Exploring Offshore Litigation

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Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

  1. 20 GIỜ TRƯỚC

    Uphold upheld: Winding-up petition dismissed despite governance failures

    On 24 March 2026, Justice Segal handed down his long-awaited trial judgment in Laggner v Uphold, dismissing a petition to wind up a Cayman Islands digital money platform on just and equitable grounds. The Petition was filed on 14 June 2022. In the four years since, the matter has been before the Court on three interlocutory occasions, proceeded to a three-week trial, and culminated in a 349-page ruling. It is one of the most substantial contested winding-up petitions to have reached a full trial in the Cayman Islands. The trial judgment is, subject to any appeal, a conclusive determination of the dispute. Background Uphold Ltd is a Cayman Islands exempted company operating a digital money platform (formerly known as 'BitReserve'). The Company was founded in 2013 and has over 800 shareholders, including significant institutional and individual investors. The dispute at the heart of this case arose from a funding arrangement entered into in mid-2016 (the 2016 Transaction) involving Adrian Steckel, a director and (through his entities, Uphold Holdings LLC and ASP Capital Sub one Inc) a major shareholder. The Petitioners were six minority shareholders, led by William Laggner, a former director of the Company. They alleged that Mr Steckel had, through the 2016 Transaction and a series of subsequent actions, gained de facto control of the Company and caused a dilution of independent shareholders' interests without their knowledge, consent, or any opportunity to participate. The Petitioners' complaints fell into three broad categories. The first was that the 2016 Transaction itself was designed to hand control to Mr Steckel at the expense of other shareholders. The transaction took the form of a revolving credit facility accompanied by a warrant which, upon exercise, gave Mr Steckel's entity approximately 50 per cent of the Company's issued shares on a fully diluted basis. The second concerned subsequent amendments to the revolving credit agreement, in particular the Third Amendment dated May 2017, which permitted the Company to pay interest on the loan by issuing shares to Mr Steckel and Mr James Chen at a fixed (and allegedly artificially low) valuation of US$48 million. This resulted in vast numbers of shares being issued as "PIK interest" without independent shareholders being informed, consulted, or offered the opportunity to participate. The third was that a valuable corporate opportunity, namely the Company's UK banking licence application (which ultimately became TBOL plc), was improperly diverted to Mr Anthony Watson, then a director and the Company's former CEO, in September 2017. Discovery had revealed an undisclosed side agreement pursuant to which Mr Steckel, Mr Thieriot, and Mr Dennings were each to receive personal shareholdings in TBOL. This was the second winding-up petition brought against the Company. A first petition was filed in February 2021 and settled in June 2021, leading to the establishment of a Litigation Committee chaired by Mr Jim Hilton, an independent director appointed in January 2021. When the current Petition was filed on 14 June 2022, the Petitioners sought either a winding-up order under section 92(e) of the Companies Act (the Act) or, as their primary relief, a buy-out order under section 95(3) of the Act. Before the matter reached trial, Justice Segal delivered three interlocutory judgments addressing service, the Company's participation in the proceedings (discussed further in our recent post 'Defanged: Curtailing company participation in winding up proceedings'), and a strike-out application. On the strike-out, Justice Segal dismissed the Respondents' applications, holding that the Petitioners' case was not bound to fail and that the disputed factual and credibility issues required a full trial. The trial took place over three weeks in April and May 2025 and judgment was delivered on 24 March 2026. The issues By the time of closing submissions at trial, the Petitioners' case had narrowed si...

    17 phút

  2. 1 NGÀY TRƯỚC

    Generative AI in Litigation: Key guidance from the Irish Court of Appeal

    Since the launch of ChatGPT in November 2022, the use of generative AI has proliferated across every domain and litigation is no exception. Courts in various jurisdictions have grappled with the challenges posed by the revolutionary technology and provided important guidance. The decision in Guerin v O'Doherty In March 2026, the Irish Court of Appeal provided its first guidance to lawyers and litigants on the use of generative AI in litigation in Guerin v O'Doherty [2026] IECA 48. The decision concerned an appeal by the defendant, Gemma O'Doherty against the dismissal of her application to strike out a defamation claim. The Court dismissed Ms O'Doherty's appeal. In rejecting all eight grounds of appeal, the Court observed that much of Ms O'Doherty's submissions and complaints addressed matters that either did not arise on the appeal, or were irrelevant to the question whether the court below had erred in refusing to strike out the proceedings (at paragraph 27). Acting in person, Ms O'Doherty used AI to prepare her written submissions for the appeal. However, she did not notify the plaintiff's solicitors in advance that she had done so. The Court found that Ms O'Doherty's submissions contained a number of "hallucinated authorities" which did not exist, or which did not support the propositions they purported to establish. This caused the plaintiff's solicitors to spend time and costs attempting to locate non-existent authorities. The Court emphasised that all parties, whether represented or not, have an obligation not to mislead the court. This includes the obligation not to rely on or advance submissions based on authorities that have no basis in law. The Court also noted that lawyers are subject to professional and ethical obligations which do not apply to litigants in person, but did not address those obligations as they did not arise in the case. The Court's guidance on AI use To assist parties, the Irish Court of Appeal set out the following general guidance for parties, whether acting through counsel or in person: 1. Parties are entitled to use AI to assist in carrying out research in respect of their case provided they do so responsibly and do not, even inadvertently, mislead the court by advancing propositions or relying upon supposed authorities which have no foundation. 2. In all cases where they do so, they should expressly inform both the other parties and the court of their use of AI. 3. A self-represented party is as equally responsible for the ultimate written or oral work as lawyers. 4. It is important, therefore, that any party who uses AI as part of their research independently verifies the accuracy of their submissions and the authorities cited as supposedly establishing the propositions advanced. 5. No authority should be cited by a party who has not verified that it is a genuine judgment of the court and that it is, or at least arguably is, authority for the proposition contended for. Consequences of improper AI use The Court had strong words of caution against the improper use of AI, noting that it could lead to wasted time and costs, cast an unfair burden on the opposing party, potentially bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and mislead the court. The Court emphasised that it had a variety of sanctions at its disposal in cases where parties use AI in breach of these guidelines and where such improper use has the potential to mislead the court. Fortunately for Ms O'Doherty, the Court declined to draw any adverse conclusions against her on that occasion, reasoning that at the time submissions were filed, no guidance was available to litigants in relation to their obligations to the other parties and to the court as regards the use of AI-generated material in proceedings. What it does mean is that going forward, all litigants and lawyers appearing before the Irish courts will have to ensure that they abide by the guidance set out above, or risk adverse inferences and sanctions. Lawyers be ...

    6 phút

  3. 1 THG 4

    Defanged: Curtailing company participation in winding up proceedings

    Koa Capital LP and 507 Summit LLC (together, the Petitioners) presented a winding up petition on 16 January 2024 in respect of Fang Holdings Limited (the Company), a Cayman-incorporated entity. The petition was directed principally at the conduct of Tianquan Mo (Mr Mo), listed as the First Respondent, who the Petitioners alleged had engaged in wrongdoing that benefited him personally at the expense of the Company. The Company itself was named as the Second Respondent. Progress was slow. The Petitioners had difficulty effecting service on Mr Mo, and the matter did not come on for a directions hearing until 25 November 2025. By that stage, the Company had engaged separate counsel and wished to participate in the proceedings beyond simply providing discovery. The hearing concerned three questions: 1. Should the proceedings be treated as inter partes between the Petitioners and Mr Mo in his capacity as a member of the Company? 2. To what extent should the Company be permitted to participate? 3. What procedural directions should be given for the future conduct of the petition, including timetabling for defences, reply, discovery, and evidence? The Petitioners argued that the dispute was properly between them and Mr Mo, and that the Company's role should therefore be confined to giving discovery. The Company, on the other hand, contended that the serious allegations against its board necessitated its separate and independent representation, and that its wider shareholder base would be prejudiced if it could not defend the proceedings. The Company invited the Court to permit it to participate and indicated (without supporting evidence) that it would establish a litigation committee for that purpose, to be comprised of independent directors. Mr Mo did not appear. The Court applied Order 3, rule 12(1) of the Companies Winding Up Rules and the established authorities, including the decisions of Justice Foster in Freerider Ltd, Justice Segal in China Shanshui, Justice Richards in Madera Technology Fund CI Ltd, and Justice Segal in Uphold Ltd. Those authorities recognise a "rebuttable distaste" for company participation in shareholder petitions brought on just and equitable grounds, the underlying rationale being that such disputes are typically between shareholders, and the company's involvement risks one faction using corporate funds to fight what is essentially a private battle. The Court characterised the real dispute as one between the Petitioners and Mr Mo. The allegations were that Mr Mo had acted in his own interests at the Company's expense. The Company had not demonstrated that it held a separate and independent position requiring protection. The Company's offer to establish a litigation committee was found to be insufficient. In Uphold, Justice Segal had set out in some detail what the Court expects where a company seeks to participate through a litigation committee: the committee must be able to act independently and without improper interference from the respondent shareholders; the committee members must confirm that they are not conflicted; and the committee must not overstep its remit, leaving the accused shareholders to take the lead in (and bear the cost of) defending the allegations against them. Even in Uphold, where the company had already established a litigation committee and put evidence before the Court going "a long way towards providing the court with the assurances that it needs", Justice Segal still required further evidence of independence. In the present case, by contrast, the Company had provided no evidence at all: no evidence of proposed committee members, no safeguards, and no articulated defence strategy. The Company had also failed to provide a draft order setting out the directions it actually sought, which the Court noted was unhelpful. On the question of Mr Mo's membership, the Court considered section 48 of the Companies Act (2025 Revision), which provides that the register of members constitute...

    7 phút

  4. 25 THG 3

    The Privy Council closes with a wide

    A long-standing question in offshore trust practice concerns the role of the protector and the nature of their power. When a trust instrument requires a protector's consent before trustees can act, does the protector simply check that the trustees' decision is lawful and rational, or can the protector form its own independent view on whether the proposed course of action serves the beneficiaries' interests? These two competing positions have become known as the "Narrow Role" and the "Wider Role." Under the Narrow Role, the protector satisfies itself only that a reasonable and properly informed body of trustees could lawfully take the decision in question and, if so, must consent. Under the Wider Role, the protector may decide for itself whether to consent by reference to its own assessment of the beneficiaries' interests and the merits of the proposal, even where the trustees' decision is perfectly rational. This debate, which has divided courts and commentators across trust jurisdictions, has now been squarely addressed by the Privy Council in A and 6 Others v C and 13 Others (Bermuda) [2026] UKPC 11. Facts and judicial history The case arose from a group of family settlements, many of which had been amended in the early to mid-1990s. Those amendments introduced common-form protector provisions requiring the protector's prior written consent for two categories of high-impact decision: capital appointments and dealings with (including the voting of) what were called "Specified Securities" (primarily a large, coordinated shareholding in a family operating company). The trustees proposed a substantial reorganisation that would allocate the trusts' aggregate assets between two family branches in a broadly two-thirds to one-third split. The protectors, having been consulted, indicated they were minded not to approve the proposal. Their objection was not that the trustees' proposal was unlawful or irrational, but rather that, in their own independent assessment, the proposal did not best serve the beneficiaries' interests. This distinction went to the heart of the dispute: under the narrow view, if the protectors could only withhold consent on the basis of the legality and rationality of the trustee's proposed action, and there were no legality or rationality concerns in this proposed split, then the protector's objection had no proper basis; whereas, under the wider view, if the Protector's could bring their own judgment to bear on the merits, it did have proper basis. The trustees responded by seeking the Bermuda court's blessing under Public Trustee v Cooper jurisdiction and, subsequently, a declaration on the proper scope of the protector's role. At first instance, Justice Kawaley held that the protector possessed only the Narrow Role. The reasoning emphasised the trustees' paramount substantive powers, the ancillary character of the consent requirement, the unanimity requirement among joint protectors, and concerns that a Wider Role would create duplication and deadlock. The Court of Appeal for Bermuda affirmed, describing the protector as a "watchdog" whose function was to supervise trustee legality and rationality rather than to substitute its own independent judgment. The appeal to the Privy Council squarely presented the same binary choice. One branch of the family contended for the Wider Role; the other urged the Narrow Role. The trustees and protectors remained neutral. The Privy Council's decision The Board's reasoning proceeded in two stages. First, it addressed the correct analytical framework. Second, it applied that framework to the particular trust instruments before it. The Board's starting point was to reject the premise that courts must choose a single, universal "default role" for protectors in the abstract. Instead, the proper question is always one of construction: what constraints, if any, does the particular trust instrument impose on the protector when exercising a power of consent, bearing in mind any ...

    9 phút

  5. 13 THG 3

    Unfair prejudice remedies: Is limitation dead?

    In THG Plc v Zedra Trust Company, the UK Supreme Court, by 4-1, overturned the Court of Appeal and held that no statutory limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (the CA). Relevant legal provisions Section 994 of the CA allows a shareholder in a company to petition to the court for a remedy on grounds that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or some of its members, or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be unfairly prejudicial. If unfairly prejudicial conduct is established, the court may grant a variety of relief that it thinks fit pursuant to section 996 of the CA, including the payment of compensation. Meanwhile, the Limitation Act of 1980 (the 1980 Act) governs time limits for bringing proceedings in a court of law. Section 8 of the 1980 Act provides that unless an action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Act, "[a]n action upon a speciality shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued." Under Section 9 of the 1980 Act, "An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued." Finally, Section 36 of the 1980 Act disapplies the limitation periods in sections 8 and 9 for "any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief", except where the court applies such time limit by analogy in limited circumstances. Background Zedra acquired a 13.2% stake in THG plc in 2011 when it was a private company under the name of The Hut Group Ltd. In 2019, Zadra filed a petition to the court under section 994 of the CA, alleging that the conduct of THG's affairs was unfairly prejudicial to it in a number of respects. In 2022, Zadra sought to amend its petition to include an allegation that it was unfairly prejudiced by being excluded from a bonus issue of shares made more than six years earlier to some shareholders, seeking equitable compensation for its alleged loss. THG opposed the amendment, arguing that it was "an action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment" and therefore time-barred by section 9 of the 1980 Act. The High Court held that the 1980 Act does not impose any limitation period to petitions under section 994 of the CA and as such, the amendment was not time-barred and should be allowed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that all petitions under section 994 of the CA are subject to a 12-year limitation period under section 8 of the 1980 Act and that claims for monetary relief under section 994 are subject to a six-year limitation period under section 9. As the only remedy Zedra sought was compensation, its claim fell within section 9 and was therefore time-barred. Zedra appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that neither section 8 nor 9 of the 1980 Act applied to an unfair prejudice petition. Judgment In a 4-1 majority decision, the Supreme Court allowed Zedra's appeal, holding that a claim under section 994 is neither an "action upon a speciality" under section 8 of the Limitation Act, nor an "action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment" under section 9 of the Act. The central issue in this case on appeal is whether any limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions under section 994 of the CA. The Supreme Court decided that: Under section 8 of the 1980 Act, "an action upon a speciality" is, in essence, an action to enforce an obligation which is created by a deed or a statute. Section 994 of the CA, however, does not create any obligations but merely provides for remedies and rights of petition if there is or has been unfair prejudice in the conduct of a company's affairs. Hence, a claim under section 994 is not an acti...

    11 phút

  6. 12 THG 3

    Mistakes happen but the court is here to help – Bermuda court sets aside trustee's tax-blind distribution

    In Conyers Trust Company (Bermuda) Limited (as trustee of the First Trust) v The Protector of the Second Trust, the Supreme Court of Bermuda exercised its power to set aside a trustee's mistaken exercise of its fiduciary powers to unwind a transaction which would have resulted in unintended tax implications. The trustee was the trustee of two related trusts, the A Trust and the B Trust. As part of a restructuring, the trustee, acting in its capacity as trustee of the B Trust, entered into a phased transaction which entailed the distribution of all the assets of the B Trust to a beneficiary. Thereafter, the beneficiary made a gift of those assets to the trustee in its capacity as trustee of the A Trust. The final step of the transaction was the amendment of the A Trust to reflect the terms of the restructuring. However, the trustee had not taken appropriate UK tax advice before exercising its power to make the distribution to the beneficiary. Had the trustee done so, it would have realised that the distribution would attract unnecessary additional tax liabilities, and it would not have exercised its power in the way that it did. As a result, the trustee applied to the court under section 47A of the Trustee Act 1975 for an order to set aside its exercise of its power and consequential declaratory relief that the distribution from the B Trust to the beneficiary be treated as never having occurred. In order to engage the court's jurisdiction under section 47A, the trustee was required to satisfy the court that (i) when exercising the fiduciary power it did not take into account a consideration of fact or law that was relevant to the exercise of the power and (ii) but for the failure to take that consideration into account the trustee would not have exercised the power at all or would have done so on a different occasion or would have exercised the power in a different manner. Where those conditions are met, the court has a broad and unfettered jurisdiction to set aside the exercise of the fiduciary power either wholly or in part without there being any need to demonstrate that the power was exercised in breach of trust. The effect of making such an order is that the exercise of the relevant power is treated as never having occurred. The evidence demonstrated that the trustee did not take into account a relevant consideration, namely the effect of an aspect of UK tax law, before exercising its power to make the distribution. Had the trustee taken such tax advice, the trustee would not have exercised its power in the way that it did. Consequently, the court found that the conditions for relief under section 47A were met and set aside the exercise of the trustee's power and granted a declaration that the distribution from the B Trust to the beneficiary be treated as if it had never occurred. This decision is a useful reminder to trustees of the care that must be taken when exercising their powers. However, where transactions are entered into under a mistaken understanding of their effect, Bermuda's statutory regime (along with similar ones which exist in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands) is helpful in enabling trustees to seek the court's assistance to unwind those transactions to avoid unintended consequences.

    4 phút

  7. 6 THG 3

    Stay denied: BVI Court of Appeal reaffirms threshold for a stay in US$40 million shareholder dispute Background The Court of Appeal's decision Practical implications

    In a previous blog post, we discussed the first instance judgment in the Phoenix BVI litigation, where Justice Mangatal considered the formalities for becoming a shareholder under s49 of the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (BCA). That judgment has now been appealed, with an accompanying application for a stay of execution. On 27 February 2026, in ICM SPC v Jarvis, the Court of Appeal refused the stay. The judgment restates the C-Mobile Services Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd criteria for stay relief and offers guidance on credibility-based appeals, the limits of using stays as leverage in foreign proceedings and impecuniosity arguments. Phoenix Commodities PVT Ltd (Phoenix BVI) was placed into voluntary liquidation in April 2020. The joint liquidators (JLs) settled a list of members which included Ancile Special Opportunity and Recovery Fund Segregated Portfolio (ASOR), a segregated portfolio of ICM SPC (ICM), a Cayman Islands company. ASOR disputed its shareholder status, arguing that neither it nor any authorised agent had agreed in writing to become a shareholder. The judge at first instance dismissed this application, finding that ASOR had so agreed through its representative. The JLs subsequently issued a call to ASOR for over US$40 million (Call). ICM appealed and sought a stay of the first instance judgment, Order and the Call, though it later narrowed its stay application to the judgment and Order only. Meanwhile, the JLs served a statutory demand on ICM in the Cayman Islands and filed a winding-up petition. The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay application with costs. It applied the five settled principles from C-Mobile Services Ltd in determining ICM's application: consider all circumstances;treat stays as exceptional;require cogent evidence of stifling;apply a balance of harm test; andassess prospects only where strong grounds exist. On its appeal prospects, ICM failed to demonstrate a realistic chance of success. While the appeal raised questions about the interpretation and application of s49 of the BCA, the trial judge's findings were heavily influenced by credibility assessments – in particular, her observations that ICM's main witness was "inconsistent, incredible and convoluted" – and appellate courts are traditionally reluctant to disturb such findings absent exceptional circumstances. On stifling, even if ICM were wound up, then the liquidators could pursue the appeal if they considered it meritorious. ICM's evidence regarding its concerns that a winding up order would result in reputational harm and irreparable damage to itself and a second segregated portfolio, fell short of demonstrating that those fears would actually be realised. On balance of harm, Phoenix BVI's creditors had waited nearly six years for the liquidation to complete. Their prejudice from further delay outweighed ICM's. While a winding-up would mean ICM's "death", liquidators could pursue the appeal alongside their other duties. The Court was also critical of ICM's true objective: using the stay to influence the Cayman winding-up proceedings. This had "unflattering optics" and amounted to seeking a "coercive measure in extra-territorial proceedings". In any event, the BVI judgment has no binding force on the Cayman Islands Court; it is merely persuasive, to be treated as a matter of judicial comity. Finally, impecuniosity was not relied upon, but the Court observed that any such argument requires cogent evidence of means, failing which the application would be "irremediably undermined". This case affirms the five C-Mobile Services criteria for stay applications. Three key takeaways: First, appeals challenging credibility-based findings face a steep uphill battle. Absent exceptional circumstances, appellate courts will not disturb them.Second, courts will scrutinise the true purpose behind a stay application. Using stay relief to gain leverage in foreign proceedings will not be tolerated.Third, impecuniosity argument...

    6 phút

  8. 16 THG 2

    English High Court considers tests for worldwide freezers and duty of full and frank disclosure There were several grave failings in the presentation of the applicant's case The court determined that

    In Lakhany v Hasan, the English High Court* discharged a worldwide freezing order (WFO) for an applicant's failure to adequately discharge their "full and frank" disclosure duty. This case is a welcome reminder of the consequences for artificially elevating a general suspicion of dissipation to a "real risk" before the court. The facts concerned a contractual dispute over an alleged debt of approximately GBP1 million. The remaining background is of only tangential interest: the key takeaway for litigators is how the "real risk of dissipation" was presented to the court. Despite the respondent having relocated from the UK to Pakistan in December 2024 (and contemporaneously informing the applicant's solicitors of this), the applicant gave misleading evidence that the relocation took place months later in March 2025. The applicant invited the court to infer that the respondent had fled the UK to avoid the consequences of any adverse judgment; In respect of a London-based property which the applicant wanted to injunct for the purposes of potential future enforcement, the applicant took four weeks to act on a property alert (being a search to protect a pending purchase) but nonetheless described the alleged risk of dissipation as "compelling". No explanation was given for the delay between the search and the filing of the injunction application (or indeed the hearing of said application, which took place a further four weeks later); and The applicant alleged that the respondent (a) had control over the property; and (b) was seeking to "liquidate his only asset within the jurisdiction" in circumstances where a reasonable public search would have revealed this to be inaccurate: the London-based property was neither the respondent's asset, nor under his control (following the appointment of an LPA receiver on 11 August 2020). To compound the misleading presentation of the case, the applicant's skeleton argument stated that no response to the application for injunctive relief had been received when, in fact, the application had not even been served on the respondent. The Judge hearing the application, unconvinced that the facts supported a conclusion that a risk of dissipation existed, adjourned the hearing to hear from the respondent, but the respondent – by then living abroad – only received two days' clear notice of the adjourned hearing. The hearing proceeded in his absence (despite some informal written representations being made) and the WFO was granted. Remarkably, the applicant's procedural inadequacies persisted post-hearing: neither (a) the transcript of the freezing injunction hearing; nor (b) the subsequent judgment itself were provided to the respondent for over 18 weeks. That transcript recorded the fact that the claimant was only seeking a freezing order in respect of the London property, and not a WFO (as had been granted). When the respondent was provided with a copy of the freezing order on 2 July 2025, he was therefore unaware of the basis upon which the WFO was sought and obtained. In these circumstances, the WFO (granted before the inconsistencies became apparent) could not survive the applicant's complete failure to provide "full and frank" disclosure. As an aside, the applicant attracted further criticism by drafting a freezing order which (a) not only failed to set a return date, but (b) also failed to provide any exception for either (i) living; or (ii) legal expenses. Inadequate notice was given for the injunction hearing; The applicant made misleading representations about the respondent's move to Pakistan and failed to disclose that the property in question was under LPA receivers' control since August 2020; and There was no solid evidence establishing a risk of dissipation. In the circumstances, it's difficult to see how the court could have arrived at another conclusion. The test, of course, for a "real risk of dissipation" is whether "unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will dissipate or dis...

    6 phút
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Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

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