NET WINS Podcast

Net Wins

Forget the eye test and "empty stats." https://netwins.substack.com .I use Python and historical APIs to rebuild NBA history from the ground up. Home of the Net Wins rankings—where the data finally settles the GOAT debate. https://willf123.github.io/nba-net-wins/ netwins.substack.com

  1. Aug 6

    Oscar Robertson

    161.5 career Net Wins. 28th all-time. One championship. One MVP. The Big O averaged 30.8 points, 12.5 rebounds, and 11.4 assists per game in 1961-62 the only player in NBA history to average a triple-double for an entire season until Russell Westbrook matched the feat 55 years later. Thanks for reading NET WINS! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Oscar Robertson was the first selection of the 1960 NBA Draft, earned Rookie of the Year honors that season with the Cincinnati Royals, and averaged 30.5 points per game while leading the league in assists. He had just won a gold medal at the Rome Olympics and led the University of Cincinnati to back-to-back NCAA Final Fours. Measuring 6 feet 5 inches and weighing more than 200 pounds, Robertson was larger than most guards and used his size to gain position for scoring and rebounding. His jump shot was released far above his head with great efficiency, almost unblockable. The Career, Season by Season Regular season: 151.6 NW · Playoffs: 9.8 NW · Combined: 161.5 NW Average: 10.8 NW/season · Peak: 17.5 (1963-64) Thanks for reading NET WINS! This post is public so feel free to share it. The Triple-Double Season In 1961-62, just his second year in the league, Robertson averaged 30.8 points, 12.5 rebounds, and 11.4 assists per game a triple-double average for an entire season. He remained the only player to do so for more than 50 years until Russell Westbrook matched his feat in 2016-17. The Net Wins formula captures exactly why this season was so remarkable. A triple-double average means positive production across every major category simultaneously: the points add directly, the 12.5 rebounds (a figure that would rank among the elite rebounders in the league in any era) add directly, and the 11.4 assists add directly. The formula sees Robertson’s 1961-62 as a 13.3 NW season genuinely elite, though not his career peak, because his efficiency that year (47.8% FG) left room for the fgmiss penalty to reduce his total. His peak by Net Wins was actually 1963-64: 17.5 NW, 31.4 PPG, 9.9 RPG, 11.0 APG the season he won his only MVP. It ranks among the top 20 single-season figures in the 47-season database. Five Seasons Near Triple-Double Averages The 1961-62 season gets all the attention, but Robertson averaged at least 9 rebounds and 9 assists per game in five separate seasons while scoring 30+ per game in six. * 1960-61: 30.5 / 10.1 / 9.7 — within reach of a triple-double average in his rookie season * 1961-62: 30.8 / 12.5 / 11.4 — the historical season * 1962-63: 28.3 / 10.4 / 9.5 — near-triple-double again * 1963-64: 31.4 / 9.9 / 11.0 — MVP year, his highest Net Wins * 1964-65: 30.4 / 9.0 / 11.5 — his highest assist average His offensive prowess changed the point guard stereotype from simply a passer and floor general to a scorer and offensive weapon. Before Robertson, point guards passed. After him, point guards did everything. The Cincinnati Years: 116.5 NW, Zero Championships Robertson spent ten seasons with the Cincinnati Royals and produced 116.5 Net Wins an average of 11.7 per season that would rank as an elite career for most players. He won zero championships. The obstacle, consistently, was Bill Russell’s Boston Celtics. For five seasons the Royals stumbled against Bill Russell’s Celtics in the playoffs. The Celtics won eight consecutive championships from 1959 to 1966. Robertson was at the peak of his powers during most of that run and had no path through Boston. Prior to the 1970-71 season, the Royals stunned the basketball world by trading Robertson to the Bucks for Flynn Robinson and Charlie Paulk. Many observers believed it was coach Bob Cousy’s jealousy of Robertson that led to the trade. Robertson had just broken many of Cousy’s passing records. The relationship had soured irreparably. The trade was among the most lopsided in NBA history in Milwaukee’s favor. Milwaukee and the Championship Traded to the Milwaukee Bucks in 1970, Robertson joined forces with dominant center Lew Alcindor (later Kareem Abdul-Jabbar). The combination was explosive. The Bucks racked up 66 wins. Robertson’s 1970-71 season: 11.9 NW, 19.4 PPG, 5.7 RPG, 8.2 APG at age 32. Not his statistical peak, but a genuine elite performance on the best team in basketball. The Bucks became just the second team to sweep the Finals, ending in a 118-106 victory in Game 4 in Baltimore. After ten seasons of producing at an elite level for a franchise that couldn’t build around him, Robertson finally had his championship. He was 32. It had taken his entire prime. The Off-Court Legacy: Free Agency Exists Because of Oscar Robertson The playing career is extraordinary. The off-court legacy may be more significant. Robertson served as president of the NBA Players Association from 1965 to 1974, making him the first African American man to head a nationwide labor union in professional sports. In 1970, as NBPA president, he filed a class-action antitrust lawsuit against the NBA Robertson v. National Basketball Association. The lawsuit challenged the reserve clause that bound players to teams in perpetuity, prevented free movement between franchises, and suppressed salaries. The subsequent settlement included the Oscar Robertson Rule, which started free agency in the NBA. Every player contract signed since 1976. Every max contract. Every trade demand. Every player who has ever changed teams as a free agent. All of it flows from Robertson v. NBA and the settlement his lawsuit produced. Without Robertson’s willingness to put his career and reputation at risk by leading that fight, the modern NBA economy with its billion-dollar contracts and player empowerment does not exist. Robertson vs. Westbrook: The Two Triple-Double Legends The database places Robertson (#28, 161.5 combined NW) and Westbrook (#29, 160.2 combined NW) within 1.3 Net Wins of each other the two triple-double legends separated by the narrowest margin in the all-time rankings. The comparison runs deeper than the number: Robertson produced more per season across a shorter career. Westbrook accumulated comparable totals over five more seasons. Robertson’s peak (17.5) is meaningfully higher than Westbrook’s (15.1). Westbrook averaged triple-doubles in three official seasons to Robertson’s one but Robertson came within fractions of the average in four additional seasons. The Net Wins database puts them almost exactly equal across their careers. The per-season rate says Robertson was the more dominant individual player. The All-Time Picture Robertson retired from the NBA in 1974 with 26,710 career points (25.7 per game), 7,804 rebounds, and 9,887 assists an NBA record at the time. His jersey was retired by both the Milwaukee Bucks (#1) and the Sacramento Kings/Cincinnati Royals (#14). The Big O. One of only two men in basketball history to average a triple-double for an entire season the first to do it, and the standard against which the second was measured 55 years later. The man who filed the lawsuit that gave every player after him the right to choose where they work. Data: Net Wins Explorer, regular seasons 1960-61 through 1973-74. Career totals: 151.6 regular season NW, 9.8 playoff NW, 161.5 combined. Peak: 17.5 NW (1963-64). Average: 10.8 NW/season over 14 seasons. All-time combined ranking: #28. © 2026 Will Fiore. Net Wins formula and all written content are original works. All rights reserved. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit netwins.substack.com

  2. Jul 31

    Splitting Net Wins in Two

    This is an update to the Net Wins formula. Thanks for reading NET WINS! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. The formula hasn’t changed. The question has. Net Wins has always been built from one combined number — Player net actions = (PTS + REB + AST + BLK + STL) − (Missed FG + Missed FT + TOV + PF) — allocated to a player by his share of his team’s total, scaled to actual wins. That number has never distinguished between a bucket and a block. A 56-win season built entirely on scoring and a 56-win season built entirely on defense look identical once they land in the same column. Every term in that formula sorts cleanly into one side of the ball or the other. Points, assists, offensive rebounds, and the misses/turnovers that offense generates all belong on offense. Defensive rebounds, blocks, steals, and the fouls spent trying to get a stop all belong on defense: Offensive Net = PTS + AST + ORB − Missed FG − Missed FT − TOV Defensive Net = DRB + BLK + STL − PF Add them together and you get back exactly the same number the site has always used this isn’t a new stat, it’s the old one split down the middle. Which means Offensive Wins and Defensive Wins fall out for free: Thanks for reading NET WINS! This post is public so feel free to share it. Offensive Wins = Net Wins × (Offensive Net ÷ Total Net) Defensive Wins = Net Wins × (Defensive Net ÷ Total Net) As a sanity check, I ran it on the example already in the Net Wins Database: Cade Cunningham, 2025-26, 1,521 net actions, 9.31 Net Wins on a 60-win Detroit team. Split by side of the ball, that’s 7.79 Offensive Wins and 1.52 Defensive Wins a team icon who’s carrying Detroit’s offense far more than its defense, which tracks with how his season actually looked. Full 2025-26 database (Off Wins / Def Wins for every qualified player) is built. Next up: running the same split back across the full 1946–2026 archive so it’s live in the Explorer. © 2026 Will Fiore. Net Wins formula and all written content are original works. All rights reserved. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit netwins.substack.com

  3. Jul 28

    Moses Malone

    189.0 career Net Wins. Three MVP awards. The first modern player to go directly from high school to professional basketball. He outrebounded Kareem Abdul-Jabbar 73-30 in the 1983 NBA Finals and then went home to Petersburg, Virginia. The numbers trace a career that redefined what a center could be. Thanks for reading NET WINS! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Moses Malone led Petersburg High School to 50 consecutive victories and two state championships and was one of the most sought-after college basketball prospects in history. He chose to bypass college, however, and sign with the Utah Stars of the American Basketball Association in 1974, thereby becoming the first player to enter professional basketball directly from high school (Historical technicality: Reggie Harding was drafted out of high school by the Detroit Pistons in 1962, though due to eligibility rules and a year spent playing in the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), he did not actually play an NBA game until 1964). He was 19 years old. He had even signed a letter of intent to play at the University of Maryland before changing his mind and accepting a five-year, $1 million ABA contract. The decision was groundbreaking and controversial. It was also the correct decision. Moses Eugene Malone played from 1974 to 1995 two seasons in the ABA and 19 in the NBA, across eight franchises, dying in Norfolk, Virginia on September 13, 2015, at age 60. The career that began in the ABA at 19 ended in San Antonio at 39. The Career, Season by Season Regular season: 162.8 NW (Explorer) · Playoffs: 15.6 NW · Combined: 189.0 NW Average: 8.6 NW/season · Peak: 16.2 (1982-83) ABA seasons discounted at 90% in this newsletter’s adjusted all-time rankings. The Explorer’s combined figure reflects ABA stats at face value. Thanks for reading NET WINS! This post is public so feel free to share it. The ABA Years and What They Tell Us Malone’s two ABA seasons (1974-76) at ages 19-20 produced 10.5 combined raw NW respectable production for a teenager against professional competition, though this newsletter applies a 90% discount to pre-merger ABA statistics to account for competition level differences. At 90%, those seasons contribute 9.45 NW to the adjusted total rather than 10.5. After the ABA dissolved in 1976, he was acquired by the NBA’s Buffalo Braves, who traded him to the Houston Rockets two games into the 1976-77 season. His NBA debut season 9.3 NW at age 21, 13.5 PPG and 13.4 RPG he arrived in the NBA ready to compete at a high level. His 1977-78 dip to 4.8 NW at 22 is the one year the data shows an adjustment to new team. 15.0 rebounds per game but only 19.4 points the only dip in the data. The Houston Prime: 1978–1982 Starting in 1978-79, Malone entered a five-year run that produced 62.4 NW averaging 12.5 per season across his ages 23-27. He won his first MVP in 1979 after averaging 24.8 points and a league-leading 17.6 rebounds per game. The 17.6 RPG figure is one of the highest single-season rebounding averages a reflection of both his relentless offensive board pursuit and his positioning in the paint. His 1,444 total rebounds in 1978-79, spread across 82 games, contributed an enormous positive to his Net Total before a single basket is counted. In 1981 he led the Rockets to the NBA Finals, their only Finals appearance in the pre-Olajuwon era. His 1980-81 playoff NW was 3.6, his best postseason run to that point. The Rockets lost in six games to Boston. His 1981-82 season may be his most statistically dominant: 31.1 PPG, 14.7 RPG, second MVP. The following season, 1982-83 produced even more Net Wins (16.2 vs 14.6), because of the Philadelphia context. A better team, better teammates, and a championship generated a larger win total for his contributions to share in. “Fo’, Fo’, Fo’” — The 1983 Championship Moses Malone won his third NBA MVP Award after propelling Philadelphia to a 65-17 record in 1982-83. He famously predicted “Fo’ Fo’ Fo’,” declaring that the 76ers would sweep each round of the 1983 playoffs. The 76ers produced one of the greatest seasons ever with some of the league’s all-time best players including Julius Erving, Bobby Jones, and Maurice Cheeks. With the addition of Malone the 76ers became unstoppable, steamrolling thru the postseason 12-1 to win the 1983 NBA championship. The prediction was updated to “Fo’ Fi’ Fo’” they went 4-0, 4-1, 4-0 rather than three straight sweeps, losing one game to Milwaukee in the conference finals. Malone was named Finals MVP after averaging 26 points and 18 boards for the series, outrebounding Kareem Abdul-Jabbar 73-30 over the four games. Kareem was a Hall of Famer averaging 21 points per game in those Finals. Malone made him invisible on the glass. His 1982-83 playoff NW of 3.6 combined with his 16.2 regular season NW, made 1982-83 the most complete season in his career. The Long Sustain: 1983–1992 What separates Malone from most centers of his era is the durability of his production. After the championship year, he posted: 10.5 NW (age 28), 13.0 (29), 9.9 (30), 9.0 (31), 8.1 (32), 10.8 (33), 7.8 (34), 5.5 (35), 5.5 (36). That’s nine consecutive seasons of positive meaningful contribution from ages 28 through 36 across four different teams. He averaged more than 20 points per game for 11 consecutive seasons and led the NBA in rebounds six of the seven seasons from 1978 to 1985. The 1988-89 season at age 33 deserves special notice: 10.8 NW with the Atlanta Hawks, averaging 20.2 points and 11.8 rebounds. A 33-year-old center producing double-digit Net Wins on a team that went deep in the playoffs is not what typical aging curves predict. Malone was the rare player whose physical style not dependent on athleticism so much as positioning, anticipation, and relentless effort aged slower than the norm. The All-Time Picture The third-leading rebounder and tenth-leading scorer in combined NBA/ABA history. Three NBA MVPs (1979, 1982, 1983). One NBA championship. 12 All-Star selections. The all-time leader in offensive rebounds since the NBA began tracking the category separately in 1973-74, with 6,731. Malone is far ahead of Artis Gilmore 2nd on the all-time list with 4816. The Net Wins formula, which credits every rebound equally, captures a portion of what that means, but only a portion. The second-chance points, the disrupted defensive rotations, the demoralizing effect of watching a missed shot immediately regenerate into another possession those consequences ripple beyond what any box score column records. The Chairman of the Boards. 189.0 career Net Wins. 17th all-time. Data: Net Wins Explorer, ABA seasons 1974-75 through 1975-76 and NBA seasons 1976-77 through 1994-95, regular season and playoffs. Career totals: 162.8 regular season NW, 15.6 playoff NW, 189.0 combined. ABA seasons discounted at 90% in adjusted all-time rankings; Explorer combined figure reflects ABA at face value. Peak: 16.2 NW (1982-83). Average: 8.6 NW/season. © 2026 Will Fiore. Net Wins formula and all written content are original works. All rights reserved. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit netwins.substack.com

  4. Jul 27

    The NFL's Most Misunderstood Debate

    32 teams. One season of data. The results are clear but the conventional wisdom about what they mean is almost entirely backwards. Teams that run more do win more. The reason why changes everything. Thanks for reading NET WINS! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Every NFL offseason produces the same conversation: run the ball to win, or throw to win? Coaches talk about “establishing the run.” Analytics departments preach pass efficiency. Fans argue about whether their team’s 4.2 yards per carry is what’s really driving the offense. The 2025 NFL season data answers the question directly and then immediately complicates it. The Numbers That Start the Conversation League averages in 2025: 32.1 pass attempts per game, 26.8 rush attempts per game. Teams ran on 45.6% of their plays. Here is what those numbers correlate with when you line them up against wins: The run-heavy teams win more. The pass-heavy teams don’t. Yards per carry has almost no relationship with winning. And the single variable most closely tied to winning isn’t run or pass volume it’s how efficiently a team passes when it does throw. By the quartile breakdown: Five wins separating the most run-heavy teams from the least. That’s the difference between a playoff appearance and a top-five draft pick. Thanks for reading NET WINS! This post is public so feel free to share it. Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong About What This Means Here’s where the analysis has to be honest about causality. Teams that are winning run more because they’re already winning. When a team has a lead in the fourth quarter, it runs the ball to drain the clock. When a team is trailing by 14 in the fourth quarter, it abandons the run and throws constantly which is why losing teams accumulate high pass attempt totals and low rush attempt totals. The correlation between rushing and winning is real. The direction of causality is backwards from what coaches usually imply. The evidence: rushing efficiency (yards per carry) has almost no relationship with winning (r = +0.095). If running caused winning, efficient running should correlate with winning. It doesn’t. What correlates with winning is rushing volume and volume is dictated by game situation, not by a team’s philosophical commitment to the run. This matters because “establish the run” is a strategy that says volume causes winning. The data says volume reflects winning. They’re very different claims. The Actual Signal: NY/A Net Yards per Pass Attempt — passing yards minus sack yards, divided by total pass plays including sacks — correlates with wins at r = 0.688 and with points scored at r = 0.887. That last number is worth dwelling on. NY/A explains 77.5% of the variation in points scored across all 32 NFL teams. It is, by a wide margin, the strongest single variable in this dataset. Every point of NY/A translates to roughly 2.9 additional wins across a season: Wins = 2.851 × NY/A − 8.89 The spread between the league’s best (New England, 7.7 NY/A) and worst (New York Jets, 4.3 NY/A) is 3.4 points a projected gap of 9.7 wins. New England won 14 games. The Jets won 3. The formula nearly explains the entire difference. Look at what happens at the extremes: NY/A ≥ 7.0 (elite passing efficiency): NY/A Every team with NY/A below 5.0 won three or five games. Every team with NY/A above 7.0 won ten or more. The Las Vegas Raiders ran the ball the least of any team with poor NY/A and still went 3-14. The Jets ran more than the Titans, Browns, and Raiders and still went 3-14. Running volume didn’t save any of them. The One Team That Proves the Rule The New York Jets are the only team in the 2025 NFL season where yards per carry (4.6) exceeded net yards per pass attempt (4.3). Every other franchise generates more value from passing than rushing on a per-play basis universally, across all 32 teams, regardless of coaching philosophy or roster construction. The Jets went 3-14. This is not a coincidence. When passing is less efficient than running, a team’s offense has broken down at its most fundamental level. The Jets’ situation isn’t evidence that running is better than passing. It’s evidence of how catastrophically bad their passing game was, so dysfunctional that their mediocre running game was actually the more productive option. Is There an Optimal Mix? Once you control for NY/A statistically, run share adds almost nothing to win prediction (R² gain of 0.009, not significant). The mix doesn’t matter independently of efficiency. But here’s the wrinkle: among the four teams with NY/A ≥ 7.0, there’s a pattern. New England (50% run share, 14W) and Seattle (51% run share, 14W) run much more than the Rams (44%, 12W). The teams with elite passing efficiency who also run heavily win the most. This is almost certainly a game theory effect. A team that passes at a 7.7 NY/A rate but runs on only 35% of plays is giving the defense permission to commit fully to coverage. A team that passes at 7.7 NY/A and runs 29 times per game forces the defense to respect both. The running game doesn’t generate wins directly it generates defensive uncertainty that preserves the passing efficiency advantage. New England and Seattle have figured this out. Their run games aren’t good because they’re committed to running. They’re good because running well keeps defenses from teeing off on Drake Maye and Sam Darnold. What About Elite Receivers? If NY/A is everything, the next question is whether teams should simply go out and acquire the best receivers available, an A.J. Brown type, to maximize it. The data is skeptical. Team-level receiver quality (measured by a composite net production metric across all qualifying targets) correlates with NY/A at only r = 0.344 and with wins at r = 0.301 neither particularly strong. The most illustrative contrasts: Dallas has CeeDee Lamb and George Pickens the strongest receiving corps in the NFL by this metric. They went 7-9. Buffalo has arguably the worst group of receivers among playoff-caliber teams and went 12-5. New England’s top receiver net score is 327, roughly equivalent to a quality #2 receiver, and posted the best NY/A in the league. NY/A is primarily a quarterback metric. It measures completion percentage, air yards, accuracy under pressure, and turnover avoidance all of which are driven far more by QB decision-making than by whether the team spent a first-round pick on a receiver. Great receivers help, but: * Elite quarterbacks elevate average receivers (New England, Buffalo, Green Bay) * Elite receivers cannot compensate for poor quarterback play (Arizona, Tennessee, Cincinnati all had above-average receiver production and combined for 12 wins) * The marginal return on upgrading from a good to elite receiver corps is smaller than the return on upgrading from a mediocre to competent quarterback The optimization hierarchy, as the data suggests it: quarterback quality → offensive line (protects QB, enables the run threat) → scheme and usage → receiver quality. Receivers are real and they matter. They’re probably fourth. What Should Teams Actually Do? The honest answer the data supports: Don’t try to “establish the run.” Run volume follows winning; it doesn’t create it. Teams that commit philosophically to running first, passing second are optimizing around the wrong variable. Maximize NY/A above all else. This means investing in the quarterback position first, the offensive line second, and scheme that produces clean dropbacks and quick decisions. Every point of NY/A is worth roughly three wins. Once you have passing efficiency, run enough to keep defenses honest. The elite teams in 2025 weren’t choosing between running and passing. They were doing both well enough that defenses couldn’t commit fully to either. 28-30 rush attempts per game, at league-average efficiency, appears to be enough to generate the defensive uncertainty that preserves the passing advantage. Don’t build a roster around receivers before you have a quarterback. Dallas proves the point most sharply. The Cowboys have the most talented receiving corps in the league, a multi-time Pro Bowl quarterback in Dak Prescott, and went 7-9. New England has adequate receivers and Drake Maye and the best record in football. If receiver quality were the primary driver of NY/A and wins, Dallas should be near the top of both tables. They’re not which suggests the marginal return on elite receivers, even alongside a quality quarterback, is smaller than the optimization model implies. Scheme, health, and offensive line quality all appear to matter more than the receiving corps in isolation. The run/pass debate has always been framed as a philosophical question about identity. The data reframes it as an optimization problem. And the optimal solution isn’t run more or pass more. It’s pass better. Data: 2025 NFL Offensive Team Statistics. NY/A = (passing yards − sack yards) / (pass attempts + sacks). WR quality metric based on composite receiver net production across qualifying targets (30+ targets). All correlations Pearson r. Sample: 32 NFL teams, 2025 regular season. © 2026 Will Fiore. Analysis and written content are original works. All rights reserved. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit netwins.substack.com

  5. Jul 25

    Kobe Bryant

    The Mamba. 20 seasons, 201.4 combined Net Wins, 11th all-time. His peak came not in the 81-point game or the scoring title season, but in 2002-03, a year of 30 points and 13.8 Net Wins alongside Shaquille O’Neal, before everything fell apart. The numbers trace a career defined by brilliance, conflict, and a second act nobody gave him credit for building. Thanks for reading NET WINS! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. Kobe Bryant entered the NBA straight from Lower Merion High School in Pennsylvania as the 13th overall pick in the 1996 draft, selected by the Charlotte Hornets and immediately traded to the Los Angeles Lakers. He was 17 years old. He became the youngest player ever to start an NBA game at the time and the youngest to win an NBA championship at 20 years old when the Lakers won their first of three consecutive titles in 2000. Twenty seasons later, he left as one of the most decorated and debated players in the history of the sport. The Net Wins Explorer traces all of it. The Career, Season by Season Regular season: 172.2 NW · Playoffs: 29.3 NW · Combined: 201.4 NW Average: 8.6 NW/season · Peak: 13.8 (2002-03) 2013-14: missed almost entirely due to Achilles tear (April 2013) The Four Acts Act One: The Shaq Years (1996–2004) — 72.6 NW Kobe’s first eight seasons are inseparable from Shaquille O’Neal. They won three consecutive championships (2000, 2001, 2002) and then dissolved in the most public partnership breakdown the league had seen since the Wilt-Russell era. The Net Wins data captures the arc precisely. His 1999-2000 season (11.0 NW) marked the first year he was genuinely elite, age 21, an MVP-caliber year under Phil Jackson’s triangle offense. The following three seasons climbed to 13.8 NW in 2002-03, his career peak. That peak season 30 points, 6.9 rebounds, 5.9 assists, 2.2 steals is the most complete statistical profile of his career, producing more Net Wins on a better team than any of his later scoring title years. The 2003-04 season (9.8 NW) is where the Shaq era ends numerically before it ended formally. The team chemistry was already broken. O’Neal’s weight, effort, and contract demands were creating friction Kobe publicly criticized. The Lakers reached the Finals and lost to the Pistons in five games their worst postseason result of the dynasty years. That summer, Shaq was traded to Miami. Thanks for reading NET WINS! This post is public so feel free to share it. Act Two: The Wilderness (2004–2008) — 43.0 NW Four seasons alone. The most famous of them, 2005-06, the 35.4 PPG scoring title, including 81 points against the Toronto Raptors on January 22, 2006 produced 12.5 Net Wins on a Lakers team that won 45 games and lost in the first round. Here is where the formula diverges most sharply from popular perception. The 81-point game is the most celebrated individual performance in modern NBA history. The 35.4 PPG regular season scoring average, the 9th highest All-Time, is the number attached to Kobe’s cultural peak. But his highest-Net-Wins season was not the scoring title year. It was 2002-03, three years earlier, when he averaged 30 points on a better team in a more efficient system. The formula explains why: 35.4 PPG requires an enormous volume of field goal attempts. Missing those attempts, even at 45% efficiency, Kobe missed 1,647 field goals in 2005-06, generates a significant fgmiss penalty that caps the Net Total ceiling regardless of the point total. The 13.8 NW peak came at 30 PPG on more balanced production across all box score categories. Elite scoring volume and peak Net Wins aren’t the same thing. The 2006-07 season (10.8 NW, 31.6 PPG) included what many consider his most famous individual quote: demanding a trade in the summer of 2007 after the Lakers lost in the first round to Phoenix. The trade demand was withdrawn when Andrew Bynum’s development and Pau Gasol’s arrival changed the calculus. Act Three: The Second Championship Era (2007–2011) — 48.4 NW The Gasol trade in February 2008 is one of the most controversial in NBA history. Memphis received Kwame Brown, Javaris Crittenton, Aaron McKie, Marc Gasol, and two picks for a 27-year-old All-Star. Critics called it collusion. The NBA investigated and found no evidence of impropriety. What it produced was a Laker team capable of competing for championships again. Kobe’s 2007-08 season (12.8 NW) earned him the league’s regular season MVP, his first and only. His 2008-09 season (13.7 NW) was his second-highest ever and came with the first of his two second-act championships. The formula’s reading of that championship run: 4.3 playoff NW, his highest single postseason, across 23 games that ended with a championship over the Orlando Magic. Two consecutive Finals appearances (2009, 2010), two championship rings. The 2009-10 championship against the Boston Celtics went seven games, with Kobe posting 10.8 regular season NW and 4.0 playoff NW. His 2010 Finals performance, 28.6 PPG, including 23 fourth-quarter points in Game 7 is widely cited as the defining clutch performance of his career. Act Four: The Achilles and the Exit (2011–2016) — 20.6 NW The final act is the most poignant in the data. At age 34, his 2012-13 season produced 9.9 NW still in the range of a genuine All-Star contributor. On April 12, 2013, he tore his Achilles tendon while driving to the basket, punched the floor, made both free throws, and walked off the court. He missed most of 2013-14. He never fully recovered the athleticism that made his first three acts possible. The 2014-15 and 2015-16 seasons produced 1.6 and 1.7 NW respectively honoring the jersey rather than competing for championships, and everyone in the building knew it. On February 3, 2016, he announced his retirement, effective at the end of the season. His final game, April 13, 2016 against the Utah Jazz at Staples Center produced 60 points on 50 field goal attempts. It was either the most Kobe Bryant thing that ever happened, or a perfect farewell depending on how you view the formula. What the Numbers Say About the Kobe Debate The analytical debate about Kobe Bryant has been running since the late 2000s. Advanced metrics have been consistently critical: his usage rate is high, his efficiency relative to that usage is below what his volume suggests, and his on/off numbers on championship-caliber teams are frequently negative because any Laker lineup featured multiple quality players. Net Wins offers a partial answer to that debate. At 201.4 combined career Net Wins 11th all-time in the database the formula places him clearly in the category of all-time great. He produced 10 or more Net Wins in 10 separate regular seasons. He produced 12 or more five times. His peak (13.8 in 2002-03) is comparable to some of the most elite seasons in the database. But the formula also confirms some of the criticism implicitly. His scoring-title season (2005-06) ranks fifth in his own career by Net Wins, behind four other seasons where he scored less but contributed more comprehensively. The fgmiss penalty is the mechanism: shooting 35 times per game, even at above-average efficiency, generates more missed shots than a more balanced production profile, and the formula penalizes that directly. The honest assessment the formula produces: Kobe was a top-15 player in history by any reasonable measure. He was not, on a per-win-contributed basis, the best player of his era that honor belongs by this metric to Shaquille O’Neal and LeBron James, both of whom generated more Net Wins per season across their primes. What he was is rarer to quantify: a player whose will to win and individual brilliance created outcomes that the box score can partially but not fully measure. The 60-point final game is the emblem. 50 field goal attempts. 22 made. The formula sees 28 missed shots and deducts them from his Net Total. What it can’t see is what it meant to 18,997 people in the building or the generation of players who modeled their games on his footwork. The All-Time Picture Erving’s raw figure includes full ABA statistics. With this newsletter’s 90% ABA discount applied, Kobe ranks 11th ahead of an adjusted Erving. 201.4 combined career Net Wins. Five championships. One MVP. An 18-time All-Star. Two Olympic gold medals (2008, 2012). The legacy is sealed. Data: Net Wins Explorer, regular seasons 1996-97 through 2015-16 and selected playoff seasons. Career totals: 172.2 regular season NW, 29.3 playoff NW, 201.4 combined. Peak: 13.8 NW (2002-03). Average: 8.6 NW/season over 20 seasons. 2013-14 omitted from table (Achilles tear, near-full season missed). © 2026 Will Fiore. Net Wins formula and all written content are original works. All rights reserved. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit netwins.substack.com

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Forget the eye test and "empty stats." https://netwins.substack.com .I use Python and historical APIs to rebuild NBA history from the ground up. Home of the Net Wins rankings—where the data finally settles the GOAT debate. https://willf123.github.io/nba-net-wins/ netwins.substack.com