One of the big debates—maybe the most important debate right now—going on in progressive politics is the the extent to which policymaking requires compromise. It’s both an electoral question—how can Democrats regain a majority both in 2026 and in 2028 and beyond—and question about crafting the kind governance that actually moves dearly held issue priorities forward. These are conversations I’m especially interested in because, although I cover all sorts of perspectives on policies related to kids and families—ranging from history to religious faith to civic engagement—at the end of the day, I’m a policy analyst. I’ve always been drawn to questions that require research, data, and evidence to bring a little light to the heat of political controversy. And right now, I’m getting pretty heavily criticized among many friends in the public school community for sticking to that approach on a couple of education questions—one of which we get into today. All of this is why I read with great interest a new book by Adam Jentleson, who makes the case that heterodoxy—both with respect to policy, but also politics—is necessary to actually win elections and govern. Adam is the president of the Searchlight Institute, having previously served in a number of leadership positions on Capitol Hill. His new book is called Supermajority: How Democrats Can Build Lasting Power (W.W. Norton & Co.) A Conversation with Adam Jentleson Adam Jentleson, thanks for being here. You make a pretty provocative argument that Democrats shouldn’t just be trying to win the next election, but should be trying to build something more like the dominant coalitions Democrats had in the FDR and LBJ eras. What do you think Democrats fundamentally misunderstand about what it takes to build a political supermajority? Yeah, absolutely. I think that’s a fair summary of the argument—and not to downplay the importance of winning elections. I would actually argue that my thesis is that we need to take that extremely seriously. But the way you do that is instead of aiming at the bare minimum number of votes. Whether you’re talking about the electoral college or like how to get to 50 plus one in individual election, instead of aiming at the bare minimum number of votes, we should be aiming higher to build bigger, broader coalitions so that every election doesn’t come down to a coin flip, you know, especially given the stakes that we’re dealing with today, where you have a genuine rise of right-wing authoritarianism in this country, and every election could be the difference between the survival of our democracy or not. So, you know, I think what the party has been missing is that—look, it is a privilege to have as much data at our fingertips as we do today. It’s an extremely useful tool. I would be the first to embrace it, but we at Searchlight have an in-house public opinion operation. We take it very seriously, and part of the argument in the book is that Democrats do need to pay attention to it. But you can’t become captive to the data. And one of the things that’s happened is we’ve decided that we can sort of, you know, slice the electorate extremely thin and aim, you know, and be very efficient in our resource allocation, you know, just to get to that literal, you know, 50 plus one that you need to win. And that has been a disservice because it’s caused us to try to be too clever by half in a lot of ways. My argument is that we should step back and say, what do I need to do to represent a broader coalition than the bare minimum necessary to win? That’s important electorally. It’s important for building, you know, more than just winning the next election. It’s important for building dominance over the next generation. But it’s also important on principle because, you know, you should aspire to represent as broad a swath of the public as you can, whether you’re talking about representing a district or a state or the country writ large as president. You know, it is a good thing and a healthy thing in civic society to try to represent as many people as you can, rather than just the bare minimum. So that’s… that’s, I think, what the party has lost, to answer your question, is that bigger perspective, that broader perspective of saying, you know, what does it take to build a dominant electoral coalition in this country, and how can we break out of that era of narrow… this era of narrow polarization that we’ve been stuck in for way too long? You write about the importance of “heterodoxy” — candidates who don’t necessarily fit neatly into the Democratic ideological box. But there’s an obvious tension here: if Democrats need to appeal to voters who don’t think of themselves as liberals, how do you distinguish productive heterodoxy from simply moving to the right? What’s the test? The test is whether you’re represent… Two tests, actually. One is whether you’re authentically reflecting your own views as a, you know, candidate, as a leader. Yeah, well, you know, let me pause on that one for a second, and I’ll get to the second test in a second. But, you know, we talk a lot about authenticity these days, right? Part of my argument is that it is actually inauthentic to assume a rigidly ideological position across the board, because that’s just not how… that’s not how I work, it’s not how you work, it’s probably not how your listeners and your readers work. I think, you know, any person, if they’re being honest with themselves, you know, is maybe mostly liberal, but probably has a few points of view where they diverge from the prevailing orthodoxy of their side of the spectrum, or, in the case of politics, from their party. And what we’ve done over the last 10 years is we’ve created an ecosystem that tries to suffocate any divergence from that orthodoxy, and that polices rigidity, and that tries to enforce these purity tests. And so what you end up having is candidates who are inauthentic, because they pretend to believe every single bullet point on their side’s, you know, articles of faith. So, I think, first of all, to answer your question, the first test is, you know, saying to yourself, well, listen, am I… are there areas where, you know, if I spoke up, I would diverge from my party, I might take some criticism from activists, interest groups, donors on my side. But I would be being true to myself, and I’d be being honest with myself. And frankly, by doing so, you’re probably gonna end up better reflecting the constituents that you’re vying to represent, because chances are that they think that way, too, where they have, you know, thoughts and ideas and beliefs that diverge. The second test is whether you’re picking fights for the sake of picking fights, or whether you’re doing it, um, to try to reflect that diversity of viewpoints that are in the, in the, uh, sort of in the mix of the American people. And I think, you know, there is risk in… part of what I outline in the book is that. These fights are actually very effective at breaking through our crowded media environment. You know, when media loves conflict, when you diverge from your party and you get yelled at by your side, that’s going to create a media scrum that breaks through, even in this intention starved environment that we live in. It is easy then to start to do that just for the sake of, you know, getting that attention and getting that fight. You do see some examples of that with folks who, you know, kind of get addicted to that high of picking the fight, getting a lot of attention, sort of wash, rinse, repeat. I think those two things combine, and that’s where you sort of form your basic standards here. You know, am I doing this because it’s what I believe in? Am I willing to have the argument because it’s my principle, or am I just doing it for the sake of fighting and for the sake of attention? And, you know, listen, as with many things in life, you know, there are gray areas, there are nuances you have to navigate here, and it could become a slippery slope, you know, but it’s easy to have a slippery slope back in the other direction of saying, well, I’m just gonna, you know, not ever speak my mind, or be honest about what I think, and instead just, you know, take the positions that are being forced on me, because that’s the path of least resistance. So, you know, we’re all adults here, I think people sort of know when they are being honest with themselves, or when they’re just doing it for the sake of attention, and that’s the kind of nuance that you have to navigate, but I think it’s worth it to embrace the challenge of navigating it, because the outcome is going to be a more, you know, genuinely representative politics, and, I would argue, more successful at dominating the power structure for the next generation. If we don’t embrace good faith policy disagreement, we really are creating a party that is going to become narrower and narrower and narrower, and our power base is going to become smaller and smaller and smaller.—Adam Jentleson You’ve argued that Democrats need to build a broader coalition without simply moving right on every issue. So let me test that with an issue I spend a lot of time thinking about: school choice. I’m not asking whether Democrats should embrace private-school vouchers. But the new federal scholarship tax credit creates an interesting wrinkle because, unlike many traditional voucher programs, the money can also support things like tutoring, after-school programs and other educational expenses for public-school families. I’ve argued that Democrats should be looking at this as an opportunity to crack open the voucher model — to make sure public schools and public-school families can access this new revenue stream, rather than ceding the whole concept of educational choice to the right. I’ve gotte