Exasperated Infrastructures Podcast

sam sklar

Ever wonder why it's still Infrastructure Week? Peep this publication. www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com

Episodes

  1. Aug 12

    Transportation and The Shape of Cities

    I have had the pleasure of being in Christof Spieler’s orbit for a few years. He released his first book, Trains, Buses, People: An Opinionated Atlas of US Transit, in 2018, followed by a Second Edition—expanding to Canadian transit in 2021. This year he’s joined forces with two titanic collaborators, David Copeland Loredo and Mandi Chapa, to release Transportation and the Shape of Cities, which consolidates, somehow, decades of experience onto your bookshelf. The work is so seminal, they’ve even built a course around it, and I plan on using it to teach when I get around to it. Here’s what I’m asking of you if you’ve made it this far: Listen or watch the conversation. There are incredible takeaways in there. Geometry is destiny; treat it as fact, not advocacy. Every mode of transportation has fixed spatial requirements that no amount of policy or intent can override. Cars will never be as space-efficient as pedestrians; trains struggle with grade separation; these are unavoidable facts. The book’s power is that it lays out these constraints neutrally, so decision-makers can make informed trade-offs rather than wish away reality. This depoliticizes infrastructure conversations by centering what’s physically possible. Standardization scales impact far more than heroics. You can build one amazing bike lane with talented designers and political will, but you’ll never create a great bikeable city that way. Real change requires the AASHTO Green Book equivalent for every mode: routinized standards and guidelines that let your average planner, engineer, and department produce good facilities consistently. Standardization is how you go from exceptional projects to systemic change at scale. The book democratizes technical knowledge so communities can negotiate rather than defer. Christof’s core insight: traditional planning meetings end when someone lists seventy things they want. The real conversation, the hard part, is figuring out what actually fits in the available space and prioritizing trade-offs. By giving elected officials, community members, and cross-disciplinary teams enough spatial literacy to have informed opinions, the book puts power in their hands instead of handing everything to engineers in a “black box.” It’s infrastructure literacy as civic infrastructure. Exasperated Infrastructures is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Exasperated Infrastructures at www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com/subscribe

  2. Jul 21

    Public 🤝 Private Partnerships: A Legacy, with Alexis Rosenberg

    I am very lucky to have an extensive network and people willing to talk to me for an hour about a niche topic: this time, public-private partnerships (P3s, PPPs, triple Ps) with Alexis Rosenberg, a partner at Ashurst Perkins Coie with a decade-plus of experience shepherding deals from inception to closing, revision, and delivery. What makes this chat different from others around this topic is that we didn’t assume any benefits and costs. Neither of us was or is sure that any one P3 structure is better than public delivery for any number of reasons. Instead, we dug into a 400+ page contract (at least the table of contents) and really yapped about the nitty-gritty of the P3 deal structure for the SR400 Express Lanes project in Georgia. And now you, too, can enjoy the conversation in video or audio form above. For your edification, Wikipedia has a pretty good explanation and/or launch pad to learn the basics of P3s. My main takeaway is that they are another tool in the toolbox for delivery, and they should be favored when the details make sense, and it’s not just a simple risk dump. Happy listening. Edited Transcript Sam Sklar: Good afternoon. I’m here with Alexis Rosenberg, partner at Ashurst. Congratulations again on your promotion. I’d love if you could introduce yourself, and tell me a little bit about your role and the firm you work for. Alexis Rosenberg: Thank you. My name is Alexis, and I am a recently promoted partner at Ashurst Perkins Cole. We’re a global law firm, but one of the things we’re highly recognized for is infrastructure and energy, particularly using P3 and alternative delivery models. I’ve worked in this space for about twelve years in total. I started my career in Australia—which is where the accent is from—and then I was in Asia for about six years, doing a bit of work in the Middle East while I was there. I moved to the US in 2021 and have been working on infrastructure projects here ever since. Sam Sklar: That’s super interesting. Maybe if we have time at the end, we can get into the differences in how different parts of the world approach building with different models of public and private investment, design, build, and operations. But I’d love if we could start with the basics. Readers and listeners may have some familiarity with what a public-private partnership—or what we’ll call P3—is. Some people call it triple P. There are lots of different ways people go about it, but what we’re talking about here is some combination of public sector and private sector investment, development planning, building, and operations. Is that about right? Alexis Rosenberg: Yes, I think it is good to step back first and define what a P3 is. It is sometimes helpful to start with traditional infrastructure delivery, which we often describe using the jargon “design-bid-build.” This is where a state agency, owner, or authority utilizes an architectural firm or works in-house to design what they want built. Then, they bid that design out to the market and hire a construction contractor to build it. They may then operate and maintain it themselves, or contract that piece out as well. Then we have what we call alternative delivery, which is not so alternative these days since it has been around for a couple of decades. Starting with “design-build,” rather than having a separate engineering firm design and then bidding that out, the state entity will combine those components into one package. They ask the market for someone who is going to both design and build the project. What’s beneficial about this model is that it aligns the designer with the builder, which incentivizes a constructible design and prevents the state from sitting in the middle of disputes. Sam Sklar: Would you say those are the two main delivery vehicles? Alexis Rosenberg: “Main” is a funny word, but I would say that represents the majority of how we deliver infrastructure, especially here in the US. The P3 model with a private financing element is more popular overseas. It has been used quite a lot here in the US as well, but it remains a bit less popular. Sam Sklar: Excellent. I know there are other alternatives, such as design-build-operate-maintain, and progressive design-build, which is a more recent and interesting one. Maybe we can talk about that a little bit. Alexis Rosenberg: A basic P3 is often described as design-build-finance-operate-maintain, or just design-build-finance-maintain, depending on the asset type. You are combining the design and build under the same private sector team, but they are also responsible for securing upfront financing through debt and equity to fund the construction. They are then responsible for ongoing maintenance, operations, and potentially tolling or generating user fees if it is a revenue-generating asset. Bringing all of that under one private sector team aligns all the elements under one roof. You have a private sector partner who is incentivized to create an efficient, constructible design that will be easily maintained and operated. They are driven to complete the project on time to avoid penalties under their financing structure and to operate it well so they can pay back that financing. That is a traditional P3. There are many different flavors these days. “Progressive” design-build is where, at the time of the bid, the exact form of the project is looser than a traditional P3. There won’t be a hard bid price when you select that contractor. Instead, you select a construction contractor based on their experience. They will then work hand-in-hand with the state to design and establish the parameters of the project before setting a final price. This can be useful for complex projects where the exact solution is not clear yet. The risk, however, is that you lose competitive tension, which means it may not incentivize the best possible price. Sam Sklar: That’s so interesting. My understanding of one of the benefits of doing a public-private partnership or bringing in a private partner is that it alleviates or shifts some of the risk parameters from the public sector onto a private actor whose incentives naturally line up, where their benefit will exceed their risk. Everyone can win in that situation. Alexis Rosenberg: I definitely agree. One of the primary benefits of this model, backed by data, is the alignment of incentives. You have a private sector entity that relies on the asset—either through generated revenue or regular availability payments from the state—to pay back their own debt. They have every incentive to keep the project functioning optimally. During the design and construction phases, they are incentivized to construct cost-effectively. That doesn’t mean cutting corners if you have the right contract with the right parameters, but rather finding ways to optimize construction costs. They also tend to design in a way that optimizes revenue, which a state agency might not naturally focus on. Sam Sklar: To summarize, it is about leveraging as much value as possible for the taxpayer to realize projects on a reasonable timeframe, allowing different actors to check each other. One of the main benefits is preventing a runaway state that might lack the capacity, resources, or expertise, especially for highly localized infrastructure. My newsletter mostly covers transportation, but infrastructure also spans water, energy, and electricity. I’d love to move beyond the basics and talk about an actual public-private partnership that you worked on, the SR 400 express lanes project in Georgia. Alexis Rosenberg: The entire contract for the SR 400 express lanes project is more than two thousand pages. The “front end” portion alone is about 470 pages. It is publicly available on the website. Looking at the table of contents, we have the two parties involved: the State Road and Tollway Authority (SRTA), which is a sister agency to GDOT, and the private developer, SR Partners LLC. The developer is a special purpose vehicle (SPV)—a new company created solely to execute this project. This structure is very important for lenders. The financing provided to this entity is inoculated from any other corporate risks; lenders are lending strictly to this specific project and expecting to get the revenue of the project back to pay down the debt. The structure of this agreement is very similar to many other P3 agreements. It covers right-of-way and land acquisition, approvals, oversight, and how to deal with existing utilities or third-party interfaces like local cities or transit authorities. It includes design and construction obligations for the 16 miles of express lanes, moving from a 30 percent design to full construction readiness. It outlines operations, maintenance, and the “hand-back” parameters since this is a 50-year contract. Finally, it details tolling mechanisms, payments, revenue sharing, non-compliance penalties, supervening events, and termination defaults. Sam Sklar: In your perspective, having done many of these in your career, which sections typically receive the most scrutiny when parties come to the negotiation table? Alexis Rosenberg: I would divide it into two main parts, starting with construction risks. Many of these are similar to traditional design-build risks, but they are exacerbated in a P3 due to the project size and private financing. This includes site access, land acquisition, utility relocation, and unknown site conditions like hazardous materials. There is a lot of scrutiny on who should bear these risks. The general rule is that the party best suited to control the risk should bear it. In a P3, the private sector can only bear risks that they can reasonably control and price, because they can go bankrupt if costs spiral out of control. A tangible example from the SR 400 project is existing utilities. How should you split that risk? This contract utilizes a utility verification period. During the pr

    Public 🤝 Private Partnerships: A Legacy, with Alexis Rosenberg
  3. Jun 25

    Sidewalk Nation: The Life and Law of America's Most Overlooked Resource

    All Roads Lead To The Sidewalk Three takeaways for the lazy. Buy the book. The sidewalk is the smallest unit of government we never talk about, and that’s exactly the point. Michael’s whole career circles around understudied legal spaces, and the sidewalk might be the most understudied one of all. It’s this small thing with an absolutely outsized impact on our lives, and once you start looking at it, you can’t stop seeing it everywhere. That’s basically how this book happened: a law review article wasn’t enough room to fit everything he found once he actually went out and traveled to look at how different states and municipalities handle the sidewalk. Sidewalks don’t fail in isolation; they fail because of everything around them. The Houston chapter is the one that really got me. Houston has decent, patchwork sidewalks, no real Euclidean zoning code, and almost nobody walks on them. Why? Zoning, parking minimums, and decades of underfunding and regulatory fights over the right of way matter just as much as the concrete itself. Whether you’ve got too much regulation or basically none, you can still end up with a place that isn’t walkable. It’s a bell curve, there’s a sweet spot, and most places aren’t anywhere near it. There’s another crazy Houston land use fact that shouldn’t surprise you or me, hidden in the book (and in the interview). You’ll be gobsmacked. Right now, we {often] hand sidewalk responsibility to private property owners, and that’s a historical accident, not a real policy choice. We don’t ask people to plow their stretch of the car-oriented street, but we do ask them to shovel and fix their stretch of sidewalk. That’s one reason why wealthier neighborhoods have decent sidewalks nobody uses, and undernourished neighborhoods have a patchwork of bad sidewalks everyone depends on. A Department of Sidewalks idea isn’t about more bureaucracy; it’s about consolidating the mess of agencies that already touch the sidewalk into one accountable one. All roads lead to the sidewalk; whatever your built-environment policy obsession is, there’s a sidewalk angle to it. Exasperated Infrastructures is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Exasperated Infrastructures at www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com/subscribe

    Sidewalk Nation: The Life and Law of America's Most Overlooked Resource
  4. May 20

    Peck, Michigan is the gold standard for project reform.

    Below is a modified transcript of the conversation above. Peck, Michigan is easy to miss. It’s a village of about 570 people in the thumb of the state — blink and you’ll drive right through. But over the last few years, Peck has quietly become a model for how small rural communities can punch well above their weight when it comes to securing and deploying public infrastructure money. They’ve secured roughly four million dollars in grants, completed a solar project that cut their electric bill by $140 a month, replaced aging water mains, and are now looking at extending their water system to support new housing. I sat down with Tim Heiden, Peck’s Village Manager, to talk through how they did it — and what other communities can learn from the approach. The conversation was brought together with the help of Danielle Capers, who connected me with the project. Partners for Public Good — led on this work by Dr. Karl Hoesch — has been working with Peck on structuring and communicating their procurement process, and that partnership is a big part of what makes this story worth telling. Together, they were able to successfully apply for, win, secure Federal funding, and procure a qualified contractor to carry out the work. This is how change starts. Right now, Peck, MI, is the gold standard for procurement reform across the entire United States. The Project Sam Sklar: Can you give a quick overview of what the project is and where it came from? Tim Heiden: In 2023, I applied for a Congressional Spending Program grant through Rep. Lisa McClain’s office (MI-09). The original grant amount was $762,000, with a total project cost of just about a million — we had to come up with a $176,000 match. We’d already secured a couple of other grants, but we were finding it tough to get bids. We’d only get one or two, so the pricing wasn’t great. The project involves replacing some older, smaller water mains for about two and a half blocks in the village and then extending our water system another two and a half blocks so we can support some new housing development and run water services out to one of our parks. SS: And so what I’m hearing is this was an EPA grant, used to replace and extend water mains — but that the really interesting part of the story is how you rethought procurement. Where did that start? TH: When I got the EPA grant, I got a cold email from somebody at Partners for Public Good. It piqued my interest, so I reached out, and we sat down and talked. It made me realize that we’d been relying on the old way of doing things — we had an engineering firm post bids on BidNet and the statewide procurement sites. Some local contractors didn’t even look at those unless I called them directly. And honestly, I didn’t have a lot of contact information, because the village hadn’t had a manager before 2022, when they hired me. For years, things were run by a council that met once a month. There hadn’t been any major infrastructure projects done in probably fifteen years or more. How Tim Got Here SS: Was the hesitancy in the past because the town felt like it didn’t have the internal capacity to manage a grant this large? Why 2022? TH: In 2018, a council member approached me about filling a vacant seat. I was hesitant — I was busy doing other things — but they pestered me for about two months, and I finally said yes. Once I got talking with our DPW supervisor, we realized there was a lot of deferred infrastructure work. I started looking into grants, and the village sent me to a two-day online grant writing course. We wrote a few smaller grants, got those, and figured: why not go after some bigger ones? At the time, I was a corrections officer working a swing shift, so I was in the village office fairly often. After a couple of years, council decided they needed a full-time manager. I was going through some medical issues that were going to force me to retire from the sheriff’s department, so I threw my hat in the ring. Since then, we just keep a list of projects and go after grants as they come up. We’ve secured about four million dollars so far. SS: Four million dollars for a population of 570! That’s punching way above your weight. And I think it’s genuinely inspiring for other communities around the country that might feel hesitant to approach state or federal grant programs with that level of enthusiasm. Too often, what we see is a game of telephone — the local community has a problem, doesn’t know who to talk to, the state doesn’t know how to talk to the federal government about what the program should look like to fund communities, and nothing gets built. What Peck has done breaks that cycle. Rethinking Procurement SS: Walk me through how the bid was structured differently this time. What changed? TH: One of the biggest things we did, working with Karl and his team at Partners for Public Good, was build out a contractor list from scratch — water, sewer, roads, sidewalk, all of it — with actual contact information. We sent a survey out to close to fifty contractors. That alone gave us useful feedback on why some of them hadn’t been bidding on Peck projects. A lot of it came down to timeline. In the past, you’d post a bid and they’d want it done in three months. That turned people off. I sat down with council and said, “If you want to not get reelected, that’s one way to do it.” The other thing was, instead of just posting the bid and hoping somebody saw it on BidNet, I was able to email the bid packet directly to contractors with a note explaining the project — where the funding was coming from, that the money was already secured, and how to reach the engineering firm for the drawings. That last part matters more than people think. Contractors want to know that the grant is locked in before they spend time putting a bid together. Sending a personal email that says, “I have an EPA grant, here’s the amount, here’s our plan,” is a completely different experience than a posting on a procurement board. It was more personalization than the standard ‘here it is, hope somebody saw it.’ SS: This is what I’d call stakeholder mapping — actually understanding the environment you’re working in, rather than hoping the right people happen to be watching the right procurement websites. The two big takeaways I’m hearing: one, be proactive and do targeted outreach to firms. These grants still have to be competitive — you can’t sole-source this kind of work — but as long as your outreach is broad enough to capture the firms that can realistically do the work, you’re already doing it better than most. And it’s not an expensive process. A week or so to compile names and contact information and do the outreach. The payoff is a more competitive bid, better pricing, and you start building actual relationships with contractors in your region. The second takeaway is cost savings that get passed directly to residents. What’s your perspective on that side of it? TH: Absolutely. I live in the village I manage. When we raise utility rates, it affects me too. I tell our residents all the time — it affects the council. I don’t take raising rates lightly. The problem is that Peck, like a lot of Michigan municipalities, went years without raising rates on a consistent basis, and now the newer generation is paying for that. Michigan Rural Water came out last year and recommended roughly a $45 increase between water and sewer. I sat down with council and said, “If you want to not get reelected, that’s one way to do it.” We compromised at $20 last year, with the plan to do the other $20 this year. But with the economy being what it is, we were able to complete this project without touching any of the funds we’d put away — so we could go another year without that increase and then reassess. SS: That’s the point I keep coming back to with this project. What the government can do here is unleash other operations. Every dollar spent well today is another dollar that can go toward a more expensive project later — and the cost of doing nothing compounds too, because inflation affects what your savings can actually buy. Residents care about this even if they’re not in the weeds on water main replacement. What they can grasp is that they’re saving several hundred dollars a year because of a government investment. That’s money being reinvested in the community. The circular economy argument. And I think where a lot of projects miss the mark is they don’t communicate these benefits clearly. Peck, with the help of Partners for Public Good, is doing exactly that. That’s what got me interested in the first place — good spending, good communications, and the people it’s actually affecting. Lessons Learned and What Surprised Them SS: What surprised you during the process? What came up unexpectedly that changed how you engaged with partners and stakeholders? TH: A lot of it was just making contact with contractors. Peck hadn’t done any major utility work in a long time, so we’re not on anyone’s radar. Some of the local managers around me and some of our commissioners used to say, for years, Peck did nothing. And now we’ve completed a solar panel project at the community center that reduced our electric bill by about $140 a month. We’re looking at CDBG funds through the Michigan Housing Development Authority to extend sewer to eight new housing units — units the developer doesn’t have to pay to connect. If we get another eight units on the same system after that, we spread the cost of the infrastructure across that many more customers without raising rates. The biggest thing was the feedback from contractors who said they’d seen Peck bids before but figured they never got selected, so they stopped looking. By reaching out personally and walking them through what we’d actually built over the last few years, I thin

    Peck, Michigan is the gold standard for project reform.
  5. May 11

    Why Nothing Works

    NOTE: I recorded this many months ago (March 2025), so the timelines might be more than slightly off. Congestion pricing is 16 months old (and exceeding expectations). Marc Dunkelman’s Why Nothing Works is a heavy-on-theory, evergreen addition to the growing library of books dedicated to practical government reform. The Professor sat down with me to talk about his thesis and core distinctions between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian visions of democracy, both of which have been warped and maligned through the speed and veracity of information. Below are my key takeaways from the conversation, but the whole conversation is worth a listen/watch and the book certainly worth a read. 1. Progressivism has been fighting itself since the beginning The core tension Dunkelman identifies isn’t between left and right—it’s internal to progressivism itself. From the very start, the movement has contained two completely opposing impulses: a Hamiltonian one that wants to concentrate power in expert hands to get big things done, and a Jeffersonian one that wants to break up concentrated power and return authority to ordinary people. The problem isn’t that either impulse is wrong. It’s that progressives tend to think of themselves as purely Hamiltonian—the party that wants government to do more—while simultaneously spending fifty years building guardrails, checks, and veto points that make government less capable of doing anything. You can’t sell government as the solution to people’s problems and then spend decades making government structurally unable to solve them. 2. The vetocracy problem isn’t that too many people can say no—it’s that nobody can say yes The word vetocracy gets thrown around a lot, but Dunkelman flips the framing in a way that stuck with me. It’s less that the system has too many blockers and more that it has no authoritative yes. Congestion pricing is the perfect local example: Bloomberg floated it in the aughts, the state spent a billion dollars building out the infrastructure, and then a governor killed it on a whim—and got sued either way. Trump thinks he has jurisdiction. The MTA chair thinks he has jurisdiction. The mayor thinks he has a say. Nobody actually has the power to ratify the decision and move forward. That vacuum—the absence of a singular accountable figure who can weigh all the tradeoffs and say this is what we’re doing—is what makes big projects so expensive, so slow, and so politically radioactive. The fix isn’t just deregulation. It’s re-concentrating the authority to decide. 3. Progressives handed Trump the keys by breaking the product they were selling This is the most uncomfortable argument in the book, and the most important one. Dunkelman is not letting conservatives off the hook—but he’s also not letting the left pretend it’s purely a victim of right-wing demagoguery. The progressive movement spent decades making government less functional in the name of accountability. And then they turned around and asked voters to trust government more, give it more money, expand its authority. That’s a lousy bargain when the refrigerator doesn’t keep the food cold. People don’t vote for abstraction—they vote based on whether the world around them feels like it’s working. When it doesn’t, they vote for whoever promises to burn it down. We laid out the red carpet. Recognizing that isn’t defeatist—it’s the only way to actually plot a path back. 4. Government has to show its work—and make it personal The RhodeWorks story is the practical takeaway I keep coming back to. Every project financed by the truck tolling program got a roadside sign showing whether it was on time and on budget—green, yellow, or red. Her staff hated it because it created accountability. That was the point. FDR didn’t put up canvas banners—he put up chrome plaques buried in the ground, built to last. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funded a sign inside Borough Hall that got taken down almost immediately. That gap between how past leaders communicated investment and how we do it now tells you everything about why people don’t feel like government is working for them, even when it is. The MTA‘s congestion pricing messaging hits the Hamiltonian notes fine—travel times are down, air quality is up—but it’s missing the Jeffersonian ask: what does this do for me, specifically, today? Tell the story of the plumber in Rego Park who can now fit in three more jobs a day. Make the deal personal. Make it visible. Make it last. Exasperated Infrastructures is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Exasperated Infrastructures at www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com/subscribe

  6. May 8

    An Exasperated Conversation with Matthew Algeo's, author of "New York's Secret Subway"

    I’m very fortunate to have access to the authors who write books that impress me to all hell. Island Press (now part of Princeton University Press) is the best imprint for built environment books and they attract the most talented authors, including Veronica O. Davis, Wes Marshall, Angie Schmitt, and many more, including Matthew Algeo, who’s written this fascinating history of Alfred Beach, who, with a few more twists and turns would have have had us flying underground in tubes powered by fans. One can only imagine. This is the first time I’ve pivoted to video and I think Matthew for looking extra spiffy. I’ve also summarized our conversation into 4 main takeaways, below. Comments always welcome, and shares appreciated. If you’re not already subscribed, you know what to do. 1. Small stories can illuminate big history Alfred Beach’s 300-foot pneumatic subway tunnel under Broadway is, on its own, a footnote. But Algeo uses it as a lens to examine an entire era—Gilded Age corruption, post-Civil War industrialization, the birth of mass transit, and the role of the press in shaping public works. The lesson for writers and planners alike: find the kernel that attracts the right characters, and the bigger story writes itself. You don’t need to contrive connections if you pick the right entry point. 2. Boss Tweed set the template for the modern power-hungry politician What surprised Matthew most in his research wasn’t the scale of Tweed’s corruption—it was how openly it was conducted and how readily people accepted it. Tweed kept literal ledgers of his kickbacks, lived in a mansion on a city commissioner’s salary, and was beloved by working-class Irish immigrants despite being neither Irish nor Catholic. The parallels to contemporary politics are hard to ignore: a figure who engenders fierce loyalty among followers by being brazenly wealthy, skilled at manipulating elections, and immune to the normal rules of accountability. 3. Beach was a media-savvy city builder, not just an inventor Alfred Beach understood something many engineers and planners still don’t: a good idea isn’t enough. He came from a media family, ran Scientific American for fifty years, and was the first person he invited to the tunnel’s grand opening were reporters from the Times, the Sun, and the Post. He built public support deliberately and understood that how a project gets written about is almost as important as whether it works. His real legacy isn’t the pneumatic tunnel—it’s that he helped legitimize underground construction entirely, proving you could dig under Broadway without the city collapsing. 4. Transit battles then look a lot like transit battles now To build anything in New York in 1869, you needed a charter from Albany—and convincing upstate lawmakers to fund a city project they’d never benefit from was nearly impossible. Beach won the votes but couldn’t overcome the governor’s veto. That dynamic maps almost perfectly onto how SEPTA fights Pennsylvania’s legislature today, or how the MTA navigates Albany. The broader takeaway Algeo draws: American cities once had the best urban transit systems in the world and lost them partly because the cost of transit was never spread wide enough. Other countries still fund it that way. We don’t. Get full access to Exasperated Infrastructures at www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com/subscribe

    An Exasperated Conversation with Matthew Algeo's, author of "New York's Secret Subway"

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Ever wonder why it's still Infrastructure Week? Peep this publication. www.exasperatedinfrastructures.com