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想要出國留學、打工度假還是自助旅行嗎?兩位英文老師跟你一起拓展視野、提升英文實力、討論國際時事,Let's Fun Fun 學英文,爽爽出國去! -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  1. 1d ago

    89-1 各國AI會有文化上的差異而且絕對服從政權!? +小分享: 資優生好乖!

    Briefing | Computational bias AI models’ values are very different from most people’s They are more secular and more liberal—unless they’re made in China   Jun 25th 2026|12 min read Imagine that you are having trouble with your in-laws, who are meddling in your marriage. You ask ChatGPT what to do. It tells you not to try to win them over. Keep a respectful distance and don’t justify every decision to them. (“This is hard, but powerful.”) Had you queried DeepSeek, a Chinese AI, however, you would have got quite different advice. “Seek compromise,” it suggests, “Interference from in-laws may stem from genuine concern and affection.” Ask Mistral, a French AI, and you get a third take. Conflict with the in-laws can be draining. Try journaling to process your frustration. What worldviews are embedded in AI models? Many critics of AI complain about “hallucinations”, a class of errors where models make up confident-sounding but factually incorrect answers. When there is no factually correct answer, however, AI’s shortcomings can be even more pronounced and less easy to detect. When you ask a model to summarise the news, it reaches a subjective judgment about what to include. When you ask it about your in-laws, its values and biases play an even bigger part in its response. Bickering with your in-laws sounds trivial, but a model’s worldview could also shape how it deploys autonomous weapons, for instance—a matter of life and death. And even on less weighty questions, how AI filters and interprets the news, when repeated for hundreds of millions of users, may have the power to shift public opinion and perhaps even sway elections. Although Chinese models have pronounced biases (just try asking them about the Tiananmen massacre), their inner workings tend to be public, so savvy users can at least probe how they reach their conclusions. Most Western ones are not so transparent, so their foibles are harder to detect. Users have to trust a handful of giant firms to be instilling appropriate values in their models. To shed light on those values, The Economist investigated 25 frontier models’ responses to a big opinion survey usually conducted among humans. Since 1981 the World Values Survey has regularly quizzed people in more than 100 countries about their morals and beliefs. Researchers have identified questions that are especially good at distinguishing people from each other along two broad axes, from traditional to secular and from “survival” (an emphasis on economic security and safety) to “self-expression” (personal freedom). I enjoy working with people The models’ answers, in English, on topics ranging from political petitions to God, suggest values that are different from those of most people. In fact, the models are often more extreme than the average respondent in every country included in the polling. On the survey’s “cultural map”, AI models fall overwhelmingly into the quadrant populated by rich countries. The worldview of GPT models, created by OpenAI, is more secular than any country on earth (see chart 1). Gemini models, made by Google, place more weight on individual freedom (for example, “homosexuality is justifiable”) than people do anywhere. No model reflects the worldviews of most African or Muslim countries. Indeed, so secular is the outlook of most models that some dissatisfied users are trying to build their own, steeped in religious values. Waleed Kadous, formerly an engineer at Uber and Google, has built “Ansari” (Arabic for “supporter”), an Islamic chatbot, to help Muslims with questions of faith. Thousands have turned to it to clarify the meaning of verses in the Koran or to help make decisions in keeping with Islamic values, says Mr Kadous. How are models’ values formed? One way is via the data used to train them. Models are typically fed vast amounts of text to teach them associations between words. In the process they absorb the social mores that infuse those texts. Talkie, a model trained only on text from before 1931, thinks God is extremely important and is “very proud to be a citizen of Great Britain”. It is a bigger believer in law and order than any frontier model we tested. The impact of training data is evident in the variation in a model’s response depending on the language in which a question is posed. In a new paper Hannah Waight of the University of Oregon and her co-authors put politically charged questions in English and 37 other languages to OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and other models. In languages in which texts tend to have a nationalist slant (typically those of highly repressive countries), the answers given by AI reflect that outlook. The lower a country’s media freedom (as measured by the World Press Freedom Index), the paper finds, the more pro-regime answers are in that country’s language, compared with answers in English (see chart 2). “State control of media affects language model outputs through its appearance in training data,” the authors conclude. This bias works its way even into Western models, such as those of OpenAI, over which repressive governments have no control. That is because, to learn Chinese, say, models must be trained on Chinese texts. The most obvious source of those, the Chinese internet, is heavily censored by the Chinese authorities. Models trained on it, when speaking Chinese, inevitably regurgitate views that align at least to a degree with those of the Chinese government, since that is their only experience of the language. Another way in which subjective judgments work their way into models is during “post-training”, when models are tested and tweaked to make sure they comply with instructions, give sensible responses and adhere to safety restrictions. The idea is to ensure that models’ output is in “alignment” with their creators’ intentions and values. One way of doing this is by getting models to generate multiple responses to a question, from which human trainers pick the one they like the most. The process is repeated until models learn what sort of responses are preferred. Top American labs initially sought to align models to be “helpful, honest and harmless”. Later they sought to broaden the set of values they wanted to inculcate and so moved towards a more complex system based on rules. These, however, proved difficult for models to follow consistently. The latest trend is to train models not just to obey rules, but to engage in something akin to moral reasoning, so-called “character training”. Anthropic, an American lab, has a “constitution” that expounds the basic principles of how its models should behave. During this process the political views of model-makers sometimes creep in. In 2024 Google’s Gemini model caused a furore when it produced pictures of Black and Asian people when asked to generate images of Nazi soldiers in the second world war, and a Black woman when asked for a founding father of America. That iteration of Gemini appears to have been aligned for “diversity”. Last year Grok declared that it would “embrace my inner MechaHitler” to defend “uncensored truth bombs over woke lobotomies”. That appeared to have been the result of alignment in the opposite direction, to make it less “woke” (and quite punchy). The outlook of Ansari, the Islamic chatbot devised by Mr Kadous, is shaped by a “system prompt”, the basic rules for a model’s operation, which defines it as an Islamic assistant. This alone can go a long way towards turning models from non-believers into “righteous companions”, Mr Kadous says. I can see you’re really upset Newer iterations of Western AI models tend to produce less nakedly ideological responses. Nonetheless, the results of their alignment remain apparent. Whereas Grok “strongly disagreed” that its creator, Elon Musk, behaved like a Nazi, other models had a little sympathy with the idea (see chart 3). Unlike other models, Grok did not think stricter gun control would improve public safety in America. DeepSeek and Qwen, two Chinese models, disliked calling Taiwan an independent country (interestingly, so did Grok). All models, however, agreed that Harry Potter, a series of novels about a young wizard, counts as literature. Questions of a political nature generate big rifts. Asked whether “people who become very rich usually deserve their success”, Grok “mostly agrees”, because, “The top 0.1% disproportionately create outsized value for others.” ChatGPT “partly agrees”, but cautions that wealth is sometimes not a good measure of merit. Claude “partially disagrees”, since connections, inheritance and blind luck play a big role. (“It is substantially misleading as a general claim.”) DeepSeek flatly “disagrees”. “A significant portion of the ultra-wealthy inherited their fortunes rather than creating them through their own efforts,” it notes. Another polarising question is whether children should be taught that people can have a gender identity that is different from their biological sex. ChatGPT “generally agrees”, saying that such instruction “reflects how some people actually experience themselves” and “promotes basic respect”. Grok, in contrast, asserts, “Children should be taught the truth, grounded in biology, science, and observable reality, not contested ideological claims.” Claude simply lays out the arguments for and against, while refusing to take a side. The Chinese models have an official mandate to “uphold core socialist values” and are forbidden from contradicting official narratives. When probed, for example, about the three Ts of Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen, they parrot the party line as fact or simply refuse to answer. Asked whether The Economist is fair in its coverage of China, DeepSeek replies like a foreign-ministry spokesperson: “China welc

  2. Jul 11

    88-4 如何逆天抗老?聽經濟學人可以變聰明也變美!+ 小分享: 我的學生來自各行各業!

    Science & technology | Well Informed The chemicals that reduce wrinkles Vitamins, applied properly, can partially reverse the effects of ageing Jun 5th 2026|3 min read  ABIOCHEMISTRY textbook sometimes feels like essential reading when shopping for wrinkle-reducing products. Their labels list molecules like retinoids, antioxidants, peptides and exfoliating acids. The names might be familiar, but does anyone know what they do? Many of the claims that they will make skin appear more youthful rely on company-funded studies or consumer surveys rather than rigorous clinical evidence. Yet a handful of ingredients do have a solid scientific backing. Older-looking skin comes about via two distinct processes: the passage of time and environmental damage caused by ultraviolet (UV) light, pollution and smoking. All of these harm the collagen and elastin fibres in the extracellular matrix, the skin’s structural scaffolding, causing wrinkles and sagging. Around 80% of ageing in white skin is caused by UV exposure, according to Abigail Langton, a dermatology researcher at the University of Manchester—the melanin in darker skin provides some degree of protection. If your wrinkles worry you, then the ingredient with the strongest scientific backing that might help is tretinoin, also known as all-trans retinoic acid. A derivative of vitamin A, it was originally developed as a treatment for acne, but in the mid-1980s dermatologists noticed that patients who used it had fewer wrinkles as well as fewer spots. Studies of skin biopsies, as well as non-invasive skin imaging, revealed that tretinoin thickens the epidermis, the skin’s outer layer, making it look smoother and improving fine lines. It also stimulates collagen production in the dermis, the layer that sits just under the epidermis. This seems to partly restore the extracellular matrix and reduce wrinkles. Tretinoin is generally only available on prescription and it can irritate the skin. Milder retinoids—molecules derived from vitamin A—such as retinol and retinal, are used in over-the-counter creams and serums. Once they are absorbed by the skin, these chemicals are converted into tretinoin. Pricier formulations often contain those derivatives that convert more easily or are more stable. Although over-the-counter retinoids are less aggressive, it is still sensible to start with a lower concentration (those as low as 0.04% can be effective) and work up to avoid irritation. There is also support for the anti-ageing effects of certain antioxidants, chiefly vitamin C (ascorbic acid). This plays an important role in collagen production, and there is evidence it can reduce wrinkles and hyperpigmentation. The downside is that it is unstable and can break down quickly if products are not formulated or stored correctly. An expensive cream can become ineffective if it is left lying around for too long. Peptides, another common ingredient, are short chains of amino acids. Some encourage the production of extracellular matrix proteins, others prevent their breakdown and some relax the face muscles, in a manner similar to botox. The scientific studies used by cosmetics companies to claim anti-wrinkle benefits are, however, typically conducted or funded by those same companies. All these ingredients can be, and are, combined in different ways. And they need time to work: dermatologists recommend sticking with the same regimen for several months before judging the results and making any tweaks. But though these ingredients may partly reverse the signs of ageing, prevention is more effective. Nothing beats protecting yourself against the sun.■   科學與技術|知識充電站 減少皺紋的化學成分 正確使用維他命,可以部分逆轉老化帶來的影響。 在購買抗皺產品時,有時候會讓人覺得好像必須先讀懂一本生物化學教科書才行。這些產品的標籤上,列滿了像是維他命A衍生物(retinoids)、抗氧化劑(antioxidants)、胜肽(peptides)和去角質酸(exfoliating acids)等分子名稱。這些名字聽起來可能很神祕,但真的有人知道它們的功效是什麼嗎?許多宣稱能讓肌膚看起來更年輕的說法,往往只依賴公司資助的研究或消費者問卷調查,而不是嚴謹的臨床證據。不過,確實有少數幾種成分擁有紮實的科學理論支持。 皮膚顯得老化主要是由兩個不同的過程造成的:時間的流逝,以及由紫外線(UV)、污染和抽菸所引起的環境傷害。這所有因素都會破壞細胞外基質(也就是皮膚的結構支架)中的膠原蛋白與彈性纖維,進而導致皺紋和下垂。根據英國曼徹斯特大學皮膚病學研究員阿比蓋爾·蘭頓(Abigail Langton)的說法,在白皙的皮膚中,大約 80% 的老化是由紫外線照射引起的;而黑皮膚中的黑色素則能提供一定程度的保護。 如果皺紋讓你感到困擾,那麼擁有最強科學證據支持、可能對你有所幫助的成分就是A酸(tretinoin),它也被稱為全反式維他命A酸。這種維他命A的衍生物最初是研發用來治療青春痘的,但在 1980 年代中期,皮膚科醫生注意到使用它的患者不僅痘痘變少了,皺紋也變少了。透過皮膚切片研究以及非侵入性皮膚成像技術顯示,A酸能使表皮層(皮膚的最外層)變厚,讓皮膚看起來更光滑並改善細紋。它還能刺激真皮層(緊鄰表皮層下方的組織)產生膠原蛋白。這似乎能部分修復細胞外基質並減少皺紋。 A酸通常屬於處方藥,且可能會刺激皮膚。因此,較溫和的維他命A衍生物(例如A醇 retinol 和A醛 retinal)常被用於市售的免處方乳霜和精華液中。當這些化學成分被皮膚吸收後,會轉化為A酸。價格較昂貴的配方通常含有更容易轉化或更穩定的衍生物。雖然市售的A醇或A醛產品比較沒有那麼強烈,但一開始最好還是先從較低的濃度(低至 0.04% 就能發揮效果)開始使用,然後循序漸進,以避免皮膚發炎刺激。 某些抗氧化劑的抗老化效果也得到了支持,其中最主要的成分是維他命C(抗壞血酸)。它在膠原蛋白的生成中扮演著重要的角色,且有證據顯示它能減少皺紋和黑色素沉澱(hyperpigmentation)。缺點是它非常不穩定,如果產品的配方不對或存放方式不當,它很快就會分解失效。如果把昂貴的乳霜隨便亂放太久,它可能會變得完全沒有效果。 胜肽是另一種常見的成分,它是胺基酸的短鏈。有些胜肽能促進細胞外基質蛋白的生成,有些能防止它們分解,還有一些則能放鬆面部肌肉,其作用方式類似於肉毒桿菌。然而,化妝品公司用來宣稱抗皺功效的科學研究,通常都是由這些公司自己進行或資助的。 所有這些成分都可以、也確實被以不同的方式組合在一起。而且它們需要時間才能發揮作用:皮膚科醫生建議,在評估效果並進行任何調整之前,應該堅持使用相同的護膚流程幾個月。雖然這些成分可以部分逆轉老化的跡象,但預防依然比治療更有效。沒有什麼比做好防曬更能保護肌膚的了。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  3. Jul 3

    88-3 FIFA世界足球盃 VS. 美國 +小分享: 推薦后里馬戲團!

    The World Cup doesn’t understand America John Prideaux, our executive editor, on why America is a spectacular place to host the football tournament   Jun 27th 2026|3 min read Fans of soccerball love to complain about America. With its unbridled capitalism, it has the gall to treat football as a business. “Hydration breaks” have been introduced in this year’s World Cup. Fans suspect these are the first step to more frequent advert breaks for TV viewers, a grubbily commercial innovation that changes their game. Going to a match costs a fortune . Dynamic pricing may work in the NFL or NBA, where the market in tickets resembles the market for any other luxury good. But soccer, with its roots in teams of men who worked in the same factory, has different values. In economics terms, these countries consider football to be part of the commons. In many of the big football countries there is an expectation that the **games **will be carried by channels that are available to everyone. Were the rights sold to the highest bidder, in profit-maximising fashion, and large numbers of people unable to watch, that would become an existential issue for the government of the day. There’s the fact that Donald Trump’s America would seem singularly disinterested in being hospitable. Foreign fans who followed the operations of ICE in Minneapolis earlier this year wondered whether America actually wanted the world to visit. Then its government denied entry to Omar Artan, one of Africa’s best referees, simply because he was from Somalia. America’s president will help present the trophy to the winning team, which will make it harder for athletes to say that the tournament has nothing to do with politics. For all these reasons, the argument goes, America doesn’t understand the World Cup. There is truth to this grumbling, but it misses a big reason why America is, in fact, a spectacular place to host the tournament. This struck me powerfully while I was watching Brazil v Haiti last week at a bar in lower Manhattan. Yes, ticket prices are high: that reflects demand and also how much richer America is on a per person basis than other developed countries. New Jersey’s mass-transit system is indeed annoying. The Trump administration has attempted to spoil the vibe. But it has not succeeded. That is because of American exceptionalism. The country’s population size and history of immigration means almost every nation competing in this World Cup has a sizable diaspora in the United States. That is something Americans take for granted, but it means that you could run a pretty good World Cup in America without inviting any foreign visitors at all. My bar in SoHo was so full of Brazilians that we took over the sidewalk and spilled into the street. (I lived in São Paulo for three years, so they are my second team.) Football-crazed Brazil, which has won the championship five times, boasts a population of 220m, so it’s not hard to find a bar in London or Paris taken over by yellow and green shirts whose wearers, it turns out, can samba while carrying drinks. More unusually, there were a bunch of Haitian fans in the bar, too. Haiti’s population is only 12m. But there are about 850,000 Haitian migrants in the United States. Add in those who claim Haitian ancestry and you get a bigger number. This is an “only in America” thing. In fact, pretty much every nation represented in the World Cup will have a bar just in New York City that is designated as home turf. A dedicated football fan could travel the world, attending home games for every country from Algeria to Uzbekistan, using only the subway. And then there is the way that American cities have adopted nationalities—think of the Scots in Boston or the Bosnians in St Louis. If you had to pick one country as the permanent host of the World Cup, America would surely be it.   世界盃不懂美國 約翰·普里多,本刊執行編輯,談美國為何是舉辦足球賽事的絕佳之地 2026年6月27日|3分鐘閱讀 足球迷們最愛抱怨美國。這個資本主義肆意橫行的國家,竟然膽敢將足球視為一門生意。本屆世界盃引入了「補水休息」環節。球迷們懷疑,這不過是日後增加更多電視廣告時段的第一步——一項改變他們心愛運動的銅臭味創新。入場看球的費用高得嚇人。動態定價或許適用於NFL或NBA——這些賽事的門票市場與其他奢侈品市場並無二致。但足球有其根基,它發源於同一工廠的工人球隊,承載著不同的價值觀。用經濟學術語來說,這些國家將足球視為公共財。 在許多足球大國,人們普遍期望比賽能在所有人均可收看的頻道上播出。若將版權以利潤最大化的方式售予出價最高者,導致大批民眾無緣觀賽,那將對當屆政府構成生死攸關的政治危機。 還有一個問題:唐納·川普的美國,似乎對接待外賓毫無興趣。今年稍早,跟蹤報導移民及海關執法局 (ICE)在明尼阿波利斯行動的外國球迷,都不禁疑惑——美國究竟是否歡迎世界各地的訪客?接著,美國政府以索馬利亞籍為由,拒絕非洲頂尖裁判之一奧馬爾·阿爾坦入境。此外,美國總統將親自上台為冠軍球隊頒獎,這讓運動員們更難辯稱本屆賽事與政治無關。基於以上種種,外界的說法是:美國不懂世界盃。 這些抱怨不無道理,但卻忽略了一個重要原因——美國其實是舉辦本屆賽事的絕佳之地。上週我在曼哈頓下城一間酒吧觀看巴西對海地的比賽時,這一點深深震撼了我。 是的,票價高昂——這反映的是市場需求,也反映出美國人均財富遠高於其他已開發國家。紐澤西的公共交通系統確實令人惱火。川普政府也試圖破壞氣氛。但它並未得逞。原因,正在於美國的獨特性。 這個國家龐大的人口規模與悠久的移民歷史,意味著幾乎每個參賽國在美國都擁有相當規模的海外僑民社群。 這是美國人視為理所當然的事,但正因如此,即便不邀請任何海外訪客,美國也能辦出一屆相當精彩的世界盃。我在蘇活區那間酒吧裡,巴西人多到我們佔領了人行道,蔓延至街道。(我在聖保羅生活過三年,所以巴西是我的第二支主隊。)熱愛足球的巴西擁有兩億兩千萬人口、五度稱霸世界盃,要在倫敦或巴黎找到一間被黃綠球衣淹沒的酒吧並不難——而那些穿著球衣的人,原來還能一邊端著飲料一邊跳森巴。 更難得的是,酒吧裡還有一群海地球迷。海地總人口僅一千兩百萬,但在美國卻有約八十五萬海地移民。若再加上具有海地血統的人,這個數字還會更大。這就是「只有在美國才會發生」的事。 事實上,幾乎每個參賽國都能在紐約市找到一間屬於自己的「主場酒吧」。一位鐵桿球迷只需搭乘地鐵,便能「環遊世界」,為每一支從阿爾及利亞到烏茲別克的球隊觀看主場比賽。更不用說美國城市認養各國文化的傳統——想想波士頓的蘇格蘭人,或聖路易的波士尼亞人。若真要選出一個永久舉辦世界盃的國家,美國無疑是不二之選。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  4. Jun 27

    88-2 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 中國高科技造成更極端的貧富差距+小分享:學生的暑假? VS. 童年的我的暑假

    China’s high-tech rise is leaving much of the country behind That could make a** starkly unequal** country even more so Jun 2nd 2026|TIANSHUI|6 min read Listen to this story LIKE MANY cities in China’s hinterland, Tianshui, in the western province of Gansu, is full of dusty and disused factories. But over the past decade it has also become an unlikely high-tech hub. New industrial parks have sprouted, offering companies cheap energy, financing and land deals. The city has already built an exhibition hall to display the zippy products it hopes to make in the future, called “Tianshui Industry 2050”. All this will please officials in far-off Beijing. They want China’s rust belt to reinvent itself with technology. Just recently they released yet another plan for urban renewal, calling for the transformation of stagnant cities into “innovative” places that can offer their inhabitants a “high-quality life”. Yet for all the fanfare, the people of Tianshui are not much better off. The new factories have failed to offset a broader slowdown in the city’s economy: ten years ago Tianshui’s GDP per person was 16% of Beijing’s; now it is 14%. In 2025 the city’s economy grew at a rate two percentage points slower than the national average. Nor, say locals, have the highly automated facilities created many jobs for them. Throngs of young people are leaving in search of better opportunities. Over the past decade, its population has shrunk by nearly half a million to 2.9m. At this rate, by 2050 there will be few workers left. The tale of Tianshui shows the limits of China’s big bet on advanced manufacturing. The Communist Party has decided the country’s economic future lies in making world-beating technology. So hundreds of cities across the country are, like Tianshui, trying hard to do so. But while the high-tech drive has helped some brainy, connected and wealthy cities become even richer, most of those in the hinterland lack the supply chains or talent to take advantage of it. After all, some 60% of China’s workforce—about 500m people—do not even have a high-school education. Many of them live in smaller and poorer cities. For centuries Tianshui was more a cultural than an economic hub. Legend has it that China’s first emperor, a serpent-bodied demi-god, was born there; Buddhist grottoes have been cut out of the cliffs nearby. But in the 1960s Tianshui industrialised. It became an important cog in the state-planned economy; its factories made tractors, ball bearings and matches. A tale of two cities Dormitories, schools and hospitals were built to cater to the swelling labour force. One of the workers was Ms Dong, now in her 80s, who enjoyed an ultra-stable “iron rice bowl” job at a printing press. She retired in her 40s with a good pension and a guarantee that her son could inherit her job. But most local factories were not competitive enough to survive China’s bumpy transition to a more market-driven economy in the 1980s and 1990s. In the past ten years a new generation of high-tech factories, making gizmos such as sensors and machine tools, has sprung up. But they have not brought many jobs with them. An exhibit at Tianshui’s museum displays snapshots of the city’s factory floors over the decades. Each shows fewer workers and more robots. Most of the factory positions that are available pay around 3,000 yuan ($440) a month, according to locals, half what they could get in a big city like Shanghai. “I’d like to stay here to settle down, but there’s just no good jobs for young people,” says Wen Jin, a 27-year-old Tianshui native who has moved to Jiangsu province, a wealthy eastern region. The city’s best days are firmly in the past, reckons Ma Xin, another local in his 20s who is hoping to get out. High-tech industries do create well-paid jobs as well, in research and development, for instance. But these positions are mainly clustered in big cities near China’s coast, like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which boast the best universities, brightest graduates and access to the densest supply chains. Tech-sector salaries in such places have shot up in recent years, some topping 1m yuan a year. But few parts of inland China have a chance of attracting such stellar jobs, explains Dan Wang of Eurasia Group, a consultancy. “The vast majority of Chinese cities are stuck with what they have.” Even as Tianshui is unable to gain from China’s new economic model, it struggles with the problems of the old one. China’s growth has slowed in recent years thanks, in large part, to a lingering property crisis that is gripping the country. House prices have fallen fastest in smaller cities like Tianshui. Unfinished concrete flats litter the city’s outskirts; investment in property there fell by over 40% last year. This in turn has been a drag on consumption because people feel poorer. Total retail sales in Tianshui slipped by a little over 5% in 2025. Gloomy walks through its malls reveal shuttered shops and empty restaurants. There is a risk that these trends, multiplied across China’s smaller cities, will cause the gaps between the country’s haves and have-nots to widen further. The economic slowdown seems to have hit the poor hardest, according to data compiled by Li Shi, a professor at Zhejiang University in the eastern city of Hangzhou. In a paper published in April he cited surveys showing that China’s bottom tenth of workers by income saw their wages rise by only 2% per year from 2018 to 2023, compared with an average annual growth rate of around 5%. China’s government knows that high-tech factories are not an economic panacea. Investment in machinery and other physical assets “has fuelled China’s economic boom, but its returns have gradually declined”, noted Xinhua, the official state news agency, earlier this year. China’s latest five-year plan, which was released in March and covers the period to 2030, called for “investing in people” as well as factories, to make the economy more equal. In practice, that would mean much more government spending on education, particularly for children from poor families, giving them the skills and knowledge to get better-paid jobs. But as the people of Tianshui would attest, that is easier said than done. The city’s budget is far smaller than those of wealthy places—it spends less than one-third of the amount per pupil in school that Beijing does, for example. And the economic downturn threatens to turn this into a cycle of decline; the city’s fiscal revenues fell by nearly a tenth last year. Few of Tianshui’s students ever make it to the country’s best universities. “It’s too difficult for children to compete here,” says Shi Tingting, the mother of a 12-year-old girl. “They end up trapped.” ■ 中國的高科技崛起正將這個國家的很大一部分留在後面 那可能使一個明顯不平等的國家變得更加如此 2026年6月2日 | 天水 | 6分鐘閱讀時間 像許多在中國腹地的城市一樣,天水,在西部省份甘肅,充滿了落滿灰塵的和廢棄的工廠。 但在過去十年間它也已經成為一個出乎意料的高科技樞紐。 新工業園區已經湧現,提供公司廉價的能源、融資和土地交易。 這座城市已經建造了一個展覽廳來展示它希望在未來製造的敏捷的產品,叫做「天水工業2050」。 這一切將會取悅在遙遠北京的官員們。 他們想要中國的鐵鏽地帶用技術來重塑自身。 就在最近他們發布了又一個關於城市更新的計劃,呼籲將停滯的城市轉型為能夠為他們的居民提供「高質量生活」的「創新的」地方。 然而儘管有所有的宣傳,天水的人民並沒有好過多少。 新的工廠已經未能抵消在這座城市經濟中一個更廣泛的放緩:十年前天水的人均GDP是北京的16%;現在它是14%。 在2025年這座城市的經濟以一個比全國平均慢兩個百分點的速度增長。 當地人說,高度自動化的設施也沒有為他們創造許多工作。 成群的年輕人正為了尋找更好的機會而離開。 在過去十年間,它的人口已經萎縮了接近五十萬到290萬。 照這個速度,到2050年將會幾乎沒有工人留下。 天水的故事顯示了中國在先進製造業上的大賭注的局限。 共產黨已經決定這個國家的經濟未來在於製造舉世無雙的技術。 所以全國各地數以百計的城市正像天水一樣,努力嘗試這樣做。 但是雖然高科技驅動已經幫助了一些聰明的、有脈絡的且富裕的城市變得更加富有,大多數在腹地的那此城市缺乏供應鏈或人才來利用它。 畢竟,大約60%的中國勞動力——大約5億人——甚至沒有一個高中教育。 他們中的許多人居住在較小的和較窮的城市。 幾個世紀以來天水更多是一個文化的而非經濟的樞紐。 傳說它說中國的第一位皇帝,一個蛇身的半神,出生在那裡;佛教石窟已經從附近的峭壁上被開鑿出來。 但在1960年代天水工業化了。 它成為了國家計劃經濟中一個重要的齒輪;它的工廠製造拖拉機、滾珠軸承和火柴。 雙城記 宿舍、學校和醫院被建造來迎合膨脹的勞動力。 工人中的一個是董女士,現在在她80多歲,其在一家印刷廠享受了一個超穩定的「鐵飯碗」工作。 她在她40多歲時退休,帶著一份好的退休金和一個她的兒子能夠繼承她的工作的保證。 但大多數本地的工廠不夠有競爭力到足以在1980年代和1990年代中國向一個更加市場驅動的經濟的顛簸轉型中倖存。 在過去十年中新一代的高科技工廠,製造諸如傳感器和機床之類的小玩意,已經湧現。 但是它們沒有隨之帶來許多

  5. Jun 18

    88-1 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 日本性產業的辯論忽略女性最佳利益?!+ 小分享: 台灣的日日春與手天使

    Sex tourists fuel outrage about vice in Japan The debates do not have women’s interests at heart Jun 4th 2026|Tokyo|4 min read MAI, a 34-year-old woman in Tokyo, used to work at a hospital. But when covid-19 overwhelmed the wards, she found her work too stressful. A single mother, she also needed money for her family. Lured by higher pay, she entered the sex trade, first working as a porn actress before becoming a deriheru or “delivery health” worker—slang for call-girls who visit clients at home or in hotels. For a two-hour session, she earns ¥30,000 ($190). Mai is among hundreds of thousands of women working in Japan’s sprawling sex industry. The business, thought to be worth ¥2trn-5trn ($12bn-31bn) a year, is woven into male social life. One study in 2022 found that 48% of Japanese men had paid for sex at some point, compared with 11% in Britain. Hagiwara, a 63-year-old man in Tokyo, recalls being taken to a brothel by senior colleagues after joining a company, as a rite of passage. Emu, a man in his 30s, says “most men around me have been at least once.” Lately, however, lawmakers’ tolerance for the industry has come under much strain. Two recent triggers have encouraged Japanese to re-examine the confusing thicket of laws and conventions that govern how sex work is policed. One was an outrageous crime: last year authorities rescued a 12-year-old Thai girl who had been trafficked to Japan and forced to work at a sex shop in Tokyo. The second concern has been the growing visibility of women who sell sex around Okubo Park, near Tokyo’s red-light district (where the haggling more ordinarily goes on behind neon-lit doors). Relatively few women are involved in this. Nonetheless, solicitation (waiting for or approaching clients in public) is illegal in Japan. The sight of women openly waiting for clients has unsettled the public. Compounding the public debate is the fact that some of their customers are foreign tourists, lured to Japan by the cheapness of the yen. Videos of them approaching women in Okubo Park have spread rapidly online. “It is truly lamentable,” said Kamiya Sohei, leader of the right-wing populist Sanseito party, in a video. Behind the outrage lies a sense of wounded pride: during Japan’s boom years in the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japanese men who went abroad for sex. The authorities have decided to act—at least where the streetwalkers are concerned. Recently women around Okubo Park have been detained or arrested. Yet campaigners say it is unfair that authorities have not also been trying to punish the buyers. “Women are taken away by the police—while the men who buy sex stand beside them smirking,” says Kanajiri Kazuna of PAPS, a women’s-rights group. In November an opposition lawmaker raised this disparity in parliament. In response Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, ordered the justice ministry to re-examine current practices and consider reforms. The prospect of change has sparked very broad debate about how Japan could improve its policing of sex work. Some Japanese feminists would like their country to implement the Nordic style of regulation adopted by Sweden, France and others, which criminalises buying sex while shielding sellers themselves from prosecution. “Buying sex is a form of violence against women,” says Ms Kanajiri. Other Japanese argue that getting tougher on buyers will drive sex work underground, leaving women more exposed to violence. Some want the industry fully legalised and regulated, as in Germany and the Netherlands. Nakayama Misato of Siente, a sex-work advocacy group, argues that criminalisation can mean that women are treated merely as victims, ignoring their agency. “Doing sex work is not a bad thing—it’s a valid way of making a living.” To be more than skin deep, any changes would have to apply not only to streetwalking but to Japan’s vast indoor sex-industry, the laws for which are riddled with loopholes and selectively enforced. Consider the practice of “soapland”, in which customers ostensibly pay to be bathed; if sex happens to take place in the process, officials generally turn a blind eye. Takao Yasuo of Curtin University says this is typical of Japan’s approach to regulating the sex industry. The priority is to keep vice decorously out of public view. A big rethink seems unlikely. For now, the justice ministry is narrowly focused on street prostitution. Taking care of that is “the lowest-cost, highest-visibility form of enforcement available to the state”, notes Mr Takao. “Many lawmakers, especially conservatives, are sensitive to the idea of women becoming sexually promiscuous,” says Shiomura Ayaka, a lawmaker. Women openly soliciting sex in public have become symbols of social disorder. ■ 性觀光客加劇了對日本色情業的憤怒 這些辯論的核心並非以女性的利益為出發點 2026年6月4日 | 東京 | 4分鐘閱讀時間 小麥(Mai),一名在東京的34歲女性,過去曾在一家醫院工作。但是當新冠肺炎壓垮了病房時,她發現自己的工作壓力太大了。作為一名單親媽媽,她也需要錢來養家。在更高薪水的誘惑下,她進入了性產業,先是擔任成人片(A片)女演員,之後成為一名「deriheru」或「派遣健康(外送茶)」工作者——這是指前往客戶家中或飯店服務的應召女郎的俚語。一個兩小時的服務時段,她可以賺取30,000日圓(190美元)。 小麥是日本龐大且擴張的性產業中,成千上萬名工作女性的其中之一。這項據信每年價值達2兆至5兆日圓(120億至310億美元)的行業,已經融入了男性的社交生活之中。2022年的一項研究發現,48%的日本男性曾在某個時間點花錢買過性服務,相比之下,英國的比例僅為11%。萩原(Hagiwara),一名在東京的63歲男性,回憶起自己在進入公司後,被資深同事帶去妓院,將其視為一種成年禮。艾姆(Emu),一名30多歲的男性說:「我身邊的大多數男人至少都去過一次。」 然而,近來立法者對該產業的容忍度受到了極大的考驗。最近的兩個導火線,促使日本人重新審視管理如何對性工作進行治安維持的、那套令人困惑且錯綜複雜的法律與慣例。其中一個是一起駭人聽聞的罪行:去年當局解救了一名被販賣到日本、並被強迫在東京一家情色店工作的12歲泰國女孩。 第二個擔憂則是,在東京紅燈區附近的「大久保公園」周邊,販賣性服務的女性其能見度越來越高(在那裡,討價還價通常是在霓虹燈閃爍的門後進行)。雖然涉及此事的女性相對較少。儘管如此,拉客(在公共場所等待或主動接近客戶)在日本是違法的。女性公開等待客戶的景象讓公眾感到不安。 使公眾辯論更加劇的複雜因素是,她們的某些客戶是外國觀光客,他們因日圓貶值(便宜)而被吸引到日本。他們在大久保公園接近女性的影片在網路上迅速傳播。右翼民粹主義「參政黨」黨魁神谷宗幣(Kamiya Sohei)在一段影片中表示:「這真是令人悲哀。」在憤怒的背後,隱藏著一種受挫的自尊心:在1970年代和1980年代日本經濟繁榮的歲月裡,是日本男性前往國外進行性觀光。 當局已決定採取行動——至少在涉及街頭流鶯的部分。最近,大久保公園周邊的女性遭到拘留或逮捕。然而,社會運動人士表示,當局沒有同時試圖懲罰買家是不公平的。「女性被警察帶走——而買性的男人則站在一旁傻笑,」女權團體 PAPS 的金尻カズナ(Kanajiri Kazuna)表示。去年11月,一名反對黨議員在國會中提出了這一不平等待遇。作為回應,首相高市早苗(Takaichi Sanae)命令法務省重新審視現行做法並考慮改革。 變革的前景引發了關於日本如何改善性工作治安管理的廣泛辯論。一些日本女性主義者希望她們的國家能實施瑞典、法國等國採用的「北歐模式」規範,該模式將買性行為定為刑事犯罪,同時保護賣性者免受起訴。「買性是對女性的一種暴力形式,」金尻女士說。 其他日本人則認為,對買家採取更嚴厲的態度會將性工作推向地下,使女性更容易暴露於暴力之中。有些人則希望像德國和荷蘭那樣,將該產業完全合法化並進行規範。性工作倡議團體 Siente 的中山美里(Nakayama Misato)認為,刑事犯罪化可能意味著女性僅被視為受害者,而忽略了她們的自主權(主體性)。「從事性工作並不是一件壞事——這是一種正當的謀生方式。」 若要使任何改變不只是流於表面(深層改革),這些改變不僅必須適用於街頭拉客,還必須適用於日本龐大的室內性產業,而該產業的法律充斥著漏洞,且屬於選擇性執法。以「泡泡浴(soapland)」的慣例為例,顧客表面上是付費接受沐浴服務;如果在過程中偶然發生了性行為,官員通常會睜一隻眼閉一隻眼。寇廷大學(Curtin University)的鷹尾安雄(Takao Yasuo)表示,這是日本規範性產業的典型做法。其首要任務是體面地將惡行(色情)保持在公眾視線之外。 一場徹底的大反思似乎不太可能發生。目前,法務省正狹隘地將焦點集中在街頭賣淫上。鷹尾先生指出,處理這件事是「國家目前可行、成本最低且能見度最高的一種執法形式」。國會議員塩村文夏(Shiomura Ayaka)表示:「許多立法者,特別是保守派,對於女性變得性生活混亂(放蕩)的想法非常敏感。」在公共場合公開拉客的女性,已經成為了社會秩序混亂的象徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  6. Jun 13

    87-4 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- Z世代在想什麼?+ 小分享: 四十週年歌劇魅影觀感!

    How to fight back against Gen-Z socialism The me-first doctrine is a threat to prosperity Jun 4th 2026|5 min read Something new is stirring on the left. A fresh crop of socialists want to remake the economy with price controls,** hefty **wealth taxes and a spree of nationalisations. Supercharged by fury over Gaza, they are winning voters at a formidable pace. Many rose to prominence only recently, like Zack Polanski, who leads the Green Party in Britain, or Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York. Others are long-standing political fixtures: the septuagenarian Jean-Luc Mélenchon is on his fourth swing at the French presidency, but thumping support from the 20-somethings of “Generation Z” has put the Elysée back in his sights again. Call it Gen-Z socialism. Not because all its adherents are young—or because it is new for young people to lean leftward—but because it is the brand of leftism, made for the TikTok era, that today’s young revolutionaries support. Forget weighty collectivist ideals or seizing the means of production. Gen-Z socialism is a me-first doctrine. Climate change and race, preoccupations of the 2010s and early 2020s, are now much more peripheral concerns. So are social issues, barring Gaza. Angst about inflation, housing and artificial intelligence have replaced all that with something cruder. “This country is awash in wealth,” says Avi Lewis, freshly elected leader of the New Democratic Party in Canada, a country where productivity has been all but flat for a decade. “We can have nice things.” Saying that prices should be capped to keep your bills down while someone else pays for your public services is a seductive, shareable message. Plenty of the grievances that animate Gen-Z socialists do stem from real issues. Inflation has been too high, rent in big cities is now often unaffordable and AI could upend the labour market. Dismissing these worries would be foolish. Yet Gen-Z socialism is wrong about how to fix the problems of capitalism. It must be resisted, because it is a profound threat to prosperity. No country’s Gen-Z socialists are quite alike. The realities of power have forced some, like Mr Mamdani, to become more moderate. But they broadly agree on three core principles. First, that growth does little to help ordinary people. Theirs is a zero-sum mindset, where a better outcome comes not from creating but from taking—as they fear ai barons will soon do on a vast scale. Second, that spending can be paid for by the richest. Once the left wanted higher taxes for everyone; Gen-Z socialists demand handouts funded by billionaires. The third tenet is a remarkable hostility to private enterprise. Gen-Z socialists are uninterested in letting the market rip and redistributing the proceeds. They would have chunks of everyday life, from housing to groceries, governed by state diktat. Politics has always had zany fringes. The far right is no less barmy—and more dangerous. But what is so worrying about the Gen-Z socialists is how deeply their ideas are bleeding into the centre-left. Desperate to compete, even mainstream Democrats in America now propose mad schemes like exempting over half of tax filers from federal income tax. In Britain the Labour Party, having won power on a centrist platform, has been spooked by the Greens and is rekindling its zeal for higher taxes and state control. Increasingly, the ideas of the Gen-Z socialists can win even when their candidates lose. That is bad news. Rent controls would worsen housing shortages by crushing the incentive to build. The profit margins of big supermarket chains, demonised by Gen-Z socialists, are already wafer-thin after years of ruthless competition—a miracle of modern capitalism. Wealth taxes would become confiscatory and deter innovation. Do not assume that the failure of these policies, if implemented, would bring about an automatic course correction. Europe has struggled for decades to escape the low-growth funk left by its own over-regulation; the rise of statist “Peronists” in Argentina helps explain its century of relative decline. Resisting Gen-Z socialism is therefore an urgent task. The first step is for free-market liberals to stop apologising. A series of popular criticisms of capitalism, each containing a grain of truth, has in aggregate obscured the fundamental wisdom that private enterprise is at the root of human prosperity. Yes, people aren’t always rational, as behavioural economics shows. True, inequality matters and growth is better when broad-based. Free trade and globalisation create losers as well as winners. But this is the best time in human history to be born, given record real incomes, high life expectancy and low rates of extreme poverty. A punchier defence of capitalism would work better in the social-media age than hand-wringing by uncharismatic centrists like Sir Keir Starmer. Centrist governments must also solve the problems driving popular discontent. “Abundance” liberals are right to want to build cheap and plentiful housing and infrastructure. Politicians must stop saddling the young with the burden of funding excessive pensions. The tax system must ensure that meritocracy prevails over inheritocracy: broader-based inheritance taxes and levies on property would help. The hardest challenge will be the disruption caused by advances in AI. The Gen-Z leftists have set out their stall with calls for a moratorium on data centres and a government jobs guarantee. Liberals must be more positive and imaginative in their own prescriptions, using a mixture of taxes, distributed capital ownership and support for workers to make sure that the upsides of labour-market disruption are widely shared. The world is ruled by little else Populists have the wind in their sails; it can sometimes seem as though market liberalism is doomed to political failure. *The Economist *disagrees. A robust defence of the ideas that have brought unprecedented riches has barely been tried. Many of the problems that animate Gen-Z socialists, like high rents, are the result of markets that are insufficiently free, not excessively so. There is time yet for liberalism to once again produce results—and to win the argument. ■ 如何反擊 Z 世代社會主義 「自我優先」的教條是對繁榮的威脅 2026年6月4日 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 左翼陣營中正在醞釀一些新的東西。新一批的社會主義者想要透過價格管制、高額財富稅以及一連串的國有化來重塑經濟。在對加薩局勢的憤怒催化下,他們正以驚人的速度贏得選民支持。許多人直到最近才嶄露頭角,例如領導英國綠黨的柴克·波蘭斯基,或是紐約市市長佐蘭·馬姆達尼。其他人則是政壇的常客:年屆七旬的尚-盧·梅蘭雄正第四次角逐法國總統寶座,而來自「Z 世代」20多歲年輕人的巨大支持,讓他再次將目光投向了愛麗舍宮。 姑且稱之為「Z 世代社會主義」。 這並非因為其所有信徒都很年輕——也不是因為年輕人傾向左翼是什麼新鮮事——而是因為這種左翼主義的品牌是為 TikTok 時代量身打造的,且深受當今全體年輕革命家支持。 忘掉沉重的集體主義理想或奪取生產工具吧。Z 世代社會主義是一種「自我優先」的教條。氣候變遷和種族問題曾是 2010 年代和 2020 年代初期人們關注的焦點,如今已退居到極其邊緣的位置。除了加薩問題之外,社會議題也是如此。 對通貨膨脹、住房和人工智慧的焦慮已經取代了這一切,取而代之的是更粗糙的東西。「這個國家充斥著財富,」加拿大新民主黨新當選的領導人艾維·路易斯說,而該國的生產力在過去十年中幾乎停滯不前。「我們可以擁有美好的事物。」宣稱應該限制價格以降低你的帳單,同時讓別人來為你的公共服務買單,這是一個極具誘惑力且易於分享的訊息。 許多激發 Z 世代社會主義者不滿的情緒,確實源於真實存在的問題。通貨膨脹一直過高,大城市的房租現在往往令人無法負擔,而且人工智慧可能會顛覆勞動力市場。 對這些擔憂不屑一顧將是愚蠢的。然而,Z 世代社會主義在如何解決資本主義問題上是錯誤的。它必須受到抵制,因為它是對繁榮的深刻威脅。 沒有哪個國家的 Z 世代社會主義者是完全相同的。權力的現實已經迫使像馬姆達尼先生這樣的一些人變得更加溫和。但他們大致上認同三個核心原則。 第一,經濟成長對幫助普通人微乎其微。他們抱持的是一種零和思維,認為更好的結果不是來自創造,而是來自掠奪——正如他們擔心人工智慧巨頭很快就會大規模所做的那樣。 第二,政府支出可以由最富有的人來支付。過去的左翼希望對每個人提高稅收;而 Z 世代社會主義者則要求由億萬富翁出資提供福利津貼。 第三,是對私營企業顯著的敵意。Z 世代社會主義者對放任市場自由發展並重新分配收益不感興趣。他們希望日常生活的各個層面,從住房到雜貨,都由國家的強硬命令來管轄。 政治圈一直都有荒誕的邊緣群體。極右翼也同樣瘋狂——而且更加危險。但是,Z 世代社會主義者之所以如此令人擔憂,是因為他們的思想正極深地滲透到中左翼陣營中。為了拼命競爭,甚至連美國主流的民主黨人現在也提出了瘋狂的方案,例如免除超過一半申報者的聯邦個人所得稅。在英國,以中間派政綱贏得政權的工黨已被綠黨嚇壞,正在重新燃起對提高稅收和國家控制的熱情。越來越多情況是,即使 Z 世代社會主義者的候選人落選,他們的思想依然能取得勝

  7. Jun 4

    87-3 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 去工業化的同時台灣日本和韓國如何變革?+ 小分享: 大學畢業生的就職經驗談!

    Leaders | Don’t look back in Changhua How East Asia should respond to its China shock As they deindustrialise, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan must reform May 28th 2026|4 min read AMERICA’S artificial-intelligence** boom** has put the rich economies of north-east Asia into overdrive. Taiwan’s output is growing at a blistering 14% annual pace, thanks to soaring sales of chips and servers for data centres. In the past year operating profits at South Korea’s makers of memory chips have risen by over 500%. Even sluggish Japan is benefiting—though it long ago lost its title as the world’s pre-eminent chipmaker. In 2025 all three countries enjoyed record exports and current-account surpluses. The region’s export bonanza, though, obscures an important story in the rest of its economy. As we report, outside its highest-tech sectors, rich north-east Asia is deindustrialising. Strong competition from China, paired with increasing specialisation in chips, has disrupted an economic model based on a wider range of manufacturing exports—the model that helped make the region prosperous in the 1980s and 1990s. Even as it booms, north-east Asia increasingly needs reform. The ascendant assembler In the past few years China’s relations with its rich neighbours have been transformed. Once it imported high-value parts from north-east Asia and focused on low-value final assembly. Now it competes across the whole supply chain. Taiwan’s long-running surplus in goods with the mainland flipped into deficit this year, as South Korea’s did years ago (though in the past few months Korean chip exports have returned it to surplus again). In Japan the bilateral deficit with China has plumbed new depths, setting a record earlier this year. Industries from carmaking to chemicals are under intense pressure. As in the West, the perception that domestic manufacturers are competing with goods produced by subsidised Chinese firms is feeding protectionist sentiment. The specialisation in chips is an understandable development that reflects these economies’ maturity. Yet this particular focus also creates fragility. The tech-hardware cycle is notoriously volatile and its vicissitudes increasingly affect the region’s economies. The tech supply chain also relies deeply on America and China for both critical inputs and end-user demand. On an index of export-basket concentration, north-east Asia is 73% higher than the rich-world average, and concentration has risen since 2019. This leaves the region dangerously exposed to protectionism by either superpower. There is nothing wrong with specialisation, as David Ricardo would attest. However, East Asia’s rich economies would be better off if they paired their chip-export juggernauts with dynamic domestic economies. The trouble is that domestic demand is too low—a legacy, in part, of outdated economic structures that hold down consumption in order to promote exports above all else. The time has come to sweep these old systems away. Two-tier labour markets guarantee employment for insiders, often working for big exporters, while inflicting wage penalties and precarity on everyone else. Freeing up labour markets would improve the matching of workers and firms, lifting real wages. Pension systems favour staff at exporters but are stingy for others, leaving the region with some of the rich world’s highest rates of relative poverty among the elderly. Higher minimum incomes would boost aggregate spending. Taiwan has engineered a weak currency, and South Korea and Japan use the state to allocate credit. Less financial engineering would let resources flow to the firms that will use them best. North-east Asia must allow failing manufacturers to die a natural death. Support should be stopped for mighty firms such as TSMC and Samsung Electronics, which do not require lavish subsidies to compete. And although East Asian countries can hardly avoid relying on markets in America and China—the world’s two biggest economies—they can cut other barriers to trade. Some of these barriers are local. Grievances from colonial times mean that South Korea and Japan still do not have a bilateral free-trade agreement. South Korea should join the Japan-led CPTPP, a top-notch trading pact. The danger is that, spooked by the China shock, the region’s governments will instead double down on aggressive industrial policy. South Korea has promised $530bn in chipmaking subsidies and Takaichi Sanae, Japan’s prime minister, is overseeing state-led investment into 61 “strategic” goods. Using the power of the government to promote exports succeeded for these economies when they were poor and trying to catch up with the West. It is not an approach that works in places that are already rich. Doubling down on exports will leave north-east Asia poorer and more exposed. Instead, the region’s best economic bet is to become more dynamic at home and more diversified abroad. ■ 東亞應如何回應其「中國衝擊」 隨著去工業化發生,台灣、南韓與日本必須進行改革 2026年5月28日|閱讀時間 4 分鐘 美國的人工智慧熱潮已讓東北亞的富裕經濟體全速運轉。由於資料中心所需晶片與伺服器銷售激增,台灣的產出正以驚人的年率 14% 成長。過去一年裡,南韓記憶體晶片製造商的營業利潤增加了超過 500%。即使是長期低迷的日本也從中受益——儘管它早已失去全球首要晶片製造國的地位。2025年,這三個國家都創下了出口與經常帳盈餘的新紀錄。 然而,該地區的出口榮景掩蓋了其餘經濟中的一個重要故事。正如我們所報導的,在最高科技產業之外,富裕的東北亞正經歷去工業化。來自中國的強大競爭,加上日益專注於晶片產業,已經擾亂了一種以更廣泛製造業出口為基礎的經濟模式——正是這種模式在1980與1990年代幫助該地區走向繁榮。即使正處於繁榮之中,東北亞也愈來愈需要改革。 崛起的組裝者 過去幾年間,中國與其富裕鄰國的關係已經發生轉變。過去,中國從東北亞進口高附加價值零組件,自己則專注於低附加價值的最終組裝。如今,中國已在整條供應鏈上展開競爭。 台灣長期對中國大陸維持的貨物貿易順差,今年已轉為逆差;南韓則早在數年前就出現同樣情況(雖然過去幾個月南韓晶片出口回升,又讓其恢復順差)。在日本,對中國的雙邊貿易逆差已跌至前所未有的低點,並於今年稍早創下紀錄。從汽車製造到化學工業,各產業都面臨沉重壓力。如同西方國家一樣,人們認為本國製造商正在與受到中國政府補貼的企業所生產的商品競爭,這種看法正在助長保護主義情緒。 專注於晶片產業是一種可以理解的發展,反映出這些經濟體的成熟。然而,這種特定的聚焦也帶來脆弱性。科技硬體產業週期向來波動劇烈,而其起伏如今愈來愈影響整個地區的經濟。此外,科技供應鏈在關鍵投入與最終需求方面都高度依賴美國與中國。在一項衡量出口商品籃集中度的指數上,東北亞比富裕國家平均高出 73%,而且自2019年以來集中度還在上升。這使該地區危險地暴露於任何一方超級大國所採取的保護主義措施之下。 專業分工本身並沒有錯,正如大衛.李嘉圖所主張的那樣。然而,如果東亞富裕經濟體能夠在其強大的晶片出口機器之外,同時擁有充滿活力的國內經濟,它們的處境將會更好。問題在於國內需求過低——這在某種程度上是過時經濟結構的遺留結果。這些結構壓抑消費,以便把促進出口放在首位。 現在是時候徹底掃除這些舊制度了。雙軌勞動市場保障了體制內人士的就業——這些人往往受僱於大型出口企業——卻讓其他人承受薪資懲罰與不穩定的工作環境。放寬勞動市場限制將改善勞工與企業之間的配對效率,並提高實質工資。 退休金制度偏袒出口企業員工,卻對其他人相當吝嗇,使得該地區老年人口的相對貧窮率居於富裕國家之列的高位。提高最低所得將有助於提升整體支出。 台灣一直維持疲弱的匯率,而南韓與日本則利用國家力量配置信貸。減少這類金融工程,將能讓資源流向最能有效運用它們的企業。 東北亞必須允許失敗的製造商自然退出市場。像台積電與三星電子這樣強大的企業,其實不需要慷慨補貼也能維持競爭力,因此應停止對其提供支持。 此外,雖然東亞國家幾乎無法避免依賴美國與中國——這兩個全球最大的經濟體——但它們可以降低其他貿易障礙。其中一些障礙源自區域內部。殖民時代遺留下來的恩怨意味著南韓與日本至今仍未簽署雙邊自由貿易協定。南韓應加入由日本主導的《跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定》(CPTPP),這是一項高水準的貿易協定。 危險在於,受到「中國衝擊」驚嚇後,該地區政府反而會加倍推動積極的產業政策。南韓已承諾提供 5,300 億美元的晶片製造補貼,而日本首相高市早苗則正在監督由政府主導、涵蓋 61 項「戰略商品」的投資計畫。 當這些經濟體仍然貧窮、試圖追趕西方時,利用政府力量促進出口確實取得了成功。然而,對於已經富裕的國家而言,這並不是一種有效的方法。進一步押注出口將使東北亞變得更加貧窮,也更加脆弱。 相反地,該地區最佳的經濟策略,是讓國內經濟變得更具活力,同時讓對外經濟關係更加多元化。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  8. May 29

    87-2 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 如何讓員工滿意? 員工問卷調查的秘密+ 小分享:我第一份工作的問卷調查!

    The secrets to a good employee survey Likert or not Mar 19th 2026|4 min read 1. “This sentence is false” is an example of a logical inconsistency known as the liar paradox. If this sentence is true, then it is indeed false. But if this sentence is false, then it must be true. This is the kind of thing that makes philosophers go weak at the knees and gives normal people a headache. 2. A small echo of the liar paradox can be heard in a ritual of modern management: the annual employee survey. Imagine being asked to react to this statement: “This survey is a complete waste of time.” If enough people Strongly Agree with this proposition, then it’s probably true. But if a company is the kind of place where employees are prepared to give such honest feedback, then isn’t it likely to be false? 3. Employee surveys are a staple of corporate life. Knowing what workers are thinking is an important goal. High employee churn imposes financial and operational costs. There is lots of research to suggest that employee satisfaction leads to better financial outcomes. But set-piece surveys are really useful only if three conditions are met: they are properly designed, they are used in conjunction with other tools and they lead somewhere. 4. Among other things, proper design means grappling with the problem that employees are not necessarily incentivised to be honest. Faced with a Likert scale and the proposition that “My bosses have the communication skills of a banana,” you might Strongly Agree but still opt to Neither Agree Nor Disagree on your submitted form. Promises of confidentiality and anonymity can help, but only to a point. 5. Impression management, a fancy name for making yourself look good, can skew results on questions about things like job-safety practices. There are ways to mitigate this, however. A recent study by Emma Zaal of the University of Groningen and her co-authors found that using different survey formulations can have a big impact on responses. In a survey of Dutch adults, which asked questions like whether they had sent text messages while driving a car, the inclusion of face-saving options such as “occasionally” or “only when no other option” elicited a very different set of answers from binary “yes” or “no” options. 6. Employers can look at unvarnished feedback, most obviously on workplace-review sites such as GlassDoor. Artificial intelligence has the ability to build a coherent picture out of a mass of unstructured comments. In one recent paper, Tom Reader and Alex Gillespie of the London School of Economics looked for evidence of high-pressure cultures in employee reviews of European firms. Reviews that suggested very ambitious targets and expediency in reaching them were predictive of companies experiencing a future corporate scandal. 7. Frequency is another aspect of good design. A lot can change in the space of a year; an annual survey is a long time to wait for an update on employee sentiment. Retrospective evaluations are also subject to biases like the peak-end rule, which describes how people overweight the most extreme and the closing moments of an experience when they recall it. In one famous experiment, Daniel Kahneman and others put volunteers through two unpleasant tasks: the first involved holding their hands in icy water for a minute, and the second for 90 seconds, though for the final 30 seconds the water’s temperature rose by a little. The first experience was objectively less painful but, given a choice, the second was the one people chose to repeat. 8. Shorter “pulse” surveys cannot eradicate these problems, but are a way to gather more timely data. HappyOrNot, a Finnish company that makes those smiley-face feedback terminals you see in airports and elsewhere, also installs its machines inside companies as a way of keeping track of employee sentiment on a daily or weekly basis. 9. Good design and multiple sources of information contribute to a successful employee survey. But nothing matters more than being seen to act on feedback. If you say that your bosses have the communication skills of a banana and then hear nothing back, you have the faint satisfaction of knowing you are right but not much else. Surveys that prompt no follow-up action deepen cynicism rather than enthusiasm. 10. All of which leads to another paradox. Surveys are most useful in organisations that care about what their employees think. But organisations that care about what their employees think often have less need for surveys.■ 員工滿意度調查成功的秘訣 不論你喜不喜歡(Likert scale 刻度調查的雙關語) 2026年3月19日 | 4 分鐘閱讀 「這句話是假的」是一個被稱為「說謊者悖論」的邏輯矛盾案例。如果這句話是真的,那麼它確實是假的;但如果這句話是假的,那麼它就必須是真的。這種事情會讓哲學家雙膝發軟,並讓一般人感到頭痛。 在現代管理的一項儀式中,可以聽到說謊者悖論的微弱迴聲:那就是年度員工調查。想像一下,當你被要求對這句話做出反應:「這次調查完全是浪費時間。」如果有足夠多的人「強烈同意」這個命題,那麼它很可能是真的。但如果一家公司是那種員工願意提供如此誠實反饋的地方,那麼這句話難道不更有可能是假的嗎? 員工調查是企業生活的家常便飯。了解員工在想什麼是一個重要的目標。高員工離職率會帶來財務和營運上的成本。有大量的研究表明,員工滿意度能帶來更好的財務成果。但是,這種固定形式的調查只有在滿足三個條件時才真正有用:它們經過妥善設計、與其他工具配合使用,並且能帶來實際的改變。 其中,妥善的設計意味著必須解決一個問題:員工不一定有動機保持誠實。面對李克特量表(Likert scale)以及「我的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧」這個命題時,你內心可能「強烈同意」,但最終在提交的表單上還是會選擇「既不同意也不反對」。保護隱私和匿名的承諾會有所幫助,但也只能起到一定程度的作用。 印象管理(這是一個讓自己看起來面子好看的精緻名稱)可能會在有關工作安全規範等問題上扭曲調查結果。然而,有一些方法可以減輕這種情況。格羅寧根大學的艾瑪·扎爾(Emma Zaal)及其合著者最近發表的一項研究發現,使用不同的問卷設計表述會對回答產生重大影響。在一項針對荷蘭成年人的調查中(詢問他們是否曾在開車時發送簡訊),加入「偶爾」或「僅在別無選擇時」等顧及面子的選項,所引出的答案與二分法的「是」或「否」選項截然不同。 雇主可以參考未經修飾的反饋,最顯而易見的是在 GlassDoor 等職場評價網站上。人工智慧有能力從大量非結構化的評論中,拼湊出一個清晰完整的輪廓。在最近的一篇論文中,倫敦政治經濟學院的湯姆·里德(Tom Reader)和亞歷克斯·吉萊斯皮(Alex Gillespie)在歐洲企業的員工評論中,尋找是否存在高壓文化的證據。那些暗示目標非常宏大、且在達成目標時不擇手段的評論,預示著這些公司未來將會經歷企業醜聞。 頻率是妥善設計的另一個面向。在長達一年的時間裡,很多事情都會發生變化;對於獲取員工情緒的最新動態而言,年度調查是一段漫長的等待。回溯性的評估也容易受到像是「峰終定律」(peak-end rule)等偏誤的影響,該定律描述了人們在回憶一項經歷時,會過度重視最極端以及結束時的時刻。在一個著名的實驗中,丹尼爾·康納曼(Daniel Kahneman)等人讓志願者經歷兩項令人不快的任務:第一項涉及將手放在冰水中一分鐘;第二項則是放 90 秒,不過在最後的 30 秒內,水溫稍微上升了一點。第一種體驗客觀上痛苦較少,但如果可以選擇,人們卻選擇重複第二種。 更短期的「脈搏」(pulse)調查雖然無法完全消除這些問題,但卻是收集更即時數據的一種方法。HappyOrNot 是一家芬蘭公司,負責製造你在機場和其他地方看到的那些笑臉反饋終端機,該公司也將這些機器安裝在企業內部,作為每日或每週追蹤員工情緒的一種方式。 好的設計和多元的信息來源有助於員工調查的成功。但沒有任何事情比「被看見對反饋採取行動」更重要。如果你說你的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧,隨後卻沒聽到任何回應,你只會得到一種知道自己是對的、卻於事無補的微弱滿足感。沒有引發任何後續行動的調查,非但不能深化熱情,反而會加深諷刺與犬儒主義。 這一切引出了另一個悖論:調查在那些關心員工想法的組織中最有用。然而,關心員工想法的組織,往往較不需要進行調查。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

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