Deal Alchemist

Dieunor Michel
  • 5.0 (1)
  • Entrepreneurship
  • Weekly

Deal Alchemist turns complex mergers and acquisitions into simple stories you can use. Each week, two hosts break down one real deal in plain English: what happened, why it happened, how it was done, and what changed after. We cover the facts, the strategy, the structure, the risks, and the early results—so operators, students, and investors can learn fast. You'll hear clear takeaways like: buy for a reason, price with discipline, and integrate to value. No jargon. No fluff. Just a deep dive that helps you think like a smart buyer. This podcast was founded by Dieunor Michel, who is also the founder of Xpertegic(Hosted by Xpertegic's AI agents). New episodes every week. Occasional sponsor: Xpertegic—an advisory firm that helps companies grow through acquisition. Follow Dieunor on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dieunormichel/ Website: https://xpertegic.com/

  1. 6d ago

    Aramark and Avendra: Did the $40 Million in Procurement Savings Show Up?

    In 2017, Aramark paid $1.35 billion for Avendra, a hotel buying group founded by Marriott, Hyatt, Fairmont, ClubCorp and IHG. Aramark promised about $40 million a year in procurement savings by year three. Every update was positive, but the final number never came. Key takeaways: How five hotel companies built Avendra, and what Marriott made on a $13 million investment Why about 95% of the price was customer relationships, goodwill and the trade name How Aramark combined the buying behind the scenes and kept the Avendra brand in front Every public update on the $40 million, and where the trail ends Five questions an investment committee will ask about procurement savings Based on public information only. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this deal, and some figures are our own calculations. Read the full case study: https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/aramark-avendra-acquisition/ Follow Dieunor Michel on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dieunormichel/

    Aramark and Avendra: Did the $40 Million in Procurement Savings Show Up?

  2. Oct 27

    Home Depot and SRS Distribution: How Private Equity Built an $18.25 Billion Exit

    In 2024, The Home Depot paid about $18.25 billion for SRS Distribution, a roofing, landscape and pool supplier that three private equity owners built through more than 100 acquisitions. Home Depot kept SRS whole, then used it to keep buying. Key takeaways: ·         How AEA Investors, Berkshire Partners and Leonard Green grew SRS from 7 branches to more than 760 ·         Why Home Depot paid about 16x EBITDA, and why about 61% of the price was goodwill ·         Why Home Depot left SRS on its own instead of folding it into its stores ·         How SRS outbid QXO for GMS, then bought HVAC distributor Mingledorff's ·         Five things a middle-market platform can build before its own sale Based on public information only. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this deal, and some figures are our own calculations. Follow Dieunor Michel on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dieunormichel/ Case study: https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/home-depot-srs-acquisition

    Home Depot and SRS Distribution: How Private Equity Built an $18.25 Billion Exit

  3. Oct 20

    Thoma Bravo and Anaplan: The $105 Million Clause That Repriced a $10.7 Billion Deal

    In March 2022, Thoma Bravo agreed to take Anaplan private for $66.00 a share in cash, about $10.7 billion. Ninety-four days later, the deal closed at $63.75 a share, about $10.4 billion. The business had not broken. The price fell because of one clause in the merger agreement: a $105 million limit on equity grants between signing and closing. Anaplan hired about 200 people in one quarter and was on course to exceed that limit by about $32 million. Thoma Bravo alleged breaches, said its lenders needed $61.00 a share, and the two sides settled at $63.75. In return, Anaplan won a $1.0 billion termination fee, up from $586 million, and waived closing conditions. In this episode of Deal Alchemist, Xpertegic Partners breaks down why Thoma Bravo bought Anaplan, how a signed price was reopened, and what every buyer and seller should track between signing and closing. We cover: Why Anaplan fit the software take-private profile: fast growth, loyal customers and heavy losses How the sale came together and what Thoma Bravo paid What interim operating covenants are, and how the $105 million grant cap worked The 94 days from signing to closing, from the May 23 call to the June 6 amendment Each price in the renegotiation: $61.00 asked, $62.00 rejected, $63.50 ceiling, $63.75 agreed What Anaplan gave up and what it got in return Anaplan under Thoma Bravo: a new CEO, add-ons and a reported IPO filing in preparation Four lessons for the period between signing and closing If you are a private equity sponsor, operating partner or corporate development leader with a deal between signing and closing, the key question from this episode is simple: does the target's hiring plan fit every cap in the interim covenants? This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including SEC filings, company and sponsor press releases and dated news reporting. The negotiation account is Anaplan's, from its proxy supplement; Thoma Bravo's allegations were disputed by Anaplan's board and were not tested in court. The 3.4% price cut, the roughly $300 million in value removed and the revenue multiples are Xpertegic calculations. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this transaction and has no non-public information about it. All analysis and interpretation are those of Xpertegic Partners. Read the full case study in the Deal Alchemist Library: https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/thoma-bravo-anaplan-acquisition

  4. Oct 13

    Why Bain Paid a Premium for a Company That Owns No Software

    HSO does not own the software it sells. Microsoft does. HSO installs it, connects it and keeps it running for more than 1,400 customers in over 30 countries. In August 2025, Bain Capital agreed to buy it from Carlyle at a reported valuation of about $1 billion. Under Carlyle, HSO grew from about 800 people to 2,800 and from €121 million to €430 million of revenue, helped by six add-ons that each brought a new market or skill. Reported bids ran at 14 to 15 times EBITDA, nearly twice the typical Microsoft Dynamics partner deal. Bain added debt too: S&P expects leverage to rise from 1.7x to 5.7x. In this episode of Deal Alchemist, our first in the ERP market, we break down what Bain bought, why it paid a premium, and what could break the case. We cover: - How the ERP market works, and why software vendors rely on partners to deliver - Carlyle's six add-ons, from U.S. scale to CRM, enterprise ERP, cloud and AI - What the reported price means against sector multiples - The buyout debt and why only about 25% of HSO's revenue recurs - Bain's four growth levers, and where HSO stands one year on - The risks of living inside one vendor's ecosystem - Three lessons for buying a vendor-dependent services firm If you are a private equity sponsor, operating partner or corporate development leader looking at a Microsoft, SAP or Salesforce partner, the key question from this episode is simple: what share of the company's new contracts started with a referral from the vendor? This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including company and sponsor announcements, Microsoft filings, S&P Global Ratings research and dated news reporting. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this transaction and has no non-public information about it. The purchase price was not disclosed; valuation figures are press reports and multiples are indicative. All analysis and interpretation are those of Xpertegic Partners. Visit the Deal Alchemist Library to explore the full case study:  https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/bain-capital-hso-acquisition Emerging private equity managers: https://xpertegic.com/charter-program/?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=audio&utm_campaign=charter-2026q4&utm_content=ep17-bain-hso Follow Dieunor Michel on LinkedIn for M&A insight. He posts new content every weekday at 9 AM ET. Like, comment and share your view; he would love to hear from you. https://www.linkedin.com/in/dieunormichel/

    Why Bain Paid a Premium for a Company That Owns No Software

  5. Oct 7

    Broadcom and VMware: The $69 Billion Integration That Worked, at a Cost

    Most acquisitions fail because the buyer moves too slowly. Broadcom did the opposite. It closed its roughly $69 billion acquisition of VMware in November 2023. Within weeks, the product line was cut to two core bundles, new perpetual licenses ended, partner programs were reset and costs started coming out. About a year later, Broadcom's management said VMware's operating margin had reached 70% and the $8.5 billion EBITDA target would be beaten early. Customers paid part of that bill. Renewal costs rose sharply, AT&T sued over support before settling, and European cloud providers have asked an EU court to annul the deal's approval. In this episode of Deal Alchemist, Xpertegic Partners breaks down how Broadcom captured value so quickly, why the strategy worked financially, and what it cost in customer trust. We cover: - Why VMware fit Broadcom's playbook after CA Technologies and Symantec - The three numbers behind the price: $61 billion, $69 billion and $86 billion - The five moves Broadcom made in its first months - How VMware went from a 28% non-GAAP margin to a reported 70% - The customer backlash, the AT&T lawsuit and the CISPE court challenge - Why lock-in is not loyalty, and how to measure customer retention after an acquisition - Which integration decisions should move fast, and which should be sequenced If you are a private equity sponsor, operating partner or corporate development leader planning your next add-on, the key question from this episode is simple: which of your integration decisions reward speed, and which ones change your customer's economics? This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including SEC filings, earnings calls, court filings and dated news reporting. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this transaction and has no non-public information about it. Margin figures after close are as reported by Broadcom management, and litigation claims described are allegations. All analysis and interpretation are those of Xpertegic Partners. Visit the Deal Alchemist Library to explore the full case study:  https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/customer-retention-after-acquisition-broadcom-vmware Emerging private equity managers: pre-applications for The Charter Program are open. Deal origination carries no monthly retainer; diligence and integration are scoped and billed per engagement. https://xpertegic.com/charter-program/?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=audio&utm_campaign=charter-2026q4&utm_content=ep16-broadcom-vmware

    Broadcom and VMware: The $69 Billion Integration That Worked, at a Cost

  6. Sep 29

    How Walgreens' Doctor Bet Ended in a $15.4 Billion Write-Down

    Walgreens wanted its pharmacies to become the front door of American healthcare. It ended with $15.4 billion of gross write-downs and a private equity breakup. In this episode of Deal Alchemist, Xpertegic Partners breaks down Walgreens' bet on VillageMD: a $5.2 billion deal for control in 2021, backing for VillageMD's $8.9 billion acquisition of Summit Health–CityMD in 2023, and the unwind that followed. The strategy made sense on paper. Walgreens sat downstream of every clinical decision, and owning primary care practices would move it upstream, to where prescriptions, referrals and care plans begin. The problem was the order of operations. Walgreens moved from minority investor to controlling owner to a transformative second acquisition before its original store clinics had shown repeatable returns. Purchase accounting showed the exposure. Across the two deals, about $13.8 billion of roughly $18.9 billion in accounting value was goodwill. Then more than 160 clinic locations were slated to close, Walgreens recorded $12.4 billion and $3.0 billion of VillageMD impairments, and in August 2025 Sycamore Partners took Walgreens private and split it into five standalone companies. We cover: - Why a pharmacy chain wanted to own the doctor relationship - How Walgreens escalated from a minority stake to control to an $8.9 billion physician roll-up - What $13.8 billion of goodwill said about the price being paid - Why the clinic model broke down, and what the closures destroyed - How Sycamore's take-private turned VillageMD into contingent sale proceeds - What private equity leaders building platforms through add-ons can learn If you are a sponsor, operating partner or corporate development leader weighing your next add-on, the most useful question in this episode is simple: what evidence has your last acquisition produced, and is it enough to justify the next one? This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including SEC filings, company press releases, investor materials and dated news reporting. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this transaction and has no non-public information about it. All analysis and interpretation are those of Xpertegic Partners. Visit the Deal Alchemist Library to explore the full case study. https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/healthcare-roll-up-walgreens-villagemd/ Emerging private equity managers: pre-applications for The Charter Program are open. https://xpertegic.com/charter-program/?utm_source=podcast&utm_medium=audio&utm_campaign=charter-2026q4&utm_content=ep15-walgreens-villagemd

  7. Sep 19

    Forward Air Hit Its Synergy Target and Still Lost 86% of Its Value

    Forward Air delivered the cost synergies it promised. Its shareholders still lost roughly 86% of their value. In this episode of Deal Alchemist, Xpertegic Partners breaks down Forward Air's $3.246 billion acquisition of Omni Logistics and what it reveals about the difference between capturing synergies and creating value. The market rendered its verdict in a week. Forward Air announced the deal on August 10, 2023 at 17.9 times Omni's trailing adjusted EBITDA, defending the price by crediting all $125 million of unearned future synergies against it to show 10.6 times. The stock fell from $110 to the low $60s before anything had been integrated. Then the structure got worse. Forward, a neutral wholesale network whose customers were freight forwarders, bought a direct retail freight forwarder and became a competitor to its own customer base. Omni's adjusted EBITDA of $181 million sat alongside a 2023 GAAP operating loss of $70.6 million and negative operating cash flow of $97.4 million. The purchase was funded with $1.85 billion of new debt, including senior secured notes at a 9.5% coupon. And management issued non-voting convertible preferred stock, which avoided the shareholder vote that a 35%-plus common issuance would have triggered. When Forward tried to walk, Omni sued in Delaware Chancery Court for specific performance. The parties renegotiated the night before trial. The deal closed three days later with the debt stack intact. Here is the paradox at the center of the episode. Management hit the cost synergy target and beat it, delivering over $100 million in annualized savings against a $75 million goal. Combined adjusted EBITDA still came in at $311 million in 2024 and $293 million in 2025, against an underwritten $594 million. Forward recorded a $1.028 billion goodwill impairment, integration and transaction costs ran to $81.5 million against a $36 million estimate, and the shares bottomed at $11.21 in May 2024. We cover: ·         What happened, and why the freight density thesis made real strategic sense ·         How the synergy target was credited to the seller, and what that costs the buyer ·         Why channel conflict is a financial dis-synergy, not a communications problem ·         The Delaware fight, the walk-away attempt, and what deal certainty is worth ·         What changed after close: leadership turnover, the goodwill write-down, the strategic review, the asset sales ·         The asymmetric outcome between the private equity sellers and the public shareholders ·         Three underwriting lessons for private equity leaders running add-on acquisitions The lasting lesson is that strong industrial logic cannot rescue a deal structure that leaves no room for error. If you are a sponsor, operating partner or corporate development leader sizing an add-on today, the question to ask before you sign is this: if your synergy case landed in full and the baseline fell 15%, would this still be a deal you want? This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including SEC filings, company press releases, investor materials, court filings as reported, and dated news reporting. Xpertegic Partners did not advise on this transaction and has no non-public information about it. All analysis and interpretation are those of Xpertegic Partners. Visit the Deal Alchemist Library to explore the full case study https://xpertegic.com/case_studies/synergy-target-value-destruction-forward-air-omni Emerging private equity managers: pre-applications for The Charter Program are open. https://xpertegic.com/charter-program/

    Forward Air Hit Its Synergy Target and Still Lost 86% of Its Value

  8. Sep 12

    Apollo's Emerald–Questex Deal: Which Operating Model Wins?

    In this episode of Deal Alchemist, Xpertegic Partners breaks down Apollo Global Management's simultaneous acquisition of Emerald Holding and Questex, and what it reveals about choosing an operating model when two companies are bought at the same time. Apollo did not buy a platform and bolt an add-on onto it. In May 2026 it agreed to acquire both companies through separate transactions, closed them together in July, and launched Forge as the combined corporate parent 36 days later. Emerald was the larger asset at an enterprise value of roughly $1.5 billion. Questex sold for an undisclosed sum. The CEO seat went to Questex. We cover: What happened, and why the deal structure was unusual Why the smaller company's operating model shaped the combined business What Emerald's 1.1% organic growth suggests about that choice Where the real integration risk sits, and why it is commercial rather than corporate What private equity leaders can learn about settling the operating model before Day 1 For private equity partners, operating partners, portfolio company CEOs and CFOs, and corporate development leaders. This episode is based entirely on publicly available information, including Apollo announcements, Emerald Holding's SEC filings and MidOcean Partners releases. Xpertegic was not involved in the transaction and has no inside knowledge of it. Lessons and interpretations represent Xpertegic's own analysis. Learn more about Xpertegic Partners: https://xpertegic.com/

    Apollo's Emerald–Questex Deal: Which Operating Model Wins?
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About

Deal Alchemist turns complex mergers and acquisitions into simple stories you can use. Each week, two hosts break down one real deal in plain English: what happened, why it happened, how it was done, and what changed after. We cover the facts, the strategy, the structure, the risks, and the early results—so operators, students, and investors can learn fast. You'll hear clear takeaways like: buy for a reason, price with discipline, and integrate to value. No jargon. No fluff. Just a deep dive that helps you think like a smart buyer. This podcast was founded by Dieunor Michel, who is also the founder of Xpertegic(Hosted by Xpertegic's AI agents). New episodes every week. Occasional sponsor: Xpertegic—an advisory firm that helps companies grow through acquisition. Follow Dieunor on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dieunormichel/ Website: https://xpertegic.com/

Information

  • Creator
    Dieunor Michel
  • Years Active
    2025 - 2026
  • Episodes
    20
  • Rating
    Clean
  • Copyright
    © 2025
  • Show Website
    Deal Alchemist