This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit www.categorypirates.news Last week, we recorded the very first episode of the Pirate Street Journal. The Pirate Street Journal is for leaders with a different mind. A different take on business news. Through the category lens. Our mini-books are timeless. PSJs are timely. Our mini-books are long stories longer. PSJs have 30-minute seat belts. Our mini-books are thinkerâs high. PSJs try to help you think before you act. But, but, but, but⌠Piratey disclaimer: This is NOT financial advice. None of us have Series 63, Series 7, Series 6 7, CPAs, CFAs, IUDs, IEDs, and hopefully not IBS (this makes DUDE Wipes sad). Think of this like professional wrestling. Itâs entertainment. Donât be so smart, youâre stupid and suplex your safety net savings. Hey Ho, Letâs Go! PSJ is the new weekly thing. The videoâs free. The deep-dive written analysis is paywalled. Watching makes you informed. Reading makes you different. Two ways to climb aboard: * Monthly subscriber: $20/month. Youâve done dumber things with $20. * Founding subscriber: $375/year. For about a dollar a day, you get every mini-book weâve ever written (300+), every audiobook (30+), digital copies of all seven of our Big Books, and unlimited access to The Pirate Eddie Bot and Pirate Christopher Bot, your 24/7 AI jamming partners for category building. To read this weekâs deep dive, become a subscriber today. 1. Why is Salesforce down? Why is Micron up? The Mag 7 reported earnings, and they were great overall. But hereâs some weird data. Salesforce (one of the Category Kings of SaaS) lost about a third of its market capitalization in the last 12 months, despite strong revenue and operating income. Forward P/E down 28% in twelve months. Benioff just announced a $50 billion stock buyback, one of the largest in corporate history. Micron (memory for AI) saw over a 6x increase in its stock price in the last 12 months, also with incredible revenue and operating income. Forward P/E sat at roughly 3x a year ago. Today it is over 7x. The stock more than tripled in that window, but earnings grew faster than the multiple did. In the columns, we have the Mag 7, plus SpaceX, which is soon to go public, as well as Micron and Salesforce. The rows are what matter. * Top row, Potential investors. Forward P/E above roughly 27, which is about +5 above the S&P 500 average PE multiple. * Middle row, market-average band. Forward P/E is roughly 17 to 27. The S&P 500 lives here at around 22. * Bottom row, Performance investors. Forward P/E below roughly 17, which is about -5 below the S&P 500 average PE multiple. The actual PEs are merely a placeholder, as thereâs nothing magic about plus or minus 5 from the S&P 500 average. We want to discuss the fact that there are two types of investors. Performance investors. They invest in companies because of their current and near-term performance. Their performance is predictable, reliable, and steady. Sometimes slow, but never surprising. These are usually Category Kings today. These companies are valued at lower multiples, whether it is price to earnings, enterprise value to EBITDA, or price to sales. And there are Potential investors. They invest in companies regardless of their performance now or in the near term, but in their long-term future potential. Usually, these are companies that can become future Category Kings that no one else really sees. These companies are valued at much higher multiples, usually because earnings or sales are emerging and expected to accelerate. When Potential investors start buying a stock, they lift the forward PE multiple as they are willing to pay a premium for potential. They think the category size of prize is growing and has huge upside. They think the category is on the good side of the S-curve. All boats rise with the tide. When Potential investors sell a stock to Performance investors, it depresses the forward PE multiple because they arenât willing to pay a premium for potential. They think the category size of prize is static and has limited upside. 2. Are you on the good or bad side of the s-curve Performance vs. Potential investors are fundamentally debating one fundamental question. Is the category and company on the good or bad side of the S-curve? You donât have to be right on the precise number and date. Itâs not like picking black 17 on the roulette table. Itâs just picking black or white. Using data and Category Design. And thinking about thinking. You donât have to predict timing. You donât have to predict a number. You should, but donât have to, do fancy analysis. Left or right of the S-curve is the question. If you are right, and everyone agrees with you, it can be a profitable bet. If you are right, and everyone disagrees with you, you can create generational wealth. But you have to be comfortable with the loneliness, name-calling and mockery that comes with rejecting the premise. When Pirate Eddie wrote in HBR that Netflixâs 80% stock drop in 2011 was Wall Street being dumb, Wall Street called him dumb. When Pirate Eddie shared on CNBC about Teslaâs superconsumer being a new superconsumer who valued both functional and fun cars, Wall Street called him dumb again. When Pirate Eddie wrote in HBR that General Mills should sell its cereal business, he made a lot of former clients/friends at General Mills angry. But the data at the time was undeniable. 12 years of category decline. And unless you believed carbs and sugar were ever coming back into vogue, General Millsâ cereal business would never be more valuable than it is today. And they should sell it. General Millsâ stock is down 38%, while Kellanova (old Kelloggs with cereal spun out) is up +4% since being acquired by Mars. General Millsâ PE ratio is 8x, and Kellanovaâs PE is 23x. Sometimes being right doesnât feel great at first. But the cost of being legendary is the willingness to be different. 3. Re-rating is a result of Category Design Re-rating is when Wall Street decides a companyâs multiple should be higher or lower. Revenue, gross margins, and cash flow donât change. The value of those economics does. Everything we value, weâve been taught to value. Re-ratings are simply a redefinition of the Category. Did you know Dominoâs Pizza was the 2nd best performing stock from 2010 through the end of 2019? Why? It transformed from a pizza delivery company to a tech company that happens to deliver pizzas. They invested heavily in their âpizza trackerâ, apps, and frictionless mobile apps. Itâs Category Design 101. And if you invested $1,000 into Dominoâs at the beginning of 2010, youâd have $40,000 in 10 years. The best part is that re-ratings can happen slowly. You could have jumped on the Dominoâs train any of the first 9 years of its run and done well. Wall Street is often blind to Category Design. Category Design is your unfair advantage. 4. The SaaSpocalypse is overstated The financial press has decided this is the death of software. Salesforce down $135 billion. ServiceNow down $100 billion. Workday down $50 billion. Hundreds of billions of dollars in enterprise software market cap gone in a year. It is the wrong frame. Software is not dying. On May 15, Marc Benioff sat down with the All-In Podcast and said, â⌠the software marketâs rerated. It happens every now and then. There are cycles. You know, Iâve been doing Salesforce for 27 years, enterprise software for 40. And the marketâs rerated.â â Marc Benioff The earnings are fine, but the multiples got cut. Salesforce guided to do $46 billion in revenue and $16 billion in cash flow this year. Performance is not the problem. Potential is. The market used to price these companies as Potential plays. Software is eating the world, every business needs a CRM SaaS, the seat count never stops growing. That story matured. The category got knowable. The TAM became visible. So the market quietly moved these names down a row. From Potential. To Neutral. Some all the way to Performance. Benioff is responding to this exactly the way a category designer should. He is doing three things in parallel. Buying back stock at compressed multiples because he believes the business is worth more than the market pays for it. Acquiring companies (Informatica), while, in his words, âeverythingâs a little cheaper.â And, most importantly, repositioning Salesforce out of the SaaS category entirely. AgentForce. Slack as the context engine. Humans, agents, and headless platforms interoperating. If that repositioning works, Salesforce gets re-rated up again under a new category label. Same business. Different multiple. Different shareholders. That is the move. 4. AI hardware is more valuable than AI software The content in this section is 100% created by AJ on X @alojoh. Heâs a former Goldman Sachs investment banker, who built his own pirate ship that is a combination of investment research and trading advice with a rare alignment of incentives with his subscribers. The goal of equity research is to drive trading revenue for investment banking, not necessarily at the benefit of the reader of the research. There is a strong motivation to put out positive news and analysis for investment banking clients and even stronger reluctance to say anything negative about those same clients. It is not 100% trustworthy. The incentives for most traders/investors is to grow their own returns, even at the expense of subscribers/readers. They may tell you to buy a stock, but only after they bought it, and at times, they sell as they tell you to buy. Or their incentive is to grow their assets under management and charge you 2% of assets and 20% of carry for as long as possible. AJ is the odd combination of a top-tier investment researcher who uses it to trade for his own account. His basic subscription on X is only $7/month, but his hardcore channel is $500/month, which Pirate E