In this episode, I am joined by Myra Abubakar, a historian of Indonesia and Research Affiliate at ICAIOS, for a conversation about her research on gender, memory, and the making of national heroes in Southeast Asia. We discuss how anti-colonial heroes are manufactured from colonial archives, why women are canonized only when they fit male martial norms, and what these patterns reveal about the limits of nation-state history. I invite you to subscribe, share this episode, and join the conversation in the comments. Host: What drew you to studying heroes and how they are represented, commemorated, and memorialized in public spaces and historical narratives? Could you tell us about your intellectual journey? Dr. Myra Mentari Abubakar: Growing up in Aceh meant living surrounded by monuments to war. Our modern history was shaped by decades of fighting, first against Dutch colonial rule starting in 1873, and later between the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian military, from 1976 until a peace agreement in 2005. Everywhere you looked, the state placed its heroes: on money, in classrooms, and on public buildings. This was the practical result of Sukarno’s famous slogan that a great nation honours its heroes, formalized in 1959 as the title of National Hero (Pahlawan Nasional). The resulting honor roll was overwhelmingly male, heavily military and run entirely from the capital. What drew me in was how the state handled the rare women who made the list. Cut Nyak Din took command of anti-colonial fighters in 1899 after her husband, the commander Teuku Umar, was killed. She is celebrated today, but only as a surrogate male warrior or as a loyal wife. Her real political agency, rooted in Aceh’s hereditary nobility and defensive jihad, was edited out. My work is not about celebrating historical figures. It is about taking apart the apparatus that creates them. During my PhD at the Australian National University, I realized official commemoration is rarely about genuine memory. It is bureaucratic management, a system of committees and decrees that shows what a government needs to claim about itself. Host: Which sites of representation have you examined, and could you share some of your key findings? Abubakar: I tracked Cut Nyak Din across a century of texts from the 1880s to the 1980s in Acehnese, Dutch, Indonesian, and English. I wanted to see how different political actors reshaped her memory. In Acehnese war poetry, she is almost invisible, appearing only as a widow weeping for her husband. It was the Dutch colonial record that took her seriously as a commander. After capturing her in 1905, Dutch writers began celebrating her courage, from a 1918 essay by the Indies journalist C. van der Pol to Madelon Székely-Lulofs’s 1948 biographical novel. Indonesian nationalists built their anti-colonial heroine directly out of that Dutch literature. In 1954, Abdul Muis translated Lulofs’s novel into Indonesian and called her a pahlawan (hero). In 1964, the government named her an official National Hero. Decades later her memory was contested again: Hasan Tiro, GAM’s founder, wrote a 1979 play to support Acehnese independence, and in 1988 Eros Djarot’s feature film brought her to a national cinema audience. These sources point to three conclusions. First, the concept of the female hero changes whenever the state faces a political crisis. Second, the anti-colonial icon was manufactured from the colonizer’s archive. Third, canonizing a woman does not change patriarchal rules. The state accepts a female hero only if she combines masculine martial violence with wifely devotion. Host: How do your findings complicate or challenge the more established narratives in your field? What is the common misconception about your topic that your work has helped correct? Abubakar: My research challenges two enduring misconceptions in Indonesian historiography. The first is that naming a woman a National Hero in 1964 marked progress toward gender equality. It did not. Sukarno framed Cut Nyak Din as a Srikandi, the armed heroine from Javanese shadow-puppet theatre admired for mastering male martial skills. That category allowed the state to praise an exceptional female warrior while keeping ordinary women in the domestic sphere. Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998) later formalized this domestic confinement through compulsory state organizations for civil servants’ wives, but Sukarno had already built the ideological foundation. The second is that she fought for Indonesia. In 1899, no political entity called Indonesia existed; the term was an ethnological label that anticolonial activists adopted politically only in the 1920s. She fought for Aceh and for religious war against the foreign kaphé (unbelievers). Sukarno admitted this in his 1964 speech. Grouping her with Sultan Hasanuddin of South Sulawesi and Prince Diponegoro of Java, he noted that each fought for a regional homeland. He stated plainly that she fought for Aceh, yet declared her an Indonesian hero anyway. That move defines the method of the national pantheon: acknowledge local and religious loyalties, then subordinate them to the central state. The timing may also matter. Aceh had joined the Darul Islam rebellion in 1953, an armed movement for an Islamic state led by Daud Beureu’eh. That conflict was settled through negotiations between 1959 and 1962, granting Aceh the status of a special region. Naming two Acehnese women, Cut Nyak Din and Cut Meutia, in May 1964 can be read as Jakarta’s way of folding Acehnese and Islamic resistance into the national story. That is an inference based on political timing rather than an explicit statement in the decree. An open fight over her legacy resurfaced only in the late 1970s and 1980s, through Hasan Tiro’s play and Eros Djarot’s film, when the separatist insurgency was under way. The pantheon is not just displayed; it is taught. In a paper I presented at the Georg Eckert Institute this year, I compared Indonesian history textbooks from Suharto’s New Order with those published after 1998. What struck me is that post-authoritarian textbooks actually intensify the military and religious framing of national heroes rather than softening it, which reverses the standard assumption that democratization naturally liberalizes a school curriculum. Host: A methodological question: in your introduction of your work on Cut Nyak Din, you say that your research “is not concerned with authenticity or veracity of the examined historical representations”. Don’t you think that this is important in any type of historical inquiry? Abubakar: Yes, veracity matters, and that sentence was clumsy phrasing. On its own, it makes me sound like a theorist detached from archives, which is not how I work. My study asks a historiographical question rather than a biographical one. Cut Nyak Din left behind no personal writings or letters. We cannot reconstruct her inner thoughts, but we can trace how stories about her became accepted as fact. That task still requires archival verification. You cannot identify political distortion without first establishing the documentary baseline. My method operates in two steps. First, determine what the documents record. Her family home at Lampisang, near Banda Aceh and now a museum, is a case in point. Popular accounts say she burned it down herself rather than surrender it. Better-sourced accounts say otherwise: the house was a Dutch gift to Teuku Umar during the years he fought on the Dutch side, and Dutch troops burned it in 1896 after he turned against them. The building stan… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit eurasiacrossroads.substack.com