Astral Codex Ten Podcast

Jeremiah

The official audio version of Astral Codex Ten, with an archive of posts from Slate Star Codex. It's just me reading Scott Alexander's blog posts.

  1. −8 h

    Never Cross a River Four Feet Deep on Average

    Guest post by Alexander "Sasha" Putilin [This is a guest post by 2024 ACX grantee Sasha Putilin. I encourage any ACX grantees who are interested to write about their projects. - SA] The results of my ACX Grants 2024 project are in. The project attempted to replicate the 2023 study "Learning at your brain's rhythm: individualized entrainment boosts learning for perceptual decisions". It claimed that if you read a person's brain waves, figured out an individual peak alpha frequency, and flashed a bright white light at that frequency, then they learned a certain perceptual task faster. Why bother? The result hinted that learning may depend in part on how well the brain keeps its rhythms coordinated. In other words, perceptual learning may rely on an internal brain metronome. If flickering light could act as an external metronome, it might help the brain maintain the right rhythm and learn faster. The study offered an invitation to develop new frontiers of neuroscience and biohacking. If the effect generalised to other types of learning, you could build a learning helmet: put it on your head, let it read your brainwaves, flicker light tailored to your individual brain — and you learn a new skill quicker. And no, it didn't replicate. Most likely it can't replicate, because the effect is probably not real. The original study obscured the data with summary statistics. Running a $32,000 replication was excessive. We could've caught the issue with this study if we simply looked at the original data carefully. *record scratch* *freeze frame* Yep, that's me. You're probably wondering how I got here. Here's the story. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/never-cross-a-river-four-feet-deep

    38 min
  2. −8 h

    My AI Opinions

    I recently had a minor spat over someone misinterpreting my AI beliefs (see section marked "Update" at the bottom here), so I thought I would list them in one place, so I can refer people when they ask. Timelines1 Define AGI as AI intelligent enough to do 90% of knowledge work jobs. I think there's a 25% chance of AGI by 20272, a 50% chance by 2034, and a 75% chance by 2045. Basic argument: In a certain sense, AI is already "smart" enough for this (eg it can answer quantum physics problems, which require higher IQ than most knowledge work). Its remaining limitations are that it's confused, unagentic, lacks situational awareness, and tends to hallucinate. The METR time horizon graph, and several other related benchmarks/experiments/intuition pumps, suggest it's improving on time horizons at an (exponential) rate that lets it cross human-level performance sometime around the early end of the schedule above, and subjectively it feels like harder-to-measure constructs like situational awareness are improving about as fast. Arguments for earlier: recursive self-improvement causes a speedup compared to the trend. This is one of the biggest blank spots in my model: I don't know how fast RSI will progress, and I don't think anyone else does either. There's some function mapping a combination of AI talent and compute to progress, and we don't know how it behaves in the domain when there's far more talent than compute available. It could fizzle out completely for lack of compute, or it could go vertical. The AI Futures Project has done some of the best work trying to model this, but even they have low confidence.

    37 min
  3. 19 juni

    Book Review: The Dialectical Imagination

    The philosophers of the Frankfurt School practiced a technique called negative dialectics, where concepts are defined as much by what you can't say about them as what you can. Appropriately, the Frankfurt School has ended up defined by what you can't say about them. You can't say that they invented a new form of left-wing thought called Cultural Marxism. This would be (according to Wikipedia) the Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, a "far right anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that misinterprets Western Marxism, especially the Frankfurt School, as being responsible for modern progressive movements, identity politics, and political correctness". You're not supposed to dub them a transitional stage between Communism and postmodernism. You're not allowed to speculate that a lot of the academic humanities, as they're practiced today, descend from the Frankfurt School's brand of critical theory. You're not supposed to think of them as the point where the muscular pro-technology leftism of the early 1900s shattered into the pessimistic degrowth leftism of the present. Art is long, life is short. Most of us only manage to not do a few things in our limited span on Earth. But the Frankfurt School managed to not invent so many movements - to not be involved in so many of the crucial ideological shifts of the past century - that they caught my attention. Who were these people? What other aspects of our culture might we be unable to say they were involved in? For answers, I turned to the classic history of the group, Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination. The basics are simple enough: the School was founded in Frankfurt in 1923. It attracted great philosophers like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse. When the Nazis took power in the early 1930s, the mostly-Jewish Frankfurters fled to America, where friendly locals helped them continue their work in affiliation with Columbia University. Mid-century Americans were suckers for sophisticated European intellectuals, and when the rise of fascism and World War II started dominating headlines, the German-Jewish Frankfurters were natural experts to help Americans process the situation. By the end of the war, they were firmly established as thought leaders. Some - including Horkheimer and Adorno - returned to Germany to rebuild its intellectual culture from the ruins; others stayed in America and remained relevant through the 60s and 70s. But figuring out what the Frankfurters believed is more complicated. Forget about the thin line between universally-acknowledged fact and fascist conspiracy theory. The School itself was famously coy, worrying that if they explained themselves too clearly, people would caricature their beliefs and integrate them into the existing capitalist system. Even when they did speak "clearly", it was in the sort of German philosophical register where "the negation of the negation" is a totally normal thing to say. Having only read a single book on them, I will no doubt fall into all the failure modes that they and their successors warned us against. But here are the analogies, intuition pumps, and parables that I found helpful. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-dialectical-imagination

    47 min
  4. 19 juni

    New Paradigms Won't Save You

    One popular objection to AI concerns is to declare that LLMs can never be AGI. You need a "new paradigm". Therefore, AGI is so far in the future that it's not worth worrying about. A common counterargument is to claim that no, LLMs can become AGI. But even without that counterargument, I think the "therefore" fails on its own terms. The key question is: how much of a new paradigm do we need? The landmark discoveries on the road to modern LLMs are something like: 1950s: Neural networks 1967: Multi-layer perceptron 2010: Modern deep learning 2017: Transformer, LLM 2022: RLHF, chatbots 2024: Chain of thought / test-time compute We can think of this as an "evolutionary tree", where a given LLM (let's say Claude Opus 4.7) shares a recent "common ancestor" with all other chatbots, and only a very distant "common ancestor" with everything else descended from the multi-layer perceptron. If AGI needs a "new paradigm", what common ancestor can we expect AGI and LLMs to share? AGI will very likely use neural networks, because the human brain is a neural network and qualifies as an AGI. It will probably use deep learning, because although deep learning isn't exactly analogous to the brain, it seems like a pretty reasonable way to emulate the brain's learning algorithms onto computer hardware. Skeptics like Yann LeCun and Gary Marcus usually pinpoint LLMs/transformers as the step where we went wrong. LeCun thinks that the first AGIs may be within the deep learning paradigm (but not LLMs); Marcus thinks that they'll combine insights from deep learning with something else. How soon should we expect a new paradigm as revolutionary as LLMs/transformers? Since we got LLMs/transformers nine years ago, Lindy's Law suggests nine more years. How soon should we expect a new paradigm as revolutionary as deep learning? By the same logic, sixteen years from now. Lindy's Law has a heavy tail, which means we can't simply halve these to find our 25th percentile estimate. Our 25th percentile estimate for the next advance as exciting as LLMs should be three years from now; for deep learning, it's five years. So even if you think AGI will require a further paradigm shift as big as the invention of the LLM or as deep learning itself, you should have 25% chance it will be developed in the next 3 - 5 years. Which is about as long as the LLM-only crowd think things will take! This isn't an excuse for relegating the risk of AGI to some vague indefinite future. It could still be the late 2020s or early 2030s! (Might we expect that low-hanging-fruit effects make the next paradigm harder to find than the last one? In practice, fields get more researchers as time goes on, and that effect usually causes time-between-advances to be approximately constant. And in fact, the number of AI researchers has grown at an unprecedented pace for a scientific field, and growth will enter an even faster regime once AIs themselves can contribute. Overall these make me think things will go even faster than Lindy's Law predicts - but I think Lindy's Law is a useful upper bound.) (Would there still be a long time between the invention of the new paradigm and the point where it could be used to maximum effect? It took five years between the invention of the transformer and ChatGPT, the first commercially-successful transformer-based project. But most of that time was spent scaling up, and we've already scaled up. If we invent a new paradigm in 2030, then any frontier lab willing to bet on it can quickly provide it with levels of compute sufficient to train human-brain-sized models.) This is my attempt to talk to the new-paradigm-wanters in their own language, but I think there's also a subtler point that undermines this worldview. In the past, new paradigms have proven useful in allowing scaling to continue after an old paradigm passed the regime where it could efficiently convert scale to results. LLMs still seem to be able to convert scale to results; while this continues, new paradigms won't be necessary, and frontier labs won't risk pursuing them. If scaling ever hits a wall, there will be a few months of confusion as frontier labs look over various new-paradigm-proposals that they already have lying around, and throw them at the wall to see what breaks through. Then scaling will continue from wherever it left off. The best way to forecast future AI progress is to extrapolate from current LLM scaling. This should work if LLMs scale all the way to AGI. But it may also work even if they don't. First, because we might get the new paradigm so soon that it won't be a significant source of delay. And second, because the most likely place for a new paradigm to start is wherever LLMs stop working, going at the same rate. https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/new-paradigms-wont-save-you

    6 min
  5. 13 juni

    Nostalgebraist's Hydrogen Jukeboxes

    In conclusion, the only good theory of taste is Nostalgebraist's. He wrote a post called Hydrogen Jukeboxes, analyzing the literary output of an AI called R1. This AI tried hard to write good fiction, which was part of the problem. It crammed its stories with what Nostalgebraist called (stealing a term from Ginsberg) the "eyeball kick" - a flashy stylistic move that immediately catches the reader's attention and "wows" them. Here are examples - some from R1, others from an experimental OpenAI model trained specifically for fiction-writing: "There is a prompt like a spell: write a story about AI and grief, and the rest of this is scaffolding—protagonists cut from whole cloth, emotions dyed and draped over sentences." "When the jar of Sam's laughter shattered, Eli found the sound pooled on the floorboards like liquid amber, thick and slow. It had been their best summer, that laughter—ripe with fireflies and porch wine—now seeping into the cracks, fermenting." "And so I built a Mila and a Kai and a field of marigolds that never existed. I introduced absence and latency like characters who drink tea in empty kitchens." "The morning her shadow began unspooling from her feet, Clara found it coiled beneath the kitchen table like a serpent made of smoke." Nostalgebraist and another writer, Coagulopath, catalogue some of the most common AI eyeball kicks, each occurring across multiple LLM models: "An overwhelming reliance on cliche. Everything is a shadow, an echo, a whisper, a void, a heartbeat, a pulse, a river, a flower—you see it spinning its Rolodex of 20-30 generic images and selecting one at random." "Conjunctions combining one thing that is abstract and/or incorporeal with another thing that is concrete and/or sensory." "Repetitive writing. Once you've seen about ten R1 samples you can recognize its style on sight. The way it italicises the last word of a sentence. Its endless "not thing x, but thing y" parallelisms…the way how, if you don't like a story, it's almost pointless reprompting it: you just get the same stuff again, smeared around your plate a bit."   https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/nostalgebraists-hydrogen-jukeboxes

    15 min

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The official audio version of Astral Codex Ten, with an archive of posts from Slate Star Codex. It's just me reading Scott Alexander's blog posts.

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