Medical Safety Podcast

Dr. Adam Shehata & Dr. Amir Hamid

Dr. Adam Shehata (former professional pilot turned physician) and Dr. Amir Hamid (anesthetist and emergency medicine physician) discuss how to improve our healthcare system by integrating human factors into systems safety, including medical incident investigation and proactive safety measures.

Episodes

  1. 33m ago

    Ep 5 - Simulation in Medicine with Dr. Jesse Guscott

    Show notes How to make simulation effectiveAlthough equipment is expensive and may seem like a barrier to establishing a simulation program, the emphasis of a simulation focused on CRM principles should be communication and having skilled debriefers who can facilitate skills developmentUsing simulation to have someone experience a crisis and reflecting on why things didn’t go well, with the help of a skilled debriefer/facilitator is key in identifying systems we can put in place to mitigate these issues when the occur in reality“Simulation without goals is just playing”When designing a good simulation experience, it is important to keep the learning goals at the forefront; this may mean that the simulation is not the highest fidelity, but sometimes they don’t need to beWhen designing a simulation for learning, you have to make a safe environment and make it clear to the participants there is no evaluation component; learning is the single priorityIt is hard to have the dual role of coach and assessor and may make the environment challenging for learningWhy simulation is importantAs we have seen with the episodes focused on the airline industry, rarely are the catastrophic events due to a technical proficiency, catastrophic mechanical failure or knowledge issue; they are more often caused by failures in communication or decision makingWhen we analyze issues in medicine we can see similar trendsThe evidence shows that simulation improves confidence of participants. It is very hard to measure competence; there is anecdotal support from bystanders, simulation facilitators, allied health that it makes people better, but there are no RCTs to demonstrate this as it is inherently a difficult thing to measureFor physicians who are at risk of leaving high acuity fields (IE: rural physicians working emergency medicine or hospitalist medicine), increasing their confidence may help with retention, which is pivotal in some of these communities. This may also encourage junior physicians to practice at full scope, especially in underserved communities where it is traditionally hard to hire physiciansSimulation directly works on team dynamics; improving team dynamics may improve the work environment and improve retentionDifferent kinds of simulationThere is a specific kind of simulation focused on logistics and ergonomicsAlthough some Simulation focused on CRM principles may bring this out, there is a dedicated form of simulation meant to test thisThis can be implemented locally without a lot of equipment or cost by a hospital “code committee” to solely look at implementation in a site or systemRapid cycle deliberate practice is a tool you can use to work on specific technical skills in a short time frame without needing a full theatre simulation experienceCan we use simulation as an evaluation tool for competency?In medicine, we are rarely given the opportunities to practice what we learn in simulation, or real life scenarios reflective of what we see in simulation, so there are not many opportunities to practice these events prior to being evaluated on themIf we build a training system that the skillsets of CRM are taught well, and people have the opportunity to practice those skills, in training and in independent practice, with a very low barrier to entry, we may have the foundations for using simulation as a competency assessment tool, like they have in aviationThere are some residency programs that make simulation a mandatory part of their program and use it as a formal assessment tool during their licensing Some key CRM themesFixation vs focus:Fixation is when you devote your attention and mental resources to the wrong thing in a crisis situationFocus when you devote your attention and mental resources to the correct thing in a crisisIf you are maintaining your situational awareness (an accurate mental model of what is occurring and what the priorities are) then you are not fixated.The issue is that our attention narrows when performing complex tasks and we lose our situational awareness (e.g. when intubating, we momentarily lose sight of the bigger picture).Either delegate such tasks (IV access, intubation, chest tube insertion, etc) or have someone else run the rest of the resuscitation and then inform you of what occurred while you were performing that task.If our system is built around the infallibility of a single person, or a few key people, our system will inevitably fail because no one can be perfect 100% of the timeCrisis resource management is fundamentally moving from a theoretical solution to a problem in crisis, to a practical solution to this problemWays to improve your performance in crisisThink about the resources you have available that can help you; sometimes this is a colleague, or a more experienced member of the team. You may also lean on support outside of your immediate institutionUse a whiteboard or other visible task board to help maintain situational awareness in crisis and manage prioritiesDevelop and practice communication, situational awareness, leadership and communication, even if it is in a low fidelity sessions like table rounds, similar to journal clubs you may already have Safety intervention worth mentioning Cognitive aids, such as the Stanford Emergency Manual (there is also a phone app)Buy a whiteboard and put it in the resuscitation area Resources mentioned in the episode Jesse Guscott’s SCORE course Random recommendations Fackham HallThe Shadow of the Sun by Ryszard KapuścińskiTake more photos of the people you love Please consider donating at medicalsafetypodcast.com

    1h 7m
  2. 6d ago

    Ep 4 - Escalating Language of Concern with Dr. Katie Lin

    What is Crisis Resource Management (CRM)?It is a set of skills that helps improve team performance through communication, leadership, and interpersonal skills.It can help build a common language and shortcuts so that even people that have not worked together before can work well together. Used well, it can improve efficiency.While it is more formalized in other industries (aviation, military), it exists in medicine and has existed for some time, but is more practitioner-dependent.Order of priorities when leading a resuscitationEstablish communication, your role, and the role of others (“I’m Dr. [X], I will be leading this resuscitation. Who else do I have in the room with me?”)Try to build some rapport, if time permitsGather information, starting with threats to lifePrioritize treatment, diagnosis, and transportationMaintain situational awareness by continually seeking new information and revaluate the diagnoses, need for more information and revaluate the decisions that have been made and need to be madePrioritize the patient’s safety but also remember your colleagues’ including transportation teamHow to manage your stress response to perform optimallyTake a breath“Slow is smooth, smooth is fast”Use a systematic approachMaintain control of the room (ask for quiet when necessary, ask those not immediately involved in the resus to step out, )Summarize the situation and seek the input of othersThe foot of the bed is often a good place for the resuscitation leader. They can see the monitor and all of the work being done, as well as the patient and their colleagues. It also helps reduce the urge to physically do tasks that might in the leader’s skillset, but that would take them away from leading the team.Practicing CRMVisualize  / walkthrough / tabletop common life threatening scenarios (head injury, multisystem trauma, obstetrical hemorrhage, etc). Do the routinely to maintain proficiency and re-evaluate as real-life scenarios occur.Situational awareness“The continuous extraction of environmental information. The integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture and the use of that picture in directing future perception and anticipating future events.”In essence: noticing what is going on, processing it, and understanding its significance (what will likely happen in the future).Avoiding fixation-induced loss of situational awarenessContinually scan the environment for cues (vital signs, patient picture, staff, look at the floor for blood, fluids etc)Recognize that any complex or lengthy procedure will lead to task saturation and a loss of situational awareness (e.g. intubation, chest tube / central line insertion, vascular access etc)Avoid doing those tasks or delegate the running of the resuscitation to someone else if you are the only provider that can complete that taskContinually seek input, challenge/prove assumptions, and summarize the situation to allow others’ to improve your situational awarenessUse closed-loop communication: expect it, and ask it of othersBuy time: summarize, have standard phrases (e.g. “IV, O2, monitors, I want a full set of vitals including glucose and temp”)If you’ve lost SA, say so. “I’ve lost situational awareness due to the intubation. Who knows what’s going with X, Y, and Z?”Summarizing for the team (shared mental model)Where we’ve beenWhere we are currentlyWhere we need to bePriorities for making that happenTelling the team the working diagnosis (e.g. respiratory failure, PE, etc) can help them access their own mental schema for that and they can watch for your blind spots and anticipate things that may be otherwise forgotten. It also makes explicit the idea that what is going on is a life threatening emergency and reduces confusion.Say “critical finding” to alert the team to issuesWhen to summarize:At handover (establishes roles and sets priorities)Before and after a critical procedure (e.g. intubation, chest tube insertion)A critical change in the patient’s conditionTips for leading resuscitations with fewer resourcesFewer hands increases the importance of prioritizing and not overloading your colleagues‘Chunking’: Make a list of medications and batch them in three’s (these 3 first, then these 3, etc.)Use whiteboards / paper to hold the big picture, as things may not move as fastManage your workload: Give the list and say “please let me know as these medications are given” (then you can focus elsewhere)Optimizing Crisis Resource Management to Improve Patient Safety and Team Performance: A handbook for all acute care health professionals. Edited by Peter G. Brindley and Pierre CardinalDr. Lin’s tips on building rapport and interpersonal dynamics: (51 mins)Start from a place of mutual respect and professionalismWho is in the room / on the call? What is their role?Disagreements happen, but we must be able to disagree in a professional mannerStay grounded and help others to stay grounded. (e.g. Pause, take a breath, remind everyone “this is a recorded call”)Validate feelings of frustration: “This is a challenging situation”Hit the reset button: “I think we’ve gotten off to the wrong start. Can we pause and reset? Can we start again?”Acknowledge the person’s expertise and find common ground: “I’m asking for your help right now because I’m really worried about this patient. I would really appreciate your help because I don’t know what to do next. I think we can agree on X, Y, and Z.”Announce: “Critical finding [x]”Assertiveness modelsThe ‘I notice’ modelI notice [x finding] “I notice that the oxygen saturation is starting to drop. Do you want to do anything about that?”I wonder [why the provider is doing something]. “I wonder if we should apply a non-rebreather mask at 15L/min?”I worry [express specific concern] “I’m worried about the hypoxia.”This is an emergency (I’m taking over)The PACE modelProbe: “Why is [x] being done?”Alert: [X finding]Challenge: “We need to do [Y[“Emergency: “This is an emergency” (I’m taking over)Other resources Optimizing Crisis Resource Management to Improve Patient Safety and Team Performance: A handbook for all acute care health professionals. Edited by Peter G. Brindley and Pierre CardinalEMsimCases.com Random recommendations Katie: The Anthropocene Review by John Green for “a moment of thought-provoking calm”Adam: Exit the GameAmir: 99% Invisible podcast

    1h 42m
  3. Jun 3

    Ep 3 - CRM with Captain Mike Schuster

    Aspects of CRMMaking a welcoming environment, so that others feel they can speak upCRM is not about being perfect. It’s about identifying and mitigating the times of increased risk of making mistakes and identifying why a particular mistake was made.The perceived tension between performance and “soft skills” (CRM)Some people view these non-technical skills as costing time and money and not contributing to patient safety or as detracting from efficiency. The reality is that good CRM skills make teams more efficient. Additionally, we are no longer in a stage in medicine where we can say that leadership or non-technical skills don’t matter. We have plenty of evidence that failures of leadership have directly resulted in bad outcomes (morbidity and mortality).Additionally, CRM skills improve the working environment for all, which leads to the preservation of healthcare workers and mitigates burnout.The origins of CRMCRM developed in aviation because of a data-driven approach where successive accident investigations determined that the majority of aviation accidents were caused by human error (team performance) rather than mechanical failure, as had happened in the past.In medicine, we can safely assume the same trend, but as a profession that purports to follow the evidence, we should investigate and build a dataset on which to make these kinds of decisions. This could look like the aviation-style medicine incident investigation systems that exist in the UK and Norway and could use systems like audio and video recording of operating rooms, ICUs, and resuscitation bays. It would also likely require a change to legislation to protect that data from being used in litigation, as currently exists for aviation black boxes.The evolution of CRM in aviationfrom elective courses to mandatory SOPs to the point where even if a pilot completed the tasks technically correct, but exhibited poor CRM skills, they would fail their flight test.“Anticipation builds vigilance; vigilance aids recognition; recognition leads to recovery.”CRM & Error ManagementIn aviation, CRM treats errors as inevitable events to be managed, not moral failures.Error prevention: reduces the chance of making an error in the first place. Usually through human factors engineering and improving working conditions. The focus is here, which involves planning, discipline, and preparation. (e.g. aircraft design, fatigue risk management, rules around how much additional fuel must be onboard, use of checklists to avoid memory errors).Error trapping: catching the error before there is any effect. This is often about vigilance and teamwork. (e.g. crosschecking, callouts, assertiveness to encourage speaking up)Error mitigation: to limit the severity of outcomes. This is about resilience and recovery. (e.g. unstable approach leads to missed approach. Short on fuel > divert to alternate.)Error chains: a single error rarely, if ever, causes a major accident. It is untrapped, unmitigated error chains that result in accidents.In clinical medicine we see this often: errors are inevitable (ask any clinician), harm is not.Medical examples of error management:Error prevention: pre-printed order sets, standardize drug trays, avoiding look-alike drugs.Error trapping: Surgical “time-out” checklists before skin incision, closed-loop communication during resuscitation.Error mitigation: iatrogenic opioid overdose that was recognized and naloxone is given.Acceptable delays to ensure appropriate margins of safetyThere are occasions in medicine and aviation where one group of professionals needs to push back on the production pressure to perform tasks appropriately in order to ensure safety. Both professions must understand that certain delays are required, however, the degree to which this happens is not consistent around the world. Mike gave the example of arriving early to train a new pilot and occasionally needing to close the cockpit door after saying the flight crew needed ten minutes. Amir and Adam gave anesthesia examples where they had to delay the OR in order to prevent or trap errors (additional airway equipment, provide preoperative medications). CRM is alive and well in medicine, but we must meeting people where they are atIn this episode, there were many examples where medical teams are performing good CRM, particularly Threat and Error Management through the use of briefings. Mike mentioned the public health example of meeting people where they are. We should acknowledge that a lot of CRM strategies and skills exist in modern medicine, but much of it is not formalized.CRM as an inclusive tool to improve team performanceCRM by its nature of improving team performance has its foundation on clear communication from all team members. While it used to be called Cockpit Resource Management, it changed to become Crew Resource Management to emphasize the inclusion of flight attendants, ground personnel, air traffic controllers, etc. Many errors have been prevented or trapped by ancillary personnel speaking up.Escalation of Language of ConcernIn order to encourage everyone to speak up, formalized escalation of language models exist. In aviation this is the PACE model:Probing: “I’ve never seen [x] done before. Can you tell me why you’re doing it this way?”Alert: “The oxygen saturation is 90%.”Challenge: “The oxygen saturation is critically low, we need to move to BiPAP.”Emergency: “This is an emergency. Dr. [x] will perform a cricothyroidotomy.”In an emergency, you can start ‘higher up’ on the PACE ladder, as appropriate, but starting lower is less aggressive and can prevent conflict.Instrumentation to avoid fixation-induced loss of situational awareness Cockpit instrumentation is being redesign to account for the fact that hearing is one of the first things to go in a high cognitive load. Rather than just the aural announcements of “terrain, terrain”, the words are being displayed in red letter on the displays in front of the pilots.Cognitive load in training: much of what we can process related to cognitive load. As novice become experts, they can deal with greater and greater cognitive loads before becoming task saturated. This is well-recognized in pilot training.Line Oriented Safety Audits (LOSA) Trained observers in the cockpit observe and report on real-world operations. In this way, an accurate analysis of company-specific operations can occur. These observe comment on both salutary solutions and errors which can then be fed-back to trainers and risk management.Theoretically, there is no reason such a system could not exist in medicine. In such a system, trained people would observe physicians and provide information solely for the purpose of improving safety, rather than any punitive action.Use people’s first names as opposed to their title, when it is critical to get their attention.Who can do what tomorrow Policy / government / regulator: Canada could have an aviation-style investigation board for medical incidents, as the UK and Norway currently have. This would be a non-punitive investigation conducted by a knowledgeable independent board to determine the causes and contributing factors of specific medical incidents. The report would be anonymized and publicly available and would include recommendations for practitioners, training institutions, medical device manufacturers, and regulators.Hospitals / heads of department: We saw in aviation how CRM was a data-driven response in the 1970’s and onward to team performance becoming the predominant reason for aviation accidents. We don’t have the same quality of evidence in medicine, however, we need not wait for the government or regulator to mandate the technology that would lead to this data becoming available. The technology exists for audio and video recording (“black boxes”) of the OR, ICU, and resuscitation bays of emergency departments. Individual hospitals or departments could run a pilot program (ensuring that such information is prevented from being used in litigation by invoking current quality of care investigation legislation). Much like Tommy Douglas’s creation of publicly-funded healthcare in Saskatchewan, which was later expended to cover all of Canada, any hospital that begins such an endeavour may be credited with pushing the entire profession in this direction.Residency program directors: while modules on human factors are a good start, we can look to the evolution of CRM in aviation and see that formalized CRM training with high-fidelity simulation is the gold standard. For those that are already doing this, Mike’s comments about the field of aviation ideally incorporating CRM into earlier stages of pilot training can be instructive for the medical field.Other Resources: United Flight 232 - Captain Al Haynes (YouTube) Next episode: Escalating Language of Concern with Dr. Katie Lin

    1h 49m
  4. May 20

    Ep 2 - Aviation Parallels to the Elaine Bromiley Case

    In this episode Amir and Adam discuss three aviation accidents that parallel the Elaine Bromiley case. Human factors in medicine: As Captain Bromiley put it, this was not an individual failure. It was a system failure. It was a failure of human performance. In aviation, 75% of airline accidents are due to human factors rather than mechanical failure. Eastern Airlines Flight 401 (1972)Fixation-induced loss of situational awareness.Troubleshooting a landing gear light indicator problem in the cockpit (one of the landing gear lights would not indicate the gear was down and locked).The autopilot was engaged and the aircraft was flying over unlit terrain (the Florida everglades) at night.One of the flight crew inadvertently bumped the control column which disengaged the autopilot.Despite an altitude alert chime being audible on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), none of the crew responded to it.The aircraft slowly descended and impacted terrain.The landing gear was in fact down and locked and the failure of a single light bulb resulted in many fatalities.United Airlines Flight 173 (1978)Fixation-induced loss of situational awareness leading to fuel exhaustion and crashing in PortlandTroubleshooting a landing gear light indication problem, similar to Eastern Airlines Flight 401Again the light failed to indicate, but the gear was later found to be in a safe positionThis time the Captain continued to circle to try to troubleshoot the problem and optimize the conditions for the emergency landing with a potentially unsafe landing gear.Despite the First Officer (FO) and Flight Engineer (FE) attempting to tell the Captain that the aircraft was dangerously low on fuel, the Captain continued to take time to work the landing gear problem.When the engines began to fail, the Captain was surprised that it was because of a lack of fuel.Air Florida Flight 90 (1982)Poor crew coordination and lack of assertiveness / failure of leadership leading to a crash on departure in icing conditions.The failure to engage the engine anti ice later led to a false indication in the cockpit instruments showing that the engines were developing sufficient thrust for takeoff when they weren’t.The Captain ignored the First Officer’s repeated concerns about the amount of ice on the wings and whether the engines were developing sufficient power on takeoff.Just a Routine Operation (YouTube - 6 min)Just a Routine Operation (YouTube - 14 min)Martin Bromiley: A patient’s perspective (March 16, 2018 - YouTube - 23 min)Eastern Airline Flight 401  Mayday Fatal Distraction - S05E09 (YouTube)United Airlines Flight 173 - Mayday Focused on Failure  S12E08 (YouTube)Air Florida Flight 90 - Mayday Disaster on the Potomac - S13E04 (YouTube)ACCRAC Ep 325: The WISH Inventory and Well-Being in Anesthesiology with Drs. Higgins and Vinson (anesthesiologists take an outsized sense of responsibility for outcomes - at 5 min

    1h 4m
  5. May 7

    Ep 1 - The Elaine Bromiley Case

    Welcome to the Medical Safety Podcast where we aim to improve the safety of our healthcare system through the integration of human factors into medical incident investigation and proactive safety measures. This podcast is hosted by two Canadian anesthetists, Drs. Adam Shehata and Amir Hamid. In the inaugural episode, we take a look at the 2005 death of Elaine Bromiley and the lessons learned from it. Elaine Bromiley Healthy 37 year old woman for elective sinus surgery in the UK in 2005Can’t Intubate Can’t OxygenateExperienced surgical teamElaine’s oxygenation fell and the team could not get oxygen to her through intubation, face mask ventilation, or by using a laryngeal mask airway (LMA)Several minutes went by, meanwhile a nurse brought in a cricothyroidotomy kit for surgical Front of Neck Access (FONA). The nurse announced the kit’s presence to the operating theatre but received no response.After 40 minutes (20 without sufficient oxygenation), an airway was established with an LMA.A nurse had arranged for an ICU bed and returned to the OR to tell the team, but received a look from the physicians as if to say, “What’s wrong? You’re overreacting.”Elaine was taken to the recovery room and the surgical team continued on with the rest of the patients on the list.The nurses in the recovery room were concerned that Elaine may have been having seizures and called the anesthetist, but he was busy with a patient in the OR and could not attend.Eventually, Elaine was transferred with an LMA (as opposed to a secured airway) to another hospital for ICU care.Having confirmed an unrecoverable anoxic brain injury due to the lack of oxygen on induction of anesthesia, Elaine was removed from life-sustaining therapy and allowed to die naturally.Martin BromileyElaine’s husband, and father to their two young children, was also a UK airline pilotHe told the hospital that he would “wait for the report” which is what would have happened if Elaine had died on or near an airplane in the UK. The accident investigation board, an independent investigatory body, would have determined the causes and contributing factors and then published an anonymized report with recommendations on how to improve safety.Mr. Bromiley was told that no such process existed in the UKMartin commissioned just such a report “so others can learn”.Importantly, Martin did not seek punishment. He specifically stated that the physicians and nurses that were in that room were intelligent, hard working, caring professionals. He did not blame them. He blamed the system. The system can be changed but first we need to know what happened and why.The reportA failure of leadership and communication which led to a fixation-induced loss of situational awarenessThe physicians became fixated on intubating to the exclusion of other possibilities of providing oxygen (such as FONA).They became so fixated that they did not respond to the nurses who later reported knowing what needed to happen but being unable to communicate it effectively.YouTube videos Martin Bromiley produced to improve patient safety:Just a Routine Operation (6 min)Just a Routine Operation (14 min)Martin Bromiley: A patient’s perspective (March 16, 2018 - 23 min)Please consider donating at medicalsafetypodcast.com

    33 min

About

Dr. Adam Shehata (former professional pilot turned physician) and Dr. Amir Hamid (anesthetist and emergency medicine physician) discuss how to improve our healthcare system by integrating human factors into systems safety, including medical incident investigation and proactive safety measures.

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