Washington Appellate Review

Washington Appellate Review

Washington Appellate Review examines significant decisions from the Washington Supreme Court and Washington Court of Appeals. Each episode uses the IRAC method—Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion—to break down recent appellate opinions, explain the court's reasoning, and discuss the practical impact on Washington law. Companion episodes feature full readings of published opinions, allowing listeners to hear the court's words directly. Designed for attorneys, judges, law students, journalists, public officials, and anyone interested in Washington law. This podcast is for educational and infor

  1. Sep 19

    Initiative 2066 Struck Down: The Single-Subject Rule & Climate Solutions v. State

    Washington voters approved Initiative 2066. So how did the Washington Supreme Court end up striking down the entire initiative? In Climate Solutions v. State of Washington, the court held that I-2066 violated Washington Constitution article II, section 19—the single-subject rule. The majority concluded that the initiative combined four constitutionally distinct subjects without the required rational unity and that the offending provisions could not be severed. In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we break down the court’s distinction between horizontal and vertical rational unity, why natural-gas access, air-quality regulation, building and energy codes, and the repeal of a severability clause became central to the analysis, and why the majority rejected arguments that I-2066 could survive as an omnibus measure. We also examine Justice Mungia’s dissent, which would have severed specific provisions and preserved most of the voter-approved initiative, and the deeper disagreement between the opinions over judicial review, Washington’s initiative power, and how demanding the constitutional rational-unity requirement should be. We’ll also explain an important limitation on the decision: the Supreme Court majority did not decide the separate subject-in-title or article II, section 37 silent-amendment challenges. 🎙️ Follow Washington Appellate Review on Spotify for new Washington appellate decisions, and subscribe on YouTube for video case breakdowns, Shorts, and Washington Supreme Court coverage. Washington Appellate Review is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Always read the full opinion and conduct independent legal research.

    Initiative 2066 Struck Down: The Single-Subject Rule & Climate Solutions v. State

  2. Sep 10

    Liberty on the Line: Expert Vouching, Joel’s Law & the Limits of Judicial Authority

    Two Washington Court of Appeals decisions filed on the same day ask a similar question from very different directions: what legal safeguards must be respected when government action affects a person’s liberty? In State v. Rowan, Division III held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support two convictions for first-degree rape of a child—but reversed the convictions because the State’s examining doctor gave an improper opinion that effectively vouched for the child witness’s credibility. The court explains the distinction between sufficiency of the evidence and reversible trial error, why credibility determinations belong to the jury, and when an unpreserved claim of expert vouching may be reviewed as manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3).  Then, in In re Detention of R.P., Division II examines Joel’s Law, RCW 71.05.201. The court reversed R.P.’s initial 120-hour involuntary-detention order because the petition was filed by his sister-in-law, who was not among the family members authorized by statute to initiate the proceeding. The court also explains why the collateral bar rule did not prevent R.P. from directly appealing the order. The later 14-day commitment, however, was separately affirmed.  Together, the cases illustrate a recurring appellate principle: serious factual concerns do not eliminate statutory and constitutional protections. Courts still must ask whether the right person invoked the process, whether the right decision-maker resolved the issue, and whether the evidence was presented in a legally permissible way. This episode covers expert testimony, witness credibility, constitutional harmless-error review, Joel’s Law, civil commitment, strict statutory construction, the collateral bar rule, and the procedural safeguards that matter when liberty is at stake. Washington Appellate Review is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the full opinions, reviewing the governing statutes and rules, checking subsequent history, and conducting independent legal research.

    Liberty on the Line: Expert Vouching, Joel’s Law & the Limits of Judicial Authority

  3. Sep 8

    Where Criminal Liability Crosses the Line: State v. Kueck & State v. Le

    Where does criminal conduct cross the statutory line? In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we examine two published Washington Court of Appeals decisions that confront that question in dramatically different circumstances. In State v. Kueck, Division III interprets what it means to kill an animal while “manifesting an extreme indifference to life” under RCW 16.52.205(1)(c). The court explains why intentional and unjustified killing alone cannot satisfy the phrase—and what additional circumstances can establish the aggravated culpability required for first-degree animal cruelty. Then, in State v. Le, Division I examines the boundary between preparation and criminal attempt. After communicating with an undercover officer posing as a mother offering her minor daughters for sex, Le negotiated a price, arranged a meeting, traveled to the location, and arrived carrying condoms and the agreed-upon cash. The court considers whether those actions constituted a “substantial step” under RCW 9A.28.020 and explains how Washington's modern attempt standard differs from the older “overt act” formulation. Together, Kueck and Le illustrate an important principle of statutory interpretation: every element matters. Courts cannot simply collapse “extreme indifference” into intentional killing or “substantial step” into criminal intent. The State must prove that the defendant crossed the particular threshold the legislature established. We break down the facts, holdings, statutory language, appellate reasoning, and practical implications of both decisions—and what they teach Washington practitioners about sufficiency of the evidence, statutory construction, and the boundaries of criminal liability. Washington Appellate Review is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Read the full published opinions and conduct independent legal research before relying on any case discussed on the show.

    Where Criminal Liability Crosses the Line: State v. Kueck & State v. Le

  4. Sep 3

    When Two Theories Can Coexist: Earl v. Campbell, Negligent Retention & Vicarious Liability

    Can an employer face both vicarious liability for an employee’s conduct and a separate negligent-retention claim for keeping that employee on the job? In Earl v. Campbell, No. 104495-0, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously says yes. The case arises from the 2016 fatal shooting of Jacqueline Salyers during an encounter with Tacoma police officers. Her estate sought to pursue both a vicarious-liability theory against the City of Tacoma and a direct negligent-retention claim based on allegations concerning Officer Aaron Joseph. The City argued that because the officers were acting within the scope of employment, negligent retention could not proceed separately. The Supreme Court rejected that rule. In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we break down why the Court treated the two theories as analytically distinct: Vicarious liability concerns an employer’s responsibility for an employee’s tort. Negligent retention concerns the employer’s own alleged negligence in retaining an employee it knew, or reasonably should have known, was unfit. We also examine CR 8’s alternative-pleading rules, the Court’s treatment of Beltran-Serrano, Niece, and Anderson, its rejection of prior Court of Appeals authority tying negligent retention to scope of employment, and the practical implications for comparative fault, evidentiary issues, and double recovery. Just as important, this is a pleading-stage decision. The Supreme Court did not find that Tacoma was negligent, that Officer Joseph was unfit, that the underlying allegations were true or admissible, or that negligent retention caused Salyers’s death. The Court held only that the claim may proceed.  Washington Appellate Review is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the full opinion, reviewing the governing law, checking subsequent history, and conducting independent legal research.

    When Two Theories Can Coexist: Earl v. Campbell, Negligent Retention & Vicarious Liability

  5. Sep 3

    Washington at Work: DoorDash, WISHA, and the Reach of L&I

    Two Washington Court of Appeals decisions filed the same day examine worker protection from two very different angles: who counts as a covered worker under the Industrial Insurance Act, and what safety rules require once a worker is exposed to a regulated hazard. In DoorDash, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries, Division II reviews roughly $14.5 million in industrial-insurance premiums and penalties and asks whether Dashers qualify as covered workers under RCW 51.08.180. The court explains why the independent-contractor label does not end the analysis, why using an ordinary personal vehicle does not necessarily make equipment rather than labor the essence of the contract, and why an earlier Board decision involving phone-book delivery did not collaterally estop L&I. Then, in Northwest Cascade, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries, the court considers a traffic flagger standing 7 feet 8 inches from a 17-foot-deep trench. The opinion explains WISHA’s definition of an excavation’s “affected area,” why a traffic flagger was not considered directly involved in the excavation process, and why Northwest Cascade failed to establish that fall protection was infeasible. Together, the cases show how Washington worker-protection law focuses on function over labels, regulatory text over intuition, and the actual administrative record over broad assumptions. Key topics include: industrial-insurance coverage, the personal-labor test, independent contractors, collateral estoppel, WISHA, excavation and trench safety, fall-protection requirements, regulatory exceptions, infeasibility defenses, and judicial review of L&I decisions. Washington Appellate Review is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the actual opinions, reviewing the governing statutes and regulations, and conducting independent legal research.

    Washington at Work: DoorDash, WISHA, and the Reach of L&I

  6. Sep 1

    Charged, Not Convicted: Bailey-Cobb, Drug-Monitoring Patches & Washington Privacy Rights

    Can a court require someone who has been charged with DUI—but not convicted—to continuously wear a drug-monitoring patch as a condition of pretrial release? In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we examine Division One's published decision in Simone A. Bailey-Cobb v. Snohomish County District Court, consolidated with Andrew P. Toombs v. Snohomish County District Court, and an important question under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs were each awaiting trial when the district court required them to wear transdermal drug-monitoring patches. The devices attach directly to the skin, continuously collect sweat, and can detect evidence of drug use over an extended period. The State argued that the monitoring furthered the compelling governmental interest of protecting the public from impaired driving and was authorized by Washington's pretrial-release statutes and court rules. Division One disagreed. The court emphasized a critical constitutional distinction: a person awaiting trial is not a probationer. Bailey-Cobb and Toombs had been charged with crimes, but they had not been convicted. Division One held that they therefore did not possess the diminished privacy interests applicable to convicted offenders. The government's legitimate interest in public safety did not, by itself, supply the "authority of law" required by article I, section 7.  The episode examines RCW 10.21.045 and CrRLJ 3.2, the State's balancing-test and special-needs arguments, and why statutory authority to impose pretrial conditions does not automatically make a particular search constitutional. We also look closely at the technology itself. The patches continuously collect biological information, can identify drugs beyond those prohibited by the release order, require information to be shared with a third-party monitoring company, and do not actually test for alcohol. Those characteristics became important to Division One's conclusion that the monitoring was not sufficiently tailored to justify the intrusion.  The significance of Bailey-Cobb reaches beyond DUI cases and drug patches. As courts gain access to increasingly sophisticated forms of continuous biometric, chemical, and electronic monitoring, this decision raises a much larger question: Does the fact that technology makes continuous government monitoring possible make that monitoring constitutionally permissible? Division One's answer reinforces an important principle of Washington constitutional law: technological capability and constitutional authority are not the same thing. For criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and lawyers litigating pretrial-release conditions, the decision is also an important reminder that being accused of a crime does not itself eliminate the privacy protections guaranteed by article I, section 7. Cases: Simone A. Bailey-Cobb v. Snohomish County District Court and Andrew P. Toombs v. Snohomish County District Court, Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, Nos. 87585-0-I and 87738-1-I. Washington Appellate Review breaks down significant decisions from Washington's appellate courts, explaining what the courts held, why they reached those decisions, and what those rulings mean for Washington law. This podcast is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the complete published opinion and conducting independent legal research. Why This Case Matters

    Charged, Not Convicted: Bailey-Cobb, Drug-Monitoring Patches & Washington Privacy Rights

  7. Aug 27

    Who Decides a Recall? The Port of Benton Case and Washington’s Recall Process

    When Washington voters seek to recall an elected official, who decides whether the accusations are actually true—the courts or the voters? In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we examine the Washington Supreme Court's unanimous decision in In re Recall of William O'Neil, Scott Keller, and Lori Stevens, No. 105253-7, filed August 20, 2026, involving all three commissioners of the Port of Benton. The recall effort originally contained 13 charges. Most were dismissed. The Supreme Court considered three surviving charges: two involving alleged retaliation against Port employees and a third involving Commissioner Scott Keller's financial disclosure filings and his ownership interest in The Axe LLC. But the most important point about the decision is what the Supreme Court did not decide. The Court did not determine that any commissioner committed the alleged misconduct. Instead, it considered whether the allegations were sufficiently supported and legally adequate to be placed before the voters. Factual vs. Legal SufficiencyWe break down the two separate thresholds a recall charge must satisfy under Washington law and explain why a recall proceeding is not a trial on the truth of the allegations. The Constitutional Right of RecallWe examine article I, sections 33 and 34 of the Washington Constitution, RCW 29A.56.110, and the unusual division of responsibility Washington law creates between judges and voters. Charges 12 and 13: Alleged RetaliationThe episode examines allegations surrounding the suspension of Executive Director Diahann Howard and termination of Finance Director Alicia Myers, including why timing, motive, and the limits on discretionary governmental authority became important to the Court's analysis. Charge 7: Financial DisclosureWe analyze the charge against Commissioner Keller involving financial disclosure forms and The Axe LLC, including the distinction between an innocent reporting mistake and an allegation of intentional concealment. Discretion Isn't UnlimitedPublic officials routinely make discretionary personnel decisions. We discuss why those decisions generally cannot support recall—and when an alleged manifest abuse of discretion may cross the line into legally sufficient recall charges. This case provides a practical roadmap for understanding Washington recall law. The Supreme Court's role is essentially that of a constitutional gatekeeper. Courts determine whether allegations satisfy the legal requirements necessary to proceed. They do not decide whether those allegations are ultimately true. That responsibility belongs to the voters. For elected officials, government and municipal attorneys, employment lawyers, election-law practitioners, and attorneys drafting or challenging recall petitions, the opinion provides important guidance about the boundary between political disagreement, discretionary decision-making, and legally sufficient allegations of official misconduct. Courts act as gatekeepers. Voters decide the facts and ultimately determine whether an elected official should remain in office. Case discussed: In re Recall of William O'Neil, Scott Keller & Lori Stevens, Washington Supreme Court No. 105253-7 (Aug. 20, 2026). Washington Appellate Review breaks down significant decisions from the Washington Supreme Court and Washington Court of Appeals—explaining what the courts held, why they reached those decisions, and what Washington lawyers need to know. This podcast is for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the actual opinion and conducting independent legal research. In this episode:Why This Opinion MattersFinal Takeaway

    Who Decides a Recall? The Port of Benton Case and Washington’s Recall Process

  8. Aug 27

    State v. Sliger: Chewing Tobacco, Breath Tests & a Divided Washington Supreme Court

    Can tiny strands of chewing tobacco left between a driver's teeth make a breath-alcohol test inadmissible? In this episode of Washington Appellate Review, we examine State v. Sliger, a closely divided Washington Supreme Court decision addressing the statutory requirements for admitting breath-test evidence in a vehicular homicide prosecution. The case arose after law enforcement arrested Sliger following a fatal collision. Before administering a Draeger breath test, the officer conducted the required observation period. Sliger removed a lump of chewing tobacco from his mouth, but the officer later observed small strands of tobacco remaining between his teeth. That seemingly minor fact produced a major disagreement at the Washington Supreme Court. The Breath-Test FoundationWe examine former RCW 46.61.506(4)(a)(iii), WAC 448-16-040, and Washington's statutory requirements for establishing a prima facie foundation for admission of breath-test results. What Does "Any Foreign Substance" Mean?The lead opinion concluded that the statute should be interpreted in light of the reliability of the breath test. The Court considered expert testimony that the residual tobacco strands could not have affected the test results. Admissibility vs. WeightWe explore an important distinction for trial lawyers: when does a problem with a breath test prevent the evidence from reaching the jury, and when does it instead become an issue affecting the weight the jury should give that evidence? A Fractured CourtThe decision requires particular attention because the justices did not speak with one voice. Four justices joined Justice Madsen's lead opinion. Justice González concurred in the result but disagreed with important aspects of the lead opinion's reasoning, supplying the fifth vote to affirm. The Dissent's Bright-Line RuleJustice Mungia, joined by three other justices, argued that the statute means what it says: once an officer observes a foreign substance in the subject's mouth, the statutory and Washington State Patrol procedures must be followed. Under that interpretation, the remaining tobacco should have prevented admission of the breath-test results. Sliger is about much more than chewing tobacco. The disagreement exposes a fundamental question about evidentiary rules: Should courts demand strict compliance with a legislatively created procedural safeguard, or should admissibility ultimately turn on whether the deviation could actually affect the scientific reliability of the evidence? For DUI and vehicular-homicide practitioners, the decision also provides an important lesson about preserving challenges to breath-test evidence, developing the scientific record, and distinguishing questions of admissibility from arguments about evidentiary weight. Today's Final Takeaway: When reading a fractured appellate decision, don't stop at the result. Count the votes and determine precisely which reasoning actually commanded a majority. Case: State v. Sliger, Washington Supreme Court No. 103563-2 (Aug. 13, 2026). Washington Appellate Review breaks down significant decisions from the Washington Supreme Court and Washington Court of Appeals, explaining what the courts held, why they ruled the way they did, and what those decisions mean for Washington law. This podcast is provided for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and is not a substitute for reading the actual opinion or conducting independent legal research. In this episode:Why This Case Matters

    State v. Sliger: Chewing Tobacco, Breath Tests & a Divided Washington Supreme Court
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About

Washington Appellate Review examines significant decisions from the Washington Supreme Court and Washington Court of Appeals. Each episode uses the IRAC method—Issue, Rule, Analysis, and Conclusion—to break down recent appellate opinions, explain the court's reasoning, and discuss the practical impact on Washington law. Companion episodes feature full readings of published opinions, allowing listeners to hear the court's words directly. Designed for attorneys, judges, law students, journalists, public officials, and anyone interested in Washington law. This podcast is for educational and infor

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  • Creator
    Washington Appellate Review
  • Years Active
    2026
  • Episodes
    18
  • Rating
    Clean
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    © Washington Appellate Review
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    Washington Appellate Review