I do this work as an independent journalist. You, my readers, are the ones funding it through paid subscriptions. Help me dig into stories that matter to you by becoming a paid subscriber or, if Substack isn’t your thing, by making a one-time or recurring contribution on my website. Thank you. [Part one is here.] This is part two of my investigation into the response to the historic July 1 flooding that saw something like 6,600 homes in Ottawa flooded, some with overland water, some with sewer backups, some with both. There have been conflicting reports about whether the city asked for the right kinds of help from the province, and whether the province actually agreed. Last week I laid out what we knew. This week the picture is a little less blurry on some fronts, and a lot sharper on where the real problems are. Let’s dig in. July 1: the phone calls As Mayor Sutcliffe indicated — and I had no reason to doubt it — on the evening of July 1, somewhere between 7 and 8 p.m., there were already phone conversations between the premier and the mayor. Updates on the situation, the beginnings of “this is big, we’re going to need help,” agreements to keep each other posted. I’m paraphrasing; I don’t know exactly what was said but assume it was the typical kind of things that get said in a situation like that. Also, keep in mind that on the evening of July 1, the scale of the problem probably wasn’t as clear as it became in the days that followed. That’s normal. This is not where the response went wrong. July 3–4: the meetings, and the email that contradicts the minister The city’s written timeline, which it sent to me directly, fills in the next steps: on July 3, city officials agreed to a meeting with the provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. On July 4, the city’s Ryan Perrault emailed the province formally requesting that DRAO — the Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians program — be activated. Remember that date, because it matters. Emergency Preparedness Minister Jill Dunlop has suggested the city didn’t ask for help until eight days after the flood. The city’s paper trail says July 4. Three days, not eight. Now, a wrinkle: DRAO doesn’t fall under Dunlop’s ministry at all. It’s a Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing program; Rob Flack’s ministry, not Dunlop’s. So either Dunlop was talking about something else entirely, or she’s confused about which programs her own government runs. I find the second option hard to believe, which leaves the first, and the question of what, exactly, she was talking about. July 7: “we need more data” On July 7, city and province officials met to share information on the scale and impact of the floods. The province asked for more information: 311 call mapping (where were people calling from), technical assessments, and more details about affected properties and flood-related damage. I understand every word in that sentence and almost none of what it entails. What does a “technical assessment” mean, in practice, a week after 6,600 homes flood? I’m still trying to find out. But note the shape of this: the city asked on July 4; on July 7 the province said “show us more.” What happened in those three days, and what exactly was missing, is one of the open questions. Below is the timeline provided to me by the City of Ottawa: On July 1, 2026, an ongoing dialogue with the Province was initiated. The City maintained nearly daily contact with the Province during the emergency response, and provincial representatives participated in meetings at the City’s Emergency Coordination Centre. On July 3, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (MMAH), under Minister Flack, and Ryan Perrault, General Manager of Emergency and Protective Services, agreed to a meeting to assess the damage from the severe weather event. On July 4, Ryan Perrault requested the Province consider activating the DRAO program and other available provincial funding and supports. [That’s the email reproduced above — BP.] During a meeting on July 7 between the City and Province to share information on the scale and impacts of the extreme weather event, the Province requested additional information, including 3-1-1 call mapping, technical assessments, affected properties, and details of flood-related damage. On July 9, the Province advised the City that it could not deploy volunteers equipped with PPE into environments presenting biohazard risks, including mold or wastewater contamination. The three programs, and which ones are actually controversial There are essentially three provincial programs in play. Let me park the uncontroversial one first. 1. The Municipal Disaster Recovery Assistance program. This reimburses the city’s own costs — capital costs to repair public infrastructure, operating costs above and beyond normal budgets that can be traced to the disaster. Not insurance-covered costs, not things that would have been replaced anyway. It’s a process: the city has to demonstrate the expenses qualify, and as far as I know, city staff are still assembling that file. Complicated, slow, but no real controversy, so I’m setting this one aside for now. 2. DRAO — Disaster Recovery Assistance for Ontarians. This is the one for individuals and small business owners: homeowners, tenants, small businesses recovering costs from overland flooding that insurance won’t cover. Up to $250,000 per applicant for eligible expenses including emergency costs and cleanup. Two critical limits. First, DRAO covers overland flooding only, not sewer backup. If the river came over its banks into your basement, that’s DRAO. If your sewer backed up, that’s not. Second, it only covers the zones the province activates. And this is where it gets bad. When the province activated DRAO in mid-July, it covered exactly two areas: the zones around Graham Creek and Stillwater Creek. On the map, that’s the shape covering Bayshore, Qualicum, Leslie Park, and Trend-Arlington. It does not cover Crystal Beach, Centrepointe, Parkwood Hills, Bells Corners, Woodpark, Quensway Terrace, Kanata North, or parts of Nepean, all of which had flooded homes. So we have a big problem with two possible explanations, and I don’t know which one is true: either the city’s request wasn’t comprehensive enough, or the city asked for all the affected neighbourhoods and the province said no. That’s exactly the correspondence I want to see — who asked for what, when. What I do know is that since mid-July, city staff have been pushing the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing to expand the zone. The city is trying to fix this. But how we got here, I don’t know yet. The second DRAO problem is crueller. Say your home got both: sewer backup and overland flooding. You’re now expected to separate the damage, to stand in your basement in coveralls and big boots, in two and a half feet of sludge, and apportion which destruction came from the sewer and which from the river. I’ve dealt with one minor sewer backup in my life and I don’t wish it on anyone. I have no idea what these people are supposed to do, or what help exists to assist them in parsing it, with their insurance, with DRAO, with the city’s compassionate grants (the $1,000 compensation for sewer backups only). 3. Ontario Corps volunteers. This one I didn’t realize was an issue until I started digging last week. Ontario Corps is the province’s volunteer program — ordinary people sign up, get managed by recognized partners, and do low-qualification disaster work: cleanup, distributing supplies, boots-on-the-ground help. Here’s what the city told me: on July 9, the province advised it could not deploy volunteers with personal protective equipment into environments “presenting biohazard risks including mold or wastewater contamination.” Mold and wastewater contamination are, of course, exactly what you expect after a flood. I don’t know whether the city requested Ontario Corps volunteers, or when, or for what. I don’t know why the province said no — especially since the same volunteers have been deployed to floods in other cities where you’d expect exactly the same biohazards. The province hasn’t confirmed any of this from its side. Big unknown, actively chasing. The people falling through the cracks The city’s compassionate grant program, $1,000 for sewer backup expenses, with the usual once-every-five-years limit lifted for July 1 victims, and a bigger budget voted to match the scale, seems to be working decently. If your home “only” had a sewer backup, the city has you. So here’s the ledger as I see it: - Overland flooding, inside the DRAO zone, no sewer backup: covered. Apply by November 16. - Sewer backup only, anywhere: covered by the city’s compassionate grant. - Overland flooding outside the DRAO zone (Crystal Beach and the rest): nobody helping you right now. - Both sewer backup and overland flooding, anywhere: standing in the soup, literally and bureaucratically, with no clear path. That last pair of categories is the scandal-in-waiting. A disaster recovery program for Ontarians should cover Ontarians facing an unprecedented disaster. Right now it doesn’t. What I’m still chasing My requests for information are outstanding with both levels of government — the correspondence, the ask-and-answer trail, the decision memos. I want to know: 1. The July 4–7 gap: what “more data” did the province need, and why did the DRAO request take from July 4 to mid-July to activate? 2. The zone decision: did the city ask for the full flooded area, or did the province narrow it? Who decided, and on what basis? 3. Ontario Corps: did the city request volunteers, when, and why exactly did the province refuse? 4. The province’s side of all of this, which, so far and except for Jill Dunlop’s cryptic and at least partly contradicted declaration that the city wait