercial success, audience demand, and the strength of a studio’s past slate. They do not tell us directly which distributor is the next best alternative for an exhibitor, how often Paramount and Warner constrain each other in negotiations, or how much bargaining leverage theaters would lose post-merger. This episode examines the difference between defining a market and measuring competition within it—and why the arithmetic of HHI can be much simpler than its economic interpretation. Read the full article and graphic analysis: https://blog.econworks.com/p/one-merger-three-answers?r=562wri Explore more visual economics content: https://econworks.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@EconWorks-d3e Substack: https://blog.econworks.com This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit blog.econworks.com/subscribe

    One Merger, Three Verdicts: Market Definition, Box-Office Shares, and Bargaining Power
  2. Aug 12

    One Merger, Three Answers: What Do Market Shares Really Measure?

    The Justice Department has approved the merger of Paramount and Warner. The European Commission cleared the deal with a slim remedy. A number of states sued to stop it. So how did three agencies investigating the same transaction come to such different conclusions? On market definition, there is clearly a disagreement. The states are looking at potential blockbusters and see Paramount and Warner as two of only a handful of big suppliers. The DOJ and the EU think there is a wider and more lively pool of rival studios. But that’s only the first question of market definition. Even if the blockbusters are a separate market, regulators still have to figure out how to measure the competitive significance of each studio. States rely on historical box office receipts. But box office receipts are a function of audience demand, marketing, timing of release, screen allocation, and negotiated licensing terms, not simply bargaining power. In this episode we discuss the following: * why blockbusters might constitute a separate product market; * the rationale for the licensing of theatre on negotiated financial and non-financial terms; * where exhibitors obtain bargaining power; * why box-office shares can be useful but incomplete evidence; * and why winning the market-definition debate does not necessarily determine the meaning of the resulting HHI. The main issue is not whether Paramount and Warner are big studios. The question is whether this physical separation materially improves the exhibitor’s alternatives in negotiations. Read the full article and graphic analysis: https://blog.econworks.com/p/one-merger-three-answers?r=562wri Explore more visual economics content: https://econworks.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@EconWorks-d3e Substack: https://blog.econworks.com This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit blog.econworks.com/subscribe

    One Merger, Three Answers: What Do Market Shares Really Measure?
  3. Jul 31

    Price Discrimination and Railroad Competition

    The simple argument is this: rail competes with trucking, and therefore the relevant market is all freight transportation. If so, then mergers of railroads operating in different regions might seem innocuous. But that argument assumes all railroad customers are in the same market. In this episode of EconWorks, we explain why railroad freight is better thought of as a market with price discrimination, where different customers face fundamentally different competitive conditions. Contractual bargaining is used by industrial shippers who ship large volumes. Smaller shippers often compare trucking and rail on a price basis. This distinction changes how economists should think about market definition, the hypothetical monopolist test, and the competitive effects of railroad mergers. Topics: * Why railroad freight is not a single market Big shippers vs. little shippers * Substitution or negotiation * Definition of market and monopoly * Why trucking will be in the relevant market only where the merger makes little difference * Implications for railroad merger analysis * If you like clear explanations of antitrust, competition policy, AI, and platform economics, subscribe to EconWorks. Read the full article and graphic analysis: https://blog.econworks.com/p/the-wrong-market-the-wrong-test-railroad?r=562wri Explore more visual economics content: https://econworks.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@EconWorks-d3e Substack: https://blog.econworks.com This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit blog.econworks.com/subscribe

    Price Discrimination and Railroad Competition

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Industrial organization insights on antitrust, digital platforms, and competition in ecosystem markets. blog.econworks.com