Exploring Offshore Litigation

Harneys

Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

  1. 3D AGO

    Common sense and common law: Navigating the gap between breach and loss

    The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has dismissed an appeal in Logix Aero Ireland Limited v Siam Aero Repair Company Limited, holding that the voluntary acts of fraudsters broke the chain of causation between an assumed breach of a confidentiality clause and the claimant's loss. The decision restates the principles of legal causation in contract and clarifies the limited reach of London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan. Although the decision is one of English law, the causation principles applied are common law principles regularly cited in the Cayman Islands and other International Financial Centres (IFCs). Background Logix agreed to purchase two aircraft engines from Siam Aero under a Letter of Understanding (LOI). The LOI was predominantly non-binding. However, certain clauses – including a confidentiality provision – were expressly stated to be legally binding. Unknown fraudsters intercepted email correspondence between the parties. They registered domain names differing from the genuine addresses by a single character and began altering emails before forwarding them on. Among the changes, they substituted their own Vietnamese bank account details for Siam Aero's Thai account in draft Purchase Agreements and invoices. Logix paid the balance of the purchase price to the fraudsters' account believing it was paying Siam Aero. Logix took no independent step to verify the bank details. The fraud came to light days later when Siam Aero informed Logix by telephone and WhatsApp that it had not received payment, by which point the funds had already left the fraudsters' account. Logix commenced proceedings in England. It initially alleged Siam Aero's complicity in the fraud but dropped that allegation after forensic investigation. The claim was narrowed to a single ground: that Siam Aero's four emails to the fraudsters breached the confidentiality clause and caused Logix's loss. The issues At first instance, Mrs Justice Williams struck out the proceedings under CPR 3.4(2)(a), holding that the claim was "bound to fail". She accepted it was arguable that Siam Aero breached the confidentiality clause by unwittingly "disclosing" documents and information to the fraudsters. She held, however, that it was not arguable that any such breach caused Logix's loss. Lord Justice Males granted permission to appeal solely on causation. On appeal, Logix argued that the Judge wrongly failed to follow Macmillan. In that case, a firm had drawn the cheque negligently, leaving gaps in the figures and words that the clerk exploited to increase the amount from £2 to £120. The House of Lords held that, notwithstanding the intervening fraud, the firm's negligence in drawing the cheque facilitated the forgery and was the effective cause of the loss. As such, the firm was precluded from recovering its loss from the bank on the basis that "forgery is not a remote but a very natural consequence of negligence of this description". Siam Aero opposed the appeal on the ground it was not arguable that its actions breached the confidentiality clause at all. The judgment Lord Justice Phillips (Lord Justice Peter Jackson and Lady Justice Cockerill agreeing) dismissed the appeal. It was common ground that the "but for" test of factual causation was satisfied. The question was whether Siam Aero could be held liable despite the intervention of the fraudsters. The Court identified three principles by which the chain of causation may be broken: 1. First, the breach may not be the "effective" or "dominant" cause of loss but merely the opportunity or occasion for it (Galoo v Bright Grahame Murray; Armstead v Royal & Sun Alliance). The same distinction has been applied in the Cayman Islands. In Omni Securities v Deloitte & Touche, the Court of Appeal considered the Galoo test in the context of auditors' negligence and held that whether a breach was the "effective cause" of loss, or merely the "occasion" for it, was to be resolved by "the application of the court's common s...

    10 min

  2. 5D AGO

    Statutory Hastings-Bass in the Cayman Islands: the Grand Court sets aside a deed of exclusion

    In the recent decision of The Trustees v AB and Ors (Re the D Trust) the Cayman Grand Court granted relief under section 64A of the Trusts Act (2021 Revision) (the Act) to set aside a deed of exclusion (Deed of Exclusion) executed by previous trustees in reliance on erroneous UK tax advice. The decision adds to the growing body of authority on the statutory Hastings-Bass jurisdiction in the Cayman Islands, and includes guidance on the good faith requirement, standing by successor trustees, notification to tax authorities, and whether section 64A applications should be dealt with on the papers. Background The D Trust is a Cayman Islands discretionary trust with a broad class of beneficiaries. It was originally governed by New Zealand law, but its proper law and forum were changed to the Cayman Islands in November 2019. The trust formed part of a wider estate planning structure. When the D Trust was settled in 2011, the Settlor transferred non-UK situs property into it. A connected trust (the H Trust, governed by Guernsey law) borrowed those funds to purchase a residential property in England. The arrangement was designed to ensure the loan owed by the H Trust to the D Trust remained "excluded property" for UK inheritance tax (IHT) purposes, shielding the value of the UK property from any charge on the Settlor's death. In early 2017, proposed changes to the IHT regime threatened to undermine that planning. The previous trustees instructed a specialist London firm, which recommended (among other options) executing a deed of exclusion to declare the Settlor an "Excluded Person" under the trust deed. The Deed of Exclusion was executed on 30 March 2017, shortly before the new rules took effect on 6 April 2017. In January 2025, a different London firm reviewed the arrangements and concluded that the original advice had been incomplete and in places erroneous. It had failed to consider: (i) the risk that section 102 of the UK Finance Act 1986 would treat the Settlor as having incurred the H Trust's liabilities; (ii) whether the charge over the UK property was an "incumbrance created by a disposition made by [the Settlor]" within section 103 of that Act; and (iii) how the General Anti-Abuse Rule might apply to the 2017 arrangements. The D Trust faced the very IHT exposure the Deed of Exclusion was supposed to prevent. The issues The current trustee applied by originating summons for a declaration that the Deed of Exclusion was void ab initio under section 64A of the Act. The application was dealt with on the papers. The principal issues were: (i) whether the current trustee had standing; (ii) whether the statutory conditions in section 64A(2) were satisfied; (iii) the scope of the court's residual discretion (including the good faith requirement and notification of HMRC); and (iv) whether it was appropriate to determine a section 64A application without an oral hearing. The judgment The applicable law Justice Segal adopted the analysis of Justice Kawaley in Maples Trustee Services v AB (In Re Settlements), describing it as "a clear and authoritative summary of the applicable law". Justice Kawaley had identified three strands of the statutory language: 1. the power must be a fiduciary power; 2. but for the mistake the power would not have been exercised in the same way, at the same time, or at all; and 3. the person exercising the power must have failed to take into account relevant considerations, or taken into account irrelevant ones. Justice Segal adopted Justice Kawaley's tentative view (that section 64A contains an implied good faith requirement), reasoning that such a qualification is necessary to keep the jurisdiction within proper bounds and avoid what Lord Neuberger extrajudicially described as giving trustees a "get out of jail free card". He disagreed, however, with Justice Kawaley's observation that the circumstances required for section 64A relief are "likely in many (if not most) cases to be indistinguishable (legal lab...

    10 min

  3. MAY 7

    BVI Court of Appeal reaffirms high threshold for case management stays pending foreign proceedings

    In the recent decision of Lim Yew Cheng v Guanghua SS Holdings Limited, the BVI Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a first instance refusal to stay BVI recognition and enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of litigation in Hong Kong. The judgment is a useful restatement of the demanding test that an applicant must satisfy where it asks the court to put its own proceedings on hold to await the resolution of foreign litigation. Background In April 2022, Guanghua SS Holdings Limited (Guanghua) obtained a Hong Kong High Court Judgment arising out of two US$80 million loan facilities personally guaranteed by Mr Lim and his son, Lin Minghan. In June 2024, Guanghua commenced recognition and enforcement proceedings in the BVI, which Mr Lim sought to stay, first relying on pending separate Hong Kong proceedings (the Hong Kong Proceedings) and, subsequently a further claim issued in Hong Kong and derivative proceedings brought in the BVI. Mithani J (Ag.) refused both the stay and a related adjournment application, and Mr Lim appealed. The threshold for a case management stay The central question on appeal was whether Mithani J, when considering whether it was appropriate to grant stay of the enforcement proceedings on case management grounds, had applied the wrong test by failing to follow Athena Capital Fund SICAV-FIS SCA v Secretariat of State for the Holy See. Ward JA accepted that the single test is whether, in the particular circumstances, it is in the interests of justice to grant a stay. However, drawing on the analysis of Males LJ in Athena Capital, the Court emphasised that the presence of "rare and compelling circumstances" remains a highly relevant factor where the stay sought is to await foreign proceedings. The Court held that, while the "rare and compelling circumstances" formulation is not itself the legal test, "it is only in rare and compelling circumstances that it will be in the interests of justice to grant a stay on case management grounds to await the outcome of foreign proceedings", describing this as a "high threshold" and noting that the usual function of the court is to decide cases, not decline to do so. The appeal The Court observed that while the first instance judge did not expressly articulate the test he applied, the factors he relied upon were "plainly relevant" to the interests of justice question under the applicable test. These included the facts that (a) the Hong Kong Judgment had not been appealed, (b) no application had been made to stay the Hong Kong Judgment in Hong Kong, which would have been an obvious and effective way to bring a halt to the BVI enforcement proceedings, and (c) the relief sought in the Hong Kong Proceedings did not seek to set aside the Hong Kong Judgment. In those circumstances, there was no reason to regard the Hong Kong judgment as not final and no reason why the judge could not proceed with the recognition and enforcement claim. The appellant, Mr Lim, also sought to make much of the judge's statement that he had not considered his late evidence in great detail. The Court noted, however, that the judge had been deluged at the eleventh hour with over 100 pages of evidence and more than 2,000 pages of exhibits, comprising allegations yet to be proven at trial in support of the appellant's stay application. The Court found nothing to suggest that the judge had failed to appreciate the appellant's case for a stay; to the contrary, the judge's recital of the background showed that he was well acquainted with the case. Accordingly, nothing before the judge amounted to "rare and compelling circumstances", and his decision sat comfortably within the generous ambit of his case management discretion. The decision is a clear signal that BVI courts will not lightly stay recognition and enforcement of a final foreign judgment to await collateral foreign proceedings, particularly where no stay has been sought in the originating jurisdiction and the foreign challenge doe...

    5 min

  4. MAY 5

    By your leave? Cayman experts (maybe) need not apply

    In the recent decision of State House Trust v Friend Media Technology Systems the Jersey Royal Court allowed an appeal against the Master's refusal to exclude an opinion from English counsel filed in support of a summary judgment application. Commissioner Sir Michael Birt (who is also a Justice of Appeal of the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal) held that there was no requirement to obtain the leave of the court to obtain evidence from a single expert witness, but that in this instance the opinion was inadmissible, and used the occasion to call for the introduction of a rule equivalent to English CPR 35.4. His analysis of the absence of a requirement for leave raises questions that Cayman Islands attorneys will recognise, because it is not clear that the position under the Grand Court Rules is materially different. Background The proceedings arise out of a shareholder dispute in which three Defendants applied for summary judgment and filed an opinion from English counsel (the Opinion) in support. The Plaintiffs sought to exclude the Opinion – the Master refused, and the Plaintiffs appealed. The judgment Commissioner Sir Michael Birt, hearing the appeal afresh, addressed three issues: 1. whether leave was required; 2. whether summary judgment must be decided on admissible evidence; and 3. whether the Opinion was admissible. He answered yes to the second and no to the first and third issues. It is the first issue – the requirement for leave – that has the most significance for the Cayman Islands. The Plaintiffs argued that Royal Court Rule 6/20(2)(d), which allows the court to "order that not more than a specified number of expert witnesses may be called", read with Practice Direction 17/09, created a leave requirement. The Commissioner rejected that submission. The rule merely empowers the court to limit the number of experts; it does not require leave. The wording is similar to, and Commissioner Birt decided has the same meaning as, the former English Supreme Court Rules Order 38, rule 4, which the English Court of Appeal in Sullivan v West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive held gives jurisdiction only to limit numbers, not to exclude expert evidence entirely. The absence of language equivalent to the English CPR 35.4(1), which expressly requires leave, confirmed the position. Commissioner Birt added that he had not reached the conclusion on leave with "any great enthusiasm". He recommended the introduction of a provision equivalent to CPR 35.4, which would impose a simple requirement to obtain the court's leave to submit expert evidence, and this would allow the court to consider admissibility and case management at an early stage. The Cayman position GCR O38, r4 is the Cayman analogue, in materially similar terms to Jersey's RCR 6/20(2)(d): it empowers the court to limit expert numbers rather than imposing a leave requirement. On a strict reading of the GCR, no express leave requirement appears to exist. O38, r36(1) restricts expert evidence unless one of four conditions is satisfied: (i) leave of the court; (ii) agreement of all parties; (iii) an application for a disclosure direction under r37 or r41; or (iv) compliance with automatic directions under O25, r8(1)(b). The third and fourth routes are procedural steps concerning the form and timing of disclosure; they are not applications for permission to call an expert. The party-agreement route is, in particular, difficult to reconcile with a blanket leave requirement. FSD Guide B5.1(a) provides that "[a]ny application for leave to call an expert witness or to serve an expert's report should be made at a case management conference or on a summons for directions". The use of "any" rather than "an" is conditional: it addresses what should happen if such an application is made, not that one must be made. The Guide also uses "should" rather than "must", and as a practice guide issued under the inherent jurisdiction of the court (not a statutory instrument or rule of court...

    9 min

  5. APR 27

    Can you repeat that for me? The Grand Court's approach to continuing the appointment of restructuring officers Background The Court's approach Reasons for approving the continuation of the ROs' appointment Key takeaways

    The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands recently delivered its judgment in In the Matter of New Ruipeng Pet Group Inc, concerning the continuation of the appointment of restructuring officers (ROs) over New Ruipeng Pet Group Inc (the Company). While the outcome was relatively straightforward on the facts, the judgment provides much-needed guidance concerning the grounds that the Court will consider when determining whether to continue the appointment of ROs given it is the first judgment to consider the issue. On 5 December 2025, ROs were appointed to develop and implement a restructuring plan for the Company and its wider corporate group to avoid a potentially insolvent liquidation. Upon appointing the ROs, the Court also directed that a case management conference be scheduled to assess progress with the restructuring plan. By the hearing on 3 March 2026, the ROs had made some progress developing a restructuring plan but had not yet obtained agreement from key stakeholders. Given liquidity pressures faced by the Company, the ROs advised the Court that they intended to pursue interim financing to stabilise the Company while continuing to pursue a longer-term restructuring of its debt. In this context, Justice Asif KC considered whether it was appropriate for the ROs' appointment to continue. As noted by Justice Asif KC, the judgment addresses interesting jurisdictional questions about the nature of the enquiry the Court must undertake when reviewing the continuation of RO appointments as there was previously no authority that directly addressed the Court's supervisory jurisdiction. The Court first considered the judgment of Kawaley J in Re Holt Fund SPC which dealt with an application to discharge ROs and records that where a consensual restructuring is no longer viable, the ROs will have grounds for their removal. Conversely, the potential for a viable restructuring must exist for the appointment of ROs to continue as detailed below. The Court accepted that the dicta of Cresswell J in Re Trident Microsystems (Far East) Ltd, decided in the context of light-touch provisional liquidations, were relevant by analogy. Cresswell J stated that when the Court is asked to adjourn a winding up petition and permit the continuation of a provisional liquidation, the Court is "in effect exercising its discretion to appoint provisional liquidators afresh" and must give due consideration to all relevant factors. Justice Asif KC determined that this approach should also be applied when considering the continuation of RO appointments. In other words, on each occasion the matter comes back before the Court, the Court must be satisfied that the statutory criteria in section 91B of the Companies Act for the appointment of ROs continue to be met. If they are not, the Court is under a duty to discharge the appointment. After establishing the applicable test, the Court approved the continuation of the ROs' appointment for the following reasons: The Company was, or was likely to become, unable to pay its debts.The Company and the ROs intended to present a compromise to creditors.The restructuring remained feasible and continued to be supported by significant stakeholders.The alternative to restructuring, being a winding up of the Company, was highly likely to result in a significantly worse outcome for stakeholders.Importantly, both the ROs and the Company itself supported the continuation of the ROs' appointment. The Court also bore in mind the warning in Re Aubit that the Court must be astute to ensure that a hopelessly insolvent company is not allowed to continue trading to the detriment of creditors and stakeholders simply by seeking the appointment of ROs. However, there was no suggestion by any party that this concern applied to the Company. Justice Asif KC's judgment is significant given the RO regime in the Cayman Islands remains relatively new. The decision serves as an important pronouncement of the obligations that ROs will be required to ...

    5 min

  6. APR 24

    Battle ready: Cayman hands parties pre-action discovery tools The Rule Comparisons with HK and UK Why this matters

    Litigants and prospective litigants are now armed with two new tools for discovery in the Cayman Islands, thanks to the newly-introduced Rule 7A of GCR Order 24. The new rule, which came into force on 30 March 2026 in the Cayman Islands, provides a structured mechanism to obtain discovery of documents before proceedings are commenced and from a non-party to existing proceedings. Rule 7(A) establishes two distinct categories of application. Under Rule 7(A)(1), a prospective litigant may apply to the Grand Court for discovery prior to proceedings being initiated. This application is made by way of originating summons, and the person against whom the order is sought is named as the defendant to the summons. Meanwhile, Rule 7(A)(2) allows a party to existing proceedings to apply for an order for discovery by a person who is not a party to the proceedings. This application is made by summons and must be served on that person personally and on every party to the proceedings. Both types of application must be supported by affidavit evidence. In the case of pre-action discovery, the supporting affidavit must state the grounds on which it is alleged that the applicant and the named person are likely to be parties to subsequent proceedings before the court. In both cases, the affidavit must specify or describe the documents sought and demonstrate, if practicable by reference to any pleading served or intended to be served, that the documents are relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise in the proceedings and that the respondent is likely to have or have had them in their possession, custody, or power. The court retains wide discretion under Rule 7(A)(5) to make the order for discovery conditional on the applicant providing security for the costs of the respondent, or on such other terms as the court thinks just. The discovery order must also require the respondent to make an affidavit stating whether any documents sought are, or have at any time been, in their possession, custody or power, and if not, when they parted with them and what has become of them. Rule 7(A)(6) contains an important limitation: no person shall be compelled by a discovery order under Rule 7(A) to produce any documents he otherwise could not be compelled to produce: in the case of pre-action discovery, if the subsequent proceedings had already begun; orin the case of non-party discovery, if he had already been served with a writ of subpoena duces tecum to produce the documents at trial. The new Rule 7(A) closely mirrors the language of Hong Kong's Order 24, Rule 7A of the Rules of the High Court, which is modelled on the former English Rules of the Supreme Court that also forms the basis of the Cayman Islands provision. There are however noteworthy differences between Rule 7(A) and the equivalent rules in England and Wales, which are set out in UK CPR 31.16 and 31.17. In the case of pre-action discovery, CPR 31.16(1)(d) additionally requires that the disclosure sought must be "desirable in order to dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings; assist the dispute to be resulted without proceedings; or save costs." For non-party discovery, CPR 31.17(3) requires that the documents sought "are likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings; and disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs." Coined as the "cards on the table" approach to litigation by the court, the new discovery measures introduced through Rule 7(A) could reduce time and costs of litigation by allowing the prospects of success of disputes to be assessed earlier. This development represents a significant step in Cayman Islands civil procedure rules and brings the Cayman Islands procedural framework into closer alignment with the position in England and Wales and Hong Kong, where pre-action and non-party disclosure rules are well established. If you are contemplating commencing proceed...

    5 min

  7. APR 24

    Back from the dead: A creditor's guide to restoring struck-off BVI companies

    The British Virgin Islands (BVI) has long occupied a pre-eminent position among the world's offshore jurisdictions for corporate formation. Hundreds of thousands of entities are registered under the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (BCA), and the territory's appeal as a domicile for holding companies, investment vehicles, and international trading structures shows no sign of diminishing. Yet with such a vast population of registered entities comes an inevitable corollary: a great many companies fall into administrative neglect, are struck off the Register of Companies (the Register), and are dissolved—sometimes without their beneficial owners, creditors, or counterparties appreciating the gravity of what has occurred. A central feature of BVI company law, therefore, is the mechanism by which a struck-off and dissolved company may be restored to the Register and brought back to legal life. Among the various grounds upon which restoration may be sought, one of the most practically significant—and frequently litigated—is restoration at the instance of a creditor. Creditor-led restorations sit at the intersection of corporate law, insolvency practice, and asset recovery, and they raise distinctive procedural, evidential, and strategic questions that reward careful analysis. This article examines the legal framework governing creditor restorations in the BVI, the procedural requirements that must be satisfied, the practical obstacles that creditors routinely encounter, and the emerging judicial solutions that have reshaped this area of practice. The Legislative Landscape: From Strike Off to Dissolution A BVI company may be struck off the Register for a number of reasons, but the most common is the prosaic failure to pay annual government fees by the due date. Other triggering events include the absence of a registered agent, the failure to file statutory returns, or the conducting of business without a required licence. The amendments to the BCA that came into force on 1 January 2023 effected a fundamental change to the consequences of a strike off. Under the previous regime, a struck-off company continued to exist in a form of corporate purgatory—suspended but not yet dead—for up to seven years before it was automatically dissolved. That grace period has now been abolished. Under the current regime, a company that is struck off the Register is simultaneously dissolved on the same date. It ceases to exist as a legal entity from that moment. The conflation of these two previously distinct events means that companies no longer enjoy a prolonged window during which restoration is a straightforward administrative matter; instead, the consequences of administrative neglect are immediate and severe. One of the most serious consequences of dissolution is that any property of the company that was not disposed of at the time of strike off and dissolution vests in the Crown as bona vacantia pursuant to section 220(1) of the BCA. Nevertheless, and critically for the creditor, the dissolution of a company does not extinguish its liabilities. Section 215(3)(b) of the BCA expressly preserves the right of any creditor to make a claim against the dissolved company and to pursue that claim through to judgment or execution. Equally, the company and each of its shareholders, directors, officers, and agents remain responsible for any liability that existed before the strike off. Two Routes to Restoration The BCA provides two mechanisms by which a struck-off and dissolved company may be restored to the Register. Section 217 provides for administrative restoration by the Registrar of Corporate Affairs (theRegistrar), while section 218 provides for restoration by order of the court. Both routes are available to creditors, although their respective requirements and the circumstances in which each is appropriate differ materially. Administrative Restoration under Section 217 The administrative route does not require a court application a...

    25 min

  8. APR 22

    Restoration and liquidation as a "single composite judicial act" - No registered agents required Appointment of a registered agent The judgment

    For a creditor to place a dissolved BVI company into insolvent liquidation, the creditor must first restore the company. Good news to all creditors – AS PNB Banka (in liquidation) v Registrar of Corporate Affairs now confirms that the appointment of a registered agent is not required as a precondition to restoration where the creditor seeks restoration solely for the purpose of placing a dissolved company immediately into insolvent liquidation. Pursuant to section 91 of the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (BCA), a company shall at all times have a registered agent, except if it is in liquidation. Section 218A(1) of the BCA provides that: quote start Subject to sub-section (2), on an application under section 218, the Court may – (a) make an order to restore the company to the Register if: (i) the Court is satisfied that a licensed person has agreed to act as registered agent of the company… As such, the practice has been to engage a registered agent for the company, for the purpose of seeking the restoration which is immediately followed by the insolvent liquidation. Unfortunately, as happened to the Claimant in AS PNB Banka (in liquidation) v Registrar of Corporate Affairs, the engagement of a registered agent is often difficult for creditors because creditors will invariably not have all the KYC documents and information that registered agents are statutorily required to obtain. No registered agents were willing to act for the Claimant , leading the Claimant to apply to the Court for restoration without the appointment of a registered agent. Upon considering the parties' arguments, Justice Mangatal accepted the Claimant's submission that a creditor's ability to exercise its rights to seek restoration cannot depend upon the "discretionary commercial risk appetite of private licensed entities". She also noted that the appointment of a registered agent would cause delay and incur unnecessary costs, especially since section 91 of the BCA clearly states that no registered agent is required for a company in liquidation, being what the dissolved company will immediately enter into upon restoration. Justice Mangatal considered what the Claimant was seeking as a "single composite judicial act": restoration of the dissolved company and the appointment of liquidators. The company therefore never exists in a state requiring a registered agent pursuant to the BCA, and hence no registered agent need be appointed for applications of this nature. Conversely, the two-stage approach creates a "circular barrier to enforcement": restoration is required to appoint liquidators, yet the appointment of a registered agent, which may itself depend upon cooperation from those whose conduct may warrant investigation, would become an indispensable threshold condition. Restoration would become impossible "precisely in those cases where corporate management has disappeared or is unwilling to cooperate – circumstances which most strongly justify investigation through insolvency proceedings". Importantly, the judge was satisfied that the Claimant's construction does not dilute the AML objectives underpinning section 218A of the BCA. In the insolvency context, regulatory and investigative oversight is provided by court-appointed liquidators operating under the supervision of the court and within the statutory framework of the Insolvency Act, rather than by a registered agent. In permitting the Claimant's composite solution, the judge interpreted the permissive language in section 218A of the BCA as providing a guide for the exercise of judicial discretion rather than an inflexible jurisdictional precondition incapable of contextual interpretation. While Justice Mangatal considered leave to appeal unnecessary, she nonetheless granted leave to the Registrar of Corporate affairs on the basis "it concerns important issues that are likely to arise again, and the point is not free from difficulty". For now, this judgment removes a very common o...

    5 min
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About

Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

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