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Annie 阿尼、Chloe 克洛伊

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  1. 18h ago

    87-2 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 如何讓員工滿意? 員工問卷調查的秘密+ 小分享:我第一份工作的問卷調查!

    The secrets to a good employee survey Likert or not Mar 19th 2026|4 min read 1. “This sentence is false” is an example of a logical inconsistency known as the liar paradox. If this sentence is true, then it is indeed false. But if this sentence is false, then it must be true. This is the kind of thing that makes philosophers go weak at the knees and gives normal people a headache. 2. A small echo of the liar paradox can be heard in a ritual of modern management: the annual employee survey. Imagine being asked to react to this statement: “This survey is a complete waste of time.” If enough people Strongly Agree with this proposition, then it’s probably true. But if a company is the kind of place where employees are prepared to give such honest feedback, then isn’t it likely to be false? 3. Employee surveys are a staple of corporate life. Knowing what workers are thinking is an important goal. High employee churn imposes financial and operational costs. There is lots of research to suggest that employee satisfaction leads to better financial outcomes. But set-piece surveys are really useful only if three conditions are met: they are properly designed, they are used in conjunction with other tools and they lead somewhere. 4. Among other things, proper design means grappling with the problem that employees are not necessarily incentivised to be honest. Faced with a Likert scale and the proposition that “My bosses have the communication skills of a banana,” you might Strongly Agree but still opt to Neither Agree Nor Disagree on your submitted form. Promises of confidentiality and anonymity can help, but only to a point. 5. Impression management, a fancy name for making yourself look good, can skew results on questions about things like job-safety practices. There are ways to mitigate this, however. A recent study by Emma Zaal of the University of Groningen and her co-authors found that using different survey formulations can have a big impact on responses. In a survey of Dutch adults, which asked questions like whether they had sent text messages while driving a car, the inclusion of face-saving options such as “occasionally” or “only when no other option” elicited a very different set of answers from binary “yes” or “no” options. 6. Employers can look at unvarnished feedback, most obviously on workplace-review sites such as GlassDoor. Artificial intelligence has the ability to build a coherent picture out of a mass of unstructured comments. In one recent paper, Tom Reader and Alex Gillespie of the London School of Economics looked for evidence of high-pressure cultures in employee reviews of European firms. Reviews that suggested very ambitious targets and expediency in reaching them were predictive of companies experiencing a future corporate scandal. 7. Frequency is another aspect of good design. A lot can change in the space of a year; an annual survey is a long time to wait for an update on employee sentiment. Retrospective evaluations are also subject to biases like the peak-end rule, which describes how people overweight the most extreme and the closing moments of an experience when they recall it. In one famous experiment, Daniel Kahneman and others put volunteers through two unpleasant tasks: the first involved holding their hands in icy water for a minute, and the second for 90 seconds, though for the final 30 seconds the water’s temperature rose by a little. The first experience was objectively less painful but, given a choice, the second was the one people chose to repeat. 8. Shorter “pulse” surveys cannot eradicate these problems, but are a way to gather more timely data. HappyOrNot, a Finnish company that makes those smiley-face feedback terminals you see in airports and elsewhere, also installs its machines inside companies as a way of keeping track of employee sentiment on a daily or weekly basis. 9. Good design and multiple sources of information contribute to a successful employee survey. But nothing matters more than being seen to act on feedback. If you say that your bosses have the communication skills of a banana and then hear nothing back, you have the faint satisfaction of knowing you are right but not much else. Surveys that prompt no follow-up action deepen cynicism rather than enthusiasm. 10. All of which leads to another paradox. Surveys are most useful in organisations that care about what their employees think. But organisations that care about what their employees think often have less need for surveys.■ 員工滿意度調查成功的秘訣 不論你喜不喜歡(Likert scale 刻度調查的雙關語) 2026年3月19日 | 4 分鐘閱讀 「這句話是假的」是一個被稱為「說謊者悖論」的邏輯矛盾案例。如果這句話是真的,那麼它確實是假的;但如果這句話是假的,那麼它就必須是真的。這種事情會讓哲學家雙膝發軟,並讓一般人感到頭痛。 在現代管理的一項儀式中,可以聽到說謊者悖論的微弱迴聲:那就是年度員工調查。想像一下,當你被要求對這句話做出反應:「這次調查完全是浪費時間。」如果有足夠多的人「強烈同意」這個命題,那麼它很可能是真的。但如果一家公司是那種員工願意提供如此誠實反饋的地方,那麼這句話難道不更有可能是假的嗎? 員工調查是企業生活的家常便飯。了解員工在想什麼是一個重要的目標。高員工離職率會帶來財務和營運上的成本。有大量的研究表明,員工滿意度能帶來更好的財務成果。但是,這種固定形式的調查只有在滿足三個條件時才真正有用:它們經過妥善設計、與其他工具配合使用,並且能帶來實際的改變。 其中,妥善的設計意味著必須解決一個問題:員工不一定有動機保持誠實。面對李克特量表(Likert scale)以及「我的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧」這個命題時,你內心可能「強烈同意」,但最終在提交的表單上還是會選擇「既不同意也不反對」。保護隱私和匿名的承諾會有所幫助,但也只能起到一定程度的作用。 印象管理(這是一個讓自己看起來面子好看的精緻名稱)可能會在有關工作安全規範等問題上扭曲調查結果。然而,有一些方法可以減輕這種情況。格羅寧根大學的艾瑪·扎爾(Emma Zaal)及其合著者最近發表的一項研究發現,使用不同的問卷設計表述會對回答產生重大影響。在一項針對荷蘭成年人的調查中(詢問他們是否曾在開車時發送簡訊),加入「偶爾」或「僅在別無選擇時」等顧及面子的選項,所引出的答案與二分法的「是」或「否」選項截然不同。 雇主可以參考未經修飾的反饋,最顯而易見的是在 GlassDoor 等職場評價網站上。人工智慧有能力從大量非結構化的評論中,拼湊出一個清晰完整的輪廓。在最近的一篇論文中,倫敦政治經濟學院的湯姆·里德(Tom Reader)和亞歷克斯·吉萊斯皮(Alex Gillespie)在歐洲企業的員工評論中,尋找是否存在高壓文化的證據。那些暗示目標非常宏大、且在達成目標時不擇手段的評論,預示著這些公司未來將會經歷企業醜聞。 頻率是妥善設計的另一個面向。在長達一年的時間裡,很多事情都會發生變化;對於獲取員工情緒的最新動態而言,年度調查是一段漫長的等待。回溯性的評估也容易受到像是「峰終定律」(peak-end rule)等偏誤的影響,該定律描述了人們在回憶一項經歷時,會過度重視最極端以及結束時的時刻。在一個著名的實驗中,丹尼爾·康納曼(Daniel Kahneman)等人讓志願者經歷兩項令人不快的任務:第一項涉及將手放在冰水中一分鐘;第二項則是放 90 秒,不過在最後的 30 秒內,水溫稍微上升了一點。第一種體驗客觀上痛苦較少,但如果可以選擇,人們卻選擇重複第二種。 更短期的「脈搏」(pulse)調查雖然無法完全消除這些問題,但卻是收集更即時數據的一種方法。HappyOrNot 是一家芬蘭公司,負責製造你在機場和其他地方看到的那些笑臉反饋終端機,該公司也將這些機器安裝在企業內部,作為每日或每週追蹤員工情緒的一種方式。 好的設計和多元的信息來源有助於員工調查的成功。但沒有任何事情比「被看見對反饋採取行動」更重要。如果你說你的老闆具備香蕉般的溝通技巧,隨後卻沒聽到任何回應,你只會得到一種知道自己是對的、卻於事無補的微弱滿足感。沒有引發任何後續行動的調查,非但不能深化熱情,反而會加深諷刺與犬儒主義。 這一切引出了另一個悖論:調查在那些關心員工想法的組織中最有用。然而,關心員工想法的組織,往往較不需要進行調查。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

    24 min
  2. May 22

    87-1 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 全世界都想要中國的科技與技術 + 小分享:台中海洋館之旅!

    The world wants Chinese tech. China is determined to keep it China’s rivals are learning how to get what China won’t share Apr 20th 2026|5 min read THEY USED to gripe about too much technology transfer in China. But in the past year or so, foreign business and political leaders** have started to fret that too little is happening.** No longer do they worry so much about Western tech landing in Chinese hands; rather, they fear that China is now too effective at preventing its best stuff from passing to foreigners. A former Chinese trade official reacts to the pivot with empathy rather than mockery. “It is a bit hypocritical but it’s understandable,” he says. It might be tempting to craft a morality play out of this, as if countries outside China are getting their comeuppance. But at its heart this is a practical problem, a question of whether China will be able to dig a moat around its world-leading technologies, from electric vehicles to artificial-intelligence-powered robots. Chaguan is inclined to take the other side of the bet—namely, that knowledge will flow as it normally does, from those who have it to those who want it. A reverse tech transfer will, over time, occur. In principle, the mechanism is straightforward. Countries can offer Chinese firms market access as long as they set up local manufacturing. In practice, none of this is automatic—and all of it is fraught. The European Union is now at the forefront, recently proposing procurement rules that would require things such as battery-storage systems for Europe to be made there. Chinese companies wanting to be let in to European markets would have to invest in factories there. Developing countries also see promise. From Brazil to Vietnam, governments are opening their doors to Chinese EV companies and urging them to use local content. Yet it is early days. “We have been talking about tech transfer for just the past year and it’s still not really clear how it will work,” says one diplomat with refreshing candour. One obstacle will be China itself. Over the past five years it has built an export-control regime, mimicking America’s. The stated goal is to protect national security but many controls are aimed at shoring up Chinese industry. Last year, for example, the commerce ministry said it would require companies to obtain licences before exporting technologies used in EV batteries. A Western trade official sees little prospect of Chinese officials letting out anything genuinely valuable. They have already reacted angrily to the made-in-Europe legislation, viewing it as a ploy to weaken Chinese industry. The saga of Manus, an AI startup, also highlights Chinese leaders’ paranoia. Founded in China, Manus shifted its business registration to Singapore last year, facilitating a sale to Meta, Facebook’s parent company. Chinese regulators are now attempting to unwind that deal and have barred Manus’s two co-founders from leaving the country. But China’s own record in digesting foreign tech offers some guidance for the rest of the world. Persistence will be essential. China took three decades to hone its methods: incentives for investors; requirements for local joint ventures; content rules; partnerships with foreign universities; and, yes, theft of intellectual property. One critical need is more attention to Chinese scientific research: much of it, at least in pre-commercial phases, is in journals, says Tai Ming Cheung, an analyst of Chinese tech policy. “It’s something we didn’t think about that now we have to,” he says. Moreover, it is a mistake to think tech transfer involves discrete bits of technology, such as a blueprint for photovoltaic cells. Instead, what matters is the whole process, including workforce training—a lesson that India is slowly absorbing. Apple, whose investments helped build up China’s supply chains, now produces a quarter of its iPhones in India. Even if most components are sourced from China, many are made in Chinese factories owned by foreign companies, according to analysis by Chris Miller and Vishnu Venugopalan for the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank. The implication is that the Chinese supply chain may ultimately prove more mobile than it currently seems. At the same time the rest of the world will have to follow a different formula from China’s. Instead of relying on the government’s top-down strategy, other countries will have to depend on companies themselves. The auto sector offers an early indication. Almost all global carmakers—General Motors, Hyundai and Volkswagen, to name a few—are now developing EVs in China, learning from local firms. Many ideas are also seeping out through research-and-development partnerships. “The biggest companies are off limits but there are thousands of suppliers to work with,” says one Chinese executive with a foreign carmaker. China’s tech controls may also have the opposite of their intended effect. For young innovators in AI, the crackdown on Manus is chilling. If they are unable to sell to foreigners, they will never get full value. That will only give them more incentive to take ideas abroad early on. The ultra-competitive Chinese business environment pushes in the same direction. The Chinese auto executive says many local suppliers are starved for profits, which makes foreign partnerships yet more tempting. Transfer portal For all its manufacturing prowess, China still wants what the West has to offer, notably in the semiconductor industry. In that sense the current wrangling over tech transfers has an air of negotiation to it. As the former Chinese trade official puts it, China will not fully benefit from its inventiveness unless it can export its own technology. The point, he says, is to extract a price from others, including access to their latest innovations. This is not a winning proposition for now, especially as American officials want to keep China away from cutting-edge chips. But it points to a possible, even a likely, future in which tech flows both ways across China’s borders. That may worry leaders in both Beijing and Washington. They will, however, struggle to stop it. ■ 世界渴望中國科技,中國決心據為己有 中國的競爭對手正學習如何獲取中國不願分享的技術 2026年4月20日 | 5分鐘閱讀 過去,人們總是在抱怨中國有太多的技術轉移。但在過去一年左右的時間裡,外國商界和政治領袖開始擔心技術轉移發生的得太少。他們不再那麼擔心西方科技落入中國手中;相反地,他們擔心中國現在過於有效地阻止其最優秀的技術流向外國人。一位前中國貿易官員對這種轉變感到感同身受,而非嘲諷。他說:「這有點虛偽,但可以理解。」 把這件事塑造成一部道德劇,彷彿中國以外的國家正在自食其果,或許很吸引人。但其核心這是一個切實的技術問題:中國是否能夠在其世界領先的技術(從電動汽車到人工智慧驅動的機器人)周圍挖出一條護城河。對此,「茶館」傾向於站在賭局的另一邊——即知識會像往常一樣,從擁有者流向渴望者。隨著時間的推移,一場「反向技術轉移」將會發生。 原則上,這個機制非常簡單。各國只要要求中國企業在當地設立製造基地,就可以向其開放市場。但在實踐中,這一切都不是自動發生的——而且每一步都充滿了挑戰。歐盟目前走在前列,最近提出了採購法規,要求供應歐洲的電池儲能系統等產品必須在歐洲本土製造。想要進入歐洲市場的中國公司必須在當地投資設廠。發展中國家也看到了希望。從巴西到越南,各國政府正向中國電動車企業敞開大門,並督促它們使用本地零組件。然而,這一切才剛開始。一位外交官帶著令人耳目一新的坦率說道:「我們在過去一年才開始討論技術轉移,目前仍不清楚這將如何運作。」 其中一個障礙將是中國本身。在過去五年中,中國建立了一套模仿美國的出口管制體系。其宣稱的目標是維護國家安全,但許多管制措施旨在保護中國的產業鏈。例如,去年商務部表示,企業在出口用於電動車電池的技術之前必須取得許可。一位西方貿易官員認為,中國官員幾乎不可能讓任何真正有價值的技術流出。他們已經對歐洲製造的立法做出了憤怒的反應,認為這是削弱中國工業的陰謀。人工智慧初創公司 Manus 的故事也突顯了中國領導人的偏執。Manus 創立於中國,去年將其業務註冊地遷至新加坡,以便利出售給 Facebook 的母公司 Meta。中國監管機構目前正試圖撤銷該筆交易,並禁止 Manus 的兩位聯合創始人離境。 不過,中國自身消化外國科技的歷史紀錄,為世界其他地區提供了一些指引。堅持不懈是至關重要的。中國花了三十年的時間來磨練其方法:給予投資者激勵措施、要求成立當地合資企業、規定在地化比例限制、與外國大學建立合作夥伴關係,當然,還有盜取智慧財產權。中國科技政策分析師張太銘(Tai Ming Cheung)表示,一個關鍵的需求是必須更加關注中國的科學研究:至少在商業化前階段,許多研究都發表在期刊上。他說:「這是我們以前沒想過、但現在必須去做的事。」 此外,如果認為技術轉移只涉及具體的技術碎片(例如光伏電池的藍圖),那就錯了。相反地,重要的是包含員工培訓在內的整個流程——這是印度正在慢慢吸收的教訓。曾協助在中國建立供應鏈的蘋果公司(Apple),現在有四分之一的 iPhone 在印度生產。根據美國企業研究院(American Enterprise Institute)智庫學

    23 min
  3. May 15

    86-4 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 中國政府提倡閱讀,但只能讀對的書!+ 小分享: 瑞士朋友來上課!

    China | Chaguan Xi Jinping wants China to read more—as long as it’s the right books A new campaign to put down phones and pick up classics Apr 27th 2026|5 min read THE BINHAI library, often called China’s most beautiful, is** breathtaking**. *Swirling shelves* of books rise in gravity-defying stacks to a high ceiling in a light-dappled room: a modern cathedral to learning. No wonder the library, in Tianjin, an eastern city, has become a favourite photo stop for glammed-up young folk posting to social media. But it does not take long in the library to see that there is less to it than meets the eye. Most of the books are just pictures of spines glued to the wall. And most of the visitors are glued to their phones, not perusing books. It is the perfect backdrop not just for photos but also for one of China’s new official obsessions: how to get people to read more, and to read more deeply. Since its founding in 1921, China’s Communist Party has treated literacy as a core objective. For Mao Zedong, briefly a librarian before becoming a revolutionary, the motivation was not bookish: he wanted to build a proletariat conscious enough to overthrow its feudal overlords. Yet literacy campaigners can appreciate his results. He helped propel China from a literacy rate of less than 20% in 1949 to about 60% at his death in 1976. It is approaching 99% today. Xi Jinping has revived the cause, with a twist. In February a new regulation that aims to promote reading came into effect. On April 26th the country concluded its first-ever national reading week. State media are full of discussions about how to get people to put down their phones and pick up a book. And Mr Xi has given it his imprimatur. In the latest issue of Qiushi, the party’s leading theoretical journal, he pronounced on the value of reading and quoted a line attributed to Mao: “One can go a day without eating, a day without sleeping, but not a day without reading.” Part of this is China’s response to a problem common everywhere. Chinese adults read on average 4.8 physical books a year, according to a national survey. Similar surveys have put American adults at about 13 books a year. Scepticism of that American figure is warranted, but Chinese reading of physical tomes is clearly down. On trains, planes and metros, it is rare to see anyone with a paperback. People do still look at text, just mostly on their phones. Wu Shulin of the Publishers Association of China has said online reading is time-killing, not knowledge-building—a gripe familiar to teachers and parents anywhere. What makes **the reading campaign **unique to China is how it reveals two of Mr Xi’s preoccupations. The first is techno-nationalism, a belief that China’s future depends on mastery of the industries of tomorrow. In a widely circulated essay, Cui Haijiao of the Chinese Academy of Press and Publication argues that deep reading breeds innovation. Mr Xi himself has called for reading the classics to grasp why things are as they are. (For the most part China’s culture vultures encourage international fare, and want everything from Tang poetry to Twain and Tolstoy appreciated.) The second is Mr Xi’s veneration of Chinese tradition, in which reading is central to what it means to be Chinese. There is indeed much history to this. “In books there are houses made of gold,” reads a famous poem attributed to an emperor of a thousand years ago. Mr Xi wants China to become a “cultural powerhouse” by 2035, and the revival of reading is one of its pillars. How, then, to do it? Here, good intentions meet practical limits. The party knows it cannot simply force people to read. The new regulation is largely about fostering conditions that would encourage more reading. It urges officials to build better public reading spaces, for instance. Yet it is easy enough to imagine cadres, ever glad of an excuse to pour concrete, putting up libraries and then losing interest. The Binhai library is a case in point: the newspaper-reading room offers a meagre selection, and by late afternoon had yet even to stock that day’s papers. The regulation gestures at supporting bricks-and-mortar bookshops, but does little. One shop owner laments the absence of bolder measures, such as Japan’s fixed-price system, which prevents online discounting. China’s marginalia Any discussion of reading must also consider what is being read. The new regulation calls for the reading of more “good” books. At a recent book fair in Tianjin, many stalls were devoted to Chinese medicine, children’s gadgets and craft jewellery rather than to books. One stall manager said people just do not want to pay to read when there is so much online for free. Indeed, some of China’s most original literature in recent decades has appeared online. Outsiders may assume that this reflects political censorship. Certainly, books critical of the party or unorthodox on history are blocked from print. Some officials have learned to their personal cost the danger of such fare: reading literature containing “serious political problems” has been cited as a reason in multiple purges in recent years. But more readers are almost certainly affected by crackdowns on unapproved, highly popular genres, especially danmei books, which depict male same-sex romance, and supernatural fiction. “If you want to publish in print, you have to cut or change things,” says a bookseller. Another trend has been the rise of independent Chinese bookshops outside China. Jifeng, a liberal one, was forced to close in Shanghai in 2018 and reopened in Washington, DC, in 2024. Causeway Bay Books, known for political contraband, moved from Hong Kong to Taipei in 2020 after five of its employees were arrested. Mainland intellectuals have also opened small independent bookshops in Tokyo, Chiang Mai, Amsterdam and beyond. So, taking a wider lens, Chinese literature is in decent shape, though much of it is now online or published abroad.** Absent from the new campaign are the things that would make it a truly valuable exercise: open publishing, diverse formats, intellectual risk. The party wants people to read more, but not widely**. ■ 這篇文章標題為《中國的邊際註記》(China’s marginalia),詳細探討了中國當前的閱讀推廣運動及其背後的政治與社會意涵。以下為全文逐字翻譯: 濱海圖書館經常被譽為「中國最美圖書館」,其景象令人屏息。旋轉的書架在光影斑駁的空間內,以挑戰重力的堆疊方式延伸至高聳的天花板:這是一座現代的學習大教堂。難怪這座位於東部城市天津的圖書館,會成為盛裝打扮的年輕人向社群媒體發文的熱門拍照景點。但只要在館內待上一會兒,就會發現這裡表裡不一。大多數的「書」只是貼在牆上的書脊照片。而大多數的訪客則緊盯著手機,而非翻閱書籍。 這不僅是拍照的絕佳背景,也反映了中國官方的新執念之一:如何讓民眾讀得更多、讀得更深。自1921年成立以來,中國共產黨一直將提升識字率視為核心目標。對於在成為革命家之前曾短暫擔任圖書館管理員的毛澤東而言,這種動力並非出於書卷氣:他想要建立一個具有足夠意識、足以推翻封建領主的無產階級。然而,識字運動的推動者會讚賞他的成果。他幫助中國的識字率從1949年的不到20%,提升到1976年他逝世時的約60%。時至今日,這一數字已接近99%。 習近平重啟了這項事業,並賦予了新的轉向。今年二月,一項旨在促進閱讀的新條例正式生效。4月26日,中國結束了首屆「全民閱讀週」。官方媒體充斥著關於如何讓民眾放下手機、拿起書本的討論。而習近平也給予了此舉認可。在黨內權威理論刊物《求是》的最新一期中,他論述了閱讀的價值,並引用了一句據傳出自毛澤東的名言:「飯可以一日不吃,覺可以一日不睡,書不可以一日不讀。」 這部分是中國針對全球普遍存在之問題所作出的回應。根據一項全國性調查,中國成年人平均每年閱讀4.8本實體書。類似的調查顯示美國成年人約為13本。雖然對美國的數據持懷疑態度是有理由的,但中國實體書閱讀量的下滑顯而易見。在火車、飛機和地鐵上,很少看到有人拿著平裝書。人們依然在閱讀文字,只是大多是在手機上。中國出版協會的鄔書林曾表示,網路上閱讀是在「消磨時間」,而非「建立知識」——這是任何地方的老師和家長都熟悉的抱怨。 使這場閱讀運動具有中國特色的是,它揭示了習近平的兩個關注點。第一是「技術民族主義」,即相信中國的未來取決於對明日產業的掌握。在一篇廣為流傳的文章中,中國新聞出版研究院的崔海教論證了深度閱讀能孕育創新。習近平本人也呼籲閱讀經典,以掌握事物運作的底層邏輯。(在大多數情況下,中國的文化推手鼓勵國際化的內容,希望人們能欣賞從唐詩到馬克吐溫及托爾斯泰的作品。) 第二是習近平對中國傳統的推崇,而在這套傳統中,閱讀是定義「何謂中國人」的核心。這確實有深遠的歷史背景。「書中自有黃金屋」是一首據傳出自千年前皇帝的名詩。習近平希望中國在2035年前成為「文化強國」,而振興閱讀正是其中的支柱之一。 那麼,該如何達成?在此,良好的意圖遇到了現實的限制。共產黨知道它不能單純強迫民眾閱讀。新條例主要在於營造鼓勵更多閱讀的環境,例如敦促官員建設更好的公共閱讀空間。然而,不難想像那些總是以灌溉混凝土為樂的基層幹部,在蓋好圖書館後便失去興趣。濱海圖

    28 min
  4. May 9

    86-3 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 公司有一老,如有一寶!+ 小分享: 台北文青之旅

    Ageing workers in East Asia are essential. More are needed Yet they often face high barriers to employment and unpalatable options Apr 27th 2026|SEOUL AND TOKYO|6 min read HONDA TAMIKO began working as a child on her family’s farm back when Japan was at war with America. Now 93, Ms Honda still puts in a hard day’s toil as a janitor at a McDonald’s branch in Kumamoto, in southern Japan. Ms Honda says her pension is plenty to live off; she chooses to keep showing up. “Humans are animals, after all,” she chuckles. “We have to keep moving as much as we can.” Ms Honda is the oldest in McDonald’s crew of some 220,000 in Japan. But she is less an outlier than a harbinger. As people live longer, they are staying healthy for longer and working longer, too. Japan and its neighbour South Korea, two of the most rapidly ageing countries, are at the forefront of this transition. Nearly 40% of South Koreans and more than 25% of Japanese aged above 65 remain at work, the highest rates in the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries (see chart). But labour markets and social systems designed for a different demographic era struggle to make the most of those who can work and to support those who can’t. Many people in both Japan and South Korea keep working out of necessity. More than half of elderly employees in Japan say they work for income. The financial pressure is even greater in South Korea, where the pension system failed to keep pace with the country’s rapid development after the Korean war, leaving generations of people with inadequate support. The average public pension replaces only about a third of workers’ pre-retirement income, so nearly 40% of South Koreans over 65 make less than half the median income, the highest rate in the OECD. Many in South Korea fear being made to retire too early: bus drivers in Seoul went on strike earlier this year demanding that the retirement age be raised. “In the past, 65 was considered quite elderly, but now, even at 65, people live a youthful life,” says Shin Gyo-beom, who drives Seoul’s bus number 107. “Wouldn’t it be better for someone more experienced to drive?” Yet money is only part of the story. Many want to keep working for other reasons. “There is infinite value that can’t be quantified in monetary terms,” says Kim Mi-gon of the Korea Labour Force Development Institute for the Aged, a think-tank. Staying employed can help stave off health problems and keep loneliness at bay. “When you’re this age, if you stay at home, you lose it mentally and physically,” says Ms Honda, who belongs to McDonald’s Japan’s “Premium Age Crew”, as employees over 60 are known. “My family keeps telling me to quit, but I know that if I stop working and stay at home I’ll be a burden to them and end up in a facility.” Across East Asia, studies show older people who keep working tend to be less frail and less likely to report depressive symptoms. (The direction of causality is hard to establish, however.) Ro Ick-kyun, a 60-year-old from Hanam, east of Seoul, has had several jobs since he retired from his original career as a corporate executive. “My wife says when I work I seem younger and more full of energy,” he smiles. Some companies are making concerted efforts to use older workers. Consulting on later-stage career options has become common practice at large Japanese firms. Companies are adjusting roles and responsibilities to accommodate older workers. The boss of a car-repair shop in Kashiwazaki, a small city in northern Japan, says that with fewer young people, he needs to get more out of his existing staff. Yet too often those who want to keep working face high barriers and unpalatable options. Lots of human capital is wasted, argues Randall Jones, a former head of the Japan/Korea desk at the OECD. Seniority-based wage and promotion systems are still common in Japan and South Korea, which makes keeping workers on full-time staff contracts costly for companies. Many thus rehire older workers after their official retirement on new temporary contracts with reduced pay and responsibilities. Those who look for new jobs can struggle, not least because discrimination is rampant. “Korean case law and social norms tend to view hiring discrimination based on age…as reasonable,” says Kwon O-hun, a labour lawyer at Gapjil119, a South Korean watchdog that combats workplace abuse. Some start small businesses. Others take on temporary work as cleaners, carers or security guards. “There’s a huge mismatch: lots of supply of desk workers and lots of demand for menial work,” says Kitao Sagiri of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “The skills older folks accumulated are not necessarily what’s needed.” Those who struggle to find new jobs can turn to a host of government programmes and agencies to support older workers. South Korea’s national government finances over 1m part-time jobs for seniors as a quasi-welfare policy. The Seoul 50Plus Foundation, an arm of the capital’s municipal government, aims to help those on the cusp of retirement from their first career plan for a second one. At one airy outpost in the city’s east, older jobseekers can get advice on how to polish their résumés or receive training in AI. Japan has more than 1,300 Silver Human Resource Centres, which help match people aged 60 or above with job opportunities, from caring for even older folk to cleaning up family gravesites for those not up to visiting. Policymakers want to encourage these trends. Keeping people employed for longer helps compensate for the shrinking number of young people in both countries; to the extent it keeps people fit, it also helps reduce health- and nursing-care costs. Since 2006 Japan has encouraged firms to offer job opportunities until the age of 65; in 2021, the government began urging employers to keep workers on until 70. In 2013 South Korea raised its statutory retirement age from 59 to 60. But that does not tackle the underlying issue about what kind of work older people should do. Getting the most out of those who can keep working while providing support to those who cannot will require a more ambitious redesign of social systems and hiring practices. For older workers it also means reconceiving the latter stages of a working life as something more akin to the beginning of it. Murazeki Fumio, the head of Koureisha, a temporary-employment agency for elderly workers in Japan, encourages his new employees to shed their attachments to their old roles: “I always tell everyone: once you’re over 65, approach it as if you were a new hire, with the mindset of starting over from scratch.” ■ 東亞高齡勞工不可或缺:需求日益增加,卻仍面臨重重障礙與無奈選擇 2026年4月27日 | 首爾與東京報導 本田民子(Honda Tamiko)在童年時期就開始在自家的農場工作,當時日本正與美國交戰。如今已 93 歲高齡的本田女士,依然在日本南部熊本市的一家麥當勞分店擔任清潔員,每天辛勤工作。本田女士表示她的養老金足夠生活,但她選擇繼續露面工作。「人類終究是動物,」她笑著說,「我們必須盡可能地保持活動。」 本田女士是日本麥當勞約 22 萬名員工中最年長的一位。但她與其說是一個特例,不如說是一個先兆。隨著人類壽命延長,健康壽命也隨之增加,工作時間也變得更長。日本與鄰國南韓作為全球高齡化最快速的兩個國家,正處於這場轉型的最前線。南韓 65 歲以上的人口中有近 40% 仍在工作,日本則超過 25%,這是經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD,主要由富裕國家組成的俱樂部)中最高的比例。然而,為不同人口結構時代所設計的勞動力市場與社會體制,正難以充分發揮有能力工作者的潛力,也難以支援那些無法工作的人。 許多日韓的高齡者是出於必要性而持續工作。日本超過半數的高齡員工表示,他們是為了收入而工作。而在南韓,財務壓力更為沉重,因為當地的養老金制度未能跟上韓戰後國家快速發展的步伐,導致好幾代人缺乏充足的支援。平均公共養老金僅能替代勞工退休前收入的三分之一,因此南韓 65 歲以上的人口中,近 40% 的收入低於中位數的一半,比例居 OECD 之冠。許多南韓人擔心太早被迫退休:首爾的公車司機在今年早些時候發動罷工,要求提高退休年齡。「過去 65 歲被認為非常老,但現在即使是 65 歲,大家生活得還是很年輕,」駕駛首爾 107 號公車的申教範(Shin Gyo-beom)說,「讓更有經驗的人來開車不是更好嗎?」 然而,金錢並非故事的全貌。許多人是為了其他原因想繼續工作。「有些無限的價值是無法用金錢衡量的,」韓國高齡勞工發展研究院(一個智庫)的金美坤(Kim Mi-gon)表示。維持就業有助於延緩健康問題,並防止孤獨。 「到了這個年紀,如果一直待在家裡,你的身心都會崩潰,」本田女士說,她是日本麥當勞「銀髮菁英組」(Premium Age Crew,指 60 歲以上的員工)的一員。「家人一直叫我辭職,但我知道如果我不工作待在家,就會成為他們的負擔,最後落入安養機構。」 在整個東亞,研究顯示持續工作的高齡者往往較不虛弱,且較少出現憂鬱症狀(然而,因果關係的方向尚難確定)。來自首爾東部河南市、60 歲的盧益均(Ro Ick-kyun)自從結束原本的企業高管生涯退休後,已經換過幾份工作。「我太太說我工作的時候看起來更年輕、更有活力,」他笑著說。 部分公司正有意識地運用高齡員工。在日本大型企業中,針對職涯後期的諮詢已成為慣例。公司正在調整職

    32 min
  5. Apr 28

    86-2 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 中國民調對台態度轉為強硬+小分享: 中國小八婆對台灣的態度!

    China | A hawkish turn Public opinion in China is hardening on America and Taiwan A rare poll shows the views of ordinary Chinese are changing Mar 19th 2026|3 min read CHINA IS having a moment in Western public opinion. Communist Party mouthpieces crow that the country is increasingly “cool”. Young Westerners on social media are “Chinamaxxing”: adopting Chinese habits like drinking hot water (not cold), or Tsingtao beer. Polls suggest that views of China, especially among the young, are growing more favourable. A report released on March 9th suggests the feeling is not mutual. Chinese opinion polls rarely ask about sensitive issues. But unusually, across three surveys in 2024-25, the Carter Centre, an American think-tank, was able to ask 6,500 Chinese people for their views on international affairs. The results suggest that China’s population sees the world in increasingly stark terms. Fewer Chinese now oppose using military force to unify China and Taiwan. President Donald Trump’s aggressive foreign policy appears to have dented views of America and stiffened Chinese resolve. The survey also shows that opinion diverges from state narratives in some key areas. Two years ago more than half of Chinese opposed unifying China and Taiwan by military force. By late 2025, that figure had fallen to 38% (see chart one). Support for forced unification, under at least some circumstances, had risen from 25% in 2024 to almost half. Importantly, of all their neighbours, Chinese feel most warmly about Taiwan—in line with state narratives that the Taiwanese are “family”. A minority see Taiwan’s computer-chip business as an important reason for unification. A series of events last year, including a big arms deal struck by America and Taiwan and comments by the Japanese prime minister, probably contributed to the rising hawkishness, bolstering President Xi Jinping’s stance. Mr Xi can also count on support for his tit-for-tat approach to relations with Mr Trump. Almost three-quarters of respondents regarded America as a national-security threat. Some 62% of people backed retaliation against America’s trade war, for instance by cutting off rare-earths exports, even if it is costly to China. Only 4% supported negotiating over export controls on chips. In 2024 views on America were more evenly split. In the past, the public saw amity with America as vital to China’s economic success. Now, however, they “are demanding a relationship of equals”, says Nick Zeller, one of the survey’s authors. Public opinion in China is remarkably unified, thanks in part to the consistency of the state narratives that help shape it. But one characteristic appears to predict a respondent’s views better than others: income. High earners tend to view America, including its culture, more favourably than does the population at large, the poll suggests (see chart two). But the well-off are also more strident about Chinese power: they think more highly of Russia, and are more open to a military solution to Taiwan. The government has previously suppressed polling that showed that the rich had views out of step with the rest of the country. Still, the population appears to be at odds with the dominant state narratives on some issues, notes Yawei Liu, another survey author. Despite support for trade with Russia, some 44% of Chinese oppose sending troops to support its war in Ukraine, a limit on the countries’ “no-limits partnership”. China calls its territorial claims in the South China Sea “indisputable”, but almost half the population would support giving up some claims in return for America reducing its security presence in Asia. And contrary to state-media love-ins, the population has a remarkably low opinion of Cambodia, a diplomatic pal, thanks to its rampant scam industry. Popular support at home can be useful to the government when it wants to signal its resolve abroad. But opinion in China tends to be elastic and responsive to state narratives. That is partly because the state can be persuasive, and partly because survey respondents know what the government wants to hear. ■ 中國民意在美國與台灣議題上正在轉趨強硬 一項罕見的民意調查顯示,普通中國民眾的觀點正在改變 2026年3月19日 | 3分鐘閱讀時間 第一段:西方對中的觀感 中國正處於西方公眾輿論中的一個高光時刻。 共產黨的喉舌媒體吹噓該國正變得越來越「酷」。 社交媒體上的西方年輕人正在進行「極致中國化」:採納中國習慣,例如喝熱水(而非冷水),或喝青島啤酒。 民意調查顯示,對中國的看法,特別是在年輕人中,正變得越來越正向。 第二段:卡特中心的調查結果 3月9日發布的一份報告顯示,這種感覺並非相互的(雙向的)。 中國的民意調查鮮少詢問敏感議題。 但不同尋常的是,在2024至2025年間的三項調查中,美國智庫「卡特中心」得以詢問6,500名中國人對國際事務的看法。 結果顯示,中國人口正以日益極端(非黑即白)的角度看待世界。 現在反對使用武力統一中國與台灣的中國人變少了。 唐納·川普總統激進的外交政策似乎削弱了對美國的看法,並強化了中國的決心。 調查還顯示,在某些關鍵領域,民意與國家論述存在分歧。 第三段:台灣議題與武力統一 兩年前,超過一半的中國人反對以武力統一中國與台灣。 到2025年末,該數據已下降至38%(見圖表一)。 對強制統一的支持(至少在某些情況下)已從2024年的25%上升到近一半。 重要的是,在所有鄰居中,中國人對台灣感覺最溫暖——這與國家敘事中台灣人是「一家人」的說法一致。 少數人將台灣的電腦晶片產業視為統一的重要原因。 去年發生的一系列事件,包括美台達成的大型軍售協議以及日本首相的言論,可能促使了鷹派情緒的上升,支持了習近平主席的立場。 第四段:對美關係與反制措施 習近平也可以指望民眾支持他對川普關係採取的「以牙還牙」方針。 近四分之三的受訪者將美國視為國家安全威脅。 約62%的人支持對美國貿易戰進行報復,例如通過切斷稀土出口,即便這對中國代價高昂。 僅有4%的人支持就晶片出口管制進行談判。 在2024年,對美國的觀點分布較為均衡。 過去,大眾將與美國的友好視為中國經濟成功的關鍵。 然而現在,調查作者之一尼克·澤勒表示,他們「正要求一種平等的關係」。 第五段:收入對觀點的影響 中國的民意顯著統一,部分歸功於塑造民意的國家敘事的一致性。 但有一種特徵似乎比其他特徵更能預測受訪者的觀點:收入。 民調顯示,高收入者往往比大眾人口對美國(包括其文化)持有更多好感(見圖表二)。 但富裕階層對中國力量也更加強硬:他們對俄羅斯的評價更高,且對台灣問題的軍事解決方案抱持更開放的態度。 政府此前曾壓制顯示富人觀點與國家其他地區不一致的民調。 第六段:與國家論述的分歧 儘管如此,另一位調查作者劉亞偉指出,在某些問題上,民眾似乎與主導性的國家論述不一致。 儘管支持與俄羅斯的貿易,約44%的中國人反對派遣軍隊支持其在烏克蘭的戰爭,這是兩國「無上限夥伴關係」的一個限制。 中國稱其在南海的領土主張是「無可爭辯的」,但近一半的人口會支持放棄部分主張,以換取美國減少在亞洲的安全存在。 與官方媒體的熱情宣傳相反,由於柬埔寨猖獗的詐騙產業,民眾對這個外交盟友的評價明顯很低。 第七段:結論 當政府想要對外展現決心時,國內的民眾支持可能很有用。 但中國的民意往往具有彈性,且會對國家論述做出反應。 這部分是因為國家具有說服力,部分是因為調查受訪者知道政府想聽什麼。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

    23 min
  6. Apr 25

    86-1 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 俄羅斯軍隊人吃人+ 小分享: 俄羅斯的飲酒和賄絡文化

    On the front lines, Russian soldiers pay officers to stay alive The war against Ukraine has created a corrupt economy of blood money Apr 1st 2026|Altai and Luhansk|5 min read The newly built one-bedroom flat is nicely decorated, with parquet floors, an aquarium, a shower cabin and a full kitchen. The downside is the location: underground in the trenches near Baihavka, a village in the occupied region of Luhansk. The apartment is home to the commander of the local Russian army unit. Maxim, a deserter who helped to build it, says the commander did not spend a kopek. Not only was the labour free, but soldiers paid for the materials, appliances and paint. Russian soldiers must also buy officers alcohol. “They have four korporativy [office parties] a week,” says Sergei, who bribed his way into a rear position as a cook. He works from 5am to 11pm, paying over half his salary to a commander for the privilege. Interviews with a dozen contract soldiers in locations including the Belgorod region, Luhansk and Donetsk reveal a system of extortion and punishment. Officers see their soldiers not just as grunts but as a source of enrichment. Corruption and slave labour have long been features of the Russian and Soviet armies: professional officers control the means of destruction, while recruits serve as cannon fodder in war or free labour in peacetime. Russia’s recruitment drive for its war in Ukraine has poured blood and money into the system, resulting in a vast battlefield economy. Soldiers describe the front lines as a marketplace where everything has a price: drones, medals, home leave and life itself. To back up their claims, they show screenshots of bank transfers, complaints to military prosecutors, demands for money and orders to take part in assaults. Maxim, a 26-year-old from the city of Krasnodar, signed his contract in August 2024 in Moscow, where bonuses were higher. He supplies various reasons: government propaganda, the death of his stepfather in the war. “Something just snapped in my head,” he says. “I didn’t even know the contract was indefinite.” It probably helped that he had been arrested with amphetamines in his pocket and given the option of enlisting to avoid prosecution. He got a bonus of 2.5m roubles ($30,000) and was sent without training to the Luhansk region, where he was paid 200,000 roubles a month until he deserted in January 2026. Of the 8m roubles he got in total, he says 6m went in equipment and bribes. Russia’s army provides gear to elite airborne and special-forces units, but infantry must buy their own. Since 2023 Wildberries and Ozon, the main Russian online retailers, have been available in the occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. “If you don’t want to spend money on a good pair of boots and a decent body-armour vest, you go into assault wearing trainers,” says Maxim. The collections begin under the pretext of raising money for drones, equipment or food, says Anton, an assault trooper. But if you pay once, “you’ll pay for ever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.” Ukraine’s wall of drones has created a kill zone at least 20km deep, rendering mass assaults suicidal. It has also created an economy of life and death. Making their own luck Maxim says his commander welcomed new recruits by telling them he had buried 12 companies and they would be the 13th. “He said we were cannon fodder and only 5% of soldiers survive assaults.” The next day he explained that survival was not a matter of luck, but of ability to pay. Maxim and Sergei, another soldier, each paid 1m roubles to be transferred to the rear, plus another 100,000-150,000 roubles a month. Some commanders requisition troops’ bank cards and PIN codes before sending them into an assault. Ilya, another deserter, says a staff officer collects them for safekeeping. The dead are declared missing, and commanders withdraw the money they earned from their bank accounts at ATMs in Donetsk and Luhansk. There is a rich trade in medical documents declaring soldiers unfit for combat. Getting wounded is not free either. “I paid 100,000 for leave after a wound,” says Anton. “To get discharged they ask for a million.” Soldiers who refuse to pay may be thrown into dug-out pits for torture. Andrey Bykov refused to hand over 2m roubles he received as compensation for being wounded to his commanders, who used the call signs Kemer and Dudka. According to his mother, he was first handcuffed and beaten for several days. Later he was tied to a tree and shot. Soldiers ordered by their commanders to kill their own comrades call it “zeroing out”. Soldiers say “refuseniks” can be zeroed out by shooting them, tying them to trees to freeze, denying them medical care after beatings or having drone operators kill them on the battlefield. Verstka, an independent Russian news site, confirmed the identities of at least 100 commanders who either ordered or carried out such killings. “Will these bastards ever be punished?” asks Elena, a 39-year-old from the Altai region in Russia’s north-east. In February 2025 she buried her son, who had served in Kemer’s regiment. He had paid 100,000 roubles “for the needs of the regiment” and was reported as having died on a combat mission. Last summer Elena’s husband, who was serving in the same unit, deserted and recorded several videos about extortion schemes. He filed a complaint with military prosecutors saying Kemer had taken 2m roubles from him. But shortly before the new year he was found by military police and sent back to Kemer’s unit. On January 11th, Elena says, he was tied to a tree and killed.■ 俄羅斯士兵在前線付錢給軍官以求活命 這場對抗烏克蘭的戰爭創造了一個腐敗的血錢經濟 第一部分:前線的「豪華」地堡與剝削 2026年4月1日 | 阿爾泰與盧干斯克 | 5分鐘閱讀時間 這間新落成的一房一廳公寓裝飾精美,鋪著魚骨木地板,有魚缸、淋浴房和設備齊全的廚房。唯一缺點是地點:位於盧干斯克(Luhansk)佔領區白哈夫卡村(Baihavka)附近的戰壕地底下。這間公寓是當地俄軍部隊指揮官的家。協助建造這間公寓的逃兵馬克沁(Maxim)說,指揮官一分錢都沒花。不僅勞動力是免費的,士兵們還支付了建材、家電和油漆的費用。 俄羅斯士兵還必須為軍官購買酒類。曾透過賄賂獲得「廚師」後方職位的謝爾蓋(Sergei)說:「他們每週舉辦四次公司派對(korporativy)。」他從凌晨 5 點工作到晚上 11 點,並將超過一半的薪水交給指揮官,以換取這個特權。 第二部分:制度化的勒索與懲罰 對貝爾哥羅德(Belgorod)、盧干斯克和頓內茨克(Donetsk)等地區的十幾名合約兵進行的採訪揭露了一個勒索與懲罰系統。軍官不僅將士兵視為底層小兵(grunts),更將其視為發財的來源。腐敗和奴隸勞動長期以來一直是俄羅斯和蘇聯軍隊的特徵:職業軍官控制著毀滅手段,而招募的新兵在戰爭中充當炮灰(cannon fodder),或在和平時期充當免費勞動力。 俄羅斯為烏克蘭戰爭發起的徵兵行動為這個系統注入了鮮血與金錢,導致了一個巨大的戰場經濟。士兵們將前線描述為一個「萬物皆有價」的市場:無人機、獎章、返鄉假,乃至生命本身。為了支持他們的說法,他們展示了銀行轉帳截圖、向軍事檢察官提出的投訴、要錢的要求以及參與突擊的命令。 第三部分:高額賄賂與物資自理 來自克拉斯諾達爾(Krasnodar)的 26 歲青年馬克沁,於 2024 年 8 月在獎金較高的莫斯科簽署了合約。他給出了各種理由:政府宣傳、繼父在戰爭中去世。他說:「我腦袋裡有些東西斷掉了。我甚至不知道合約是無限期的。」另一個推動因素可能是他因口袋藏有安非他命被捕,並獲得了透過參軍來避免起訴的選擇。他獲得了 250 萬盧布(3 萬美元 (1 俄羅斯盧布 等於 0.41 新臺幣 )的獎金,並在未經訓練的情況下被派往盧干斯克地區,在那裡他每個月領取 20 萬盧布的薪水,直到 2026 年 1 月逃亡。在他總共獲得的 800 萬盧布中,他說有 600 萬盧布花在了裝備和賄賂上。 俄羅斯軍隊為精銳的空降兵和特種部隊提供裝備,但步兵必須自備。自 2023 年以來,俄羅斯主要電商 Wildberries 和 Ozon 已在頓內茨克、盧干斯克、扎波羅熱和赫爾松等佔領區提供服務。馬克沁說:「如果你不想花錢買一雙好的靴子和體面的防彈背心,你就得穿著運動鞋去衝鋒。」 第四部分:生存的代價 一名突擊隊員安東(Anton)表示,募款通常以籌集無人機、設備或食物的錢為藉口開始。但如果你付了一次錢,「你就得永遠付下去,這樣他們才不會把你送進肉靶機(meat grinder)。」烏克蘭的無人機牆已創造了一個至少 20 公里深的殺傷區,使得大規模突擊等同於自殺。這也創造了一種生與死的經濟。 馬克沁說,他的指揮官迎接新兵時告訴他們,他已經埋葬了 12 個連,他們將是第 13 個。「他說我們是炮灰,只有 5% 的士兵能在突擊中倖存。」隔天他解釋說,生存不是運氣問題,而是支付能力的問題。馬克沁和另一名士兵謝爾蓋各付了 100 萬盧布被調往後方,此外每個月還要再付 10 萬至 15 萬盧布。 第五部分:「清零」與殘酷處決 一些指揮官在將部隊送入突擊前,會徵用士兵的銀行卡和 PIN 碼。另一名逃兵伊利亞(Ilya)說,一名幕僚軍官會收集這些卡片以便「安全保管」。死者被宣佈為失蹤,而指揮官則在頓內茨克和盧干斯

    35 min
  7. Apr 17

    85-4 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 日本女性在鄉村地區的消失了+小分享: 波蘭的百貨公司 金色梯田(Złote Tarasy)

    Why women, more than men, are abandoning rural Japan Bigger cities are, in turn, skewing more female Apr 1st 2026|NANTO|4 min read KOYASU MIWA traverses Japan, from Sapporo in the north to Miyazaki in the south, with one goal: to make the countryside less hostile to women. Ms Koyasu runs a consultancy that advises local governments, lectures businessmen on discrimination and runs workshops urging community elders to let women take a bigger role in local decision-making. On a recent stop in Nanto, a region in central Japan ringed by snow-capped mountains, she leads a session on gender inequality for members of its various community councils, volunteer bodies that deal with issues from disaster preparedness to organising festivals. Of the 31 council chairs in the region none is a woman. Ms Koyasu’s work is part of an effort to assuage a national worry: young women are draining away from the countryside and from small-town Japan. A government report in 2014 expressed alarm about the future of 900 municipalities, half of the country’s total. It concluded that the number of women of child-bearing age in those places would fall by half within the next quarter-century, and that these municipalities faced “extinction” as a result. Officials in lots of outlying places accept that young people will move to cities for university or a first job. But they count on them doing a U-turn and returning home in their 20s or 30s. Yet in roughly 70% of Japan’s 47 prefectures, young women are leaving at higher rates than young men. In Toyooka, a small city in western Japan, census data show that 52% of men who left as teenagers came back in their 20s. For women, the figure was just 27%. Tokyo and a handful of other urban centres are seeing the opposite trend, with more young women moving in than men. The reasons for all this are deeply entrenched: a shortage of good jobs for women, a wider gender pay gap than in the cities and many other forms of sexism. Last year a government regional-revitalisation plan cited unconscious bias and inflexible gender roles as forces pushing women away. Rural areas often struggle with attitudes that the larger cities have shed, argues Yamamoto Ren, a campaigner. In many small offices, women still make the tea while men make the decisions. Ms Yamamoto says those who have left for cities sometimes dread returning home for holidays. “Family and neighbours keep asking, ‘Isn’t it time for a baby?’” Although many Japanese women are enjoying their lives in the cities, others would willingly return to the countryside if things were different. Tokuno Sayuri, a woman in her 30s from Nanto, returned there after briefly living in Tokyo, finding the capital too hectic. Miura Miwako, a journalist in Akita, a northern prefecture famed for its bears, says she would ideally spend her whole career there. “The countryside suits me better,” she says. Yet both she and Ms Tokuno are deeply frustrated with the status quo. “When women notice discrimination here, they rarely speak up—they just leave silently,” says Ms Miura. Many smaller places have now established strategies to tackle gender discrimination. Initiatives in Toyooka include handing out manga cartoons that raise awareness of the issue, and training teachers and businesspeople. Ms Koyasu, the consultant, says her work was once met with jeers and pushback. “But people are increasingly realising that being inclusive towards women is a matter of survival.” Therein lies a tension at the heart of many of the official initiatives. The single biggest reason authorities want women to stay in the countryside is so they can have children. “I never want women to feel like they’re simply kept around to pop out babies,” says Ms Koyasu. Promoting gender equality ought to mean accepting a woman’s choice not to marry or have children. In practice, many towns send mixed signals. Even those that now promote gender equality also sponsor nannyish matchmaking schemes, such as hosting government-backed parties for young singles to find partners, or getting local elders to encourage those who are too shy to pair off. In Nanto, both programmes sit in the same department. Last year Iwate prefecture published a dating guide urging women to wear skirts that make them look “delicate” and make-up that looks “demure” to attract husbands. Changing attitudes, as Ms Koyasu puts it, will take time. ■ 日本鄉村的「消失女孩」 日本的鄉村正在失去她們的女性。 雖然日本年輕人往大城市跑不是新鮮事,但最近的數據顯示,女生離開家鄉的比例遠遠高過男生,這讓很多地方政府開始緊張了,甚至出現了「地方滅絕」的危機感。我們一起來看看是怎麼回事。 1. 誰在決定鄉村的大小事? 我們先把鏡頭轉到日本中部的「南砺市」。這裡風景很美,被雪山環繞,但這裡的社會結構卻很「硬」。 有一位叫小安三和(Koyasu Miwa)的顧問,她每天的工作就是跑遍全日本,試圖讓鄉村對女性更友善一點。她在南砺市辦了一場講座,對象是當地的「社區委員會」。這些委員會管的事情可多了,從防災到辦祭典都要負責,但全區 31 個委員會的主席,竟然沒有一個是女性。 這就是問題的核心:在很多鄉下地方,做決定的永遠是男性長輩。 2. 回不去的家鄉 日本政府早在 2014 年就發出警告,全日本有一半的鄉鎮(大約 900 個)面臨消失的風險。原因很簡單:育齡女性流失得太快了。 很多地方官員原本以為,年輕人去東京讀書、工作,到了二、三十歲總會回鄉成家吧?結果數據狠狠打臉。在兵庫縣的豐岡市,去外地闖蕩的男生有 52% 會回流,但女生只有 27%。換句話說,女生一旦看過外面的世界,就不想回去了。 3. 為什麼女生不回來? 這背後的原因其實很根深柢固: · 職場天花板: 鄉下的好工作少,男女薪資差距比大城市還大。 · 刻板印象: 很多辦公室還留著「女生倒茶、男生決策」的舊習。 · 社交壓力: 很多女生說,回老家過年最怕鄰居問:「什麼時候要生小孩?」這種令人窒息的關心,讓家鄉變成了壓力堡壘。 有一位在秋田工作的記者三浦美和子(Miura Miwako)說得很精準:「當女性在這裡感覺到歧視時,她們很少會大聲抗議——她們只是靜靜地離開。」 4. 為了生存,還是為了女性? 現在,越來越多的小鎮開始緊張了。有的發漫畫宣傳性別平等,有的幫老師和商人上課。小安顧問說,以前她演講時常被噓,但現在大家慢慢發現:「這已經不是政治正確的問題,而是生存問題。」 不過,這裡有個很矛盾的地方。政府之所以想留住女性,主要目的是希望她們「生孩子」來挽救人口。 這讓政策變得很奇怪:一方面在推性別平等,另一方面卻在辦那種「保姆級」的相親活動。甚至還有縣政府發手冊,教女生要穿裙子看起來比較「纖弱」、妝要畫得「端莊」才討男人喜歡。 說到底,如果鄉村留住女生的目的只是為了讓她們當「生育機器」,那這種平等恐怕只是表面功夫。 真正的進步,應該是讓女生不論想不想結婚、想不想生小孩,都能在自己的家鄉感受到尊重,並且有發揮才華的空間。這條改變觀念的路,日本鄉村顯然還有一段路要走。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

    20 min
  8. Apr 11

    85-3 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist-自動駕駛車即將改變我們的日常生活?! + 小分享: 波蘭的飲食文化和復活節派對

    Self-driving cars will transform urban economies A robotaxi boom is coming. The impacts might be broader than you expect Nov 27th 2025|San Francisco|6 min read Urban Economies reflect how their residents get around. And before long, that will start to change—more dramatically than at any time since the automobile was invented over a century ago. The robotaxis now autonomously shuttling passengers around the Bay Area or Los Angeles may look like ordinary cars, perhaps with a few ungainly sensors, but as they spread and develop, they will operate under different constraints to human-driven ones, and accordingly reshape cities. Over the next year, robotaxis will become** increasingly** difficult to ignore. Waymo, Google’s offering, plans to expand to cities including Miami and Washington. London will mark the company’s first international expansion and put it in direct competition with Uber, which is also set to launch a self-driving offering in the city. San Francisco’s experience suggests that public and regulatory resistance—a formidable force in many cities—can be overcome. A thin majority of residents opposed robotaxis in 2023 when Waymos hit the streets. Today two-thirds are in favour. Pioneer cities offer a glimpse of changes to be expected elsewhere. Road safety ought to improve: Waymos are involved in ten times fewer serious crashes than an average human driver. So far, at least, in San Francisco there have not been job losses among cab or rideshare drivers. The cars operate at the top end of the market. A trip with a Waymo costs roughly a third more than a ride-hailing service on average, reflecting the swish Jaguar cars the firm uses and research spending that must be recouped. Despite the cost of a ride, robotaxis’ market share is rising fast . This is just the start. Robotaxis are losing money at present, but they ought to become much cheaper. The most important fact about them is also the most obvious: no one is at the wheel. That makes their economics entirely different to either regular taxis or cars. Unlike taxis, per-trip costs can be low. A rider no longer needs to buy a driver’s time at a high enough wage to make it worth their while. Although robotaxis still need to be charged, maintained, cleaned and so on, doing so is far cheaper. Unlike regular cars, robotaxis do not sit idle for most of the day, meaning their main cost—the investment to build them—can be spread across many more journeys. Such costs will also come down once fleets begin to be built in bulk. Carmakers will be able to fiddle with the shape of cars that no longer need to accommodate a driver. Tesla, Elon Musk’s firm, is trying to work out how to just use cameras rather than more expensive lidar sensors. Further down the road Thus the economics of owning a car, even an autonomous one, will be altered. In the countryside, which may lack the population density to sustain a robotaxi network, things will probably not be too different. Yet car ownership could lose appeal for many city- and suburb-dwellers. The average American household **allocates **15% of its spending to vehicle ownership. For anyone who is not a ferocious gearhead, drastically reducing this would be tempting. A world of cheap urban transportation is alluring. But it could also cause a real problem: horrific traffic jams. Congestion is** a classic economic externality.** The cost of any single car’s contribution to a jam is not borne entirely by its occupants. Instead, it is spread across everyone on the road. At present, urban traffic is constrained by the fact that getting around by car either requires (expensively) paying someone else to drive or (inconveniently) driving oneself. Without such constraints, the result could be brutal gridlock—negating many of the benefits of robotaxis. An economist’s answer to this conundrum is straightforward: put a price on traffic. Although congestion charging has been a feature of European roads for decades, it is formidably unpopular in America. New York recently set road fees, but only after a protracted battle. Swarms of robotaxis may force the matter. Self-driving cars are much less likely to break traffic rules and incur fines, meaning something will need to fill a hole in city budgets. Presenting a congestion charge as a “robot tax” might even make it easier to swallow. San Francisco may not yet have seen job losses, but that is likely to change as costs fall. America is home to 1m taxi and bus drivers, as well as over 3m truck drivers—adding up to 3% of the working population. Other potential losers are less obvious. Without car accidents there will, for instance, be less demand for personal-injury lawyers. If people stop buying cars, dealers and used-car salesmen will go. Robotaxis might compete with short-haul air travel and even hotels if some are kitted out with beds. Although new jobs will be created—in, say, managing fleets or manning depots—they will hardly make up for the losses. Social disruption is likely; at the same time, job losses will be an opportunity. Workforces in the rich world are shrinking as populations age. Freeing people to work elsewhere might be invaluable. Productivity in the transport industry would surge. The rest of the economy ought to perk up, too. An average working American spends just under an hour commuting each day, against eight hours on the job. Turning even a sliver of that into work could boost output appreciably, says Will Denyer of Gavekal, a research firm. Self-driving cars offer a smoother ride, which, along with better suspension, should make it easier to get work done onboard. And fewer accidents not only mean fewer human tragedies—they also mean lower hospital and rehabilitation bills. Then comes the impact on urban areas. Parking spaces take up a quarter of the downtown of the average American city (see chart 2). Most could be put to better use, perhaps as housing or offices. On-street parking could become drop-off bays or pavements, making city strolls more pleasant. More urbanites might cycle if traffic accidents become less common. Denser and better connected city centres ought to be an economic boon. Outside city centres, however, robotaxis will probably lead to sprawl, since longer journeys will be more tolerable. Self-driving cars could pull people away from more space-efficient transport such as buses, subways and trains, prompting a “death spiral” where fewer customers mean lower revenues, leading to worse service and, in turn, fewer customers. Policymakers will have to increase funding and use autonomous technology to improve public transport (think of self-driving buses). Other policy conundrums will also emerge. Roads dominated by robotaxis may need to be regulated more tightly. Already, human drivers tend to bully their robot counterparts; risk-averse algorithms tuned for safety would rather get cut off at an intersection than risk a crash, and drivers know that. Besides, there is no one behind the wheel to honk or yell profanities. Pedestrians, too, can wander across streets without the frisson of fear that comes from jumping in front of a vehicle with a potentially erratic human driver. Crime might be another problem, since driverless cars are easy to steal from and vandalise. The final shape of the self-driving city is hard to predict. Nearly a century passed after the automobile’s invention before the car-oriented city reached its apogee in places such as Atlanta, Dallas and Los Angeles, each with thick arterial roads, enormous parking lots and sprawling suburbs. The self-driving era carries risks of its own—but also vast promise. ■ 無人駕駛車將翻轉城市經濟 機器人計程車(Robotaxi)熱潮即將來臨,其影響力可能遠超乎你的想像。 城市經濟的樣貌,往往取決於居民的移動方式。不久後,這一切將迎來百年前汽車發明以來最劇烈的變革。目前在舊金山或洛杉磯街頭穿梭的無人駕駛計程車,雖然看起來跟一般車子差不多(頂多多了些笨重的感測器),但隨著技術普及,它們不再受限於人類駕駛的種種約束,進而重新形塑城市。 接下來這一年,機器人計程車將讓你無法忽視。Google 旗下的 Waymo 正計畫擴張到邁阿密和華盛頓;倫敦則將成為其進軍國際的首站,直接對上同樣準備推出無人駕駛服務的 Uber。舊金山的經驗顯示,原本強大的法規與輿論阻力是可以克服的——2023 年 Waymo 剛上路時,過半居民是反對的,但現在已有三分之二的人轉向支持。 先驅城市的轉變跡象 從這些先驅城市可以預見未來的改變。首先,道路安全會提升:Waymo 發生嚴重車禍的機率比人類駕駛低十倍。此外,目前舊金山的運將或外送員尚未出現失業潮,因為無人車目前鎖定高端市場,由於採用捷豹(Jaguar)車款且需回收研發成本,車資比一般叫車服務貴約三分之一,但其市佔率仍快速攀升。 這僅僅是個開始。雖然目前機器人計程車還在虧損,但未來價格一定會大降。無人駕駛最核心的關鍵就在於「沒人開車」,這讓它的經濟模式與傳統計程車完全不同。你不必支付司機薪水,雖然仍有充電、維修與清潔成本,但相對便宜許多。而且與私人轎車不同,無人車不會整天閒置,建造成本可以分攤到更多的趟次中。未來車廠若能大規模量產,甚至能因不必預留駕駛座而改變車體設計;特斯拉(Tesla)甚至嘗試捨棄昂貴的光學雷達(lidar),改用純相機感測來壓低成本。 更遠遠景的連鎖反應 這將改變擁車的邏輯。鄉村地區因人口稀疏可能維持現狀,但在城市與郊區,買車的吸引力將大減。一般美國家庭約有 15% 的支出花

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