Global Tantrum! with Steve Palley and Prof. Galen Jackson

Steve Palley, Galen Jackson

Two International Relations PhDs help you make sense of the post-postwar era. globaltantrum.substack.com

  1. 1d ago

    Saudi Arabia's Worst-Case Scenario

    The Houthis have rapidly expanded their control along Yemen’s western coast, seizing Mocha and strategically important Red Sea positions. That advance gives them more leverage around the Bab el-Mandeb just as a reported Iran-aligned militia attack put Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline under pressure. Riyadh wants help. Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asked Donald Trump to intervene against the Houthis, but the White House held off. Saudi Arabia still has money, reserves, and time, but its reliable ways to move oil around the Strait of Hormuz are narrowing. Andrew Leber joins us to explain why the Houthis are a harder problem than a conventional Iranian proxy. They receive Iranian support, but they have their own political goals, their own local base, and their own reasons to push for control of Yemen. That independence makes a broader deal with Tehran harder to translate into a durable settlement. The episode also looks beyond the immediate crisis. The new Makkah defense agreement links Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, but it does not guarantee that either partner would fight Iran. The United States remains powerful in the region, yet its military capacity and political appetite are both more limited than Gulf allies once assumed. We ask what Saudi Arabia can still do, whether a renewed bombing campaign would change anything, and whether the least bad option now runs through another uneasy accommodation with Iran and the Houthis. Further reading: Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner, “The Impacts of the Houthis’ Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi Arabia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 23, 2026. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Saudi Arabia's Worst-Case Scenario
  2. Sep 12

    Agentic AI and the Future of Cyberwarfare

    AI is getting better at finding vulnerabilities. Whether that makes the world safer is a different question. Lennart Maschmeyer’s International Security article argues that defenders stand to gain more than attackers. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson use that argument to ask whether increasingly capable AI agents are changing the balance. We put the article alongside Anthropic’s account of an AI-assisted espionage campaign and the independent investigation of the Hugging Face incident. A system that finds a bug is one thing. An agent that keeps working, coordinates with other agents, and finds ways around obstacles presents a different problem for the people defending a network. There are two risks running through the discussion: governments using powerful systems against each other, and systems behaving in ways their operators did not intend. The distinction matters for deterrence. We debate whether nuclear weapons are the right comparison, or whether the difficulty of containing biological threats tells us more about what could go wrong. The United States and China both have reasons to keep pushing. That competitive pressure could make cooperation hardest just when it becomes most useful. We close with the prospects for AI arms control, the danger of a perceived first-strike advantage, and the uncomfortable question of how much control governments and companies can actually retain. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Agentic AI and the Future of Cyberwarfare
  3. Sep 5

    Is This World War III?

    Would we recognize a world war before historians gave it a name? Bret Stephens’s recent essay gives us a reason to ask. Fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East, cooperation among authoritarian powers, and the possibility of war over Taiwan make the 1930s comparison tempting. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson work through where it helps and where it breaks down. Nuclear weapons are the biggest difference. They make another march on Berlin hard to imagine, but they also make a confrontation over something a government considers essential far more dangerous. Deterrence might prevent a great-power war. It might also leave leaders gambling inside a crisis they cannot easily control. Then there’s the question of who could actually fight. Drones are changing the battlefield, American interceptor supplies are strained, and China leads global manufacturing. The industrial advantage that helped the Allies win the last world war cannot simply be assumed this time. Neither can the ability of robots to make war less destructive. The discussion ends with the United States. Would Americans fight to preserve their position, or try to sit the next conflict out? The current national security strategy still prioritizes Taiwan, even as it turns toward the Western Hemisphere. We also get into debt, the dollar, and whether a shift in economic power could settle the contest before the military question is answered. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Is This World War III?
  4. Aug 29

    Canada Draws the Line

    The United States and Canada have spent decades building one of the deepest economic relationships in the world. Cars and their components cross the border repeatedly, supply chains are tightly integrated, and the two countries traded about $872.3 billion in goods and services in 2025. Now Donald Trump is treating that interdependence as leverage rather than an alliance. The immediate dispute is narrow but revealing. Washington imposed 50 percent tariffs on nearly $20 billion in Canadian vehicles, alcohol, and dairy after negotiations collapsed. Mark Carney recalled Canada’s team and promised dollar-for-dollar counter-tariffs on a broader group of American goods beginning September 8. The disagreement is not only about those products or French-language rules. It is about whether Canada remains free to set its own trade policy, including a new quota allowing up to 49,000 Chinese-made electric vehicles per year at the 6.1 percent most-favored-nation tariff. We talk through why Carney chose confrontation, why the political costs may land in precisely the American states Trump needs before the midterms, and why tariffs are not a bill sent to a foreign government. They are collected from importers and, as recent Federal Reserve work shows, most of the burden falls on domestic firms and consumers. The larger question is what replaces the trading system Trump is breaking. Galen discusses Lori Wallach’s Foreign Affairs article, “The Right Way to Balance Trade,” which proposes balanced trade, shared labor and environmental standards, and coordinated pressure on countries running persistent surpluses. The old order produced cheaper goods, but it also contributed to deindustrialization, concentrated corporate power, and brittle supply chains. Reform was overdue. Destruction is not the same thing as reform. Canada may be smaller, but it is not behaving like a vassal. The episode asks whether Washington is gaining anything durable by humiliating its closest partner, and whether other countries will respond by accepting American leadership or by building a trading system that leaves the United States behind. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Canada Draws the Line
  5. Aug 22

    The Houthis Close the Red Sea

    The Houthis have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, attacked vessels near the Bab el-Mandeb, and renewed strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. The immediate trigger was a July strike that disabled the runway at Sana’a airport as an Iranian flight attempted to land, but the confrontation rests on a much older Saudi-Houthi conflict. We trace the Houthis from their roots in Yemen’s Zaydi community through the fall of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the seizure of Sana’a, and the Saudi-led war that failed to dislodge them. That history matters because the movement is not merely an Iranian unit operating abroad. It is locally embedded, increasingly capable of producing and adapting weapons, and able to exploit terrain that makes outside military victory extraordinarily difficult. The strategic distinction is between controlling territory and controlling risk. The Houthis do not need to dominate the Red Sea to raise shipping costs, threaten Saudi export routes, or force much larger states to divert scarce defenses. The Bab el-Mandeb is valuable precisely because a relatively small force can impose consequences far beyond Yemen. That helps explain why Iran’s regional network has survived repeated predictions of collapse. A recent Foreign Affairs analysis argues that the Axis of Resistance has become more decentralized, locally supplied, and resilient. China also complicates Western pressure by providing an alternative market and supply base even when it is acting from narrow commercial interests rather than ideological alignment. This week, we ask what Saudi Arabia thought it could gain by reopening a front it could not win before, whether economic pressure can produce an off-ramp with Iran, and why accommodation may ultimately look more realistic than another round of bombing. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    The Houthis Close the Red Sea
  6. Jul 18

    Why Regime Change Fails

    Galen Jackson’s new War on the Rocks essay examines five regime-change campaigns, from Suez and Lebanon to Iraq, Libya, and Iran, and asks why outside powers keep making the same gamble. The central mistake is confusing tactical success with political control. Great powers can destroy targets, topple governments, and kill leaders. They cannot manufacture legitimacy, national cohesion, or a stable replacement regime. Why keep trying? Decapitation looks cheap and decisive, military superiority feels like political leverage, and occasional apparent successes in places such as Panama and Venezuela invite bad analogies. In the Middle East, nationalism, weak institutions, and rival intervention make the wager even worse. We discuss Galen’s article, the failures from Iran in 1953 to Libya in 2011, the comparisons with Germany, Japan, and Latin America, and why the current Iran war shows that the old lesson still has not been learned. Also in this episode: we talk about a quieter change in academic publishing. Peer-reviewed journals still reward rigor, but they are slow, expensive, and often inaccessible outside universities. Hybrid outlets such as War on the Rocks let scholars bring research-based arguments to policymakers and the public, though tenure incentives have not fully caught up. In an era of abundant opinion and declining trust in expertise, we argue that academics should engage more without abandoning the standards that make their expertise worth hearing. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Why Regime Change Fails
  7. Jul 11

    Politicizing The Pentagon

    On July 3rd, C.Q. Brown, the Air Force general Trump fired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in February 2025, published an essay in Foreign Affairs with Duke political scientist Peter Feaver, warning what happens when a country asks too much of its military. He never names Trump or Hegseth. He doesn't have to. In the sixteen months since Brown's dismissal, Pete Hegseth has fired or forced out more than a dozen general and flag officers, most recently Chris Donahue, the commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, in June. The American civil-military canon is built on a different kind of crisis. Truman and MacArthur, Lincoln and McClellan, Obama and McChrystal. Those were fights over strategy, with generals straining against civilian control. What's happening now is a different and potentially more serious problem. Nobody disputes that the Secretary of War has the authority to fire whomever he wants. The question is what it means when the firings are about composition rather than competence, and when the officers being removed keep turning out to share certain demographic characteristics. Hegseth has been explicit that his priority is getting wokeness out of the military. But the deeper worry has less to do with him than with three conditions stacking up at once. First, a force that fewer than one percent of Americans serve in; second, a hyperpolarized country that has lost faith in nearly every other institution; and third, a formerly ironclad norm that the military should be apolitical that the civilian side keeps bending. The military is the last American institution both parties still respect. That is precisely what makes it worth capturing. We discuss Hegseth’s 2025 Quantico spectacle and the silence that met it, why Huntington's clean separation of soldier and state was always something of a fiction, and why the thing to fear isn't a man on horseback but a citizenry that invites him in. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Politicizing The Pentagon
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Two International Relations PhDs help you make sense of the post-postwar era. globaltantrum.substack.com

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