VoxDev Development Economics

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Hear about the cutting edge of development economics from research to practice. 

  1. 8 hr ago

    No Taxation without Administration

    Research on how to collect more tax in developing countries has focused on how information, especially administrative data, can help. But in Uganda for example, buyers and sellers report different amounts for the same VAT transaction in 79% of cases. The invoices exist ... but nobody in the tax administration is comparing them. In this week's VoxDev Talk Anders Jensen (Harvard Kennedy School) and Jonathan Weigel (UC Berkeley) argue that information needs an administration that is able to use it. They have examined the research evidence on how tax authorities are organised, who they hire, where they send their staff, and how much freedom those officials get. To maximise revenues they find that many of Max Weber's century-old rules for how to run a bureaucracy still apply, but others often need to bend a little.  The research behind this episode: Jensen, Anders, and Jonathan L. Weigel. 2026. "No Taxation without Administration: Bringing the State Back into the Public Finance of Developing Countries." Journal of Economic Literature 64 (1): 246-280. The working paper version is available as NBER Working Paper 34729. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Jonathan Weigel, and Anders Jensen. 2026. "No Taxation without Administration." VoxDev Talks (podcast).About the guestsAnders Jensen is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and research co-director of the State programme at the International Growth Centre. His research spans the rise of modern tax systems, informality and consumption taxes, and how governments with limited capacity can improve tax administration and enforcement. He works with governments in Ghana, Zambia, Liberia and Brazil. Jonathan Weigel is Assistant Professor of Business and Public Policy at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, and a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research spans state capacity, taxation, corruption, and the links between religion and institutions. His fieldwork is based mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he runs the research organisation ODEKA. Research cited in this episodeNo taxation without information. Dina Pomeranz's study of Chile's value-added tax showed how the paper trail between firms helps to enforce the tax; each firm has a reason to demand an invoice from its supplier, and the tax authority can use those invoices to detect evasion. Pomeranz, Dina. 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax." American Economic Review 105 (8): 2539-2569. Third-party reporting in Denmark. Henrik Kleven and co-authors ran a randomised tax audit experiment in Denmark. Evasion was close to zero on income that employers and banks report to the tax authority, and substantial on income that taxpayers report themselves. Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Martin B. Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Soren Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez. 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark." Econometrica 79 (3): 651-692. Missing transactions in Uganda. The 79% figure comes from VAT reports in Uganda, where sellers and buyers declare different amounts for the same transactions. The gap suggests that the tax authority does not systematically cross-check the reports, or that firms act as if it does not. Almunia, Miguel, Jonas Hjort, Justine Knebelmann, and Lin Tian. 2024. "Strategic or Confused Firms? Evidence from 'Missing' Transactions in Uganda." Review of Economics and Statistics 106 (1): 256-265. The US tax gap. Even a high-capacity administration struggles without third-party data. For tax years 2014 to 2016, the Internal Revenue Service estimated that 55% of income subject to little or no information reporting, such as sole proprietor income, was misreported, compared with 1% of wages and salaries. Internal Revenue Service. 2022. Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2014-2016. Publication 5364. Washington, DC: IRS. "In developing countries, tax administration is tax policy." The paper's epigraph comes from Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, who co-edited an IMF volume on tax administration with Richard Bird. The line sums up an older policy consensus that building the tax authority matters more than setting the right rates. Bird, Richard M., and Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. 1992. Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Weber's ideal bureaucracy. Max Weber described a "rational" bureaucracy with a single chain of command, specialised departments, recruitment by examination, promotion by seniority and decisions governed by rules rather than discretion. Jensen and Weigel use his categories to organise the evidence, and show how developing countries adapt them to local conditions. Weber, Max. 1978 (first published 1921). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. The sinews of power. The phrase comes from John Brewer's history of the British state, which credits a professional, specialised Excise Office with raising the revenue that paid for Britain's 18th-century wars. Brewer, John. 1990. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Medium taxpayer offices in Indonesia. Indonesia created dedicated offices for medium-sized corporate taxpayers, which sharply cut the number of taxpayers per auditor. Revenue from the firms in these offices rose by 64% in the short term and by 128% after six years. Basri, M. Chatib, Mayara Felix, Rema Hanna, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2021. "Tax Administration vs. Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia." American Economic Review 111 (12): 3827-3871. Transfer mispricing and the arm's length principle. Multinationals can shift profits by setting the prices of transactions between their own subsidiaries. Tax authorities test these prices against the arm's length principle, which asks what unrelated firms would have charged each other. Staff in large taxpayer offices must learn to apply it; staff who deal with small firms never need to. The Pendleton Act. The US Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 introduced competitive examinations for federal jobs, to limit patronage appointments. Abhay Aneja and Guo Xu find that the reform improved public sector performance. Aneja, Abhay, and Guo Xu. 2024. "Strengthening State Capacity: Civil Service Reform and Public Sector Performance during the Gilded Age." American Economic Review 114 (8): 2352-2387. City chiefs as tax collectors. In Kananga, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, neighbourhoods were randomly assigned to property tax collection by state agents or by local city chiefs. Chiefs raised revenue by more than 40%, mainly because they knew which households were more willing to pay. Balan, Pablo, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel. 2022. "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." American Economic Review 112 (3): 762-797. Assigning tax collectors. The same tax campaign randomly assigned collectors to teams and to neighbourhoods. Simulations suggest that pairing the best collectors together, and sending them to the neighbourhoods with the highest revenue potential, would raise compliance by 37% compared with random assignment. Weigel, Jonathan, Pedro Bessone, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and John Kabeya Kabeya. 2025. "Supermodular Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from the DRC." American Economic Review. Discretion, technology and bribes. In Ghana, property tax collectors equipped with tablets and digital maps spent less time finding properties and more time deciding whom to revisit; collections rose by 103% relative to the control group. In Tajikistan, electronic filing removed face-to-face contact with inspectors, and firms at high risk of evasion paid more tax, probably because they could no longer bribe the inspector. Dzansi, James, Anders Jensen, David Lagakos, and Henry Telli. 2023. "Technology and Tax Capacity: Evidence from Local Governments in Ghana." NBER Working Paper 29923. Okunogbe, Oyebola, and Victor Pouliquen. 2022. "Technology, Taxation, and Corruption: Evidence from the Introduction of Electronic Tax Filing." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 14 (1): 341-372. Public goods and tax compliance. Several studies test whether a government can persuade citizens to pay more tax by providing public goods first. In Acayucan, a small city in Mexico, randomised street paving raised property tax compliance. Programmes in Mexico City, Pakistan and Freetown, Sierra Leone, found small or mixed effects. Fernandez, Manuel, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Climent Quintana-Domeque. 2025. "Local Public Goods and Property Tax Compliance: Evidence from Residential Street Pavement." Working paper. Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, Benjamin A. Olken, and Mahvish Shaukat. 2023. "Strengthening the Social Compact: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan." Working paper. The demand-driven social contract. Douglass North and Barry Weingast argued that 17th-century English taxpayers agreed to pay more tax in exchange for a greater say in government. In Kananga, citizens in neighbourhoods assigned to door-to-door property tax collection became more likely to attend town hall meetings and to evaluate government performance. North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803-832. Weigel, Jonathan L. 2020. "The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When It Tries to Tax Them." Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (4): 1849-1903. Procedural justice. Citizens are more likely to accept a

    No Taxation without Administration

  2. 16 Sept

    Rethinking development cooperation: The case for a 'balance sheet' approach

    Many conversations about development for focus on aid: how much, from whom, and for how long. But aid has never been more than a small part of what pays for a country's development, and in 2025 it fell by 23.1%.  The need to rethink our attitude to development has inspired the Future of Development Cooperation Coalition (FDCC). In this week's episode, Alexia Latortue and Radha Rajkotia of FDCC talk to Tim Phillips about its first report,. The report assesses the development challenges of LMICs using a balance sheet approach, with assets on one side and liabilities on the other. Tax revenue, remittances, pension and sovereign wealth funds, trade, natural resources and the skills of the population sit on the asset side. Unsustainable debt, illicit financial flows, poor credit ratings, weak institutions, climate exposure and conflict sit on the other. The idea? Each country focuses on the policies to develop their most important assets, and minimise their most problematic liabilities. They argue that governments and donors alike should stop thinking of developing countries as recipients of aid, and start thinking of them as partners in economic development. The research behind this episode: Future of Development Cooperation Coalition. 2026. "The Development Balance Sheet: Rethinking Development Cooperation from the Ground Up." Published 20 May 2026. Research team: Radha Rajkotia, John Norris and Mma Amara Ekeruche. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Alexia Latortue, and Radha Rajkotia. 2026. "Rethinking development cooperation: The case for a 'balance sheet' approach." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guestsAlexia Latortue is Head of Secretariat of the Future of Development Cooperation Coalition and a Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Global Development. She served as Assistant Secretary for International Trade and Development at the US Treasury, where she led work on reforming the multilateral development banks and on using public finance to pull private capital into emerging markets. She was previously Deputy CEO and Managing Director for Corporate Strategy at the Millennium Challenge Corporation, sat on the Executive Committee of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and spent ten years at the World Bank working on financial inclusion, ending as Deputy CEO of CGAP. Radha Rajkotia is Director of Research at the Future of Development Cooperation Coalition and lead researcher on this report. She was Chief Executive Officer of Building Markets and, before that, Chief Research and Policy Officer at Innovations for Poverty Action, running its strategy across 22 countries. She spent eleven years leading the economic recovery and development unit at the International Rescue Committee, on work spanning cash-based relief and job creation in conflict settings. She holds a PhD in Refugee Studies from the University of Sussex, is a Senior Policy Fellow at the Henry Leir Institute at Tufts University, and teaches at Georgetown. Research cited in this episodeThe balance sheet approach. The report sets out assets and liabilities but argues that neither is a checklist. Some entries are country-specific, such as natural resource endowments or exposure to climate risk. Others are structural, such as a sovereign credit rating, which constrains or enables progress regardless of what a government does at home. The point of the exercise is situational awareness before prioritisation, not a universal to-do list. The 30 national development strategies. The research team reviewed the current development strategies of 30 countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America. All 30 prioritise economic transformation and human capital. Governance appears as a stand-alone pillar in two-thirds of them. Inequality is a defining element in almost every Latin American strategy and largely absent as an explicit constraint in Africa and Asia. Most countries frame technology as digital economy rather than as AI governance or chip access, which the report reads as a widening sophistication gap. Nigeria and Ethiopia. The report's worked comparison. Ethiopia attracts more than three times Nigeria's foreign direct investment despite being roughly 100 million people smaller. Nigeria has strong tax revenues, considerable pension fund assets, a heavy debt servicing burden and large losses to illicit financial flows. Ethiopia has a narrow tax base and weak compliance, suffers far less from illicit flows, carries a lighter debt service burden and is nonetheless in debt distress. Debt as both asset and liability. Low-income countries spend 18% of government revenue on average servicing foreign debt. Angola, Laos, Bhutan, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, the Bahamas, Tunisia, Zambia, Benin and Senegal each spent more than 30% of tax revenues on debt servicing in 2024. As of 2026, 27 countries face a high risk of debt distress and nine are already in it, the majority of them in Africa. Latortue argues that the problem is the price, tenor and currency of debt rather than debt itself, and that restructuring machinery built around the Paris Club has not kept up with a creditor base that now includes China, Gulf states and a large body of commercial lenders. Credit ratings. Only eight countries across Latin America and Africa hold an investment-grade rating from Moody's, Fitch or S&P. They are Chile, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Botswana and Mauritius. A UNDP analysis cited in the report estimates that flawed ratings have cost African countries as much as $74.5 billion in excess interest and foregone investment, more than the continent's entire net receipt of official development assistance. The African Union is launching its own credit rating agency in 2026. South-South trade. UNCTAD figures in the report put South-South merchandise exports at about $0.5 trillion in 1995 and $6.8 trillion in 2025. Some 57% of developing-country exports now go to other developing markets. Rajkotia points to the Africa Continental Free Trade Area and to Mercosur as existing infrastructure that could support production integration rather than trade agreements alone. Demographics. Africa's working-age population is expected to double by 2050, which the report treats as an asset conditional on policy. By 2050 only 26% of the world's population is projected to live in Europe, North America and China, falling to 18% by 2100. Domestic capital in Africa. Latortue cites more than $4 trillion of assets held across the African continent, a figure that combines central bank reserves, commercial bank assets, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds, pensions and insurance. Her argument is that moving even a small share of it into productive investment would outweigh anything aid can now do. The report notes that Ghana mandated 5% of its pension fund for venture capital in 2025 and that Mexico legislated for an allowance of up to 30%. Conflict. The one item Latortue places firmly on one side of the ledger. She counts at least 60 live conflicts worldwide. The Peace Research Institute Oslo recorded more conflicts in 2024 than at any point since the Second World War, and more than half of all conflict-affected states now face at least two separate internal conflicts. Development work has a role in keeping the real economy going, she says, but the solutions are political. More VoxDev Talks episodesThe end of aid dependency. W. Gyude Moore argues that the contraction in aid is structural and that governments should use growth diagnostics to decide which offers of assistance to accept and which to turn down. The closest companion piece to this episode. Ethiopia's economy: Mamo Mihretu on economic reform and the macroeconomic foundations of growth. The other half of the report's Nigeria and Ethiopia comparison, told by the person who ran the reforms. Why civil service reform fails and what actually works. Martin Williams on the execution gap that this report identifies as a liability in its own right. Related reading on VoxDevTaxation in LMICs, a VoxDevLit edited by Anders Jensen, Anne Brockmeyer and Lucie Gadenne, reviews the evidence on why governments in low- and middle-income countries collect so much less of national income than their richer counterparts.

    Rethinking development cooperation: The case for a 'balance sheet' approach

  3. 9 Sept

    Cape Town's day zero: How data rebuilt a city's water resilience

    By 2018 the reservoirs supplying Cape Town were down to 20% of capacity. If they reached 13.5%, the city would need to shut down parts of the water network and send residents to collection points to fetch water. That was known as Day Zero, and the rain came just in time to avoid it. Hugh Cole (City of Cape Town) joined the city government in the middle of the crisis, and has subsequently driven the use of data for many aspects of city planning, not just for water. Cape Town now runs its own household survey, works with a private sector partner to measure net migration, and randomises the rollout of water meters so it can find out how they change behaviour. It also runs trials on its electricity subsidy to check whether the money reaches the households it is meant to reach.  Cole tells Tim Phillips how the Day Zero near miss changed how the city's leadership uses evidence, and how other cities can follow the same path. The research behind this episode: Abajian, Alexander C., Cassandra Cole, Kelsey Jack, Kyle C. Meng, and Martine Visser. 2025. "Dodging Day Zero: Drought, Adaptation, and Inequality in Cape Town." NBER Working Paper 33468. Cole, Hugh, Kelsey Jack, Derek Strong, and Brendan Maughan-Brown. 2020. "City of Cape Town, South Africa: Aligning Internal Data Capabilities with External Research Partnerships." In Handbook on Using Administrative Data for Research and Evidence-based Policy, edited by Shawn Cole, Iqbal Dhaliwal, Anja Sautmann, and Lars Vilhuber. Cambridge, MA: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Hugh Cole. 2026. "Cape Town's day zero: How data rebuilt a city's water resilience." VoxDev Talks (podcast).About the guestHugh Cole is Director of Policy and Strategy and Chief Data Officer at the City of Cape Town, where his department covers strategic policy, strategic planning, research and economic analysis. He is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the School of Public Policy at the London School of Economics. Before joining the city in 2017 he was Director of Country Programmes at the International Growth Centre, running teams in 14 countries across sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Research cited in this episodeDay Zero. The term began in the media as the day Cape Town's taps would run dry, then settled on something more specific. It became the day dam levels would hit 13.5%, at which point the city planned to shut down parts of the reticulation network and open water collection points, sequenced so that the most vulnerable communities were affected last. Dodging Day Zero. Abajian, Cole, Jack, Meng and Visser use municipal billing records to show what the emergency measures did to different households. Before the drought, richer households used twice as much piped water as poorer ones; at the peak of the crisis they used less, partly because they could drill boreholes and substitute private groundwater for the public supply. That eroded the utility's revenue and shifted the cost of supply towards households who could not afford a private alternative, which is why the tariff reform that followed matters as much as the conservation campaign did. Zonal water balance assessment. Pressure management in the network was one of the two measures Cole credits with the largest effect during the drought, alongside communication with residents. Managing pressure means knowing the boundaries of each pressure zone, and those boundaries had drifted over years of pipes being added and not always recorded. The remapping exercise that followed compares water entering a zone with water leaving it, and it is still going on. The Green Dot map. During the drought the city published a neighbourhood level map of household water consumption, developed with academic partners including Martine Visser at the University of Cape Town. Households within their usage band showed as a green dot. The aim was peer pressure at street level rather than a citywide number. The Water, Air and Energy Lab. Launched in March 2024 by J-PAL Africa at the University of Cape Town, the City of Cape Town and Community Jameel, the WAE Lab pairs city policymakers with researchers to run randomised evaluations on clean air, water and reliable energy. Kelsey Jack is its scientific advisor. It is part of a network of J-PAL air and water labs that also includes national and state level labs in Egypt and India. Free basic electricity. Cape Town subsidises electricity for low-income households, targeted using thresholds on property value and consumption. Because eligibility turns on a cutoff, households just above and just below it are otherwise similar, which lets researchers separate the effect of the subsidy from everything else that differs between rich and poor households. The city funds this transfer from its own budget rather than through National Treasury grant regimes. Advanced metering infrastructure. The city is replacing water meters with digital ones to improve billing accuracy, revenue recovery and leak detection, and to see whether more frequent consumption information changes what households use. Contractor capacity and budget mean the rollout has to be phased, and the phasing is what makes randomisation possible. Charging ahead. An earlier Cape Town collaboration with the same origins. Jack, B. Kelsey, and Grant Smith. 2020. "Charging Ahead: Prepaid Metering, Electricity Use, and Utility Revenue." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12(2). Over 4,000 customers were switched from monthly billing to prepaid meters in a randomised order; electricity use fell by about 13%, and the utility recovered more of its revenue on time. Non-revenue water. Water that is produced and then lost before it can be billed, mostly through leaks. It is a persistent problem for utilities across the continent, and separating the leak detection effect of new meters from the behavioural effect on households is one of the questions the city wants answered. Data protection. South Africa's Protection of Personal Information Act is the law Cole refers to as the local equivalent of the European Union's GDPR. It governs what the city can share, and it is why partnerships with banks and telecommunications firms on the informal economy are framed around aggregated and anonymised data. More VoxDev Talks episodesMinibuses, major gains: Rethinking urban transit in developing countries. Lucas Conwell on the privately run minibus networks that Cape Town depends on, and the policy tweaks that would make them work better. Cole describes the city's own minibus taxi reform programme in this episode. The role of cities in economic development. Edward Glaeser and Diego Puga on why the cities of the developing world are the place to look. Cole quotes Glaeser twice here, so this is the natural next listen. How AI can put 20 years of development evidence to work. Iqbal Dhaliwal of J-PAL on why new technology only helps when it is attached to an existing evidence base. Related reading on VoxDev.orgAvoiding day zero: Drought and water pricing in South Africa. The authors of the paper set out how private adaptation by wealthy households undermined the utility's ability to cross-subsidise everyone else, and what the tariff reform did about it. Charging ahead: Prepaid metering, electricity use, and utility revenue. Kelsey Jack and Grant Smith on the Cape Town prepaid metering trial, and what it means for utilities trying to serve low-income customers.

    Cape Town's day zero: How data rebuilt a city's water resilience

  4. 2 Sept

    Fifty years of Chinese growth: The gradualist reform strategy explained

    In 1978, a farmer in rural China could not sell a sack of grain above the state quota, choose an employer, or move to the nearest city without a permit. In this week's VoxDev Talk, Kaiji Chen and Tao Zha (both Emory University and Atlanta Fed) explain how China dismantled barriers like this one at a time. Gradualist reform first gave farmers the right to sell surplus grain at market prices. Small state firms were privatised 19 years later, while the largest kept state backing. This style of reform powered two distinct growth engines: first, labour moving off the land, then a wave of capital into infrastructure and property. The result: half a century of unprecedented growth -- but it also produced the debt, inequality and trade tension now working against China's growth model. The research behind this episode: Chen, Kaiji, and Tao Zha. 2025. "China's Macroeconomic Development: The Role of Gradualist Reforms." Journal of Economic Literature 63 (4): 1331-62. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Kaiji Chen, and Tao Zha. 2026. "Fifty years of Chinese growth: The gradualist reform strategy explained." VoxDev Talk (podcast).About the guestsKaiji Chen is Professor of Economics at Emory University and a research fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Center for Quantitative Economic Research. His research spans financial contracts, business cycles and China's macroeconomy, with recent work on housing policy, credit allocation and household consumption in China. Tao Zha is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Economics at Emory University and executive director of the Center for Quantitative Economic Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. He is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2017. His research spans macroeconomics, financial economics and econometrics, with a long standing focus on China's economy. Research cited in this episodeThe household responsibility system. Piloted in Sichuan and Anhui from 1978 and adopted nationwide by 1980, this reform kept land collectively owned but contracted it to individual households, who could sell output above a fixed state quota at market prices. It replaced work point pay with a direct link between effort and income, and the productivity gains it released freed the rural labour surplus behind China's first wave of industrialisation. Township and village enterprises (TVEs). Rural, collectively owned firms that absorbed workers leaving agriculture through the 1980s and 1990s, often with local governments acting as guarantors for bank credit the firms could not secure alone. TVE employment grew from 28 million in 1978 to 135 million by 1997, and TVE output rose from under 6% of GDP to 26% over roughly the same period. The hukou system. China's household registration system, introduced in 1958, ties access to housing, healthcare, education and grain rations to a person's registered location, rural or urban. It made moving to a city without an urban permit practically impossible. Restrictions eased in stages from the late 1990s, and the formal rural urban distinction was removed nationwide only in 2014. "Grasp the large, let go of the small." The policy, initiated in 1997, under which China privatised or allowed the bankruptcy of small and medium state owned enterprises while retaining state control of the largest, most capital intensive firms in sectors such as infrastructure, energy and real estate. WTO accession and permanent Most Favoured Nation status. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. From 2002, permanent MFN status with the United States removed the annual threat of tariff spikes on Chinese exports, a stability that Chen and Zha's paper credits with accelerating China's shift from labour intensive exports toward electronics and other capital intensive goods. The 2009 stimulus and local government financing vehicles. In response to the global financial crisis, China launched a four trillion RMB fiscal package alongside a sharp expansion of bank lending. Much of the resulting infrastructure spending ran through local government financing vehicles, off budget entities set up to borrow for public projects; the debt they built up is now central to China's financial stability risks. Total social financing. International Monetary Fund. 2026. "People's Republic of China: 2025 Article IV Consultation." IMF Country Report No. 26/044. The IMF's broadest measure of credit in the Chinese economy, the figure Kaiji Chen cites as roughly 315% of GDP in 2025. More VoxDev Talks episodesThe Four Pests campaign and China's Great Famine, in which Shaoda Wang traces a darker chapter of Chinese economic history, the mass eradication of sparrows during the Great Leap Forward and the millions of deaths that followed. The rise and fall of China's overseas lending, in which Sebastian Horn explains how China became the developing world's largest bilateral creditor, and why that lending boom has now gone into reverse. Related reading on VoxDev.orgThe Mandarin model of growth, on how China's system of promoting local officials for delivering growth shaped decades of investment led expansion. How China became the world's factory: Trade, industrial policy, and growth, on the trade liberalisation and industrial policy that took China from export processing to global manufacturing leader. The bubble dynamics of China's housing boom, Edward Glaeser on the construction surge behind the price rises Chen and Zha describe in this episode.

    Fifty years of Chinese growth: The gradualist reform strategy explained

  5. 26 Aug

    Caste, race, and power: The barriers to political inclusion

    The ballot cast by a landless labourer counts the same as the one cast by the landlord whose fields he works. In this way, democracy can give excluded or subordinate groups access to political power. That's not what has happened, at least, not in large parts of the Global South. Amit Ahuja (UC Santa Barbara) calls those at the bottom of the social order "subaltern groups". Three barriers stand between their votes and any lasting gain. Violence that goes unpunished. The erasure of their shared culture and history by those in power. And they have too little money and organisation to campaign for their rights. The evidence shows that since 2014 the gains that these groups made in the previous three decades have started to reverse, he warns. The old hierarchies are reasserting themselves. The research behind this episode: Ahuja, Amit. 2026. "Subaltern Mobilization in the Global South." Annual Review of Political Science 29: 391-411. Open access. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Amit Ahuja. 2026. "Caste, race, and power: The barriers to political inclusion." VoxDev Talks (podcast).About the guestAmit Ahuja is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, with research spanning ethnic parties and movements, military organisation, caste, and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in multiethnic societies. His book Mobilizing the Marginalized: Ethnic Parties Without Ethnic Movements won the 2020 Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay NIF Book Prize. He co-edited Internal Security in India: Violence, Order, and the State with Devesh Kapur. Research cited in this episodeSubaltern. The word means "of inferior rank" and was used by Antonio Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks to describe groups subordinated by a ruling elite. Ahuja gives it three working attributes: a stigmatised identity acquired at birth, disproportionate poverty, and disadvantage that passes from one generation to the next. Ranked and unranked social orders. Donald Horowitz, in Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985; University of California Press, 2000 edition), separates societies where groups sit in a vertical hierarchy from those where they sit side by side. The Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria, and Maronite Christians, Sunnis and Shia in Lebanon, compete without one being formally subordinate to another. Hierarchy is not a universal feature of diverse societies. Greed against grievance. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argued in 2004 that people join insurgencies to capture resources such as diamonds or minerals; Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel (1970) argued instead that rebellion follows the gap between what people have and what they expect. Ahuja adds a third answer drawn from ethnography. The dignity of insurgency. Elisabeth Wood's study of El Salvador (2003) and Alpa Shah's work on Maoist central India (2013) both find that the poor support armed movements partly because insurgents treat them better than landlords and state officials do. Participation confers dignity in a setting built to deny it. The identity penalty. Devorah Manekin and Tamar Mitts (2022) find that nonviolent campaigns led by marginalised groups attract less popular participation and fewer elite defections than comparable campaigns led by dominant groups. Nonviolence works, but not equally well for everyone. Undocumented rights. Afro-descendant communities on Colombia's Pacific coast, the San in the Central Kalahari, and Adivasis in India's forests all hold customary claims that colonial and postcolonial registries never recorded. Without a written record they are reclassified; Adivasis became "encroachers" under British forest law and the conservation regimes that followed. The Dalit Panthers. Formed in western India in the 1970s, the group combined revolutionary politics with armed self-protection for Dalits facing caste violence, taking its name and some of its style from the Black Panther Party. Military service as a school for organisers. Black South Africans recruited during the Second World War, and Dalits taken into the British Indian Army during the world wars, both emerged with leadership training and a more assertive political style. Dominant groups are usually reluctant to arm subaltern populations; labour shortages force the question. The Indian Election Commission. Amit Ahuja and Susan Ostermann (2018) trace how the commission secured polling stations through the 1990s and 2000s, which made it possible for parties to bring marginalised voters to the poll. Institutional autonomy, backed by the courts, can partly offset a coercive environment. Co-optation in Bolivia. Movimiento al Socialismo absorbed parts of the country's Indigenous movement and blunted its radical edge. Alignment with a party brings resources and patronage positions; it can also cost a movement its original demands. More VoxDev Talks episodesCan contact between groups reduce prejudice? Matt Lowe on why decades of evidence for the contact hypothesis look weaker under preregistration, and why prejudice does not simply fade with development. Caste, identity, and worker productivity in India Daniel Keniston on how caste still sorts Indians into occupations, and what the economy loses because of it. Related reading on VoxDev.orgSomething to complain about: How minority representatives overcome ethnic barriers, on a formal complaints system in Bihar that gave Scheduled Caste ward members leverage over village heads who were holding up their projects. How expanding voting rights shaped politics in India. Franchise expansion in 1935 and 1950 barely moved turnout or competition, and yet it shifted public spending towards the newly enfranchised. No representation without reservation: The long-term limits of gender quotas in India, on what happens to descriptive representation once the quota is withdrawn.

    Caste, race, and power: The barriers to political inclusion

  6. 19 Aug

    Masculinity norms and their economic implications

    Do economists treat what men do as normal human behaviour, and then study norms around women as a departure? If so, we need to pay more attention what we mean by masculinity. That's what Pauline Grosjean (University of New South Wales, CEPR) does. She argues that these masculinity norms carry economic weight of their own. What do men around the world think "being a man" means? The consistent answers: winning against other men, self-reliance, control over women, aggression, and the avoidance of anything coded as weak or homosexual. Grosjean and her co-authors measure adherence to these core dimensions across 70 countries. How do these beliefs vary by age, economic development, and culture? And what do they predict about the way men will behave? The research behind this episode: Matavelli, Ieda, Pauline Grosjean, Ralph De Haas, and Victoria Baranov. 2026. "Masculinity Norms and Their Economic Implications." Annual Review of Economics 18:127-55. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Pauline Grosjean. 2026. "Masculinity norms and their economic implications." VoxDev Talks (podcast).About the guestPauline Grosjean is a professor in the School of Economics at the University of New South Wales and a fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Her research spans culture and institutions, gender roles, violence and conflict, and how historical conditions shape economic behaviour long after those conditions have gone. Research and concepts cited in this episodeMasculinity norms. Social expectations about how men should behave, or how a "real man" should behave. Grosjean draws the distinction from gender-role norms, which define men relative to women. Masculinity norms are largely about how men rank against other men. The five core dimensions measured in the survey are the importance of winning and status, self-reliance and help avoidance, violence, power over women, and avoidance of homosexuality. Global Masculinity Survey. The 70-country survey behind the review, built on measurement tools developed by social psychologists and run in partnership with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development across its countries of operation, then extended to a further 32 countries. See De Haas, Ralph, Victoria Baranov, Ieda Matavelli, and Pauline Grosjean. 2024. "Masculinity Around the World." CEPR Discussion Paper 19493 (gated). Male-biased sex ratios in colonial Australia. Grosjean's earlier work uses convict transportation, which left parts of Australia with far more men than women, as a natural experiment. Areas that were historically male-biased show stronger masculinity norms today, more violence and male suicide, and weaker support for same-sex marriage; the last of these puzzled economists, because a shortage of women should, on a supply-and-demand reading, make men more relaxed about other men's homosexuality, not less. See Baranov, Victoria, Ralph De Haas, and Pauline Grosjean. 2023. "Men. Male-Biased Sex Ratios and Masculinity Norms: Evidence from Australia's Colonial Past." Journal of Economic Growth 28:339-96. Ten to Men. An Australian longitudinal study of male health that measures both adherence to masculinity norms and a range of self-reported violent behaviour. Grosjean cites its strong associations between norm adherence and interpersonal aggression, sexual violence and self-directed harm. Testosterone and status seeking. The link often assumed to run from testosterone to aggression is, on the evidence, better read as a link to status seeking, with aggression only one of its possible expressions. Testosterone itself responds to social context, diet and caregiving, so it sits inside the culture rather than outside it. Misperceived norms. Men often overestimate how strongly other men endorse restrictive norms, and also misjudge what women want, believing women approve of controlling or emotionally closed behaviour when they do not. Grosjean links this to Marianne Bertrand's work on men declining paternity leave for fear of others' disapproval, and to the gender-segregated online spaces of the manosphere, where the norms are advertised and reinforced. School intervention in Brazil. An ongoing trial with Ieda Matavelli comparing two approaches in schools, one closer to cognitive behavioural therapy and one that directly tackles beliefs about what it means to be a man. Matavelli's earlier work documents how warped young men's views of others' expectations can be, and tests whether correcting them changes behaviour. More VoxDev Talks episodesNon-elite women in politics. Soledad Artiz Prillaman on how patriarchal norms and social networks shape which women can take part in politics, and why a seat count tells you little about power. Paid work for women and domestic violence. Deniz Sanin on how the spread of coffee mills in Rwanda gave women paid work and, with it, less violence at home. Related readingMasculinity norms and their economic consequences, a VoxEU column by the four authors setting out how these norms shape labour markets, health, education, households and politics, with the country and individual-level survey findings.

    Masculinity norms and their economic implications

  7. 14 Aug

    How global supply chains are built

    This is an episode from VoxDev's new podcast series, Ideas in Development. This series has a separate podcast feed, where you can find every episode of Oliver Hanney’s conversations with leading development thinkers. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgwcv4fyU28 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/how-global-supply-chains-are-built-and-how-to/id1866874059?i=1000774798943 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5EECcLVxxEQtkX3gJZcHGH?si=94e15ed7834a4e86 Audioboom: https://audioboom.com/posts/8922412-how-global-supply-chains-are-built-and-how-to-actually-attract-investment Substack: https://ideasindevelopment.substack.com/p/how-global-supply-chains-are-built  Bill McRaith spent his career building supply chains – from 1980s Britain, to a factory in Panyu, China in 1990, to Ethiopia three decades later. He joins Oliver Hanney to explain what really attracts manufacturing investment to a developing economy, and why the model most countries are targeting no longer exists. In this wide-ranging conversation we cover why China’s industry grew; why responsive local governments beat tax holidays; the collapse of the wage gap; how Ethiopia was chosen as a beachhead; and why apparel remains the right first-mover industry for countries not yet on the industrialisation road.

    How global supply chains are built

  8. 12 Aug

    Using mobile phones to support teachers, parents, and students

    More households in low-income countries own a mobile phone than have electricity or clean water.  So why is education one of the last places it has been put to work? Jenny Aker (Cornell) and Noam Angrist (Oxford) are the academic leads on a J-PAL Policy Insight that reviews 30 studies of mobile phone programmes in education. They tell Tim Phillips that the cheapest option, blasting out SMS messages, is usually the one that fails. But put a real person on the other end of the line, and that's an effective and inexpensive way to improve education. The phone is a platform, Angrist points out, not a pedagogy. The research behind this episode: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). 2026. "Leveraging Mobile Phones for Learning." J-PAL Policy Insight. Academic leads Jenny Aker and Noam Angrist; insight authors Jessica Williams and Demitria Wack. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, Jenny Aker, and Noam Angrist. 2026. "Using mobile phones to support teachers, parents, and students." VoxDev Talks (podcast).About the guestsJenny Aker is the Daniel G. Sisler Professor of Development Economics at Cornell University. She is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and co-chair of the Digital Identification and Finance Initiative at J-PAL Africa. Her research spans mobile technology and agricultural markets, adult literacy and numeracy, financial inclusion, and the design of cash transfers and social protection in Africa. Noam Angrist is Academic Director of the What Works Hub for Global Education and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, and co-founder of Youth Impact, one of the largest NGOs scaling health and education programmes backed by randomised trial evidence. His research spans distance education, the measurement of implementation, and how programmes that work in a trial can be made to work at national scale. Research and concepts cited in this episodeOne Laptop per Child. The plan to put a cheap laptop in the hands of every child in the developing world, launched in 2005 and abandoned as evidence of its effect on learning failed to appear. Angrist raises it as the cautionary tale for anyone introducing a device: the schools could not absorb it, the software was an afterthought, and nobody planned for charging or breakage. Phones avoid that problem because they are already there, so the marginal cost of adding good pedagogy is low. A long-term follow up from rural Peru found no positive effect on educational outcomes. Mobile coverage. GSMA. 2025. "The State of Mobile Internet Connectivity 2025." Around 95% of the world's population now lives within range of a broadband network. In sub-Saharan Africa coverage is about 80% and adoption about 60%, and what people mostly hold is a simple handset rather than a smartphone. Phone tutoring in emergencies. Angrist, Noam, Micheal Ainomugisha, Sai Pramod Bathena, Peter Bergman, Colin Crossley, Claire Cullen, Thato Letsomo, Moitshepi Matsheng, Rene Marlon Panti, Shwetlena Sabarwal, and Tim Sullivan. 2023. "Building Resilient Education Systems: Evidence from Large-Scale Randomized Trials in Five Countries." NBER Working Paper 31208, revised 2025. Weekly maths texts combined with live tutoring calls raised test scores by 0.30 to 0.35 standard deviations at an average cost of US$11 per child. SMS on its own moved the needle only where access to learning was already very low. Scaling up without the drop. The first Botswana phone tutoring trial produced an effect of about 0.12 standard deviations; by the fifth replication, in Uganda, Angrist says the effect was over 0.8, and implementation fidelity data improved in step with the order of the studies. He sets this against the voltage drop described by John List in The Voltage Effect (2022), the tendency of programmes to lose their punch as they scale. Common, Angrist argues, but not inevitable. A/B testing the tutoring call. Angrist, Noam, Claire Cullen, and Janica Magat. 2025. "Cheaper (and More Effective) by the Dozen: Evidence from 12 Randomised A/B Tests Optimising Tutoring for Scale." What Works Hub for Global Education Working Paper 2025/001. Roughly half the cost of a tutoring programme goes on scheduling rather than teaching. One call of 40 minutes every fortnight, instead of 20 minutes every week, delivered the same dosage for less. Handing the call to a parent partway through doubled to tripled the effect; motivational nudges to parents did nothing. Monitoring teachers by phone. Aker, Jenny C., and Christopher Ksoll. 2019. "Call Me Educated: Evidence from a Mobile Phone Experiment in Niger." Economics of Education Review 72: 239 to 257. Weekly calls to the teacher, the village chief and two students raised maths and reading scores. The counter-example comes from Côte d'Ivoire, where nudging parents and teachers at the same time left the most motivated teachers turning up less; too much scrutiny, the authors suggest, corroded the motivation the programme depended on. Platform and pedagogy. Angrist's phrase for the distinction the review keeps returning to. The phone carries an intervention; it is not the intervention. Targeted instruction and early childhood stimulation both travel down the line, but somebody still has to decide how often to call, who picks up, and what happens on the call. The same traffic makes the phone a good instrument for research, since the data is traceable and the units of randomisation are well powered. Education Cannot Wait. The United Nations fund for education in emergencies and protracted crises. Its 2022 global estimate put 222 million crisis-affected children and adolescents in need of urgent education support, up from about 75 million in 2016. Angrist uses the same figure in the five-country paper, and cites it here to make the point that the humanitarian structures for education in emergencies exist while the evidence base underneath them barely does. More VoxDev Talks episodesHow AI can put 20 years of development evidence to work. Iqbal Dhaliwal on why One Laptop per Child failed, and what that failure should teach anyone now betting on AI in development. Why we need to invest in foundational learning. Benjamin Piper on the gap between getting children into school and getting them to read, which is the gap most of these phone programmes are trying to close. Related reading on VoxDev.orgHow simple technologies can improve learning: Evidence from Niger, in which Jenny Aker and Christopher Ksoll show that a weekly call to teachers and students almost doubled the effect of an adult education programme. Educating children in emergencies: Global evidence from five randomised trials, the five-country evidence on cheap phone tutoring that runs through much of this conversation. How AI tutors improved learning in Nigeria, on a six-week after-school programme in Edo State that produced large gains in English, and on the guardrails that made it work.

    Using mobile phones to support teachers, parents, and students
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