Institute for Futures Studies

Institutet för framtidsstudier

Independent research foundation. We conduct research on issues of great importance for our future.

  1. Sep 7

    Instrumentalism Regarding the Justification of Democracy with Dick Arneson

    The instrumentalism of the title says roughly that the form of governance that would be feasibly best in any circumstances is any one whose establishment and operation would bring about consequences morally no worse than those of any other that might instead be put in place. I stipulate that the consequences to be assessed exclude any possible noninstrumental value that attaches to all members of the society having an equal vote or equal opportunity for political influence (EOPI). This allows, components of democratic institutions such as protection of freedom of speech and association do have such value that weighs on the scales. Authoritarians favoring nondemocracy might be reasonable liberals, social democrats, or conservatives. Does instrumentalism favor democracy always or almost always in our time? The stipulated exclusion is incorrect if all having equal vote or EOPI really in themselves have noninstrumental value. This exclusion applies only to political power, not power generally, but might be supported by a general claim: The distribution of power over others is normatively neutral in itself and matters only insofar as it gives rise to good or bad consequences. No person has a moral claim to power over others except on the basis, that person’s having the power will be fair in its effects on those affected. The discussion surveys relevant arguments advanced by Niko Kolodny, Daniel Viehoff, and Jeremy Waldron. Research seminar with Richard Arneson, distinguished Professor of Philosophy at University of California, San Diego. He is a holder of Valtz Family Chair in Philosophy. Arneson received his PhD in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley in 1975. His work focuses on theories of social justice, as well as normative ethics including applied ethics topics.

  2. May 28

    Exploitation & Time - Future Generations, Social Roles and Structural Injustice, with Nicola Mulkeen

    This paper presents a chapter from the draft manuscript entitled Exploitation & Time and asks whether and how future generations can be exploited given that they do not yet exist and cannot interact with us. It argues that existing accounts of exploitation struggle with this problem because they rely on interaction reciprocity counterfactual comparisons or collective generational agency all of which break down across time. In response the paper develops a structural role-based model of intergenerational exploitation that shifts the focus away from generations as homogeneous moral agents and toward enduring social roles authorised and sustained by state and institutional frameworks. On this view exploitation across non overlapping generations occurs when earlier generations design and entrench roles such as creditor, regulator, policymaker, corporate executive or caregiver in ways that systematically position future individuals in structurally vulnerable roles from which value can be extracted. Future people are therefore often exploited not by the dead but by their own contemporaries who inherit and occupy these empowered roles. The model avoids the non-identity problem by locating injustice in the structure of roles rather than in welfare comparisons allows for fine grained attribution of moral responsibility within generations and captures the uneven impacts of exploitation across different future groups. The paper illustrates the account through cases involving climate policy, resource extraction, public debt, and unpaid care work and concludes that protecting future generations requires institutional reform aimed at dismantling exploitative roles before they are inherited.Research seminar with Nicola Mulkeen. Nicola is a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at Newcastle University. Her research interests are in contemporary political philosophy. At the moment, her focus is primarily on intergenerational justice. She is currently working on two book projects one entitled Exploitation & Time which develops an account of how exploitation is reproduced over time and across age groups including between present and future generations and a second on climate debt and future debt relations. Alongside her academic work, Nicola collaborates with Save the Children on research policy and impact concerning children in future generations. Prior to joining Newcastle University, she was a Teaching Fellow in PAIS at the University of Warwick and a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Manchester. Recently, she has held visiting positions at the University of Oxford and the University of Gothenburg.

  3. Mar 30

    Philosophy of Madness and Lived Experience, with Sofia Jeppsson

    Philosophy of Madness is a rising philosophical subfield. There are diverging opinions and many unclarities surrounding its relationship to other subfields, most notably Philosophy of Psychiatry. In a chapter for a forthcoming Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Zsuzsanna Chappell and I tentatively define Philosophy of Madness thus: In a narrow sense, it is philosophy about madness, done by openly mad philosophers, which centres madpeople’s experiences. In a wider sense, one or both of the first two conditions could be absent. The author might identify as sane, neurodivergent-but-not-mad, or neither. The text might use mad insights, mad intuitions, etc., applied to a topic other than madness itself. In any case, wider or narrower, the centring of madpeople’s experiences is crucial, if Philosophy of Madness is going to be anything other than a new, edgy name for the same old Philosophy of Psychiatry. When discussing Philosophy of Madness in a narrow sense, the topic naturally connects to the lively debate about involving people with lived experience in research projects and academic writing. What role can and should they play? Psychologist Jasper Feayerts (Ghent University) and I are starting up a research group about this matter. There may be little that you necessarily need LE people for, little that is impossible to achieve for a thoroughly sane research group. Nevertheless, involving LE people could remain important if doing so makes certain pitfalls much more likely to be avoided. One necessary difference between the madperson and the sane academic studying them, which the madperson is more likely to take into account, is this: the madperson can’t declare themself a hopeless case and proceed to walk away from themself to other topics. They must continue to live with themself, and find some way to do so. This is something that I and Elliot Porter have written about in different papers on agency and moral responsibility, but the difference is relevant for many other topics as well.

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Independent research foundation. We conduct research on issues of great importance for our future.