The Twin Wisdoms

Twin Wisdoms

In an Iranian digital landscape increasingly fractured by partisan vitriol, vulgarity, and the fog of fake news, this space is a commitment to restrained, academic rigor and clear-headed policy analysis. It is more than a blog; it is a response to a crisis of critical thinking. It is time to heed the call of reason. The Twin Wisdoms (twinwisdoms.org) is the English-language home for Dr Daryoush Mohammad Poor’s essays and critical observations. Its sister site, Malakut (malakut.org), is his long-established Farsi-language platform, where he has published commentary and analysis for a Persian-speaking audience for many years. Both sites are authored by Dr Mohammad Poor and reflect his commitment to thoughtful, rigorous engagement with the political, intellectual, and spiritual questions of our time. The views expressed are those of the author in a personal capacity and do not represent any affiliated institution.

  1. 4h ago

    The Love of the Microphone

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast On Masih Alinejad’s theatre of grief, the platforms that reward it, and the war she now says she never wanted. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the Partido Popular, greets Masih Alinejad before the ‘Mujeres libres’ session at the Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid, 5 March 2026. Credit: EFE / Borja Sánchez-Trillo, via Infobae. On 21 July the mayor of New York conceded on video what his lawyers had told him: the city has no independent authority to execute the International Criminal Court’s warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu, should he arrive for the General Assembly in September. The next day Masih Alinejad answered him with a bicycle. She filmed herself beside a Citi Bike, pointed at its worn brakes, told Zohran Mamdani to fix what actually endangers New Yorkers – ‘Oh busy trying to arrest Netanyahu?’ – and offered him instead the names of Iranian officials she says are bound for the same city. The bicycles are operated by Lyft and sponsored by a bank; the mayor owns neither the brakes nor the warrant. It scarcely matters. The clip was never an argument. It was a set: one prop, one grievance, one camera. It was also a rerun. On 28 February, the first day of the war, with American and Israeli aircraft over Iranian cities, she told the same mayor to stop lecturing Iranians about peace. A man who objected to the bombing of her country had become, in her telling, a threat to her safety in his own. Whatever else that is, it is consistent, and the consistency is the subject of this essay. The Style There is an older clip, from the years when Javad Zarif still toured Western studios selling the republic’s smoother face. She posted herself at a laptop while he spoke, weeping at the screen, grief staged at broadcast scale, as though the man in the frame were one of the century’s great criminals and she the survivor appointed to testify against him. I wrote this week about Iranians abroad who reach for the Nazi analogy as a shortcut through thought. She arrived there years early, and she arrived in character. The United Nations appearance of January 2020, reading the names of the protest dead through tears, ran on the same voltage. Some of those tears may well be real. That is what makes the choreography work, because a performance needs true feeling somewhere in the building. The question is what the feeling is for, and the answer, across a decade of footage, is that it is for the camera that happens, every time, to be running. Say the true things first, because they are serious. The Islamic Republic has tried to kidnap her and tried to kill her. A Manhattan jury convicted two men over the plot, and in October 2025 they drew 25-year sentences. My Stealthy Freedom gave women inside Iran an outlet the regime answered with the threat of ten-year prison terms, and it cost her own family dearly. Her fear is earned. Nothing below erases it, and nothing below is written in the regime’s defence. What the Public Record Shows Now the ledger, drawn only from documents anyone can read. In 2015 she received the inaugural Women’s Rights Award of the Geneva Summit, the annual gathering convened by UN Watch, the advocacy group best known for defending Israel at the Human Rights Council. The organisation’s own website claims the prize under its name. The same year she signed with Voice of America’s Persian service, where her federal contract described her as an ‘anchor, writer, reporter’. The publicly posted awards passed $305,000 by 2019, and she remained on the agency’s books for years afterwards. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the capital’s flagship pro-Israel think tank, gave her its Scholar-Statesman medal; the institute’s own transcript records her greeting its director as ‘my brother in arms’. And on 18 February this year, ten days before the first bombs fell, she stood at the Geneva Summit once more, accepted its Courage Award on behalf of the heroes of Iran, and asked the hall to bring Europe’s leaders together to plan for an Iran after the Islamic Republic. None of this was hidden. That is the point. What the documents describe is an economy in plain sight: attention as the labour, platforms as the wage. Her politics sit squarely inside the exiled opposition, and the opposition’s one attempt at unity shows how she operates within it. In February 2023, at the height of the Mahsa movement, she shared a Georgetown stage with Reza Pahlavi and a handful of others. An alliance was announced, a charter followed, and within months the arrangement had come apart. The public accounts of the collapse differ. My own reading is that two principals, each built for the microphone, could not share one. I examined his half of that temperament last week. This is hers. The War She Never Wanted Then the war came, and the record became a sequence. On the first day she was among the exiled figures calling for the attacks to continue, and viewers reposted footage she had circulated of a strike near Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s house, asking why the screams of the neighbours had not detained her. By last summer a New Lines essay could already describe her as functioning as ‘a mouthpiece for Netanyahu’. On 5 March she stood in the Spanish Congress as a guest of the opposition bench and told Pedro Sánchez, a prime minister whose offence was refusing his bases to the operation, that he stood with the murderers and had dared to use the wounded bodies of her people as ammunition in his domestic quarrels. In the same room she defended the strikes without a hedge: approve of the American president or not, he had done the right thing. The Spanish press carried her in translation, so the wording travels loosely; the position does not. There is a precedent for what happened next. In June 2025, during the twelve-day war, she amplified Israeli evacuation orders to Iranians, took a storm of criticism, and pivoted within days to an open letter telling Netanyahu to spare the people of Iran; a BBC Persian correspondent drily pronounced that Netanyahu had lost her. The same hinge swung this spring. As the casualty count climbed and the water failed in Hormozgan, she began insisting she had never championed a military attack on her country. Viewers did what viewers now do. They produced the clips, dated and side by side, Madrid included. The inconsistency is not incidental to the style; it is the style. A performer holds the position the room rewards, and the room keeps changing. A correction of my own, before the close. When I wrote last week about Reza Pahlavi’s bookkeeping of grief, I treated the habit as a monarchist defect. That was too narrow. The habit belongs to an industry, and the industry has more than one star. She quarrelled with the prince’s camp and kept the business model: the same wounded bodies, itemised for whichever audience is paying that season. Iranians inside the country film what is done to them at the risk of prison, and are paid in nothing. She films herself beside a bicycle. The tears are hers, and some of them may be true. The stage, the lights and the wage bill are other people’s, and whoever pays for a theatre has a say in the play. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  2. 1d ago

    Somebody Else’s 1945

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast On the Nazi analogy, the Iranians who reach for it from abroad, and the state that made it plausible Aftermath of overnight US strikes on a bridge in Bandar Khamir county, near the Strait of Hormuz, 17 July 2026. Screengrab from footage broadcast by Iran’s IRINN state television, made available via AFPTV. Credit: AFP / IRINN, via Al Jazeera. The strikes resumed on 6 July. Bridges in Hormozgan. A pumping station at Jask, and twenty villages left without water. By Sunday it was the ninth consecutive night. And across my timeline, from Toronto and Stockholm and Los Angeles, one sentence keeps arriving with the confidence of a proof: they are the Nazis, and nobody negotiates with Nazis. I want to take that seriously. Taking it seriously is the fastest way to show what it does. What the Analogy Skips Germany was invaded because Germany invaded. Poland first, then France, then the Soviet Union. The Allied campaign answered a conquest. It was never a remedy for domestic tyranny, and the record on that point is humiliating: while the camps were being built and the race laws passed, the world’s considered response was Munich. Nobody bombed Berlin in 1935 to save anyone. Iran has invaded no one. The war of 28 February opened in the middle of live negotiations, with the assassination of a head of state on his own soil. The resistance point runs backwards too. The officers of 20 July 1944 acted inside Germany. The White Rose printed leaflets in Munich. None of them petitioned anyone to flatten Hamburg. And the flattening, when it came, is the part historians still cannot agree was worth the cost – except on one finding, which is that a terrorised population closes around the state being bombed. We have just watched it happen here. A leadership was decapitated in February and a successor was seated within nine days. Then there is the ending. Whoever invokes 1945 is invoking unconditional surrender, foreign occupation, and forty-five years of partition. That is what the analogy promises. Anyone using it should say so aloud. The Word Doing the Work I argued in June that ‘proxy’ does the work thinking is supposed to do. ‘Hitler’ is the same instrument turned the other way, and it runs on the same mechanism: assert that the outcomes resemble each other, skip the demonstration that the machinery does, and arrive at the verdict you brought with you. Let me add what I did not say clearly enough in March. This is not carelessness among people who ought to think harder. The analogy is supplied. It has an infrastructure, and that infrastructure has budgets and editorial lines – Persian-language satellite channels financed from well outside their own audiences, amplified by Israeli, American and Gulf outlets whose governments are in live confrontation with Tehran. One of them has a documented Saudi origin in UK corporate filings. In March I asked the diaspora to be more honest with itself. That misdescribes the problem. You do not reason someone out of a conclusion that is being delivered to them nightly. The Other Half Now the harder part, and I will not soften it. The analogy is false. The conditions that make it feel true were manufactured in Tehran. I set out the ledger of Ali Khamenei’s leadership in an earlier essay and I stand by every line of it. Forty-seven years produced a system in which one man’s judgement displaced every institution capable of correcting it; in which loyalty outranked competence in each appointment that mattered; in which a former prime minister and a former speaker of parliament were confined for fourteen years without charge or trial. The standing answer to a crowd in the street was a bullet. In January the answer was given again, and credible monitors put the dead at no fewer than seven thousand. Add decades of sanctions, which are not a separate story. They crushed wage-earners and the sick. They enriched whoever controlled the scarcity. And they handed the state a permanent alibi for failures it authored on its own. So here is the sentence that cuts both ways. A government that spends half a century teaching ninety million people that nothing can be changed by lawful means has manufactured the audience for the analogy it now denounces. Despair is no argument for invasion. It is an explanation, and the men who produced the despair do not get to look surprised at what grew in it. What Is Actually Being Prescribed Say the whole sentence, then. The sentence is: I want a foreign air force to do to my country what was done to Germany, I accept the arithmetic of graves that follows, and I stand at no risk myself. Some who say it have lost family to this state and have earned their fury. I have argued against the Islamic Republic for years and paid for saying so. What I will not accept is a shortcut through somebody else’s history standing in for thought about my own country. Germany’s ending is not available to us. What is available is slow and unglamorous: a settlement with the state that exists, and then the argument with it, conducted by Iranians, on Iranian ground, in a country still standing. Nobody was ever liberated by the bombing of their own house. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  3. 2d ago

    Nobody Wants to Go to War

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast On a corridor interview of 21 July 2026, and the verb that carries a war A journalist puts one question to three United States senators: the President has formally told Congress that the war with Iran has resumed. What do you make of it? The exchange, filmed by Marzia Hussaini and posted to X on 21 July 2026, runs to about two minutes. Three answers; three different objects of attention. Cory Booker answers with cost and strategy – a failed war doubled down on, an upended economy, billions spent without objectives. Ruben Gallego answers with law. The war never stopped, he says, and deciding what counts as a war belongs to Congress, not to a president setting his own definition of it. Rick Scott answers with permission. ‘We can’t allow them to have a nuclear weapon.’ Read the verb slowly. To allow is to hold a power of refusal over something already in motion. The sentence installs two claims without arguing either: that a weapon is being acquired, and that Washington is the body whose consent is at issue. Take the first. The 2025 American public intelligence assessment stated that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon, and that the then supreme leader had not reauthorised the programme suspended in 2003. On 4 March 2026 the IAEA’s Director General, Rafael Grossi, said the agency had never held information indicating a structured, systematic programme to construct one. The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment does not address the matter. What has changed is that the inspectors are gone. They withdrew after the American and Israeli strikes of June 2025, and the agency’s report of 4 June 2026 describes a near-total loss of monitoring, with a stockpile once counted to the kilogram now unaccounted for. The bombing produced the darkness. The darkness is now the argument for more bombing. The shape is Iraqi, and worth being exact about. The failure of 2003 went deeper than a false claim. A phrase – ‘weapons of mass destruction’ – fused aspiration, capability and possession into one object, so evidence for the weakest member established the strongest. ‘Have a nuclear weapon’ performs the same fusion. Enrichment, threshold capability, a suspended weapons programme and a deliverable bomb become one noun, and the fusion does the work an argument should do. Then comes the destination. Scott disclaims the thing he is about to endorse – ‘nobody wants to go to war’ – and arrives four sentences later at regime change. The interviewer had asked about the war’s new objective. He received one that Congress has not authorised and the President does not state. This was no slip. On 13 May he published an opinion piece calling for a final blow to the Iranian government. On 18 May he proposed bombing the living daylights out of Iran to produce a compliant regime. On 15 July, the blockade reinstated, he counselled sticking it out. The position is consistent; it deserves to be tested as one. Between the disclaimer and the destination lies one clause about the ninety million people who live there. ‘It’s too bad for the people of Iran.’ Too bad. No agent, no cost, no duration. It is the only moment when Iranians appear at all. The partisan grammar is not hidden. Opposing a reconstruction fund in June, Scott explained that Republicans are not the party of Barack Obama, which throws money at them. On Fox News Sunday in April he routed the nuclear question through money Obama gave them. A question about war, answered in the currency of party. The bomb is not the subject of these sentences. It is the warrant. I hold up neither Democrat as a model. Booker measures a war at the petrol pump and the grocery till, its own provincialism. Gallego, who fought in Iraq, identified the mechanism. A president who can declare a war terminated on 1 May and resumed on 10 July, restarting a sixty-day clock each time, has taken from Congress the power to say what is happening – which is why a blockade, an act of war on any reading of the law of naval warfare, arrives without a vote. These wars persist for many reasons, and Iran’s rulers have supplied a long list of them. They also persist because sentences like these travel unopposed. A verb of permission asserts an authority nobody conferred. A fused noun converts an unverifiable capability into an imminent weapon. A regretful clause disposes of a nation. Two minutes in a corridor, and a war acquires an aim no legislature has voted for and no evidence has established. Nobody wants to go to war. Almost everybody says so, and the sentence has never once stopped one. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  4. 2d ago

    The Table and the Ledger

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast On Sada Cumber’s ‘Iran at the Crossroads’ (National Security Institute), and what would tell us the turn is real A crossroads implies a traveller. Somebody walked to get there, at a price, and somebody now has to choose a road. Sada Cumber has the right image for this moment, and I want to take it at its word. On the substance we are close. Iran’s durable asset is its people, and a policy organised around the nuclear file will win the argument it is having while losing the one that matters. When Sada writes that ‘governments negotiate agreements, but societies determine whether they endure’, he puts in one line what I have been circling for a year. From his seat that sentence travels further than from mine. Where I want to press him is on how the traveller got here. In Sada’s account the incentives move almost of their own accord. Confrontation revealed the limits of force. Regional priorities began to shift. The environment in which old differences are managed changed. Something like that has happened. But a transition of this kind has authors – and a bill. The ceasefire he asks us to read as a strategic opening was bargained under fire, and I set out the arithmetic of it a fortnight ago: a war that opened in February with the assassination of a head of state in the middle of live negotiations; five months of bombardment; a strait closed at a cost the reinsurance industry now warns could swallow the annual premium base for the entire war-risk class; a Gulf that has absorbed the fallout twice and will not volunteer for a third. The quarrel is no cooler than it was. Continuing it simply became unaffordable. Nobody underwrites a burning strait twice. Naming that price takes nothing from his conclusion. It is the reason his conclusion holds. There is a second thing I would add, and it comes out of the exchange we were having in June. Writing then about Magnifica Humanitas, I argued that pluralism parts company with relativism on the point that decides everything: a pluralist reading declares its assumptions and says what would refute it. Sada closes his essay by saying that analysis cannot predict which path will prevail, and that its work is to catch a pattern early enough to influence it. Agreed. So let us say what would show the pattern. Not rhetoric. Appointments and budgets. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei appears in public or governs from behind the office. How authority settles between the clerical bureau, Larijani’s security council, and Pezeshkian’s government. Whether the maritime formula is restored under a new name or quietly allowed to lapse. Whether the coming budget moves money from the security apparatus toward the recovery Sada describes. Whether the engineers and physicians Iran needs are given reasons to stay that outlast a season of patriotic feeling. Each of these is visible within months, and each can fail. That is what makes them worth watching. A pattern we cannot be wrong about is one we cannot learn from. A word on vocabulary, since his argument turns on Iranians becoming visible in the analysis. Among the concerns he lists as still central sits the language of proxy networks. I have written that the term closes the inquiry it pretends to open, converting a hard question about who armed whom and under what law into a verdict delivered the moment it is spoken. Everything else in his essay works to put Iranians back into the picture. That phrase quietly takes some of them out again. Which brings me to where we agree most, and to what I would attach to it. Sada wants Iran to reconnect with its scientific and entrepreneurial diaspora. So do I. That reconnection carries a condition, and the condition is not economic. Iranians abroad have spent this year being pressed, from several directions, to choose between their country’s faith and its poetry, between the Quran and the Shahnameh. I wrote about that framing a few days ago. It is a false choice, and it is the most reliable way of keeping the diaspora he describes exactly where it is: talented, dispersed, and unreconciled. He ends by saying that peace amounts to more than the absence of war. I would put it in the terms this year has taught us. Peace holds when both sides can count what another round would cost and neither can afford the sum. Opportunity is what people build once that arithmetic has settled. The table is waiting. The ledger is what will keep anyone sitting at it. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  5. 3d ago

    The Ledger of Ali Khamenei

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast Ali Khamenei held the office of Supreme Leader for thirty-six years. He inherited a republic that was bruised, broke, and at war, and he left behind a state whose legitimacy had been hollowed from within – by his own hand, and often against his own stated interests. The record is long enough to sort. He began by surviving. Khomeini had filled the office by force of personality; Khamenei, a mid-ranking cleric with a thin scholarly reputation, could only fill it by institutional manoeuvre. He built a network of appointees across the judiciary, the Guardian Council, the security apparatus, and the Friday prayer rostrums. He played factions against one another – reformists against conservatives, the Guards against the regular military, elected presidents against unelected supervisory bodies – and presented himself as the indispensable arbiter. For a time, this worked. The serial murders of dissident intellectuals in 1998 were the first clear signal that the security state had slipped, or been let off, its leash. The investigation pointed upward; the trail was cut short. Saeed Emami died in custody. The judiciary, by then packed with Khamenei’s appointees, ensured that the affair ended without a reckoning. The message was registered: accountability ran in one direction only. The attack on the Tehran University dormitory in July 1999 confirmed it. Students beaten in their beds by plainclothes paramilitaries. No senior commander held to account. The pattern was set for every subsequent confrontation between the state and its citizens – force first, impunity after, and a judiciary that functioned as an instrument of political discipline. The press followed. Khamenei presided over the systematic closure of reformist newspapers in the early 2000s, a campaign so thorough that it created the very thing it sought to prevent: a Persian-language media sphere headquartered in London, Washington, and Prague, funded by hostile governments, and consumed by millions who no longer trusted domestic outlets. The state did not eliminate critical journalism. It exported it – and lost control of the narrative permanently. Domestic politics calcified accordingly. The Guardian Council’s vetting power narrowed the electoral field until elections became competitions among pre-approved candidates. The judiciary prosecuted political opponents on national-security charges. The intelligence services surveilled, detained, and intimidated civil society. Politics ceased to be a contest of programmes and became a managed performance whose outcome was largely determined before the vote. The public understood this. Trust eroded quietly, then all at once. The one area where Khamenei’s strategic instinct may have served the country is the missile programme. Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile capability, developed under sanctions and without a nuclear warhead, became the credible conventional deterrent that air power and a weakened conscript army could not provide. In a region where three of Iran’s neighbours were invaded or bombed by foreign coalitions within two decades, the argument for a survivable retaliatory capability is not trivial. It is, on balance, the strongest entry on his side of the ledger. It is dwarfed by the Ahmadinejad catastrophe. Khamenei did not merely tolerate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He sponsored him, shielded him, and in June 2009 certified a fraudulent election to keep him. The Green Movement was crushed; the two contesting candidates placed under house arrest without charge. Judicial killings reached levels unseen since 1988. The nuclear file was escalated to international confrontation, and the domestic legitimacy required to negotiate a resolution had been destroyed by the very fraud that secured the presidency. Ahmadinejad spent the largest oil windfall in the Republic’s history and left the economy weaker than he found it. He dismantled planning capacity, transferred productive assets to institutions answerable to no electorate, and hollowed out the technocratic competence of the state. Khamenei paid more than his client. He set aside the founding generation of the Republic – Rafsanjani sidelined, Mousavi and Karroubi imprisoned, reformists purged – to protect a president who defied him within two years, whose faction he then had to dismantle, whom he barred from three subsequent elections, and who now stands accused of having been cultivated by the intelligence service of the state against which Khamenei had defined the Republic’s identity. The patron’s judgement was worse than the client’s ambition. He was killed on 28 February 2026 in a strike on his own residence (not in an underground bunker). The office passed to his son by a process no Iranian was invited to observe. The republican element of the Islamic Republic – already diminished – did not survive the transition in any recognisable form. The ledger is not complicated. Khamenei kept the state intact and kept himself in power. He did so by stripping the state of the internal mechanisms – a free press, an independent judiciary, competitive elections, public trust – that might have made it durable. He optimised for control and achieved fragility. That is his legacy. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  6. 5d ago

    Nobody Is Free to Stay

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast The programme opens in Istanbul, at a reading of the Shahnameh. Fifty thousand couplets, a thousand years old, recited aloud by Iranians far from home. Within two minutes the frame is set: this, we are told, is where Iranians go now, as disillusionment with Islam takes hold. ‘War, God and the Islamic Republic’, an edition of Heart and Soul presented by Emily Wither, broadcast on the BBC World Service on 18 June 2026 and released as a podcast the following day, then spends half an hour with four anonymous voices inside Iran, describing what decades of state religion have done to their faith. That testimony is real and it should be heard. A woman in her fifties who still prays, privately, and has no further use for the mosque. Her son, who once walked in the Muharram processions and now hears in them traffic and noise. People who lived through an uprising in January, then a war, then a truce that held by its fingernails. I doubt none of it. What I doubt is the frame assembled around them, which makes substitutions the witnesses themselves never make. Saying It for Them The title names the Islamic Republic; the half-hour delivers a verdict on Islam. Between the two sits a doctrine, velāyat-e faqīh, which is younger than most of the people interviewed, which was advanced as a comprehensive theory of government only in the twentieth century, and which was dismantled on Shiʿi philosophical grounds by Mehdi Hairi Yazdi in Ḥikmat wa ḥukūmat, a work I translated and have argued through at length elsewhere. None of this reaches the listener. They finish with the mosque and the Supreme Leader fused into one institution, and with the impression that leaving the second requires leaving the first. That is precisely what the clerical establishment in Tehran has always insisted. The BBC has now said it on their behalf. Conceded, Then Ignored In a single sentence, the programme’s own commentary concedes that reading Ferdowsi as a weapon against Islam runs ‘contrary to Ferdowsi’s own ideas’ – and then builds the remaining twenty-five minutes on that reading anyway. Ferdowsi was a Shiʿi Muslim. Hafez carries the name every Iranian knows him by because he had the Quran by heart, and his ghazals collapse without it. Take out the Quranic allusion and what is left is decorative noise. Rumi’s Masnavi has been called the Quran in Persian for eight hundred years. Offering these three as the refuge from Islam is a nationalist claim with a documented history, laundered here through a documentary as though it were a finding. I have written about what that amputation costs. The Shift Has Owners A deep and largely private turn, self-fashioned, welling up from within: that is how the billing describes it. It is nothing of the kind, and the misdescription does the most damage of all. This shift has an infrastructure, and the infrastructure has owners, budgets and editorial lines. Iran International and Manoto did not report the collapse of religious authority in Iran; they worked at it, nightly, for years, in Persian, into every satellite dish in the country, welded to a monarchist restoration project that needs Islam understood as an Arab imposition on an Aryan nation. Reza Zia-Ebrahimi gave the ideology its name, dislocative nationalism, and I have set out what it does to the people who take it seriously. A programme about Iranian faith that cannot name any of this is reproducing one of its outputs and calling the result evidence. The War as Weather The half-hour dates itself by a war, opens in that war’s aftermath, and treats the war as weather. Nobody bombed anyone. The bombs simply fell. Nobody tore up the JCPOA in 2018 while Iran was still keeping to it; the agreement merely lapsed. Nobody spent decades tightening sanctions until cancer patients could not find medicine and a middle class was ground into the dust; hardship simply arrived. Those decisions were taken in Washington, and in the European capitals that went along with them, and every one of them fed the disenchantment the programme finds so moving. The Islamic Republic has brutalised Iranians for forty-seven years. It has never done so alone, and it has never been the sole author of what Iranians now believe about God. What Survives the Edit Consider what a listener carries away. Across half an hour, no Iranian is heard saying that Islam is theirs, that they hold it with pride, that they oppose the Islamic Republic in the name of a faith it stole from them. Such Iranians number in the millions, inside the country and outside it, and some have paid for that position with prison. They are absent. What survives the edit is one proposition: faith is the thing you leave, and being Muslim is a condition to be recovered from. Run the substitution on any other religious community – half an hour in which every voice describes the tradition as something they were relieved to shed, with no believer given room to answer – and ask whether it clears the commissioning meeting. Freedom of conscience, on this evidence, runs one way. You are free to leave. Nobody appears to be free to stay. Flattening the field this way helps nobody. It explains nothing about why a devout household in Tehran and a secular one in Shiraz arrive at the same exhaustion by different roads. It offers no purchase on what should come next, because a situation described with half its causes missing cannot be repaired. And it lands in Britain, in English, at a moment when Muslims here are asked with some regularity to account for themselves. The BBC did not manufacture that climate. On this occasion it fed it. This Is Already Policy None of this defends the Islamic Republic. I have spent years arguing that it is a disaster for Iranians and a corruption of the tradition it claims to speak for, and I have paid for saying so. But an account that hands the whole catastrophe to a single culprit does more than mislead. It disarms the people it claims to be listening to. It tells Iranians that the road out of tyranny runs through the surrender of half of what they are, and it tells the rest of the world that a Muslim is something one recovers from. Neither is journalism. Both are already policy. What Outlasts Them The wedge being driven between the Quran and Hafez, between Islam and the Shahnameh, will outlast the men who made it feel necessary. Rulers fall. What a people has been persuaded to disown is far harder to get back. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  7. Jul 16

    The Grief You Can Afford

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast On Reza Pahlavi’s sudden mourning for the conscripts of Bampour, and the children of Minab he was willing to call a price This week you asked Iran’s soldiers not to die for the Islamic Republic. You mourned the conscripts killed at the Bampour garrison. You told their parents to keep their sons at home. You thanked the people of Iranshahr and Zahedan who queued to give blood for the wounded. And you said the regime imposed this war on the nation, so the blood is on the regime’s hands. Some of that is true. The Islamic Republic does hide its commanders and leave its conscripts exposed. But you are the last man entitled to say it, because the war you now place at the regime’s door is the war you asked for. Let me be precise, since the record is. At Munich you told the world that American military intervention could save Iranian lives. You urged foreign governments to join the protesters ‘fully’ and to strike the Guards’ command. When the bombs arrived – on the first morning of the war – you called them a ‘humanitarian intervention’. You did not accept this war reluctantly. You campaigned for it from a podium abroad, far from any garrison. You wanted it. The soldiers of Bampour were killed by the same campaign you cheered. Now you weep for them as though a different hand had fired the missile. Here is what makes the grief hard to credit. When this campaign killed the children of Minab – some hundred and seventy people at the Shajareh Tayyebeh school, most of them children, the youngest barely seven – you said nothing. Your movement filed them, along with the neonatal unit at Gandhi Hospital and some ninety thousand ruined homes, under three tidy words: the regime’s infrastructure. Condolences came quickly enough for foreign soldiers. For the girls of Minab you had a filing category. You have said, more or less plainly, that such deaths were a necessary cost of liberation. They were seven years old. Notice what has changed. The dead are conscripts now, and conscripts are useful. A dead child is an embarrassment to a war you endorsed; a dead soldier is a recruit for the defection you are trying to engineer. So the grief appears this week, on cue, addressed to precisely the audience you need. That is not mourning. It is bookkeeping. There is a third matter, and it is the one a king who loved his country could never wave away. Throughout this war your closest allies have taught Iranians to applaud the ruin of their own inheritance. When Golestan Palace, Tehran’s only UNESCO World Heritage site, was cracked open by a nearby strike, when Chehel Sotoun and Ali Qapu in Isfahan shook with the blasts, this too became ‘the regime’s’ property, a phrase stretched wide enough to file four hundred years of Qajar and Safavid workmanship under the heading of enemy assets. Bridges, hospitals, universities, a synagogue emptied at Passover: each reclassified as government real estate, so its destruction could be sold as freedom. Damaging a World Heritage site is a war crime. Your circle called it a fresh start. In Odesa – of all places, a city that knows exactly what a foreign bomb does to a home – you assured your hosts that Iranians celebrated the wreckage. Nobody asked the three million driven from their houses. So let me say what a serious claimant to Iran’s future actually owes it. You cannot bomb a country into your keeping and present the rubble as a gift. You cannot grieve the soldiers of one week while dismissing the children of another, and expect anyone still living in Iran to mistake the difference for principle. The oath you keep quoting, to Iran and not to a regime, is a good sentence. The trouble is that you invoke it selectively, and an oath honoured selectively is just a slogan with better manners. Iran does need its children alive. All of them. The conscript at Bampour and the seven-year-old at Minab, weighed on the same scale, grieved in the same voice, counted by nobody as an acceptable loss. On the day you can hold both without first asking which death serves your case, the throne you imagine might be worth discussing. Until then, spare the families of Bampour the sermon. You helped write the arithmetic that put their sons in the ground. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

  8. Jul 9

    Bargaining by Fire

    PodcastBy Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms Podcast The funeral has ended, the firing has resumed, and the next fortnight will decide whether the June understanding can be rebuilt. It can, and it probably will be. Ayatollah Khamenei was buried in Mashhad today, at the close of a six-day procession through Tehran, Qom, Najaf and Karbala that his state mounted, at great cost, as a demonstration of survival. The same week produced the sharpest exchange of fire since the June memorandum: shooting around tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, two nights of American strikes on Bandar Abbas, Bushehr and the Qeshm coast, Revolutionary Guard missiles against American bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, and an attack that cut the railway carrying mourners to the burial. Cortège and cruise missile shared one news cycle. That looks like the opening of a second war. I read it as the closing argument of the first – bargaining by fire between two sides that have already learnt what they most needed to know about each other, and now need a table more than a target list. The fire cannot hold Consider what the exchange has avoided. It began around shipping and it has stayed in the Gulf; Israel is bracing but untouched, and Iran has aimed at bases whose defences and politics it knows intimately. The American targets were naval facilities and a railway line – damage without decapitation. Washington’s language tells the same story. Trump pronounced the memorandum ‘over’ one day and allowed that talks could continue the next, while Vance reduced the whole architecture to a price list: the blockade stays lifted so long as the ships go unmolested. A price list is an invitation to haggle. Pakistan, which brokered the June understanding, urged restraint within hours, and the Gulf states – struck again, absorbing it again – will press for de-escalation, because their airspace and their insurance premiums carry the cost of every round. Then there is the market, which has stopped extending credit to either side’s theory of victory. The effective closure of Hormuz has already cost upwards of $60 billion in damage to energy infrastructure and more than $150 billion in lost export revenue, and the reinsurance industry now warns that a single chokepoint event of this kind could swallow the annual premium base for the entire war-risk class. Nobody underwrites a burning strait twice. Iran hurts too, but it hurts differently: its grip on Hormuz has become an organ of the state’s post-war survival, its trade with China runs largely outside the dollar system, and five months of bombardment have taught Tehran that endurance, plus the power to make global commerce bleed, is a currency no sanctions regime can freeze. Deterrence by bombardment has produced fragmentation and called it security. Neither treasury can sustain this posture through July, and neither leadership wants to; confined targets and open channels are the recognisable prelude to renewed talks, probably on wider terms than shipping alone. My expectation: a pause within days, and a restored – perhaps renamed – understanding within two or three weeks. A year’s ledger Now set the year in order. The war of 28 February began, in the middle of live negotiations, with the assassination of Iran’s head of state and much of its high command. Its declared purpose, in Washington and among parts of the exiled opposition, was to finish the Islamic Republic – the maximalist wager that has organised American policy for a generation, now tested to destruction against a polity that closes ranks under siege. Five months on, the ledger reads differently. The Assembly of Experts met under bombardment – its Qom office was hit mid-session – and produced a successor within nine days. The state then staged a five-city funeral across two countries and ran it with a discipline nowhere in evidence at Khomeini’s burial in 1989. A Friday prayer leader in Qom promptly claimed the crowds as a fresh plebiscite on the system. Stage-managed, certainly, and ruinously expensive. But the machinery worked, and after a season of decapitation strikes a working machine is itself an argument. The scale bears recording, because it will be disputed. In Karbala, by an eyewitness account received last night, one entry point alone – the approach from Najaf – held a 12-kilometre stretch filled with people and service stations. None of this launders January, when the system answered protest with a repression that credible monitors reckon at no fewer than 7,000 dead. The crowds were an alliance of the convinced and the affronted: the ideological core marching beside Iranians of no settled loyalty, for whom foreign bombs had rekindled an old reflex of national defence. That bloc is broad and it is loud, and it remains well short of half the country. But wars are settled by states, and the state stood. Pakistan sent its Prime Minister; the Gulf monarchies split the difference, sending deputies who kept the channel to Tehran warm while committing to nothing; Russia and China lent the occasion their presence while keeping their signatures off it; and more than 30 governments asked to take part. What carried the moment past confessional lines was the oldest grievance in politics: a head of state assassinated on his own soil. A power that was supposed to be broken is instead burying its leader before millions and negotiating as a state. The upper hand that matters is not military parity but outcome, and on outcome the year belongs to Tehran. An opposition that answered its own question If the war consolidated the state, it exposed the state’s loudest rivals. The restoration movement treated foreign bombardment as its moment. Satellite hosts cheered attacks on the country’s grid and ports; Reza Pahlavi reportedly told a forum in Odesa that Iranians had celebrated them, a claim I answered at the time. The constituency never materialised. Manoto, the movement’s flagship channel, had already gone dark for want of a paying audience. The Lion and Sun was waved over rubble, and the January dead – who belong to no exile’s column – were conscripted into arguments their families never made. Iranians who despise the Islamic Republic drew the obvious conclusion about an opposition that needed foreign bombs to feel within reach of power. That opposition is weaker today than at any point since 2022, and the monarchist project is, for practical purposes, finished. Western policy built on the premise of a government-in-waiting now has nothing left to point at. The fortnight ahead Four things are worth watching between now and the end of July. First, the maritime patch: quiet Pakistani shuttling, with Qatari help, toward the ships-for-blockade formula under a new name – and, running beneath it, Muscat’s quieter proposal to govern passage through the strait by ‘service fees’, which reads as administration where a toll would read as siege. Second, Tehran’s tone. Rhetoric will stiffen before it softens: a new leadership must prove its firmness to a grieving base before it can risk flexibility across a table, so a loud interval will precede a quiet one. Third, consolidation: whether Mojtaba Khamenei appears in public, and how the division of labour settles between the clerical office, Larijani’s security council and Pezeshkian’s government. Fourth, the spoilers. A sunk tanker, a strike that kills the wrong man, an Israeli decision to widen the theatre beyond the Gulf – any of these could turn bargaining by fire into the war neither principal wants this month. Behind all of it stands a constraint that nobody in Washington or Brussels says aloud. Europe has neither the capacity nor the politics for another refugee movement on the scale of 2015, the region has less, and no market can price a closed Hormuz for long. The system in Tehran will remain – for how long, nobody knows, and I make no prediction – and every serious government has conceded as much by negotiating with it. The Gulf capitals have gone a step further: their planners now argue that there is no return to the status quo ante, and that the durable answer is a regional compact – a collective non-aggression arrangement that acknowledges Iran’s weight and sets hard limits on its conduct – written by the neighbours who must live with the outcome. The honest policy follows from the same admission: a charted settlement covering the nuclear file, shipping and sanctions, agreed with the state that exists, on a timetable measured in weeks. The funeral is over. The table is waiting. Subscribe: Newsletter | RSS

About

In an Iranian digital landscape increasingly fractured by partisan vitriol, vulgarity, and the fog of fake news, this space is a commitment to restrained, academic rigor and clear-headed policy analysis. It is more than a blog; it is a response to a crisis of critical thinking. It is time to heed the call of reason. The Twin Wisdoms (twinwisdoms.org) is the English-language home for Dr Daryoush Mohammad Poor’s essays and critical observations. Its sister site, Malakut (malakut.org), is his long-established Farsi-language platform, where he has published commentary and analysis for a Persian-speaking audience for many years. Both sites are authored by Dr Mohammad Poor and reflect his commitment to thoughtful, rigorous engagement with the political, intellectual, and spiritual questions of our time. The views expressed are those of the author in a personal capacity and do not represent any affiliated institution.