Ctrl Alt Army

This interview did not add anything to military operations or strategy that is not already known to military professionals. There was an opportunity here to address some of the significant concerns of the force such as (1) how does AFC bridge the greatest gap in capability that lies in non-lerhal effects when AFC has virtually no significant investment in nonlethal capabilities. Last I checked the portfolio AFC considered non-lethal was the laser that guides the bomb to kill you. (2) Excessive emphasis on tactical operations. The US is quite skilled at tactical operations to win battles (not wars). The gap is the ability to achieve strategic objectives from battles which we have failed to do in almost every conflict since WWII. (3) the failure to address EW in any meaningful way. We are decades behind at least one adversary with no plan to even achieve parity. In fact we are going in the opposite direction with expiring funding on existing kit causing the loss of the limited existing capability. This is further exacerbated by the mismanagement of the 17B career track in the Army leading to EW professionals voting with their feet. (3) Contested logistics. We need to stop ignoring the elephant in the room. We cannot flow a TPFDD when our ROROs are sunk before they reach the SPOD. (4) Ignoring the competition phase where the military will be 99% of the time. Are 99% of AFCs investments commensurate to the actual mission of competition? The Joint Concept for Compering was published yet we see little movement in AFC. There are many other substantive issues which could have been addressed in this podcast which were not. When senior leaders do not address the actual realities of modern warfare which their staffs are struggling with it further fuels the perceived rift between senior leadership and the folks that actually make things happen. Thanks for reading.