Let's Know Things

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A calm, non-shouty, non-polemical, weekly news analysis podcast for folks of all stripes and leanings who want to know more about what's happening in the world around them. Hosted by analytic journalist Colin Wright since 2016. letsknowthings.substack.com

  1. Balcony Solar

    3 days ago

    Balcony Solar

    This week we talk about plug-in power, renewables, and Germany. We also discuss inverters, solar arrays, and microgrids. Recommended Book: Consider This by Chuck Palahnuik Transcript Most climate scientists and knowledgable folks in adjacent fields will tell you that, as a species, we’re way behind where we need to be if we’re going to avoid a whole lot of negative consequences caused by global climate change. We’ve blazed past a bunch of tipping points already, and while the worst-case scenarios we were worried about a decade ago are no longer likely because of the energy-generation and related changes we’ve made globally, since then, the damage caused up to this point is already doing some pretty bad things to our water cycle and other temperature-regulating systems, and that’s looking like it will get even worse over the next several decades—even if worse no longer means cataclysmic in the sense of ending all life on the planet. That said, even noting that progress has been a lot slower than most experts would prefer, progress is happening in regards to the deployment of renewable energy sources, and in the replacement and retirement of dirty, carbon- and methane-spewing sources, like coal, petroleum, and gas. As of 2026, the global share of total electricity generation, so all electricity produced by all sources for all purposes, is about 33.8% for renewables, marking the first time renewables have been used to produce more than a third of the total electricity produced, globally; that also means renewables have surpassed coal for electricity generation for the first time. While hydro and wind continue to contribute to the growth of renewables deployment and electricity generation, solar power is by far the biggest growth area for renewables right now, and solar, alone, covers 75% of total electricity demand growth in 2025—which means as countries around the world deploy more electricity generation assets to account for electricity demand growth, three-quarters of that demand is being met by solar. And this is notable because typically that kind of demand, the majority of which arises in huge, rapidly scaling countries like China and India, has up till recently been met by the dirtiest of energy production sources, coal. There’s also been a .02% reduction in fossil fuel generation, year-on-year, which is a very small number, but that level of production is massive, and there are a lot of subsidies and other mechanisms that keep fossil fuels flourishing around the world, so every little sliver of fossil fuel energy production reduction is still a pretty significant thing. Many of these renewables-related wins, in recent years, have been attributable to the large-scale installation of solar facilities, backed by massive, utility-scale battery backups, primarily in China. China is by far the largest producer of solar panels and related technologies—Chinese companies produce somewhere between 80-90% of all the key components and perform the same portion of all key manufacturing stages for the global supply chain, while also controlling the vast majority of resources necessary to manufacture solar panels. And it has been on a tear over the past decade or so, installing just a silly amount of solar infrastructure. Which is good, because China is also seeing a lot of growth in energy demand, so if they weren’t deploying that much solar, they would likely be deploying that much coal infrastructure, instead. That said, while huge solar arrays are important to renewables growth, there’s also been a recent boom in smaller-scale solar energy deployment in recent years, especially but not exclusively across Europe. And that’s what I’d like to talk about today: the emergence of so-called ‘balcony solar,’ and what it might mean for the further expansion of solar’s footprint around the world. — In 2025, Utah, which is a deeply Conservative, Republican state, became the first US state to pass a bill that makes it easier to legally install plug-in solar panel systems. As of mid-2026, about 30 states have followed suit, and even more are considering it, laws allowing for the installation of such solar technologies winding their way through legislative bodies on the back of the popularity and seeming no-downsides nature of this tech product category. Plug-in solar, also sometimes called balcony solar or garden solar, is currently most popular in Germany, which is the biggest market for this product right now, with about four million such systems installed as of 2025. To understand the popularity of this type of solar installation, it’s useful to understand that conventional solar installations have typically required a decent amount of electrical surgery to install. They’ve usually involved a large number of panels operating as an array, and that array has produced quite a lot of electricity that then has to be funneled as a direct current either back into the local grid using what amounts to two-way wiring, which makes these arrays function like any other power plant, or that electricity is converted using an inverter into an alternating current, where AC is the electrical standard, anyway, so that it can directly power a large building like a hospital or school, or be stored in a large battery facility. All of these options require a huge up front investment, and a reworking of local energy infrastructure so that solar can be incorporated. And that investment requirement, and the necessity to hire specialist electricians to get it all done, severely limits the range of this tech, because there are only so many entities that can afford it, only so many spaces that can deploy that number of panels, the number required to make that investment make sense, economically, is generally quite large, and there are only so many specialists of that kind in a given country, so the labor aspect of this is a big deal, too, these sorts of projects often severely backlogged. Plug-in solar, in contrast, is usually sold as a kit with one or two small- to medium-sized panels and a microinverter or plug-in inverter, depending on whether the end-user’s existing electrical setup uses an AC or DC current. A home owner or even a renter with a balcony or garden, or the right amount of space outside one of their windows, can buy one of these systems, hang or place the solar panel or panels in a location where they will get a decent amount of sun, and then plug them in, via the inverter, directly to their home’s outlet. The electricity generated by the panels is then shared through the building’s existing wiring to all of their outlets, and this allows the resident to use that available energy, first, only drawing energy from the local grid when there isn’t enough from the solar panels available. And all of this happens automatically—the solar energy is used if available, and if not, energy is drawn from the grid like normal. This creates a layer of essentially free, clean energy for the resident with a usually fairly small up-front cost: these plug-in solar kits can cost as little as $500, with larger systems that generate more electricity costing between $1200 and $3000; so even on the high-end, because there’s no additional installation cost, the home owner or renter setting it all up themselves, this is an investment that can easily pay for itself, usually within 2-5 years. There are caveats here, including that not all grid systems are complaint with this use-case, so would-be plug-in solar users have to check to make sure their local setup can handle this sort of application, and there are many places where this product type still isn’t legal, in some cases because of concerns about people installing it without checking to make sure their wiring and the local grid can handle it, and in some cases because of old laws that favor local energy grid companies and their business models, or which favor fossil fuel energy production. The explosion in use of this type of small solar setup, though, speaks volumes about how good a deal it is for many people, and even those who don’t live in particularly sunny areas—so places where traditional solar arrays wouldn’t make sense, economically—are finding them useful, because they still pay for themselves within some number of years, due to energy bill savings. It’s also possible to install home-scale battery systems alongside these balcony solar systems, which means even small trickles of solar energy production can add up, and can be used at night, when the sun isn’t shining at all. There are quite a few possible ramifications of this trend. At the local, household level, these sorts of systems can dampen the impact of energy price increases, due to global issues, like the gumming up of the Strait of Hormuz, and due to local issues, like the trend of energy companies increasing prices because of new data centers being added to their grid. That, in turn, can reduce the impact of certain aspects of inflation on individuals home owners and renters. Larger-scale, though, these systems also serve as a sort of deconstructed secondary energy grid. In Germany, for instance, as of late 2025, around 1.14 gigawatts of energy was being produced by balcony solar systems across the country. That’s 1.14 GW of pressure taken off of local energy grids, and that represents more resilience for these grids, too, as reduced pressure means fewer brown-outs and similar negative fluctuations. It also means people who have such systems won’t be as negatively impacted by issues that take down grids; and that means normal, brown-out like issues, but also problems related to potential cyberattacks and hacks and even physical conflicts. That kind of resiliency is what every nation hopes to have, because it makes strikes on them less damaging, and this is one way to achieve that kind of resiliency—a deconstructed network of microgrids, underpinning the macro-scale o

    14 min
  2. Cholesterol Therapies

    16 Jun

    Cholesterol Therapies

    This week we talk about LDL, HDL, and cardiovascular issues. We also discuss one-time therapies, statins, and pharmaceutical economics. Recommended Book: Blood by Dr. Jen Gunter Transcript Cholesterol is the most common type of what’s called a sterol, which is a type of steroid, but also structurally technically an alcohol. But functionally, and classified by scientists, cholesterol is a lipid, which in this case is similar to a fat in all but how the body uses it. Cholesterol is the type of sterol most commonly found in animals—other types are found in plants and fungi—and its function, and this is where it varies from fats, which are used to store energy, is to basically help hold the cell membrane together, and it also serves as an intracellular messenger. Cholesterol is especially prevalent in the brain and spinal cord of animals, but it’s found throughout their bodily tissues, as well, and again, it’s vital for holding everything together and helping things communicate, in addition to being a precursor for vitamin D, steroid hormones, and bile. You want to have cholesterol, then, as without it you would be dead. Too much cholesterol in the blood, however, can also make you dead, especially when it’s bound to what’s called low-density lipoprotein, or LDL, as that contributes to cardiovascular disease like heart attacks and aneurysms, which can massively impact one’s overall wellness and quality of life, and at extremes lead to the whole system shutting down as a consequence of heart attack, stroke, and the like. A lot of things can contribute to the development of cardiovascular disease, including habits like smoking, genetic predisposition, and the enthusiastic consumption of alcohol and unhealthy foods. But high blood cholesterol, of the LDL variety, is one of the top contributors, as these low-density clusters of lipoprotein can clog the pathways that blood takes throughout our bodies. Other, denser types of lipoproteins, HDLs, can clear it, like a heavier, denser substance pushing through clogs of less-dense materials that are gumming up a pipe, but LDL is at times accumulated as a result of consuming delicious but unhealthy foods, which are hard to avoid, and for some people the only consistently available and affordable foods; and for other people LDL accumulates as a result of their genetic predispositions—two things that are devilishly difficult to change. What I’d like to talk about today is a new type of therapy that may be very good news for people who struggle with the accumulation of LDL, and why this is being seen as very good news more broadly, at the scale of entire nations, as well. — Pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly is testing a new, experimental drug called VERVE-102 which is a one-time infusion that is currently administered over the course of about four hours, and once completed, it turns off a gene called PCSK9, which is responsible for making a protein that regulates cholesterol levels in humans. As I said, this drug is still being tested, so these are early results. But in a study of 35 people with high cholesterol levels, high levels of LDL or LDL-C, which is short for lipoprotein cholesterol, they found that this infusion, which again, is a one-time treatment, so get it once and then theoretically at least you never have to get anything done ever again, it reduced those LDL and LDL-C levels by as much as 62%, and that reduction was maintained a year and a half after the infusion; that’s how far out they’re retested so far, and the hope is that each retest will continue to show the same. On the strength of those very promising results, a Phase 2 study has been planned by the end of 2026, and the US Food and Drug Administration, the FDA, previously fast-tracked this existing study, because of the promise and potential this drug already demonstrated in early studies; all of which is considered to be very significant progress and possibility. To understand that significance, though, it’s useful to know some health stats. And I’m going to focus on the US here, as that’s where this drug is being developed, but many wealthy countries have similar stats, at least in terms of cardiovascular disease struggles. As of 2024, which is the last year we had good, cohesive data on this in the US, it was estimated that about 11-12% of the US adult population has high cholesterol levels. This typically doesn’t come with any symptoms, but it can contribute a higher risk for all those cardiovascular diseases, including heart attack and stroke. A further 86 million US adults have borderline or elevated cholesterol levels, which can easily tip higher, but also, even in that existing, elevated state, contribute to negative cardiovascular outcomes. There are treatments for high cholesterol, the most common of category of which are called statins, which reduce the production of LDL by inhibiting an enzyme that produces cholesterol in the body. Unfortunately, these drugs do come with some usually minor side effects, which can cause patients to stop using them, and they have to be taken daily, ideally at the same time each day. That necessity for consistency leads to a lot of incorrect or incomplete usage, which reduces the effectiveness of these drugs. But it’s also estimated that only about 54.5% of US adults who would benefit from statins are currently taking one—so that’s people who could benefit and who have it prescribed, and then within that number are all the people who are taking this drug incorrectly or incompletely, reducing the effectiveness. So a relatively small number of people who should probably be on these things are getting the full benefit they offer because of the nature of the drug. And that’s not great, because in the US alone, heart disease is the leading cause of death for pretty much every adult demographic; men, women, people of most racial and ethnic and economic groups, you name it, heart disease is the biggest threat to their lives. One US citizen dies every 34 seconds of some kind of cardiovascular condition, and as of 2023, 1 in every 3 deaths in the US was caused by the same, adding up to just over 919,000 people that year. Between 2021 and 2022, alone, the cost of services and medications related to heart disease added up to more than $168 billion; again, that’s just in that period, and just in the US. And once more, these are ailments that are caused or heavily influenced by high levels of cholesterol, which are themselves amplified by common lifestyle choices, environmental factors that are hard for many people to avoid, and just by raw, dumb luck because of genetics. This treatment category, then, is being seen as a pretty big deal because a one-time infusion means those who receive it don’t have to remember to take a pill every day at the same time, and won’t experience those statin-based side-effects. It also means that people who are currently costing the medical system a bunch of money each year, because they need treatments for all the issues they suffer as a result of high cholesterol, will suddenly cost the system a lot less money, for treatments and medications. Not for nothing, their health and quality of life will likely improve as well. So in addition to having better, healthier outcomes personally, their cost to healthcare systems will drop. Eli Lilly’s drug isn’t the only one currently working its way through clinical trials, either. Amgen is working on a similar treatment, and Novartis and Ionis Pharmaceuticals have drugs that are even further along in the process, their medicines that cut heart attacks, strokes, and cardiovascular deaths could be approved by the FDA as soon as next year. There are a lot of caveats worth noting here, including that the science is still out as to whether this approach, silencing proteins that lead to the creation of more LDL and a similar substance called Lp(a)—which is more dangerous because it’s stickier and thus more likely to get stuck in important blood pathways, and it’s also more likely to be caused by genetics than lifestyle—the word is still out on whether reducing these things in the body actually reduces hearth attacks and stroke. Some people have had this particular risk variable dramatically reduced, but have still suffered from cardiovascular events, which raises the question of whether this path is the right one to take in trying to reduce this category of health issues; the correlation between LDL and heart attacks and strokes might not be a clear-cut as long assumed. There’s also the issue of price. Drug-makers are economically incentivized to sell treatments over cures, because that means they can continue selling their product over time, potentially for the life of the patient, and a cure, in contrast, is a one-time hit that in theory should alleviate the need for future treatment. There’s a chance, then, that the drug-makers will decide they need to make these one-hit treatments really, really expensive in order to make their R&D dollars back and to make the kinds of profits their investors expect from them. That could then reduce the potential audience for these treatments, even if they are effective, and could further slow their deployment and future research in this space. If these trials continue to go well, though, there’s a good chance that this combination of similar but distinct treatment types will provide a more sustainable alternative to current options, and that, like the recent bogglingly rapid and widespread deployment of GLP-1 treatments for all sorts of issues, could lead to a new paradigm in this facet of the medical world. Show Notes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cholesterol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardiovascular_disease https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_cholesterol https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10982736/ https://www.cdc.gov/heart-disease/data-research/facts-stats/index.html https://www.who.int/health-

    14 min
  3. SpaceX IPO

    9 Jun

    SpaceX IPO

    This week we talk about initial public offerings, Anthropic, and investment flywheels. We also discuss AI, financial entanglements, and backstops. Recommended Book: Superconvergence by Jamie Metzl Transcript An initial public offering, or IPO, is what happens when a private company goes public and starts selling shares of itself, occasionally to just institutional investors like banks and sovereign wealth funds, but usually also to retail investors, which means normal people who buy stocks as part of their investment strategy. Often private companies go this route, go public, because it’s one of the primary ways of gleaning new, oftentimes large inflows of money, and that money can then be used for investments in assets for the company, but it also allows employees who have shares in the company as part of their compensation to cash out, to get paid possibly a huge bonus for all their efforts, and it’s often a means by which executives garner huge paydays for themselves, because they can now sell their accumulated shares, or borrow against them, or because they have something in their contract that says they get x amount of bonus money or new shares if they take the company public, or achieve a certain valuation goal—and going public is a good way to do that. This is also one of the primary ways investors in a company, whether that’s a bunch of smaller seed investors or big-name venture capitalists, to get their money back; the 10 or 100x-ing of their investment, getting ten or 100-times the money they put into the company, generally happens through an IPO, because it can balloon the valuation of that company, and it gives them a more conventional and reliable way of getting money back for their shares: they can just sell those shares on the open market. So an IPO allows a private company to make shares of itself available to others, on scale. And the ‘initial’ part of initial public offering points at the early days of the process, during which the baseline price of a share of stock is established. A fairly arcane and complex process has emerged around this, and it’s an entire industry at this point, with some institutions specializing in taking companies public, helping them get as high an initial price on that stock as possible. They also help them leap all sorts of regulatory hurdles set by the Securities and Exchange Commission, if they’re going public on a US exchange, at least, other bodies handle such things in other countries, and these going-public entities, called underwriters, which are usually investment banks, also typically have their own stake in the matter, earning compensation through a fee called a ‘gross spread,’ which is the difference between a discounted rate on the stock and what the stock is sold for on the open market on that first day it’s available. What I’d like to talk about today is a wave of very closely watched unusual, impending IPOs that are coming later this year, and one of them in particular that looks to be even more unusual than the rest. — SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic are three of the largest companies in human history; on paper, at least. And that’s an important caveat. Market valuation for private companies is generally determined by how much investors are willing to spend on a percentage ownership of the company. So if you start a lemonade stand and I offer to buy 1/10th of that lemonade stand from you for $100, that implies, using this logic, that your lemonade stand has a valuation of $1000; 10 times that $100 that I offered to pay you. Such valuations are also informed by independent analyses from outside experts and institutions. SpaceX, for instance, pre-IPO, is estimated to be worth somewhere between $780 billion and nearly $2 trillion, depending on who you listen to, based on their assets, their potential future earnings, and any advantages they might have in the markets in which they operate. AI company Anthropic is estimated to be worth something like $965 billion, based on a May 2026 series H funding round, through which it raised $65 billion; based on that funding round, the calculations were done, and just shy of a trillion dollars is what the math says the company is worth, though some outside analyses say it’s worth a bit less than that, while others suggest it’s maybe closer to $1.4 trillion. OpenAI, a direct competitor of Anthropic, is valued at about $100 billion less than Anthropic based on its most recent $122 billion funding round, but again, analyses put the company’s actual value, what people and investors would pay for it on the open market, all over the place. Each of these companies have different variables acting upon them heading into a period in which it’s expected that all three will IPO. OpenAI kicked off the current AI race, for instance, but it’s burning money at an incredible rate, and has yet to make a profit, losing billions per year, and will probably continue to lose billions each year for a while into the future. Anthropic, on the other hand, offers a similar product as OpenAI, but is projected to post its first quarterly operating profit of just over half a billion dollars in Q2 2026, making it one of the first frontier-model-making AI companies to make a profit, as most of these companies are investing so heavily in research and infrastructure like data centers that they’re still in heavy cash-burn mode. SpaceX is distinct from these other two also high-flying, cash-burning tech companies in part because of its colorful and controversial owner, Elon Musk, and in part because it’s a rocket launch company that also sells internet services beamed down to earth from satellites, and until recently, most of its reliable income has come from that single offering, selling internet access. But it also recently had X, formerly called Twitter, a social network, and an AI company meant to compete directly with OpenAI and Anthropic, called xAI, folded into it. So it’s now a multifaceted company with several edgy, but somewhat mature and difficult to compete with offerings, most of which make no money, but all of which in theory at least kinda sorta orient around AI and other sci-fi goods and services. The surge in interest and investment in AI over the past several years led to a pivot for most of Musk’s companies, and that led to the merging of the smaller xAI and X into SpaceX, which was the only really profitable company of that trio of companies, and that merging, until just recently, made SpaceX unprofitable, as well. Because of the unprofitability and relative unpopularity of xAI’s offerings, like the controversy-ridden Grok chatbot, SpaceX has recently taken to leasing out its data centers to competitors, like Anthropic and Google, each of which are paying around a billion dollars a month to use some of SpaceX’s data center capacity, which xAI hasn’t needed, because of the unpopularity of Grok, for their own AI services. That, in turn, has suddenly made SpaceX a little bit profitable, which is important for reasons I’ll get into momentarily. This portion of the US-based AI industry is kind of a tangle in many ways, all of these companies competing, but also intersecting and overlapping, often investing in each other and in the infrastructure that underpins them, while also being invested in by those same infrastructural entities. And these three companies’ IPOs are being seen as something of a weathervane, their success or failure, and the degree to which they succeed or fail hinting at the direction of this industry, and whether or not this is a financial bubble that will soon, or eventually, pop. There are hints that those at the top of these companies are attempting to hedge their bets, in case their IPOs don’t do what they need them to do, or don’t do what they need them to do at the right magnitude. Sam Altman, OpenAI’s also fairly controversy-ridden CEO, has been very close with US President Trump, and has reportedly been holding meetings about the possibility of the US government taking a significant stake in OpenAI, and maybe other AI companies as well. The idea here is that US funds, so taxpayer dollars, would be invested in these companies, and that would tie the companies more closely to the US government, which could be beneficial if these companies then increase in value, making the US government a profit on that investment. This would be beneficial for the companies, in turn, because they would basically be backstopped by the US government; the US would be more likely to help them stay solvent to avoid losing that invested capital, with its regulations and laws related to AI, but it would also make these companies too big and too important to fail, giving them a lot of leeway in how they behave and compete, or fail to, from that point forward. And if they do still fail, the US taxpayer would be paying for a significant portion of that loss while those in charge, investors and the higher-ups of these companies, would walk away with a bunch of money. SpaceX is taking another approach to IPO bet-hedging, by asking top US stock indices, like the Nasdaq 100 and S&P 500, which track top stocks, ‘top’ designated by value, but also other metrics, usually related to stability and profitability, to ignore some of those other metrics and allow SpaceX entrance into their indices more rapidly than would typically be allowed. These indices are meant, in part, to help protect investors from volatility. High-flying startups might surge at the beginning, immediately after their IPO, but then fizzle out when it becomes clear their fundamentals aren’t good, and they’re not actually a solid investment, long-term. What SpaceX wants is to be allowed into this club of valuable, long-term profitable and stable companies, because it is big and flashy and might have the largest IPO in history. And if these indices don’t want to be left out of all that, the argument goes

    19 min
  4. Jones Act Waiver

    2 Jun

    Jones Act Waiver

    This week we talk about the Merchant Marine Act, trade routes, and incentives. We also discuss Wesley Jones, foreign competition, and artificial monopolies. Recommended Book: The Quantum Thief by Hannu Rajaniemi Transcript In 1920, the then-Senator for the state of Washington, Wesley Jones, who was also the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, introduced the Merchant Marine Act as a method by which the American merchant marine could be sustained and remain competitive in the face of external competition, and in the wake of the destruction of a bunch of ship during WWI. The US Merchant Marine is all the commercial water-going vessels that are US flagged, and the crews of these vessels. During peacetime, these boats and ships conduct trade and other services along the United States’ coasts and throughout its internal waterways, its rivers and lakes. During wartime, these vessels and their crews are tapped to help move troops and weapons and supplies for offensive or defensive military efforts. The theory of this proposed Act, then, was to ensure that the US Merchant Marine would remain well-funded and well-taken-care-of, because lacking some kind of government support, there was a good chance it would either slowly degrade, not having enough business to pay for itself, or—and this has been a persistent concern for similar pseudo-fleets of merchant vessels around the world for the past few hundred years—it would fall into disrepair because it would be outcompeted by vessels and crew coming in from elsewhere that would charge lower prices, creating unsustainable economics for the locals and thus slowly degrading this economic and military asset. When this Act was proposed, in 1920, the preservation of this asset was on the mind of many US politicians, as the world had just emerged from World War I, and in that and previous conflicts, the US Merchant Marine had been pretty vital to ensuring the US eventually came out on the right side of things. It was also fundamental to the rebuilding of the US economy following difficult conflicts, because the moving of cargo from city to city along coastlines, and throughout long expanses of rivers—getting food from place to place, getting building supplies where they need to go—has always been important, especially following periods in which there isn’t a lot of building going on, and when supplies chains are reoriented toward other purposes, like fighting. So in addition to all the language the helps regulate trade within US waters and between US ports, and which says how the crew of such vessels have to be treated, this Act was also meant to provide protected status to US Merchant Marine vessels and crew, giving them a pseudo-monopoly on certain types of trade activities in the US. It was also—and this is important context—meant to give Senator Jones’ state of Washington a de facto monopoly on trade with Alaska. But it was sold to the rest of Congress and the country as a means of bolstering the funds flowing into the US Merchant Marine. Section 27 of this act, often called the Jones Act, requires that all goods transported between US ports be carried by US vessels built in the US, flying the US flag, owned by US citizens and with majority US citizen and permanent US resident crews. What I’d like to talk about today are the other consequences of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, and in particular the Jones Act component of it, and why there’s been renewed opposition to the Jones Act in recent months. — The logic of the Jones Act, at least on the surface, is pretty straightforward. If you’re worried about foreign competition coming in and taking all the shipping jobs, swooping in from areas where crews aren’t paid as much, and where ships can be built cheaper, so they can charge less than US-made and -manned ships, all you have to do is require all the ships and people on the ships are of US-origin, and you’re good to go. Those foreign competitors aren’t allowed to take the jobs, and that sets the standards in a different place, allowing US vessels and their crew and owners to charge whatever they need to charge to sustain themselves. This, in theory at least, should also stimulate the US ship-building industry, as that monopoly means anyone who builds new ships stands a pretty good chance of making their money back. After all, there’s no dramatically cheaper competition out there, so you’ve got relatively little downward price pressure and seemingly plenty of customers, because there’s a lot of US coast, and a lot of internal waterways that have traditionally be used for trading purposes. In practice, though—and this isn’t uncommon with protectionist measures; things that seem like they should work for the intended purpose actually leading to other, less ideal outcomes—the Jones Act is often blamed for increasing prices on pretty much everything, and for increasing prices dramatically in places like Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and other US territories, like American Samoa and Guam, that are reliant on imports to survive. If open competition isn’t allowed, prices don’t tend to go down, and in fact they can instead go up, especially if the number of entities providing these services drops over time. That means places without other options, without the ability to ship food and electrical equipment and other such fundamentals using highways or regularly flying, large cargo planes, they are forced to pay increasingly high cargo ship prices, instead. And there’s no chance that a competitor will emerge, because there just aren’t enough ships available to haul all the stuff these places need at a regular, sustaining, cost-effective cadence. These higher prices are kind of built into the monopoly model, but they’re made even worse by the state of the US shipbuilding industry, which for a while, from about the mid-1800s until the mid-20th century, was top of the line, producing more ships than any other country during WWII, and before that churning out some of the best and fastest ships in the world for trade purposes. But after the two world wars, and a surge in shipbuilding infrastructure that was rapidly deployed in the first half of the 20th century, US government subsidies for the industry began to dry up, many of the ships built during the war were sold to foreign countries and private owners for a quick buck, and most of that infrastructure was mothballed, the more efficient processes it developed decommissioned in favor of less-efficient, more expensive approaches. During WWI, the US churned out more then 5,000 ships at the over 100 shipyards it had operating at the time, and was able to produce more naval tonnage in three years than it had produced in the entire history of the nation’s existence, up till that point. Post-WWI, though, the US was already less efficient than foreign competitors, especially European competition, and post-WWII, the emergence of overland infrastructure in the US, like the burgeoning national highway system, made shipping via trucks increasingly competitive with the previously dominant approach of shipping via internal waterways. Airline shipping became a competitor, too, around that same time. So the technological developments and new overland infrastructure of the post-World War era meant that in the US, although coastal shipping in particular remained a solid option for many types of shipping, using trucks on the nation’s growing highway system usually ended up being cheaper and easier, and in some cases much faster, too, and eventually air cargo became even more competitive for some types of jobs and clientele. The oil crises of the 1970s amplified this trend, collapsing the market for oil tanker ships and seriously damaging the overall shipbuilding industry, including in the US. Even with new US government subsidies meant to support the flailing industry, building ships in the US usually just didn’t make much economic sense, the cost of building on US soil costing nearly twice as much as it did in some foreign ports. During the Reagan administration, even those 1930s-era subsidies were dropped, and that led to further collapse in the US shipbuilding industry. Before the end of these subsidies, the US was producing about 20 commercial ships per year, already a catastrophic drop from the World Wars era, but after the end of the subsidies, it produced five commercial vessels in the next eight years, combined. Some new subsidies were introduced in the 90s, when the Cold War ended, but the industry was in such bad shape at that point, orders from the US military and from commercial traders often went unfulfilled, or went wildly over budget. Some ships were finished, but riddled with so many flaws that they were unusable. US shipbuilders blamed foreign government subsidies, claiming they were really bad at their jobs because other countries were giving their shipbuilding entities more money to exist, and President Bill Clinton was able to secure an agreement with many of the US’s trading partners to temper these subsidies a bit, in response to those complaints. Though when US shipbuilders realized this agreement would also mean they would lose some of their subsidies, in the tradeoff, they switched to campaigning against it, and the US ultimately wasn’t involved in that agreement. The US’s shipbuilding efforts improved a bit in the late-90s and early 2000s, but efforts elsewhere were better, and while the US produced about 3% of all commercial shipping tonnage, of all trade-related naval vessels, basically, in the early 1970s, by 1999, that was down to 0.25% of global tonnage. At this point, following that aforementioned agreement to reduce subsidies and others like it, much of the world’s shipbuilding industries are on pretty solid footing without government support, while the US’s is protected by the Jones Act, and very much not in solid shape; it’s completely uncompe

    20 min
  5. 2026 DRC Ebola Outbreak

    26 May

    2026 DRC Ebola Outbreak

    This week we talk about the Democratic Republic of the Congo, malaria, and healthcare infrastructure. We also discuss militants, Uganda, and the Bundibugyo virus. Recommended Book: We Should Get Together by Kat Vellos Transcript Ebola, which is more formally called Ebola Virus Disease or Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, is caused by an infection by a type of RNA virus called an orthoebolavirus. There are six known species of orthoebolavirus, and four of them have at some point infected and caused illness in humans. Those four are the ebola virus, sometimes called the Zaire ebolavirus, which historically has been the strain responsible for the biggest, most devastating outbreaks of this disease, the Sudan virus, the Taï Forest virus, and the Bundibugyo virus, the latter three each causing a variant of the disease that carries the same name. The other two orthoebolavirus species that we know of, the Reston virus and the Bombali virus, have been known to infect animals, but have not, at this point at least, been known to make the jump to human hosts. Ebola symptoms vary a bit between specific viruses and between hosts and infection conditions, but in general those who are afflicted by ebola begin to experience symptoms between a few days and a few weeks after infection, and they’ll start by experiencing cold and flu-like symptoms, like fever, sore throat, headaches, and general muscle pain. Soon after that, though, they’ll start experiencing diarrhea and rashes, they’ll begin vomiting, and they’ll begin to experience liver and kidney dysfunction, and around that same time, they’ll start to bleed internally and externally. Once infected, a person has between a 25 and 90% chance of dying, depending on the strain of ebola, and if they die, usually due to what’s called hypovolemic shock—a severe and sudden loss of bodily fluids, including blood—they usually die between 6 and 16 days after those first symptoms are reported. What I’d like to talk about today is a new outbreak of ebola centered in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and why this one stands out from other recent outbreaks in the region. — Ebola was first officially reported in medical literature in 1976, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, and there have been semi-regular outbreaks in that region, of various sizes ever since, and very likely before that, too. This disease is spread through direct contact with the body fluids of someone who’s infected, and it’s thought that this is probably how the disease made the leap from animals, like primates, to human beings: locals sometimes come into close contact with local primates, either while just coexisting, or while hunting bushmeat, hunting monkeys for food. It’s thought that fruit bats serve as hosts for the virus, long-term, and it then spreads to other animals, and then sometimes to humans, in some cases causing illness along the way in those other species, but not always; bats are not negatively afflicted by it, for instance, but humans very much are. Despite not being an airborne pathogen, so it’s not spread by coughing or talking too close to someone, like a cold or Covid-19, ebola can still be spread person-to-person through bodily fluid contact. That means fluids like saliva and blood and semen and breast milk, and research has shown that even after someone survives and recovers from ebola, the disease can linger in their fluids for months. So if someone catches it, survives, and then breast-feeds their child, or kisses or has sex with their partner, or gets a cut and then someone else comes into contact with their blood, like a health worker, that can lead to the transmission of the disease, despite their having been well and seemingly fully recovered for weeks or months. That lingering contagiousness is a confounding factor with this disease, as it requires that people be very careful, even to an antisocial degree, and even well after it seems like that’s no longer necessary, because they feel good and healthy again. This also means that if someone dies of ebola, contact with their bodies can be incredibly dangerous. And past outbreaks have stemmed from or been further enflamed by locals wanting to perform community funerals and wakes, during which the body is often on display and touched by attendees, and that has led to further spread of the disease—which in many cases is difficult to tie back to that wake, because again, symptoms don’t arrive right away, and ebola symptoms are similar to what locals experience all the time from other afflictions, like colds and malaria. This past week, in Bunia, which is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, locals stormed a regional hospital in an attempt to recover the body of a beloved local figure who died of ebola. In the process, the hospital’s isolation ward, which was being used to keep ebola victims separate from everyone else, to keep the disease from spreading further, that ward was burned to the ground. There are no vaccines or treatments for the Bundibugyo Ebola species that is at the core of the outbreak, and the spread of misinformation in the area had locals believing that these health workers were trying to kill their patients, not save or isolate them so no one else caught ebola. The man at the center of this, who died five days after being admitted to the hospital, was thought, by his family, to have malaria, which is common in the area and has very similar symptoms, at least in the early days of an ebola infection. They demanded the hospital release his body so they could bury him, and the staff refused, saying doing so right now could lead to more ebola spread. The family gathered more locals, who threw stones at hospital workers, they broke through the gates of the hospital, police fired into the air to try to disperse the angry crowd, and the ebola ward caught fire during the melee. During that fire, five patients who were in the ward, all suspected of having ebola, fled, and they haven’t yet returned—so they are possibly out in the open, no longer isolated, suffering and maybe dying from their infection, and possibly spreading it to others, as well. There’s a lot going on in this story, and misinformation spread by local traditional healers who don’t like the hospitals and the medical workers who tell locals medical information rather than folk healing information are part of the problem, but the local medical establishment not doing a good job of educating locals about what they’re doing and why are arguably the flip side of that same coin; more investment in that kind of information dissemination by the government would go a long way to preventing this sort of thing in the future, and health workers globally could use more resources and overall infrastructure to help protect them while they’re carrying out their work. That said, this is just one small facet of what’s become a much larger story. As of the day I’m recording this, this new outbreak, which was first reported in the Ituri Province of the DRC, has caused 186 confirmed deaths, with 82 more confirmed cases and 836 suspected cases. As I mentioned, it’s caused by the Bundibugyo ebolavirus, which is less common, at least at this scale, and thus typical response efforts used against the more common Zaire ebolavirus, don’t seem to map onto this strain as well as was hoped, and the World Health Organization declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on May 16, as while this is unlikely to become as significant an issue as Covid-19 or other aerosol-spread infections on a global level, regionally it’s causing a lot of damage, and its nature, and the state of international aid for this sort of thing—which is currently substantially reduced, in part because of pullbacks on such programs by the current US administration—means it could continue to flare for several more months, before eventually starting to slow, killing many, many people, in any incredibly painful and contagious manner, in the process. This is the 17th ebola outbreak in the DRC since the disease was first recorded in the medical literature, and the third outbreak of this strain—the first of which was in the Bundibugyo District of Uganda in 2007 through 2008, that’s where it got its name, and then another in 2012 in the DRC. This isn’t the deadliest strain of ebola, only killing between 25 and 50% of those afflicted, but because of those aforementioned issues, plus it having flared in a region where governance is complicated by the presence of several militant groups, this wave of infections has created a broad and precarious situation; lots of people have been uprooted from their homes because of conflict between these militant groups and the government, and those refugees have been spreading ebola to other areas throughout the region, making contact tracing difficult or impossible, and leading to surges of new infections in neighboring, and a few further-flung, provinces. According to a predictive model of the outbreak published by the MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, the current number of infected people could actually be well over 1000, in part because of how difficult it’s been isolating the infected, and because the early symptoms are so similar to other common local afflictions; so people are less likely to visit hospitals and get an accurate diagnosis, because they assume it’s just a bout of something else, something less deadly and contagious. Getting resources into the area is becoming more difficult, too, as those militant groups are fairly active, one such group recently taking over a primary regional airport, which has disallowed the import of necessary medical equipment for regional hospitals. This hasn’t had much of an impact globally, yet, though cases have been documented in neighboring Uganda—a total of five confirmed infections, as of the day I’m recording this—and the World Cup team from

    15 min
  6. Super El Niño

    19 May

    Super El Niño

    This week we talk about oceanic surface temperatures, trade winds, and global climate change. We also discuss the Polar Jet Stream, hurricanes, and climate models. Recommended Book: Kleptopia by Tom Burgis Transcript Under normal circumstances, the Pacific Ocean’s average surface temperature, the distribution of heat across its vast expanse, is moderated by trade winds that blow east to west along the equator, which help move warm water from South America over toward Asia. Those winds are called trade winds because, back during the European age of Exploration, they helped ships from Europe head west toward Asia and the Americas. And these winds form in part because of the Earth’s rotation, the Coriolis effect funneling air toward the equator, where it is then more concentrated and thus potent, which is useful if you’re trying to move a ship with sails, but also serves the purpose of moving warm water from one part of the ocean to another part of the ocean. As those warmer surface waters are shifted from the Americas to Asia, water is pulled up to the surface from lower down in the ocean as part of a process called upwelling. This process results in cooler temperatures on the surface, because lower down, oceanic water is colder, and that lower-down water is also more rich in nutrients, which has the knock-on effect of stimulating more biological activity along these cooling surface waters. That’s the normal state of things in the Pacific Ocean. There are sometimes deviations in this norm, however, that result in very different outcomes; these deviations are broadly called the El Niño Southern Oscillation Cycle, and that cycle consists of opposite El Niño and La Niña climate patterns. During La Niña patterns, trade winds are more powerful than usual and they shove a lot more of that warm surface water to Asia than is typical, and that has the net impact of moving more deep-down cold, nutrient-rich, ocean water to the surface. This, in turn, nudges the Polar Jet Stream, which is a channel of fast-moving, westerly winds that lives about 30,000 ft or just over 9000 meters up in the sky, and which crosses both warmer, mid-latitudes and far colder Arctic latitudes, further north. The Polar Jet Stream is responsible for moderating or intensifying weather patterns around the world, and like the trade winds, it’s influenced by the spin of the planet, but it’s also adjusted by surface systems, like the temperature of the Pacific. So the arrival of a La Niña pattern pushes the jet stream further north, and as a result, weather patterns change, and in North America, we tend to see drought in the southwest, heavier rains and flooding and in the Pacific Northwest and Canada, warmer winters in the South, and cooler winters in the North. La Niñas also tend to result in more severe hurricane seasons in the Atlantic basin, while suppressing hurricane activity in the central and eastern Pacific basins. El Niño, in contrast, results from weaker trade winds, which, because these winds don’t pack as much of a punch, means less warm water is being shoved from South America to Asia, and thus the surface temperature of that part of the Pacific is warmer, lacking that upwelling of cold water to replace the warm water that would otherwise be displaced over to Asia. El Niño also adjusts the location of the jet stream, but in the opposite direction, pulling it south of its usual spot. That then causes more heat and dryness across the northern US and Canada, but makes the southern US and Gulf Coast a lot wetter, leading to more flooding. What I’d like to talk about today are predictions about an anticipated upcoming El Niño climate pattern, and why some climate scientists are warning that it could be a doozy. — Climate scientists with the US’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the NOAA, released new model forecasts in mid-May, and one of those models indicated that an El Niño pattern could form in the Pacific as soon as June. The NOAA puts together and releases new models on a regular basis, as the variables influencing these massively complex patterns are always changing, and the trend over the past three months has been increasing certainty about the formation of this El Niño pattern, but also an increasing likelihood that this potential El Niño would be very strong, perhaps historically so. There have been a total of 27 El Niños since 1950, when we started officially tracking such things, and we get one every three or four years, on average. The last one occurred from the summer of 2023 into spring of 2024. The current models show that we could see another one of these systems as soon as next month, then, and there’s currently a nearly 60% chance that this particular El Niño would become strong—and that’s an official designation, by the way, a strong El Niño being one that sees an ocean surface temperature increase of between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius—and a one-in-three chance that it could become a very strong, or super El Niño, which means it tallies an oceanic surface temperature increase of 2 degrees celsius or higher. These so-called super El Niños are a lot rarer than the typical kind. There have only been five recorded since 1950, the last one straddling 2015 and 2016. Some of these models suggest that this system could be historically strong, though, pushing into territory where we might need a new rank on that existing scale—it could surpass 2.5 degrees celsius above the standard oceanic surface temperature, which would make it the most, or among the most intense El Niño systems on record. I want to note real quick here, before we get into possible implications, that these models are inherently imperfect, because of how complex these systems are, and how many variables influence them. But also that, again, it’s just some models saying this, that it’s only a 60% chance of even a strong El Niño, and that it’s still a 1 in 3 chance of a very strong one—so this isn’t at all certain, and the scientists behind all this are urging preparedness, but not panic, and are trying really hard to make it clear that this isn’t some kind of prophecy or guarantee. The reporting on this NOAA announcement has been frantic and panicky in some cases, but that’s probably not the proper response to this, and the real-deal experts here are encouraging awareness and that we recognize the potential for something wild with this pattern, but it’s definitely not the declaration of the end of the world or anything. So, that important caveat noted, let’s talk about some potential impacts of this system, if it does indeed hit that currently unlikely, but possible, very strong designation, or higher. In general, during El Niño patterns, hurricane seasons in the Atlantic are quieter, while hurricane seasons in the Eastern and Central Pacific are more active. This isn’t 100% the case, but it’s the overwhelming trend. So there’s a good chance we would see more and more powerful hurricanes in the Pacific during this period, should we step into super El Niño territory. Beyond hurricane impacts, though, these systems also influence water cycles around the world; during El Niño patterns, the US south tends to be wetter, as does East Central Africa, while northern South America tends to be drier, as does Australia and Northern and Central India. Shifting or amplifying water cycles, in one direction or the other, drier or wetter, can cause all sorts of issues, ranging from flooded homes to devastated crops. Just like with hurricanes, this usually represents a break in the normal way of things, so we tend to see things like mudslides and erosion and unplanned-for droughts that cause a lot of damage. Another significant component of these patterns are the temperature spikes they stoke. During the last recorded normal El Niño in 2023, global temperature levels were pushed up by 1.45 degrees C above pre-industrial levels, causing global mean temperatures to peak at 1.58 degrees C between July 2023 and June 2024. In practice, that means the earth momentarily shot past that 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels milestone that climate scientists have been warning about for decades, because it marks a point at which many natural systems will begin to change or fall apart, and many ecosystems will begin to collapse, leading to mass die-offs and potentially even the necessity for wide-scale human migration, away from areas that are no longer sustainably livable. That spike was momentary, but illustrative, and there’s a chance that another one, especially one stoked by a super El Niño, could push things even further, speeding up the melting of the ice caps and other glaciers, which then, in turn, could speed up the larger, consistent increase in global temperatures because the white of the ice bounces light from the sun, and thus heat, back into space, while the comparable dark of water and land absorbs more of that light and heat. In this way, even short-term spikes in temperature can speed up the long-term trajectory of global climate change, because the variables that are informing that change can be permanently adjusted; ice caps are just one example, there are countless such variables, some that we know about, and others that we certainly don’t, yet. While this potential upcoming El Niño might be par for the course, in other words, it’s also arriving at a moment in which many of these variables are already being fiddled with by other forces, and that means even a not-very strong, not-super El Niño could have outsized impact, in terms of pushing the planet toward a new, unfamiliar climate regime, the implementation of which could lead to all sorts of ecological and civilization devastation and change. Show Notes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Ni%C3%B1o%E2%80%93Southern_Oscillation https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/weather/2026/05/14/powerful-el-nino-is-taking-shape-f

    14 min
  7. 2026 UK Local Elections

    12 May

    2026 UK Local Elections

    This week we talk about Keir Starmer, Labour, and the Reform UK party. We also discuss Tories, the Lib Dems, and two-party systems. Recommended Book: Peak by K. Anders Ericsson and Robert Pool Transcript For more than 100 years, the British political system has been dominated by two parties: Labour and the Conservative Party, often called the Tories. In practice, that means these two parties, which are center-left and center-right in their leanings, respectively, have tended to shape the direction of British politics and the Overton Window of thinkable proposals—things that might actually happen because they get the requisite support from politicians and the public. These two parties have usually had to work with other, smaller parties in order to get anything done, because the UK has a parliamentary system that often leaves the party with the most representatives lacking enough support to run a functioning government, solo. As a consequence, the Liberal Democrats, which is a fairly centrist party, the Green Party, which focuses on environmentalism and more left-wing concerns, Plaid Cymru (plied KUM-ree), which is the Welsh nationalist party, and the Scottish National Party, which is exactly what it sounds like, have long influenced Labour and the Tories, aligning their votes with whomever gives them a seat at the table. This has given some influence to smaller groups that might otherwise lack representation, though that influence has typically been moderate to meager, at best—the folks in Labour and the Conservative party have run things in the UK, and that’s been the case for generations. Things started to shake up a bit in the 20-teens, however, when anti-immigration and EU-skepticism in Britain led to the creation of the far-right Brexit Party, which was co-founded by politician Nigel Farage, who was the leader of the UK Independence Party in the early 2000s and 20-teens, and who was previously a Tory, and Catherine Blaiklock, a politician and hotelier who stepped down from her position as party leader the year after the Brexit Party was founded after anti-Islamic and racist comments she’d previously made online were rediscovered. The Brexit Party existed, almost exclusively, to push for a no-agreement exit from the European Union by the UK, which was considered to be a fairly fringe ideology back then, but which gained a lot of steam as other populists began to add their support to the general concept. Both the government and the existing political structure of the UK was then caught flat-footed, by all indications very surprised by the eventual success of that push, and the UK left the EU on January 31, 2020, after a whole lot of skepticism that it would ever happen, even after a vote in favor of Brexit took place. This represented a serious come to Jesus moment for British politicians, but also British society, and there’s been quite a lot of self-reflection and naval gazing in the years since, as the Brexit pullout from the EU has caused quite a lot of economic and diplomatic damage, while also shining a spotlight on numerous simmering issues that were previously overlooked or unaddressed, including the bubbling resentment and at times outright xenophobia felt by a significant portion of the British electorate, and persistent economic issues faced by folks at the middle and lower rungs of society. What I’d like to talk about today is the recent 2026 UK Local Elections, and what they seem to tell us about how things are going in British politics, and what they portend for the current Labour-run administration. — On May 7, 2026, the UK held local elections for 5,066 councillors, 136 local authorities, and six directly elected mayors. Some of these elections were postponed in 2025 to allow for government restructuring, but most of these positions were last up for election in 2022. This election was generally seen as an unofficial referendum on the governing Labour Party, and in particular the current Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, who has been in office for just under two years, and who stepped into the role of PM after the role was held by the Conservative Tories for 14 years; five different Prime Ministers taking the reins during that period, including David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak. All that changing in leadership is indicative of the chaos the UK government was experiencing at the time, the May 2010 general election leading to a period of significant austerity—the government cutting tons of social programs in order to reduce spending—which then fed into more support for Brexit when some members of the party positioned the economic issues people were facing as the consequence of EU-related immigration, and shortly thereafter, the world succumbed to the Covid-19 pandemic. There was a lot of truly significant political change from about 2010 onward, then, and a lot for the general population to be upset about. The Conservatives held onto power despite it all for those 14 years, but the shift back to Labour was the result of Starmer and his party saying, listen, we hear you, a lot has to change, and we can instigate that change. Trust us. This new election suggests that the majority of voters in the UK feel that the Labour Party hasn’t lived up to that trust. In Wales, Plaid Cymru has taken the most seats, 43, but failed to achieve the 49 seat majority they would require to govern, solo. In Scotland, the SNP took the most seats, but also fell short of a majority, netting 58 seats, not the 65 required for a majority. Both of those results are not terribly shocking, though in Wales Labour lost a lot of power, down 35 seats and holding onto just 9. The Conservatives also lost in Wales, holding onto seven seats and losing 22. In Scotland, too, Labor lost some of their influence, losing 4 seats and retaining 17, while the Conservatives lost a whopping 19 seats, holding onto just 12. In England, the change in seat allocation was stunning, though. Labour lost 1406 seats, leaving them with 997, while the Conservatives lost 557 seats, holding onto just 773. Even considering those losses, the biggest story in England is the surge in support for previously small parties, in particular a far-right party called Reform UK, previously called the Brexit Party, and run by the aforementioned proponent of the British exit from the EU, Nigel Farage. Reform UK went from 2 seats to 1,444; a shocking outcome, and one that makes them the biggest winner in this election, by far. They also gained 17 seats, up from zero, in Scotland, putting them at an equal level there with Labour, and they went from zero to 34 in Wales, putting them in a competitive second place after Plaid Cymru, which again, claimed 43 seats. Other, non-Labour, non-Conservative parties also gained seats in this election, though not at the level of Reform UK. The Green Party gained two seats in Wales and six in Scotland, bringing them up to 15 there. They also gained 374 sets in England, bringing them up to 515 total seats, which leaves them in fifth place, but just 258 seats shy of the Conservatives. The Lib Dems, which are the local Centrist party, gained 151 seats, putting them in third. And there was a small surge in independent politicians winning elections, as well, that group now controlling 199 seats, up from 27 before this vote. In the wake of this absolute shellacking of Keir Starmer’s Labour party—which again, lost 1406 seats in England, and their opposition, and in many ways their polar opposite, the far-right Reform UK party, gained even more than Labour lost, up 1442 seats—in the wake of that, Starmer has been asked to resign, and as of the day I’m recording this, at least, he’s saying that he will not resign, and since there’s no formal challenge to his leadership, he can stay in power if he chooses. There is a growing movement amongst Labour lawmakers to ask him to set a timetable for stepping down, however, and there’s a pretty good chance that will happen, as the British political system allows parties to change their Prime Minister mid-term without requiring a new election, so they could swap him out for someone else, making him the face of this immense electoral failure, then they could try to change course before the next election, which will happen by mid-August of 2029, during which the vote will be for the 650 seats in the House of Commons, which is currently dominated by Starmer’s Labour party. The big takeaway here, from political analysts at least, is that what used to be a reliably two-party system, for over a century that’s been the case, is now a five-way race within a cultural context in which voters seem to be a lot less loyal to politicians and parties, and in which a whole lot of previously reliable infrastructure, social systems, and cultural expectations have been recently disrupted. People in the UK seem to be generally unhappy about all sorts of things, and that kind of broad unhappiness often results in more populism, which means general anti-establishment stances and us-versus-them ideologies, including racial, religious, and nationalistic versions of such ideologies, and typically a lot more support for charismatic leadership over leaders who are generally qualified and will probably be good at their jobs because they’re experienced and knowledgeable. In other words, you’re more likely to get loudmouths and celebrities running for office, successfully, in populist electoral contexts, and you’re also more likely to see parties leaning into superficial race, class, and elite-vs-everyman issues, as opposed to running on well-defined approaches to dealing with more complex issues. In the meantime, until that 2029 election, it’s likely Farage’s Reform UK will bang the drum against the governing Labour party to gather more power in the lead up to 2029, and that other non-Labour, non-Conservative parties will attempt to do the same, newly e

    14 min
  8. Child Mortality

    5 May

    Child Mortality

    This week we talk about industrialization, antibiotics, and child mortality rates. We also discuss corruption, instability, and progress. Recommended Book: Empire of Silence by Christopher Ruocchio Transcript Demographic transition is a social sciences theory that posits, based on all sorts of modern historical data, that societies tend to change, demographically, as they transition from a largely agrarian, low-industrial society, to that of a less-agrarian, high-industrial society. Most modern, post-hunter-gatherer societies have started out plowing the vast majority of their labor into bare subsistence, human beings spending their days, throughout their whole lives, working the land in order to produce enough food to live. All sorts of social and economic systems arose around this base-level fact, including those that tied laborers to the land, allowing for the rise of a leadership or ruling class, regional militaries, and other sorts of specialists. But until relatively recent history, the majority of people in a given society labored to produce raw essentials, and that was just the shape of things. This began to change with the dawn of the industrial revolution, and in some areas a bit before that, as precursor technologies allowed societies to produce more food and other essentials with less manual labor and using fewer foundational resources, like land. These technologies, as they became more widely distributed, more effective and efficient, and cheaper to deploy and operate, allowed more people to do more sorts of things, leading to a ballooning of industry and commerce in industrializing regions, and that allowed said regions to invest in other things, including medical knowledge, education, and so on. Life wasn’t exactly a cakewalk in these industrializing areas, and all sorts of new abuses and issues, including long hours at factories and problems related to pollution, arose and became common. But because these sorts of societies required professionals with new types of knowledge and know-how, and because they were able to sustain an increasing number of specialities beyond working the land to generate food and other bare necessities, keeping people alive, longer, and ensuring more people had the specialized knowledge required to do all those things, became more of a priority, and one that could actually be addressed because of the concomitant ability to feed and clothe and house and address more of the needs of more people. There were gobs of other spiraling forces in the mix, of course, including religion, politics, and so on, but that general tendency to shift away from raw subsistence into more complex and diverse economic systems was a driving factor behind a lot of what happened from around 1800 until, well, now. What I’d like to talk about today is a specific data point, or collection of data points, that arguably, more than any other such data points, show the benefits of the industrialized, modern society we’re living in, today, despite all the accompanying downsides. — So most societies, at this point, have undergone significant changes as a result of our widespread application of technologies that allow human beings to get more done with the same amount of effort. We’re able to generate more value, of all kinds, than our ancestors, and though it’s possible to criticize the change in priorities and focus on all the negative knock-on effects of these changes—and there are many such negative knock-on effects, like large-scale military conflicts and rampant pollution and climate change—it would be difficult to argue that there haven’t been some fairly significant upsides for humanity, as well. One key upside is related to that demographic transition I mentioned. As societies shift and it becomes better for everyone if more people know how to do more things, and it thus becomes a priority for more people to live long enough to use the knowledge and know-how they acquire, it has increasingly made more sense for governments to invest in our overall longevity and survivability. We can’t just say, I’d like everyone to live longer, and then snap our fingers and make that happen. But we can, and have, invested in technologies and systems that make longer lives more likely, and from 1800 onward that’s generally been the trend, with a huge upswing arriving in the mid-20th century, when a bunch of new tools and technologies, including things like modern antiseptics and early antibiotics, first arrived on the scene, dramatically reducing the mortality rate associated with all kinds of medical procedures. Arguably the most significant social gain during this period, though, has been the bogglingly large reduction in child mortality rates. Child mortality refers to the death of children under the age of five, and this figure is, today, usually expressed as the likelihood of a child under five dying, per 1000 children in an area. So you might say in India, the child death rate is 92 in 1000, which means 92 of every 1000 children resulting from live births in India die before they reach the age of five. And that was actually the real child mortality rate in India back in the year 2000. And the story of overall global child mortality rates is actually pretty well exemplified in India’s rates, as the country has seen a dramatic drop in all-cause child deaths in recent decades. In the year 2000, as I mentioned, it was expected that 92 out of every 1000 children would die before the age of 5 in India. As of 2024, though, that number has dropped to just 32 out of every 1000; a 68% drop. If you go back as far as 1990, the progress is even more impressive, those 2024 numbers representing a 76% drop in child mortality. This progress has largely been the consequence of intentional, targeted health interventions by the Indian government, including institutionalized child delivery services and widespread, well-funded immunization efforts that ensured more children got vaccines and other sorts of care that was previously lacking, or which was not widely disseminated beyond wealthy families. They’ve also invested in newborn care and neonatal units at hospitals, which has increased child survival outcomes in a large radius around these facilities. Southeast Asian nations still account for about 25% of all under-five deaths, globally, but improvements in India mirror those in China, which made rapid and sustained progress on this issue beginning in the 1950s, but really hitting their stride in the 1970s, when their child mortality rate was 143 per 1000 children; that rate dropped to just 12 per 1000 by 2020. Globally, right now, the average child mortality rate is just under 40 per 1000, which is down from 93 per 1000 in 1990. That’s a staggering amount of progress, but it does mean that nearly 5 million children still die each year before their 5th birthday, which adds up to something like 15,000 of such deaths per day. At the moment, the vast majority of these deaths, about 80% of them, occur in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The cause of these deaths varies a bit based on location, and there’s a time component to this, too, as some areas have seen much higher rates due to epidemics, but most of the causes of child death before the age of 5 are consistent, with premature birth and pneumonia, birth asphyxia or trauma, malaria, diarrhea, congenital abnormalities, and sepsis representing about 60-70% of such deaths, globally. Almost all of these issues are preventable, and the major barrier to reducing these numbers further is access to resources and expertise that are more widely available and accessible in the wealthier world; there are huge disparities in child mortality between rich countries and poor countries, in other words, and while the number of child deaths has decreased everywhere, including in the world’s poorest countries, over the past 100 years, countries like Finland see about 2 in every 1000 children die before they reach the age of five, while countries like Niger see nearly 115 in every 1000 children die before the age of five. This figure was previously around 500 in every 1000, globally, so about half of all children would die before the age of five, even in relatively recent history, even in the wealthiest regions, just a few hundred years ago—so again, stunning progress in this area; and looking back, in addition to families needing more hands to work the fields, before everyone started industrializing, families would tend to have as many kids as they could because it was generally just assumed that about half of them would die within the first couple of years; some cultures still have traditions of not naming their children until they’ve lived for a few years because of that earlier child mortality trend. There’s still plenty to be done in this space, though, and the changes necessary to dramatically drop this mortality rate even further, regionally and globally, are not revolutionary in nature, it’s just a matter of more widely and equitably disseminating tools and technologies and cultural and economic infrastructure that already exists across much of the world, to the places where it doesn’t exist yet. That’s a tall order in some locations, though, as part of why some high child mortality rate regions still have those high rates is that they’ve also had persistent government instability, which has in turn led to persistent internal conflicts and government overthrows and long histories of grift and corruption at the top-most levels of society. In other words, it’s extremely difficult to improve these sorts of numbers when those who are in charge of a high-mortality-rate region are seemingly incapable of keeping things stable, and always seem to be enriching themselves at the expense the the country they’re meant to be governing. That’s a much larger systemic issue, of course, made up of numerous fractal issues that each have their

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A calm, non-shouty, non-polemical, weekly news analysis podcast for folks of all stripes and leanings who want to know more about what's happening in the world around them. Hosted by analytic journalist Colin Wright since 2016. letsknowthings.substack.com

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