General Offensive - General Uprising

Lynette Nusbacher
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Blunt discussions of war and national security from war historian and former intelligence officer Dr Lynette Nusbacher nusbacher.substack.com

  1. 10h ago

    Frozen in Carbonite: The Anatomy of ‘The Two-State Delusion’

    The whole reason to delay recognition of Palestinian statehood, was to build it into the Two State Solution. Arguably, Western recognition of the State of Palestine, creating a failed state ab initio, was a recognition that the future state of peaceful coexistence however cold between Israel and Palestine was no longer a near-term goal. Recognising Palestine could be used as a brickbat with which to beat Israel for its harsh tactics in the Gaza War of 2023-, rather than as part of creating something productive. There are creative ideas like the Canton Solution to the problem of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, but since the hopeful early days of the Oslo Accords in 1993, right through the darkest days of the Second Intifadah, most of the world was bought into the idea that the State of Israel and an eventual State of Palestine could be brought to live together in some sort of peace. The one-state solution of a Palestine without Jews, and the one-state solution of an Israel with a politically disempowered Arab population, were viewed as borderline preposterous outside political extremist circles. Those one-state solutions are now, particularly after Hamas began the Gaza War in 2023, viewed as plausible. Those who advocate for a Palestine with no Israel imagine, or at least pretend to imagine, a Palestine so respectful of pluralism that 10 million Israeli Jews could continue to live there. Those who advocate for an Israel with Judaea and Samaria annexed, imagine, or at least pretend to imagine, a Palestinian Arab population accepting full civil rights but no votes: permanent expatriates. Both sets of believers are more or less willing to imagine a massive transfer of population to get rid of the people they don’t like. The LLM which coded this graphic did a reasonable job, but I do find it interesting that it balked at referring to Jerusalem and Ramallah as national capitals. This fudge will please nobody. This leaves us with the question whether those violently opposed to Palestinian and Israeli states in peaceful coexistence, led of course by Iran, but supported by Hamas as well, have succeeded in making that coexistence seem utterly absurd. I’ve offered a brief history, from the UN Partition of 1947, through the old rejectionism of the Arab states and the newer rejectionism of Hamas, Hizballah and Iran. The Arab and Iranian rejectionisms of the past envisioned either mass expulsion or mass murder of Israel’s Jews. Jewish rejectionism has its roots in Vladimir Jabotinsky’s revisionist Zionism which was ready to envision coexistence, but which has since the Second Intifadah explicitly envisioned for the Palestinians a mass transfer of population alongside a form of disenfranchised loyalty to Israel. I thought I’d talk about land swaps, and I prepared a graphic for that. If the Two State Solution is frozen in carbonite, perhaps the land swaps that would enable it mean nothing now, but the discussions of the E1 development adjacent to Jerusalem refer to the land swap discussions. Israeli towns and villages in Area C which were envisioned in past negotiations as occupied territory swapped to become part of Israel are now referred to as though that swap were a fait accompli, including E1. It was, people are saying now, always meant to be part of Israel in future, swapped for some part of Israel that would become part of Palestine. It’s interesting that one side of the swap is convenient even if the agreement that might implement the swap (or the other side of the swap where an Israeli slice of the Gaza Envelope would become part of Palestine) is so hard to imagine now. Show Notes & Essay Breakdown (Suggested by Gemini) * The History of Rejectionism: Tracing the evolution from mid-century Pan-Arabism to the modern Islamist rejectionism of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. * The Sparta Doctrine: How the October 7 attacks forced Israel into a state of permanent war, empowering a right-wing vision of annexation and disenfranchisement. [I’m not sure I said this in the video.] * The One-State Delusion: Why both the vision of a Palestine without Jews and an Israel with a permanently disenfranchised Arab population are dark fantasies. * Land Swaps and the Green Line: An analysis of the 1949 Armistice boundaries, the E1 development, and why the mechanics of a two-state solution remain the only viable long-term blueprint, even if currently frozen. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

  2. 3d ago

    Two Chokepoints Too Many: The Houthi Stranglehold on Global Trade

    Maybe it’s a little bit passive-aggressive for me to go on the Socials and note that I’ve been warning about the Houthi threat to global supply chains since April. Maybe it’s just that your Cassandra is weary of watching people walk into unconcealed pitfalls. The constant reassurances from the White House ring in the ear: Iran has been rendered incapable of action. Chiming with this has been the White House’s truce with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Americans appeared to assume, would deal with the Houthis. Neither has seemed inclined to take on this burden, and if you and I know about Houthi re-armament, you can bet they knew about it too. The Red Sea and the nearby seas around the Horn of Africa are about the most heavily-armed stretch of water in the world: a lot of navies keep a lot of ships there in order to safeguard access to the Suez Canal. These ships are not, however, well-suited to fighting a well-equipped and apparently well-supplied militia now in control of an increasingly large acreage of Yemen’s land. Price effects have been noticeable, particularly on oil. Both Brent and West Texas Intermediate are over $100 a barrel today. This isn’t just because of the threat to the Bab-al-Mandeb: markets have clearly been losing faith in the White House’s weekly reassurances that the war will end tomorrow, and in point of fact ended a few months ago. The price of oil is, however, back to where it was in May, when the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve held about 375 million barrels. Now it’s down to 285 million barrels. This doesn’t mean that inventory is dangerously low; it does mean that selling oil out of the salt caverns of America’s Gulf Coast might over the next few weeks become less effective at keeping the price down. The Iran theatre’s been hot for weeks, and it looks as though it might be getting a bit bigger and a bit hotter now. Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) * The Dual Chokepoint Strategy: How joint Iranian and Houthi positioning at the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb grants Tehran unprecedented leverage over Western and Asian trade. * The Suez Bypass Fallacy: Why shutting Bab al-Mandeb effectively neutralizes the Suez Canal, forcing global shipping into costly detours around Africa. * Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Trap: How Houthi coastal dominance blocks Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil export routes to India and China. * The Truce Miscalculation: Analyzing how diplomatic concessions allowed Houthi forces time to rearm, resupply, and seize vital coastal artillery positions. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Two Chokepoints Too Many: The Houthi Stranglehold on Global Trade

  3. 5d ago

    British Labour’s Gift to Israel’s Far Right

    I recorded this podcast today for the MAZL podcast, which Elissa Wald runs. I know that at least one subscriber wanted me to offer a message of hope, but this sure as shootin’ ain’t it. Binyamin Netanyahu, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar ben-Gvir stood every chance of being voted into irrelevance by Israelis next month; perhaps they will be nonetheless. These sanctions, though, are pure right-wing electoral gold. The British Government could have waited until November to take further action against Israelis living in the West Bank who conduct violence against Palestinians, or to take further action against the Israeli Government for allowing the E-1 development plan in the West Bank to proceed. Instead, Andy Burnham went for a big policy move now, in time for the Labour Party Conference which begins 27 September. The measures taken by the British Government are no threat to Israel’s economy, nor to the UK-Israel free trade agreement, but they will at least in theory require Israeli exporters to distinguish between goods produced in Israel, and goods produced in Israeli towns and villages in the West Bank. That is something this Israeli government will not willingly do. Using a term like ‘ethnic cleansing’, though: that’s going to hurt. It won’t hurt Binyamin Netanyahu; it will hurt British Jews who suffer increased violence when Israel is delegitimised by narratives and language that reinforce the long-held canard that global Jewry deflect the consequences of Israel’s actions. Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) * The Domestic Electoral Motive: How UK Labour’s policy shifts on West Bank settlements are calculated to reclaim voters lost to the Green Party ahead of the upcoming Labour Party Conference. * The E1 Strategic Reality: Why the proposed development between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim serves as a highly combustible political football for both Western politicians and Israeli annexationists. * Smotrich’s Retaliation Rhetoric: Analyzing Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s explicit boast that E1 expansion is a deliberate attempt to bury two-state prospects in response to Western diplomatic pressure. * The Netanyahu Lifeline: How the opportunity to defy “British meddling” allows Israel’s far-right coalition to shift public focus away from October 7 security failures and onto nationalist defiance. * Domestic UK Fallout: Why framing UK foreign policy around anti-Israel political point-scoring risks reinforcing hostile domestic narratives against British Jews without delivering meaningful relief or statehood to Palestinians. ERRATUM: At one point in the video I refer to Bezalel Smotrich as Itamar ben-Gvir. I’ve corrected it in the transcript. My video about the E1 tender (recorded more than two weeks before the sanctions were announced) is here on General Offensive! General Uprising! ‘Smotrich rejoices as settlement plan that ‘erases 2-state delusion’ gets final greenlight’, The Times of Israel article I reference in the video, is from 20 August 2025. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    British Labour’s Gift to Israel’s Far Right

  4. Sep 8

    How the Ukraine War Ends: Three Real Endgames for WW 3.0

    I’ve used an open source map from the Institute for the Study of War Map Room with attribution on screen. I’ve also asked Gemini to gin up a WW3.0 briefing graphic. I keep talking about that framing, and without a graphic it really is difficult to understand why that Heartland Alliance / Triangular Alliance is so cohesive even though it’s easy to imagine Iran, Russia and North Korea as so distant from one another. I’m open to corrections and suggestions that other states be colour-coded in this map. I’d be particularly interested to hear how Georgia might be coded. I’m trying to be a little bit sophisticated with maps and stuff. This adds to the timetable significantly, not because it’s hard to flick to and from maps while I’m recording, but because I make mistakes, and then I need to edit out the mistakes (or re-record the whole thing). Show Notes (Suggested by Gemini) * The Clausewitzian Fallacy: Why classical military doctrine assumes wars end when rational aims fail [That’s not right, and that’s not what I said, Gemini!], and why modern great powers keep fighting long after strategic objectives become unobtainable. * The Interconnected Theatres: How Iranian drone and missile supplies in Ukraine—and Middle Eastern tension driving up Russian oil revenues—connect the European and Persian Gulf fronts of World War 3.0. * Scenario 1 — The Mortality of Vladimir Putin: Why a palace coup is unlikely, how health or age-related incapacitation would instantly terminate the war, and why a post-Putin Kremlin would immediately reorient to counter Chinese encroachment in Eastern Siberia. * Scenario 2 — Systemic Russian Breakdown & The St. Petersburg Line: How Russian oil sales prop up a failing war economy, and why forcing Putin to conscript young men from Moscow and St. Petersburg represents his true political red line. * Scenario 3 — Ukrainian Political Collapse: How a combination of Western air defence starvation and Russian strikes on power infrastructure during an Eastern European winter could break the political will to fight before the army runs out of supplies. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

  5. Sep 6

    Falkland A!

    This is being called Javier Milei’s sabre-rattling, and it’s an appropriate descriptor. A sabre is an effective weapon in skilled hands, but it’s absolutely useless at a range of 300 nautical miles. It’s not remarkable that Milei is going for the old Argentine wheeze of attacking the British because the economy is going desperately wrong. Inflation is coming down in Argentina because Milei is reducing wages and benefits, so nobody can afford to buy anything. Well, Milei can afford to buy F-16s, but second-hand. Show Notes (suggested by Gemini) * The 1982 Contrast: Why Britain’s permanent Mount Pleasant garrison, Sky Sabre missiles, and Typhoon fighters make a repeat of 1982 impossible. * Argentina’s 24 F-16s: The operational limits of Buenos Aires’ Danish fighter purchase—range, fuel constraints, and lack of loiter time over the islands. * The Sea Lion Oil Wealth: How Falkland Islands EEZ oil reserves will fund the islanders’ self-defence while Javier Milei impoverishes Argentina to curb inflation. * The Asymmetric Drone Threat: Why the true danger isn’t an amphibious invasion, but low-cost Iranian-style drones targeting oil rigs, tankers, and fuel storage from 300 nautical miles away. * The Mainland Dilemma: The lesson from the Red Sea and Houthis: stopping asymmetric standoff strikes requires bombing launch bases on the Argentine mainland. It makes me just a little bit happy that four important people are on this thumbnail, and one of them isn’t even mentioned in the interview!My best line: ‘I don’t think President Trump thinks in terms of endgames. He thinks in terms of momentary incremental advantage.’ This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

  6. Sep 3

    Golden Domes, Broken Promises: Has Anyone Got A Nuclear Umbrella?

    I didn’t mention Russian nuclear attack this week because I think it’s likely. I was talking about other means of Russian attack against countries supporting Ukraine, and the UK as singled out by Russia for splitting away from Ukraine’s supporters. There was, however, a robust response to that aspect of the pod. We assume nuclear deterrence is an absolute shield, that 'Mutual Assured Destruction' keeps the UK safe from Russian nuclear attack. Britain doesn't have enough operational warheads to wipe Russia off the map, though; and NATO's Article 5 doesn't mandate a nuclear response if London or Faslane takes a nuke. When you factor in counterforce targeting and missile defence shields like the 'Golden Dome' (or SDI in the old days), deterrence isn't an absolute shield. It's a fragile calculus, and it’s actively breaking down. Thousands of bots and Vatniks! As subscribers to this podcast understand, the content goes out in various forms after a short delay. (I’m happy to revisit this at an appropriate point in future.) I put a clip from my Hybrid Warfare pod earlier in the week onto Instagram, the bit about the top end of the Russian escalation ladder, and I was really astonished at the response. Views are approaching 20,000 (I’m more used to a couple of thousand), and the hundreds of comments included a lot of Russian bots, and the sort of tankies and Vatniks I don’t usually deal with. I had a certain amount of that from my recent post on Russian / Iranian threat to undersea cables, but views on those maxed out at under 2,000 so the Kremlin representation was comparatively small. So when I made today’s video I was responding to what I perceive as genuine response from humans: surely the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent would deter a Russian nuclear attack against the UK or UK forces deployed, and surely NATO’s collective defence would deter a Russian nuclear attack against a NATO member. Also a strong narrative in the responses: the idea that because I was identifying and analysing a threat I was causing needless fear and alarm (‘scaremongering’). Likewise the narrative that because I was analysing Russian threat against states supporting Ukraine, I was doing Russia’s bidding. For me, coming from a national security background where one prefers not to be ignorant of threat, this was fascinating. Show Notes (Generated by Gemini) * The Deterrence Delusion: Why possessing a nuclear deterrent does not guarantee immunity from an adversary’s nuclear strike. * UK Trident Realities: The mathematical truth about Britain’s warhead count and why the UK cannot “wipe Russia off the map.” * The Article 5 Loophole: Why NATO’s collective defence clause does not automatically guarantee a US or French nuclear counter-strike if London is hit. * Counterforce vs Countervalue: Why targeting an enemy’s nuclear storage and deployment facilities is far more valuable than striking population centres. * The Missile Defence Paradox: How Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) concepts and Trump’s “Golden Dome” destabilise MAD by encouraging first-strike incentives. * Hybrid Escalation in Europe: Putting recent Russian drone attacks against Ukrainian assets in Germany into the wider strategic picture. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Golden Domes, Broken Promises: Has Anyone Got A Nuclear Umbrella?

  7. Sep 1

    Hybrid Warfare: Useful Term or Crap Jargon?

    A meeting with video and in-person attendees was a ’hybrid’ meeting until we got used to it, and now it’s just a meeting. Thing is, combining high-intensity operations with lower-intensity operations and working across domains with covert operations and information operations … that’s just war. Calling it ‘hybrid war’ suggests that it’s a special case, and it isn’t. If we’re not operating across all relevant domains when we fight, we’re not doing it properly.Show Notes (suggested by Gemini) * The “Nuke-on-Nuke” Dilemma: Why non-nuclear ballistic missile strikes (like the Oreshnik in Ukraine) double as nuclear warnings to Western powers. * Critical National Infrastructure at Risk: The reality of pre-positioned munitions on ocean floor internet cables and energy interconnectors. * The Triangular Alliance in Action: How Russia, Iran, and China coordinate parallel kinetic, economic, and cyber tactics across global theaters. * Historical Parallels (WW2 vs. Today): Why WWII was just as “hybrid” as modern war, from covert assassinations to full-spectrum information shaping. * The Buzzword Trap: How labeling full-spectrum war as “hybrid” gives Western leaders an excuse to limit strategic commitment. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Hybrid Warfare: Useful Term or Crap Jargon?

  8. Aug 24

    Israel’s E1 Tender: Urban Planning or Political Trap?

    There is a newly opened tender for constructing three neighbourhoods connecting part of Jerusalem Municipality which is over the Green Line to Maale Adumim, which is a Jerusalem suburb over the Green Line. For a town planning artefact this is attracting a mass of condemnation. Why? Maybe it’s because it’s politically convenient for everybody to pretend that this is going to cut the northern West Bank off from the southern West bank and make a future Palestinian state impossible. Maybe it’s because it’s going to play merry Hell with the lives of the Palestinian villagers and Bedouin who are living there now. Maybe it’s because the road is going to involve carriageways separated by security control. Maybe it’s just because ‘Forget it, Jake, it’s the Middle East’*. *You’ve seen Chinatown, right? I’ve been assessing for a few months that Itamar Ben-Gvir is seeking to increase violence by Israelis who live in the West Bank against Palestinians who live in the West Bank, and to ensure that the Israelis enjoy an aura of impunity for these actions. I think he’s doing so in order to provoke a Palestinian uprising along the lines of the (original) Intifadah between now and the Israeli elections. I judge that he’s doing so in order to enable him to put the IDF in the position of having to use force to put down the uprising, to destroy the Palestinian Authority as a government-in-waiting, and to enable an annexation of the West Bank. This past week IDF sources have briefed to Israeli Channel 12 that this is what is happening and that it’s working. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nusbacher.substack.com/subscribe

    Israel’s E1 Tender: Urban Planning or Political Trap?
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Blunt discussions of war and national security from war historian and former intelligence officer Dr Lynette Nusbacher nusbacher.substack.com

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