General Offensive - General Uprising

Lynette Nusbacher

Blunt discussions of war and national security from war historian and former intelligence officer Dr Lynette Nusbacher nusbacher.substack.com

  1. 5d ago

    American Recessional: Transitioning to China’s Unipolar Moment

    Regular viewers and listeners know that I don’t generally spend time editing: I do a piece to camera, and press ‘send’. Because I wanted to bring some maps into this one, I also did some editing. I did a lot of editing. I did it on Goole Vids, which can edit out those pregnant pauses I’m given to while my brain is working, but it replaces them with jump cuts which isn’t ideal. This week I also did more work for the World Service than usual, which ensured that I had time to think about the relationships between those interviews (on America abandoning the Saudis on the shores of the Red Sea) (and on the Houthis asking Claude how to build hypersonic missiles, and apparently getting an answer). Of course it cut into my editing time. There’s a weak section in this video. I know which one it is, but when I asked Gemini to guess, it guessed something else. Superior intelligence indeed! You can put your guess into comments, and I’ll tell you if it’s the one I know I neglected. I’ll put it in another video. I get Gemini to do search engine / algorithm optimisation when I post videos to other platforms (after giving due time for paid subscribers to read and appreciate. My theory is that Gemini might be a first cousin of the YouTube algorithm, so perhaps they know each other well. Gemini is very keen for me to have more actionable commercial advice on here, but restricted to a top-level founder-type subscription. When I ask for show notes it usually just gives me a chapter breakdown (as you’ll see below, as usual), but today it suggested: The Corporate Risk Matrix (Paid Subscriber Exclusive) The macro shift outlined in this video creates immediate operational liabilities for multinational firms. Paid subscribers can access the complete Risk Matrix below the paywall, detailing the specific supply routes (including the Bab-al-Mandeb and Malacca straits) facing immediate insurance premium hikes, and download the 4K unwatermarked vector maps for internal board presentations. I know what I think a risk matrix is, but when I asked Gemini what a risk matrix is, the machine was vague. I think my regular viewers know every global choke point off by heart at this point, but what do you think? Are more pointed recommendations useful? Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) 00:00 Introduction: The American Recessional 01:40 Great Powers vs. Superpowers 04:54 The Unipolar Moment & China's Rise 05:56 The "Civilisational Power" Myth 08:05 The US Retreat from Freedom of Navigation 09:10 Handing Over Global Maritime Chokepoints 11:47 Map 1: The American Sphere 12:04 The Military Race for the Moon 14:34 Map 2: The Chinese Sphere & Belt and Road 15:24 India: The Ignored Strategic Rival 16:30 Map 4: The Arctic Ocean & Polar Horizon 17:16 Mackinder’s Heartland 18:33 Map 3: The Russian Eurasian Heartland 19:54 Why the Russian Empire is a Fantasy 21:16 The Post-Putin Geopolitical Landscape This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

  2. Oct 10

    Why the US-Russia Diesel Deal Corners Ukraine

    Unsolicited LLM Background Brief I’ve been using Google Gemini to produce podcast show notes for my videos, and it’s been interesting. This morning I asked it for show notes for yesterday’s podcast (I recorded and posted in haste), and in the first instance it gave me a brief based on current media reports, rather than on notes based on my own content. I consider this a little bit dangerous, because my own assessment is different from the recent media reporting on this. It is also a very American framing (‘both sides of the aisle’). I’m going to paste it in here with a big fat caveat. I also have a set of show notes below, which the Gemini interface suggested as an ‘executive summary’ which is also not what I asked for. It is, however, consistent with my comments. Gemini news briefing (not my comment): President Donald Trump has announced a deal struck with Russian President Vladimir Putin to supply millions of tons of Russian diesel fuel to the United States and global markets. The agreement marks a sharp reversal of recent US policy and lifts sanctions previously intended to choke off funding for Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Key Details of the Agreement * Supply Timeline: Russia has agreed to immediately supply over 300,000 metric tons of diesel, which equals roughly 2.25 million barrels. This will be followed by 500,000 tons in November, 1 million tons “immediately thereafter,” and an additional 3 million tons shortly after that. * Sanctions Lifted: To facilitate the deal, the US Treasury Department issued a license temporarily lifting sanctions on Russian diesel imports until April 7. These sanctions were originally imposed in October 2025 to restrict the money available to Putin’s government. Allowing the imports could provide Russia with billions of dollars in new revenue. Motivations * Soaring Fuel Costs: Trump stated the deal is necessary to reduce skyrocketing US energy prices, which surged following his decision to go to war against Iran. * Political Timing: The agreement is widely viewed as an attempt to address high domestic fuel prices and ease the financial burden on American consumers right before the US midterm elections. Backlash and Criticism * Ukraine’s Condemnation: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy heavily criticized the agreement, calling it a “weak decision on the part of strong partners”. He warned that “gifts to Putin” will not bring peace and that the revenues will be used to fund further attacks on Ukrainian civilians. * Domestic Opposition: The deal has drawn fire from both sides of the aisle. Democrats argued the move undercuts a law Trump signed last month designed to sanction Russian energy importers. Republican Representative Don Bacon also criticized the decision, stating the US should be squeezing Putin’s war machine rather than putting more money in his hands. * Market Impact Doubts: Energy watchers have noted that the initial 300,000 metric tons (2.25 million barrels) is minuscule relative to US energy demands, equating to less than a single day’s worth of US diesel consumption. For context, the US typically exports around 1.5 million barrels of diesel every single day. Show Notes (suggested by Gemini) * The Transactional Illusion: The reported volume of Russian diesel bound for the US is minuscule—barely enough to supply American domestic demand for a couple of days. It is far too small to drive down consumer pump prices on its own. * The European Exposure: The UK relies heavily on diesel originating from US refineries. Any disruption to American supply chains directly impacts British and European fuel security. * Putin’s Strategic Judo Move: By establishing Russia as a formal supplier of US energy, Vladimir Putin has reframed the operational reality of the war. Ukrainian drone and missile strikes against Russian oil refineries are no longer just strategic attacks on Moscow’s war machine—they are now, by definition, strikes against an energy source for the US and UK. * The Diplomatic Leverage: This shift gives Washington political cover to pressure the UK and European allies to halt the provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine. The argument will be framed not as abandoning Kyiv, but as defending critical Western energy infrastructure. * The Strategic Bottom Line: Ukraine’s most effective asymmetric capability—disrupting Russian refining capacity—has been deftly turned into a direct threat to Western energy markets, putting European donors in an uncomfortable dilemma. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Why the US-Russia Diesel Deal Corners Ukraine
  3. Oct 10

    The Jerusalem Consulate Crisis: Who Is Really Punishing Whom?

    The British Consulate-General (BCG) in Jerusalem is one of the few vestiges remaining of the Palestinian Authority’s intent to make Jerusalem its capital. Taking consular services away from British citizens in the Jerusalem area is non-trivial; taking British diplomatic representation to Palestine, along with British security assistance to the PA, is more significant. The main British victory in all this is maintaining a foot on the ground in Jerusalem. This all prompts the question why the British Embassy isn’t in Jerusalem. I wrote an article on the subject some years ago. Show Notes & Essay Breakdown (Suggested by Gemini) * The Consulate That Is Not A Consulate: The British Consulate-General in Jerusalem is an anomaly. Predating the British Mandate back to the Ottoman Empire, it never reported to the Embassy in Tel Aviv. Instead, it functioned as the de facto British diplomatic mission to the Palestinians. [I’ll point out that though Tel Aviv was founded when it was in the the Sanjak of Damascus, Ottoman Empire; there wasn’t a British embassy in Tel Aviv til a few years later.] * The E1 Corridor and the “Two-State Illusion”: In August 2025, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich explicitly stated his intention to prevent any future Palestinian state by building out the E1 corridor east of Jerusalem. This infrastructure is meant to make a contiguous Palestinian state physically impossible, but it really doesn’t. * The Diplomatic Escalation: Following the UK Government’s recognition of a Palestinian state and the implementation of sanctions on Israeli settlement products, the Israeli government retaliated aggressively. They ordered the British Consulate-General closed, forcing Consul-General Helen Winterton to leave. * The Ramallah Problem: Despite the Palestinian Authority opening an embassy in London in January 2026, the UK government has so far declined to open an embassy in Ramallah, preferring to maintain the historical fiction of the Jerusalem consulate. * The Strategic Bottom Line: While the British government attempts to balance domestic political pressures with symbolic diplomatic gestures, the Israeli government is systematically altering the facts on the ground. Symbolic sanctions on settlement goods are being met with the hard removal of Palestinian diplomatic infrastructure. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    The Jerusalem Consulate Crisis: Who Is Really Punishing Whom?
  4. Sep 29

    Salami Tactics, Prime Minister

    Editing and adding production values slows my workflow down, but I’ve been thinking for a few weeks about the eerie parallels between the first episode of BBC’s Yes Prime Minister from 1986. It’s not just that the Russians are conducting low-level attacks on NATO countries; it’s the comments on the socials. People really believe that deterrence is a linear system: that nobody would ever tempt a nuclear-armed state to use a nuclear device; that any attack on a nuclear state would invite nuclear devastation. So I’m offering bits of that splendid scene in which Oscar Quitak and Paul Eddington play out Sir Antony Jay’s and Jonathan Lynn’s brilliantly written words about deterrence, conventional forces, and the need to invest in emerging tech. One more reason, though: in the past I’ve posted a link to the episode on YouTube, but I don’t think enough people click over to view it. Suggested Bibliography: The Deterrence Strategy of Sir Solly Zuckerman (Compiled by Gemini) * Nuclear Illusion and Reality (1982). This is Zuckerman’s most famous and direct critique of the nuclear arms race. In it, he systematically argues that tactical nuclear weapons hold zero actual military utility, and that the concept of a “limited” nuclear exchange is a dangerous political fantasy. * Monkeys, Men, and Missiles: An Autobiography, 1946–88 (1989). The second volume of his memoirs covers his critical years serving as Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence and to the British Government. It details his internal Whitehall battles against the unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons and his deep scepticism of the “balance of terror.” * From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904–1946) (1978). While focused on his earlier career as a zoologist and his World War II bombing strategy, this volume establishes the operational research principles and hard analytical frameworks he later applied to Cold War deterrence. * Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs (1966). A foundational collection of his lectures and essays examining the moral and practical responsibilities of scientists in the nuclear age, exploring how technological escalation consistently outpaces strategic doctrine. Show Notes (suggested by Gemini) * The Origins of “Salami Slicing”: Why I consistently use this term to describe the ongoing Russian kinetic campaign against the West. The concept is flawlessly illustrated in the very first episode of the classic 1980s BBC comedy Yes, Prime Minister. * The West Berlin Scenario: A detailed look at the scene where the Government Chief Scientist—a character modelled on former UK Chief Scientific Adviser Sir Solly Zuckerman—forces Prime Minister Jim Hacker to confront the uselessness of the nuclear deterrent against incremental aggression. He walks the PM through a hypothetical sequence: a fire in West Berlin, followed by East German firemen crossing the border, then East German police, then East German troops, and finally Russian troops. At no point in this slice-by-slice escalation is the Prime Minister willing to press the nuclear button. * Real-World Slices in Poland and Germany: How Moscow is executing this exact script today. We examine recent sub-threshold events, including a Russian military helicopter intentionally breaching Polish airspace for precisely 42 seconds—a move easily dismissed as a navigational error—and previous Russian drone impacts on Polish soil disguised by the “fog of war”. We also look at the escalation of these tactics with the recent drone strike on a Ukrainian aircraft at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport. * The Strategic Takeaway: Because Russia will deliberately avoid crossing the massive threshold required to trigger a unified NATO conventional or nuclear response, our ultimate deterrent is effectively neutralised. The episode concludes by reinforcing the TV scientist’s 1980s solution: Western governments must urgently pivot their focus and expenditure toward precise, adaptable conventional armed forces and emerging technologies that can actually counter these incremental, slice-by-slice attacks. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Salami Tactics, Prime Minister
  5. Sep 19

    Salami Slicing Article 5: Why Russia's War on Europe Has Already Begun

    I’ve tried to stay calm about this paper, and mostly failed. Definitely read it, and tell me what you think about its arguments and conclusions.https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/ The paper’s introduction:The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat in order to design and execute holistic responses. European governments increased their willingness to publicly attribute and discuss ongoing Russian kinetic attacks against Europe after the German government officially attributed the August 5 Leipzig airport drone attack to Russia.[1] European states and leaders still too often refer to Russian actions with language that impedes effective responses, however, and have not taken sufficient action of their own to deter the escalating Russian campaign against them. European governments must develop a shared conceptual framework to understand ongoing Russian campaigns, an essential step toward creating a coordinated policy plan to respond to and deter Russian actions. NATO has recognized the changing near-term Russian conventional threat and has identified the need for rapid European rearmament and adaptation drawing on lessons from Ukraine to meet this threat, although action is lagging behind words. European states must accelerate and improve these rearmament and adaptation efforts and must prepare for the risk of a limited Russian conventional attack on a shorter timeline than the 2028-2030 window that many NATO states currently discuss. NATO and European states can defeat the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the growing Russian conventional threat, but only on the basis of a shared understanding of the problem that will enable them to design and execute coordinated policy plans with the necessary sense of urgency and without panic. This paper presents an initial assessment of the current and near-term Russian threats, priority lines of effort for NATO states, and necessary future analytical work by ISW and other organizations. Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) * The Cognitive Trap: How terms like “sub-Article 5,” “provocations,” and “hybrid warfare” preemptively constrain NATO’s freedom to act and excuse inaction in the face of direct Russian aggression. * The Salami-Slicing Strategy: Examining recent attacks—including the August 5 Leipzig/Halle drone strike and Polish railway sabotage—as parts of a deliberate, state-directed kinetic campaign across Europe. * Hollowing Out Article 5: Why the near-term threat is not a massive armored march on Berlin, but a limited conventional attack (such as a shallow ground incursion in the Baltics) meant to test NATO’s resolve and watch the mutual defense clause collapse from political indecision. * The Heartland Alliance Factor: How Russian success in paralyzing NATO directly empowers the broader geopolitical aims of Iran, North Korea, and China within the World War 3.0 framework. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Salami Slicing Article 5: Why Russia's War on Europe Has Already Begun
  6. Sep 15

    Frozen in Carbonite: The Anatomy of ‘The Two-State Delusion’

    The whole reason to delay recognition of Palestinian statehood, was to build it into the Two State Solution. Arguably, Western recognition of the State of Palestine, creating a failed state ab initio, was a recognition that the future state of peaceful coexistence however cold between Israel and Palestine was no longer a near-term goal. Recognising Palestine could be used as a brickbat with which to beat Israel for its harsh tactics in the Gaza War of 2023-, rather than as part of creating something productive. There are creative ideas like the Canton Solution to the problem of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, but since the hopeful early days of the Oslo Accords in 1993, right through the darkest days of the Second Intifadah, most of the world was bought into the idea that the State of Israel and an eventual State of Palestine could be brought to live together in some sort of peace. The one-state solution of a Palestine without Jews, and the one-state solution of an Israel with a politically disempowered Arab population, were viewed as borderline preposterous outside political extremist circles. Those one-state solutions are now, particularly after Hamas began the Gaza War in 2023, viewed as plausible. Those who advocate for a Palestine with no Israel imagine, or at least pretend to imagine, a Palestine so respectful of pluralism that 10 million Israeli Jews could continue to live there. Those who advocate for an Israel with Judaea and Samaria annexed, imagine, or at least pretend to imagine, a Palestinian Arab population accepting full civil rights but no votes: permanent expatriates. Both sets of believers are more or less willing to imagine a massive transfer of population to get rid of the people they don’t like. The LLM which coded this graphic did a reasonable job, but I do find it interesting that it balked at referring to Jerusalem and Ramallah as national capitals. This fudge will please nobody. This leaves us with the question whether those violently opposed to Palestinian and Israeli states in peaceful coexistence, led of course by Iran, but supported by Hamas as well, have succeeded in making that coexistence seem utterly absurd. I’ve offered a brief history, from the UN Partition of 1947, through the old rejectionism of the Arab states and the newer rejectionism of Hamas, Hizballah and Iran. The Arab and Iranian rejectionisms of the past envisioned either mass expulsion or mass murder of Israel’s Jews. Jewish rejectionism has its roots in Vladimir Jabotinsky’s revisionist Zionism which was ready to envision coexistence, but which has since the Second Intifadah explicitly envisioned for the Palestinians a mass transfer of population alongside a form of disenfranchised loyalty to Israel. I thought I’d talk about land swaps, and I prepared a graphic for that. If the Two State Solution is frozen in carbonite, perhaps the land swaps that would enable it mean nothing now, but the discussions of the E1 development adjacent to Jerusalem refer to the land swap discussions. Israeli towns and villages in Area C which were envisioned in past negotiations as occupied territory swapped to become part of Israel are now referred to as though that swap were a fait accompli, including E1. It was, people are saying now, always meant to be part of Israel in future, swapped for some part of Israel that would become part of Palestine. It’s interesting that one side of the swap is convenient even if the agreement that might implement the swap (or the other side of the swap where an Israeli slice of the Gaza Envelope would become part of Palestine) is so hard to imagine now. Show Notes & Essay Breakdown (Suggested by Gemini) * The History of Rejectionism: Tracing the evolution from mid-century Pan-Arabism to the modern Islamist rejectionism of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. * The Sparta Doctrine: How the October 7 attacks forced Israel into a state of permanent war, empowering a right-wing vision of annexation and disenfranchisement. [I’m not sure I said this in the video.] * The One-State Delusion: Why both the vision of a Palestine without Jews and an Israel with a permanently disenfranchised Arab population are dark fantasies. * Land Swaps and the Green Line: An analysis of the 1949 Armistice boundaries, the E1 development, and why the mechanics of a two-state solution remain the only viable long-term blueprint, even if currently frozen. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

  7. Sep 12

    Two Chokepoints Too Many: The Houthi Stranglehold on Global Trade

    Maybe it’s a little bit passive-aggressive for me to go on the Socials and note that I’ve been warning about the Houthi threat to global supply chains since April. Maybe it’s just that your Cassandra is weary of watching people walk into unconcealed pitfalls. The constant reassurances from the White House ring in the ear: Iran has been rendered incapable of action. Chiming with this has been the White House’s truce with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Americans appeared to assume, would deal with the Houthis. Neither has seemed inclined to take on this burden, and if you and I know about Houthi re-armament, you can bet they knew about it too. The Red Sea and the nearby seas around the Horn of Africa are about the most heavily-armed stretch of water in the world: a lot of navies keep a lot of ships there in order to safeguard access to the Suez Canal. These ships are not, however, well-suited to fighting a well-equipped and apparently well-supplied militia now in control of an increasingly large acreage of Yemen’s land. Price effects have been noticeable, particularly on oil. Both Brent and West Texas Intermediate are over $100 a barrel today. This isn’t just because of the threat to the Bab-al-Mandeb: markets have clearly been losing faith in the White House’s weekly reassurances that the war will end tomorrow, and in point of fact ended a few months ago. The price of oil is, however, back to where it was in May, when the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve held about 375 million barrels. Now it’s down to 285 million barrels. This doesn’t mean that inventory is dangerously low; it does mean that selling oil out of the salt caverns of America’s Gulf Coast might over the next few weeks become less effective at keeping the price down. The Iran theatre’s been hot for weeks, and it looks as though it might be getting a bit bigger and a bit hotter now. Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) * The Dual Chokepoint Strategy: How joint Iranian and Houthi positioning at the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb grants Tehran unprecedented leverage over Western and Asian trade. * The Suez Bypass Fallacy: Why shutting Bab al-Mandeb effectively neutralizes the Suez Canal, forcing global shipping into costly detours around Africa. * Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Trap: How Houthi coastal dominance blocks Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil export routes to India and China. * The Truce Miscalculation: Analyzing how diplomatic concessions allowed Houthi forces time to rearm, resupply, and seize vital coastal artillery positions. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Two Chokepoints Too Many: The Houthi Stranglehold on Global Trade

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Blunt discussions of war and national security from war historian and former intelligence officer Dr Lynette Nusbacher nusbacher.substack.com