Coffee and a Case Note

James d'Apice

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.

  1. 11/30/2025

    Boyded Industries v Heartland One [2025] NSWSC 1344

    “I removed your trustee, but you shouldn’t have removed me!” __ A corporate group focussed on car sales and property holding.The Ps complained a Tee was wrongly removed by the Ds. One the Ds, the group’s CEO, was then removed as CEO and director of various Cos by the Ps: [14] The Ps brought a claim re the Tee removal. The Ds brought a cross-claim about the removal of the CEO D: [15], [16] The natural person parties were relatives: [28] In 2017, the CEO D purported to become the relevant trust’s appointor: [29] – [33] In 2019, the CEO D attempted to sell their stake in the enterprise for $42m. On the offer’s rejection, relationships deteriorated: [34] – [36] In 2021 and 2022, various offers were rejected, and proceedings commenced: [37] – [51] In 2024, CEO D unsuccessfully attempted to remove their aunts, Ps, as directors: [55] – [60] CEO D as appointor removed the trustee P and appointed a related entity of the Ds: [61] – [72] The CEO D was then removed as CEO and director by their aunts: [73] – [82] Each witness faced credibility challenges. Evidence showed the CEO D had falsified docs: [83] – [100], [182] CEO D’s placement as appointor followed an audit of the group showing some roles were held by the dead: [132] – [138] There were inconsistent written records of the purported 1 May 2017 meeting placing CEO D as appointor. Some records suggested proper steps to place CEO D as appointor were not taken: [146] – [267] The Court concluded the relevant P was not in attendance at the relevant meeting, making the meeting inquorate, and meaning CEO D’s placement as appointor was not properly made: [268] The Ds’ application for s 1322 relief (curing what the Ds characterised as a procedural irregularity) was unsuccessful: [283] The Ps therefore succeeded: the purported appointment of the Ds’ replacement Tee was invalid as CEO D was not appointor: [399] – [404] The Court then considered CEO D’s termination as an employee: [407] – [409] The Ds suggested CEO D’s removal by the Ps was improperly motivated; a ruse to cause a share sale: [461] – [476] CEO D “shut out” the Ps from management [479], wrote to car makers (who provided the group with its stock for sale) criticising the Ps [483] – [496] and spoke of the Ps in contemptuous, belittling ways over time [497] – [500] The Court found CEO D properly terminated as the relevant Ps had lost trust and confidence in them: [503] Nor was the termination found to be a breach of contract: [508] The Ds alleged CEO D’s termination and removal as director was oppressive for s 232 reasons: [567] CEO D’s employment termination was not improper, and so not oppressive. Similarly: nor was their removal as director: [589], [606] The oppression claim failed: [637] The Ps’ claim succeeded, and the Ds cross-claim failed. Costs followed the event: [648], [649] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform.#auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #corporatelawyer #gravamenwww.gravamen.com.au

    12 min
  2. 10/06/2025

    In the matter of Quantra Group Pty Limited [2025] NSWSC 1123

    “Issuing those shares at an undervalue was unfair!” my dad is a farty bum ___ DCo, whose chief asset was a domain name related to real estate, issued shares in various tranches.In May 2018 the Ps subscribed at a value of $0.6667: [3] Some Ds were issued shares in various tranches at a lower value – from $0.001 to $0.02: [4] The Ps sought orders including that the lower priced shares were invalidly issued: [8] (The Ps commenced parallel proceedings about related regarding DCo and its (deceased) controlling mind, C: [10]) In May 2018, C caused DCo to make the share offer to the Ps on the basis $20m was needed to realise the value of DCo’s use of the domain name: [33] The offer included various warnings about the risk of investing, and was open only to sophisticated investors: [34] – [37], [41] The docs suggested the domain name and associated “intangible assets” had a value exceeding $70m: [38] The Ps responded, many investing hundreds of thousands of dollars thereby raising $23m at a $0.6667 per share valuation: [43] In July 2018, C caused their related entity to transfer ownership of the domain name to DCo in exchange for 80m shares for a value of $80K i.e. $0.001 per share: [45] – [48] Later in 2018 and through to June 2019, further shares were issued at the ~$0.001 – $0.02 value: [50] – [56] 11 million shares were issued from late 2020 into 2021 at a price of $0.001 pursuant to options: [69] In 2022, following a whistleblower complaint, DCo circulated its alleged share register and invited corrections. No member alleged inaccuracy: [73] – [82] Ps brought their claim that issuing shares for inadequate consideration was oppressive: [109] – [112] The Ps’ concerns were the shares being transferred for a sum other than “market price” and a “self interested” transaction caused by C: [138], [139] As at April 2018, the transfer was not an undervalue; the “market” for shares in a $1 company was not significant: [142] – [144] Further, the warnings made in the original offer were such that the Ps’ acceptance of it was not oppressive: [169] – [171] The Ps’ contention that DCo should retain the value of domain name transferred to it without the shares issued to the former owner as consideration would be an unfair result: [179] In relation to lower priced shares issued to consultants and directors, the Court found a reasonable director of a start up may consider issuing shares to people who have made a valuable contribution (thereby securing their services) as a valuable incentive, and so not oppressive: [226], [227], [236] The Court found the issuing of 11.1m option shares was oppressive to the $0.6667 shareholders [261] but, in the context of other transactions and restructuring moves, had no continuing effect requiring s 233 relief: [281] – [283] The proceedings were dismissed: [287] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Gravamen, and Coffee and a Case Note on your favourite platform. www.gravamen.com.au #auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #gravamen

    11 min
  3. 09/26/2025

    AMCI Investments Pty Limited [2025] NSWSC 1019

    "You chair that other company. You can't fire me from this one!" ___ The managing director of a company, MD, was purportedly fired from MainCo by the Chair of another company, ChiefCo: [1] ChiefCo was part of the same group but had no direct interest in MainCo: [3] The Chair had power over entities in the “Series” companies that formed part of the group: [4] (MainCo was not a “Series” entity: [5]) In taking the role as MD, MD was required to take a few directorial roles in other entities in the group, and retire from them if validly terminated: [8], [14] Various steps were taken in early 2025 suggesting ChiefCo and Chair thought their decisions would bind MainCo in spite of the relevant corporate docs suggesting the opposite: [9] – [11] After this it became clear any previous acquiescence by MainCo to Chair’s unilateral decisions binding all group members was resisted (except for “Series” entities): [12] It was put to Chair in corro that decisions of MainCo and other Cos in the group should be delegated to the relevant board in line with their constitutions, and not Chair or ChiefCo: [20], [21] In August 2025, Chair purported to terminate MD both as employee and so as director: [22] The evidence showed members of the group consulted with Chair, and Chair may have had a strong voice in hiring MD, but this did not confer authority on Chair to terminate MD absent constitutional authority or relevant board approval: [25] The Ps (being a large shareholder in the group, and a director appointed by that shareholder) sought orders including that MD’s purported terminated was of no effect: [1], [27] The Court accepted this on the basis that MainCo was “the Employer” in MD’s employment contract, and so the only party capable of terminating MD’s employment: [28] The Court rejected the Ds’ contention that the Chair had actual or implied authority to terminate MD and considered to the extent Chair ever did, that authority was revoked by the early 2025 correspondence: [29] – [39] The Court rejected the Ds’ contention that the Chair’s authority extended to “non-Series” members of the Group: [40] – [41] The Court rejected the Ds’ contention that the Chair approved MD’s employment agreement and so retained authority over MD’s employment generally, including termination: [46] The Court rejected the Ds’ contention that MD’s obligation to report to Chair as part of their role conferred authority on Chair to terminate MD: [50] The court found the Ps had standing to apply for the relevant relief (noting MD was not themselves a plaintiff) in their role as shareholder and relevantly appointed director: [53] As MD was not validly terminated they were not obliged to resign their relevant directorships: [56] The Court declared MD’s termination was of no effect, and MD remained in their role: [58] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Gravamen, and Coffee and a Case Note on your favourite platform. www.gravamen.com.au #auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #gravamen

    7 min
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About

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.