Pope of FEMA Podcast

David Richardson

David Richardson is a Marine veteran, painter, and former senior political appointee at FEMA. Author of Texas Flood: 4 July 2025 and War Story. They called him the Pope of FEMA. www.popeoffema.com

Episodes

  1. Oct 9

    FEMA’s Billion-Dollar Gravy Train

    David Webb talks with David Richardson, former acting FEMA administrator and author of Texas Flood 4 July 2025, about the federal programs that keep people building where the water comes back. Richardson explains why FEMA’s flood maps are actuarial tools, not safety tools, and how the National Flood Insurance Program — in place since 1969 — turned a limited backstop into a nationwide subsidy for coastal and floodplain development. Taxpayers far from the water pay so premiums stay cheap. Developers make billions. When the flood hits, the loss is someone else’s problem. He ties that system to places like North Topsail Beach and to the July 4, 2025 Guadalupe River flood that killed more than 130 people, including children at Camp Mystic. He also gives his account of the response: coordinating with Texas emergency manager Nim Kidd, Coast Guard rescues, why he stayed in Washington, and his decision to override DHS’s $100,000 contract rule so aid could move. They close on what would actually change the incentives — private insurance, a blended model for people already there versus new construction — and why FEMA, Congress, and the FEMA Review Council keep pointing at each other instead of fixing it. Transcript David Webb:But let’s get a little bit more into the weeds. FEMA’s outdated flood maps and FEMA’s billion-dollar gravy train. David Richardson, former acting FEMA director, joining me now. And David, as we hear, the late storm of late storms about to come on shore in the Gulf seems an appropriate title and topic. But thanks for joining me this morning. David Richardson:David, thanks for having me. I love your show, by the way. You’re doing great things for the American people. David Webb:I appreciate that. With guys like you to help me and what you’ve sent me, that’s how we help people. And I really mean that. Let’s dive in because your recent op-ed on FEMA’s billion-dollar gravy train exposes so much right down to the outdated flood map. So help us understand this more. David Richardson:Yes, so I’ll talk about the flood maps first because the flood maps are tied to something called the National Flood Insurance Program. And the National Flood Insurance Program is designed to essentially rebuild structures in the floodplain after they get flattened or really from flood damage by hurricanes or any other type of flood. And essentially, it’s a subsidized program. And by subsidized, I mean everybody across the country is paying so that people living in the coastline and in floodplains can have cheap insurance. It’s changed a little bit over the years. But in general, it’s the same program we’ve had since I think it’s 1969. And it was never intended to do that. So it was never intended for communities to pop up in places like North Topsail Beach, North Carolina. Where I lived for a while, which is essentially a sandbar. And every time there’s a hurricane, the structures get knocked down and the National Flood Insurance Program assists in rebuilding them. All of these coastal communities, for the most part, have popped up since the National Flood Insurance Program. And here’s the deal on the flood maps. The flood maps support the National Flood Insurance Program. And the way they do that is there are lines drawn in these Floodplains, and they dictate how high the premiums are. And FEMA will tell you that the flood maps are for actuary purposes only, and they are not predictive. They have nothing to do with safety and precaution. So that’s kind of how the flood maps work. They’re not ideal. There’s better ways to do it. But FEMA chooses to stick with the old way of doing it, and that’s partially—I know you’re familiar with the Camp Mystic and the children that died there and the children that died along the Guadalupe River. Between the National Flood Insurance Program and the flood maps, we’re allowed to build in the floodplain because of that. But the key point is they have nothing to do with safety or precaution. It’s all actuary information for insurance. So that’s kind of the story on the flood maps. David Webb:Yeah, so the name doesn’t really fit the reality, I guess. And by the way, David’s book is Texas Flood, Power, Money, Politics, History, Bureaucracy, and Tragedy. Picture the Texas flag on there. I’m reminded, David, and it was a tragedy in a sense. I remember when the Trinity flooded in the 90s in Houston. There was a house floating down the river on fire because it was on the banks of the Trinity. You know, just one of those areas that you didn’t think till you saw the news roll of it. But these areas that are being built up, infills and, you know, all of this. I mean, people are making, I don’t know, I call it bad decisions. Am I wrong? David Richardson:No, you’re not. Number one, people are making billions of dollars by building in the floodplains and selling condominiums and what have you. It’s not a prudent decision, and it wouldn’t be allowable—not allowable, it wouldn’t be feasible unless you had the National Flood Insurance Program that started in 1969. And by the way, one of the architects of the program, there were some senators at the time that said this is going to backfire. Instead of simply insuring the structures that were currently in the floodplain, it’s going to cause a building boom in the floodplain because when the floods do come, the damage is going to be, ding, ding, somebody else’s problem. And that’s exactly what happened. David Webb:Oh, God. You know, the minute you say Senate, I just—something I read—the hairs on the back of my head raise up. My guest, David Richardson, former acting FEMA administrator. Let’s dive into more of the topic areas that we want to hit on here. And again, the book Texas Flood, it’s available wherever books are sold. It’s an inside account of disaster response, the bureaucracy, the leadership decisions made. As you put it, under extraordinary pressure. And it is pressure. When these events, these tragic events fold out, communities are uprooted in so many ways. Not just people, not just property, even animals. Agriculture, wild animals, so much is in this mix. And yes, we often think of that scene, the reporter, the storm, the wind blowing. We see that. But what’s really going on here is the destruction of so many lives in so many ways. Let’s go into that a little bit more. What happens? And, you know, Texas, Texas flood. Use Texas as that example. David Richardson:Yeah. So in Texas Flood for July 2025, I describe that. The conditions that caused that flash flood. And there have been five or six of those in American history. And what happened there was a storm settled over the hills of Texas. And it got stuck there for reasons that we don’t need to get into, but it’s not climate change. The primary cause was the storm that stalled over the hills of Texas. And then what happened was there was potentially some failed warning systems. And there was also some talk about the weather predictions never being perfect. Well, I’m not telling anybody anything new, but warning systems are never perfect. And the weather forecast is never perfect. And in that case, there’s a bill right now on the president’s desk. I think it’s HR 7022. Called the Camp Mystic Alert Bill. It addresses one of the proximate causes, but it does not get into the deep cause, as we just discussed, of actually building in the floodplain, which is allowed by two FEMA programs, the National Flood Insurance Program, as well as the flood mapping. So what happened there was I got a call about 12 in the afternoon on 4 July while I was driving to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania with my two boys. And it essentially outlined that what had happened about somewhere between 1 and 4 in the morning, that flood had—correction, thunderstorm stalled out and was causing mass flooding. I think it was like three months’ worth of rain fell within like 72 hours. So it was massive flooding. And they were in the floodplain. And partially the reason they were there, as I’ve… Get full access to Pope of FEMA at www.popeoffema.com/subscribe

    FEMA’s Billion-Dollar Gravy Train
  2. Sep 22

    The Bureaucracies of Natural Disasters

    The interview aired today on Cheryl K. Chumley’s Bold & Blunt podcast from The Washington Times. Transcript: Cheryl ChumleyMy guest today, David Richardson, is the former acting head of FEMA. He oversaw FEMA as the acting head during the 2025 Texas floods, and he has lots of insider information on why it takes so long to get FEMA money into the hands of those who need it most. David Richardson, I want to thank you so much for being on Bold and Blunt. So great to have you here. David RichardsonWell, Cheryl, thank you for having me. I greatly appreciate this. CherylThis is going to be a very interesting discussion because we’re going to talk about the bureaucracies of government responding to natural disasters, but you have an insider look because you were the former acting head of FEMA during the 2025 Texas floods. Start a little bit from the very beginning. What happened when this flooding first started occurring? DavidThe flooding, which is not necessarily anything unusual, was caused by a stalled-out storm in the hills of Texas. We got first word of this about noon on the 4th of July. By that time the flood had already essentially occurred, and most of the deaths had already happened, because it started sometime about four in the morning. What we immediately began to do is coordinate search and rescue. I was in contact with Nim Kidd, who was the emergency manager in Texas. I was also in contact with Sean Plankey, who was overseeing the Coast Guard at the time. Most of the immediate support came from within Texas — FEMA teams in Texas, Texas National Guard, Nim Kidd’s teams, and the Coast Guard. Last time I talked to them I think it was like 235 survivors were rescued, some out of trees. After the first day it was a search-and-rescue operation. Unfortunately for the people in Texas, primarily a search operation for the bodies. We reacted immediately on the 4th of July, then began to coordinate moving search and rescue into Texas over the next few days. I was in very close contact with Nim Kidd. There were bureaucratic obstacles we had to overcome, and we overcame them successfully to make sure the people of Texas got what they wanted when they asked for it. CherylWhat are some of those bureaucratic obstacles? Response then versus New Orleans during that hurricane was very different. What are some of the obstacles people might not be aware of? DavidWhen it comes to search and rescue, you don’t want to turn it into a pile-on sport. There’s only so many teams you can fit into the scheme of maneuver as they work down the river. Nim Kidd and the State of Texas had a plan. He wanted the teams phased in according to his plan. He needed search-and-rescue teams from Colorado and Missouri on the move by Monday morning so they could get to Texas. DavidSo I gave them a chance to relieve us of the burden of the hundred-K memo, and when they never did, I simply released the search and rescue, and we paid them as we normally would have without the hundred-K memo in place. CherylWhat is the memo? What did it state? DavidThe hundred-K memo stated that the secretary herself would sign off on all contracts over a hundred thousand dollars. We knew search and rescue and whatever else Texas needed was going to be in the millions. The operations officer at FEMA had walked me through a day in the life of a disaster — a day in the life of a hurricane — the decision points, then the graph of the money spent. An average level-three hurricane, we were spending five hundred million dollars a day. I’d done the math on a piece of paper. Nobody could sign all those contracts. CherylHow long does it take to unfreeze funding? California wildfires have fallen off the radar, but a lot of angry people didn’t get the promised funds. Is it fraud? Is it bureaucracy? What takes place behind the scenes? DavidFEMA is DHS’s pot of gold. It’s the fattest calf in DHS to be sold, slaughtered, and consumed. There’s a lot of money to be had, and with that lot of money goes a lot of bureaucracy and paperwork. There are hordes of FEMA personnel in the field, living on per diem in hotels. They report to a center each day, go downrange, and count every fence, driveway, shed, house — anything that’s had damage — and they evaluate it. Those evaluations are open to appeals, and they’re often slow. It’s not uncommon that if FEMA evaluates something at a certain cost, the state or county has hired a former FEMA employee to appeal that. Appeals go on sometimes for years. A lot of bureaucratic wrangling inside FEMA and the states, arguing and grabbing for that money. CherylIs there a better way to administer emergency funds so the people most impacted get the money quicker? DavidThere is. First: Texas got what they wanted when they needed it, and I detail that in my book, Texas Flood 2025. Instead of evaluating every fence and driveway as a bottom-up count that can be appealed — lawyers, paperwork, years — we could use block grants. [Thinner stretch: block grants and aerial photos; then his uncle’s 2012 Arkansas individual-assistance case.] In 2012 his house was built inside the levee in Arkansas. He got some FEMA money. I paid for a third of the house to be rebuilt. He was flabbergasted at the amount of work it took just to get individual assistance. The corollary to the block grants — I had a plan to do this before I left FEMA — they could make an app. I spoke to Steve Davis, Elon Musk’s right-hand man, about a streamlined way for Americans to apply for individual assistance. There are ways to reduce it. There’s no push to get it done. CherylYour book is Texas Flood. I imagine you wrote it in part from the frustration, and to give people a better way forward. DavidThe book is titled Texas Flood 2025, because if you search Amazon there are other Texas floods. David Richardson, Texas Flood 2025. Shameless plug. I wrote it for the children of Camp Mystic and the other people who died, because I had to get to the bottom of the why. The immediate cause was a stalled storm in the hills of Texas. It had nothing to do with climate change, regardless of what institutes, PhDs, and everybody else will tell you. The storm moved in and couldn’t get over the hills. [Thinner stretch: immediate / proximate / deep cause.] Building in the floodplain is the deep cause of the tragedy in Texas. It’s fostered partly by NFIP and flood maps. FEMA will tell you flood maps are for actuarial purposes and they are not predictive. That’s true. They inform the National Flood Insurance Program. What they won’t tell you is they have nothing to do with safety and precaution. Immediate cause, proximate cause, deep cause. There is no one cause, and that one cause is definitely not climate change. CherylFrom local zoning coverage: environmentalists expanding flood maps and floodplains as a way of halting development. Response? DavidThe flood maps are a weapon. You can use them to keep people from building in the floodplain. You can also appeal to FEMA to alter them so you can put more buildings in the floodplain, or cut the already-low premiums. That’s what happened at Camp Mystic. Between 2011 and 2020, Camp Mystic and associated personnel appealed to FEMA to change the lines so they could either build more or reduce premiums on the ones already in the floodplain. FEMA works with locals. Could be the environmentalist. Could be people who want to expand into the floodplain. The levels just get deeper. CherylIf you yourself were hit by a flood, would you wait on FEMA, or take other measures? DavidI would move on. FEMA doesn’t respond immediately. That’s mostly the state. FEMA is the wagon train that comes in and burrows in at the state and local level so they can collect per diem and sift through the bureaucratic mess. I would take matters into my own hands and stay free from anything FEMA had to offer. I witnessed that with my uncle. I footed a third of the bill. We built nothing more than a shack on a small hill that passed state and federal housing inspection. CherylTha… Get full access to Pope of FEMA at www.popeoffema.com/subscribe

    The Bureaucracies of Natural Disasters
  3. Sep 20

    FEMA and Its Connection to the Deep State

    Grant Stinchfield: Now, let’s talk about FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This agency is, I don’t know, it’s ripe with fraud. Why? Because the bureaucracy is so big. The contracts can be huge, and quite frankly, people take advantage of it. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Mark Wayne Mullin talked about the need for overhaul over there at FEMA. Listen to him this week. Mark Wayne Mullin (clip): It’s a constant battle of figuring out how we can cut the red tape and allow local authorities to have the ability to go out, respond, and get refunded faster. I think that is the number one conversation we have with the president. Every time we talk with him is about FEMA and how to reorganize it to get it back to what it was intended for. Grant: Look, it’s basically a lose-lose proposition. They can never get there fast enough, right? They can never be fully prepared. There’s always something that’s going to come up, but you do the best that you can. But when it gets like this, when it becomes so political, you know the agency has a problem. Who could forget this? FEMA employee (Fox News clip): And someone feels uncomfortable, we can’t go to that home. If you have loose dogs and someone on the team is comfortable with dogs and another person is not, we can’t go to that home because of safety precautions. Fox News host: So you fear the Trump houses—the people on FEMA were fearing the Trump houses like they were fearing people with vicious dogs in their backyard. FEMA employee: Exactly. Grant: Oh my gosh. Well. I want to bring in now to discuss all of this former acting Federal Emergency Management Agency administrator and author of Texas Flood. He was in charge of the response to that Texas flood back on July 4th a year ago. David Richardson is with us. David, welcome to the program. David Richardson: Thank you, Grant. Glad to be here. Grant: All right, it’s a pleasure to have you on. Let me ask you—you get into FEMA. What was it like, as far as, you know, we say the deep state, but the ruling class of bureaucrats, career politicians, whatever you want to call it—what was that like in that agency? David: Well, I gotta say this first. President Trump keeps his promises, and I know he wants to either radically transform FEMA or shut it down, and I know he will keep that promise. So what it was like for me when I arrived at FEMA: the first day, I walked around the seven floors at FEMA, kinda chatting with the folks, and what I heard was, “We are not ready to do our mission, and our morale is low.” And I’ve heard that in every federal organization I’ve worked with, but particularly at FEMA. So there was much fear. I arrived when it was in tatters, and I immediately began to orient them on their mission and being prepared for what they needed to do by writing a hurricane strategy and doing a few other things to tighten them up, to get them ready. And I’m glad I did because, as we’ll shortly discuss, there was a tragedy in Texas that we addressed. But between the time I arrived, which was mid-May, and that tragedy, I had a lot of work to do making sure that we had a strategy in place. Grant: Look, David, I don’t need to be some big-government bureaucrat to know that FEMA, you’re supposed to respond to hurricanes and wildfires and all these things. A hurricane strategy? FEMA didn’t have a strategy in place? I mean, who’s responsible ultimately for those failures? David: You know, my predecessor—I’m not sure what they were doing. They were very… they were busy doing stuff, but the first thing I asked when I got there was, “Do we have a strategy?” Now, a caveat to that: we did write the strategy. I sent it up to DHS headquarters, and they never approved the strategy. But here’s the deal. The plan is one thing, but the planning is everything. So we did the planning. We had it in place, even though it was never signed off by DHS headquarters. I still had the plan. So no, they weren’t ready for hurricane season when I got there, and I quickly brought them up to speed from them claiming that they weren’t ready and that they had low morale and they couldn’t do their job. Grant: Yeah, yeah. Amazing. Which brings us to the Texas floods. Now, I broadcast from Dallas. Sadly, there were many families that I know that lost children in those floods. This was the summer camps that were just devastated. So many kids losing their lives there. You had to organize response there. What was that like? Take me through it, and was FEMA ready? David: So we were ready when that came. When that happens. And there’s something to point out: there are actually FEMA programs that contributed to that tragedy in Texas. And they are the National Flood Insurance Program and the Flood Mapping Program. Both contributed to that disaster and the horrific things that happened there. But since I had planned with my team— Grant: Oh, wait, hold on, David. We need to—how did those things, the flood mapping and the flood insurance program, contribute to it? If you can briefly, but I’m curious about that. David: It’s easy. So the National Flood Insurance Program was never intended to encourage people to move into floodplains, but it did because of the low insurance premiums that the National Flood Insurance Program offers. Structures could get run over by water or whatever have you, and they could be replaced with somebody else’s money. And as FEMA would tell you, the flood maps that support the National Flood Insurance Program—the flood maps have nothing to do with safety and precaution. The flood maps are non-predictive, and they are for actuarial purposes only. FEMA will tell you that, but what they won’t tell you is they have nothing to do with safety and precaution. So that’s how those FEMA programs contributed to that tragedy in Texas. Grant: All right. So after everything you went through, what is the number one piece of advice you would give FEMA today as they quest to reform this agency? David: So first of all, they should take their numbers down to about half, and then they should focus on closing out—listen to this—the 80,000 projects across the country. There are 80,000 FEMA projects. In states like Florida and Tennessee, almost every county has open FEMA projects in them. But because those FEMA projects are jobs programs for FEMA people who are on per diem in those states, living in hotel rooms, they don’t want to shut those projects down because they are job security. So shut the programs down. Reduce the FEMA workforce by about 50 percent. And that’s easy to do. I had the plan in place. Wouldn’t have been a problem. However, because I refused to work with the leadership at DHS at the time, I resigned. Grant: All right, and that was Kristi Noem at the time, and now she’s gone as well, and we could get into all of that as well. David Richardson, I urge people to read your book, Texas Flood. We appreciate you coming on the program today, and thank you for your service to this country as well. David: Thank you, Grant. Thanks for having me. Grant: Absolutely. Get full access to Pope of FEMA at www.popeoffema.com/subscribe

    FEMA and Its Connection to the Deep State
  4. Sep 17

    Downsizing FEMA and DHS

    The National Security Hour · America Out Loud Talk Radio Hosts: Dr. Michael Scheuer and “Colonel Mike” · Guest: Lt. Col. David Richardson Editor’s note. This is a cleaned-up transcript prepared from the show’s auto-generated captions. Mis-heard names and terms have been corrected (e.g., Kristi Noem, Tom Homan, Camp Leatherneck, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, DOGE, Guadalupe River), repeated words and verbal stutters have been smoothed for readability, and station promotions and advertisement reads have been removed and marked. The substance and wording of the interview itself are preserved. Because both hosts speak throughout, a few host attributions are best-effort and may need correction. SEGMENT 1 COL. MIKE: Welcome back to another episode of The National Security Hour on America Out Loud Talk Radio. Today we have a really big show — like Ed Sullivan used to say — and I’ll tell you why. We have with us Dave Richardson. He’s got a new book coming out. What was he doing? He was working with the government. So what could possibly go wrong working with the government, right? Dave, welcome to The National Security Hour. We want to discuss this new book, and we want to tell people how screwed up FEMA is. RICHARDSON: Thanks for having me. I greatly appreciate it. I’m really glad to be here to speak with you two gentlemen. COL. MIKE: So, Dave, why were you chosen to lead FEMA? What qualified you? RICHARDSON: Number one, I’ve got a background in strategy. I was a ground combat officer in the Marine Corps in a couple of different theaters of war. I went to the Marine Corps schools and essentially learned how to plan, build strategies, and do things like mission analysis. After I got out of the Marine Corps — partially due to what I did in Korea — I got into the countering weapons of mass destruction business. Eventually I was appointed by President Trump in 2020 to be the Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. When Trump didn’t get back into office, I spent four years doing similar work. When he came back into office, I returned as the Assistant Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction — and I was immediately told they were going to shut it down. Look, I’m a small-government guy, partially because, as you said, the government can be a mess. The smaller the government, the smaller the mess. So I turned to shutting down Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. I’d done a mission analysis on it. It’s simple: you go to all the laws, figure out what you should do by law, do only that, and match the people to the law and the capabilities. As I was shutting that down, the President had expressed a desire to do the same at FEMA — like had been done at the Department of Education, and then USAID. Since I was having success systematically shutting down Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction — and that wasn’t happening to the President’s approval at FEMA, which he wanted shut down or drastically reduced and rebranded — they removed the person running FEMA and sent me over. I made no bones about it when I got there. There was much howling and gnashing of teeth the day I told them I intended to carry out the President’s intent, because they knew what that was: shut it down, or drastically reform and rebrand it. I lay all this out in my book, Texas Flood 2025. COL. MIKE: So hang on — what did you find when you got to FEMA? RICHARDSON: As I say in my book, I found people wandering around the seven floors at 500 C Street SE, essentially saying their morale was low and that they couldn’t do their mission. I immediately turned to addressing both. A note on federal employee morale: it’s a perennial problem. It’s always low, because they have a sneaking suspicion their work doesn’t matter — and in some cases they’re right, because they’re stuck leaderless, with no one pointing out the mission and driving them toward it. So they wander around and complain. And even if one person is cut, they’ll go to the press and say, “We can’t do our mission — of 18,000 of us, there are only 17,999 left.” COL. MIKE: This almost sounds like Voice of America when they started cutting VOA — “You don’t understand, we need to check the birds in Ghana, the ones with that special whistle, we just can’t report anymore.” So you had a plan to shut it down. Mike and I both lived in Northern Virginia; you’re in Northern Virginia. We understand the morale — every year when the government’s going to shut down, the world ends. It’s War of the Worlds. So what was your plan? RICHARDSON: My plan was very similar to the one I did at Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and it’s simple. The military calls it “troop to task.” What do you have to do — your mission — and what are the subtasks? You figure out your specified tasks and subtasks and align the people to them. That tells you what your org chart should look like. Most government people, when told to reorganize or reduce, immediately go to the org chart. That’s 100% the wrong answer. You go to the law, figure out exactly what it tells you to do, figure out how many people you need to do it, and then build your org chart. Otherwise you’re just stirring the pot — which is what I think my predecessor did, because I don’t think he had a strategic-level understanding or knew how to do mission analysis. When I walked through the door, I’d already had my team at Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction do a mission analysis on FEMA, and we redrew the org chart. There were 6,000 people at FEMA headquarters. I quickly discerned we only needed about 2,000 of them. There are another 12,000-plus FEMA people in what they call “the field” — which always makes me scratch my head, because as a ground combat Marine, “the field” means living in the woods. Instead, many of these field offices are living in hotels on per diem, overseeing a bureaucratic process for handing out FEMA money that goes on for years. So there were two pots. At headquarters, they needed maybe 2,000 people to do what 6,000 were doing. It took me the summer to figure out what to do with the roughly 17,000 to 18,000 in the field. I started from what the law requires, matched people to it, and my plan was to cut FEMA — headquarters down to 2,000, and eventually the field down to about 4,000. Keep in mind, during Hurricane Katrina FEMA was about 4,000 people. It’s grown to the behemoth it is today — around 18,000. Right about the time I got there, the FEMA Review Council stood up. I collaborated with them as much as I could, because they were moving the same direction, but it was a committee — and I don’t lead by committee. I knew it would be slow. My plan was to have it down by about half by the end of October 2025, and to cut more over the next six or seven months. If I’d stayed, it would be no more than 8,000 people, not 20. COL. MIKE: Let me ask you — what was your budget at FEMA? RICHARDSON: Get ready for this one. About $30 billion. And keep in mind: a million seconds is 12 days; a billion seconds is 31 years. I’d managed a budget at Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction of about $400 million. Now I’m dealing with a pot of gold. The money at FEMA is DHS’s largest calf to be slaughtered. Thirty billion dollars. That’s a drop in the bucket compared to the Department of Defense, but for DHS it’s the pot of gold for anybody who can hand it out and get the credit. COL. MIKE: So what’s the DHS budget itself? RICHARDSON: I don’t know the total — I’d be guessing. Anybody could do a quick search. I imagine it’s probably double FEMA’s, so maybe $60 billion, but I don’t know. COL. MIKE: Michael, let me ask you — back when you were at the Agency, what was the budget? DR. SCHEUER: I have no idea. COL. MIKE: You don’t remember? DR. SCHEUER: I don’t know if I even asked. I wanted to know how much money I had to run my operations. COL. MIKE: How much did you have? DR. SCHEUER: The most I ever had was about a million and a quarter. If it was a terro… Get full access to Pope of FEMA at www.popeoffema.com/subscribe

About

David Richardson is a Marine veteran, painter, and former senior political appointee at FEMA. Author of Texas Flood: 4 July 2025 and War Story. They called him the Pope of FEMA. www.popeoffema.com