Right, so Donald Trump has just come out with the line that tells you where this is really heading. Regime change in Iran, he says, would be “the best thing that could happen”. Well for who, you big orange balloon? So when you now hear about how “talks are ongoing”, don’t picture diplomats leaning over a table looking for a deal. Picture a countdown with a polite label stuck on it instead. Because at the same time, the US military is being described as getting ready for operations that could run for weeks, with everyone involved expecting Iran to hit back. A second aircraft carrier is moving in. Bases are being hardened. And the kind of targets being discussed aren’t just “nuclear sites”, they’re the state itself. So in this video I’m going to do something really simple. I’m going to take the tangerine tyrant’s quote, lay it next to the buildup, and show you what it removes, because in doing what he has done and saying what he has said, he’s already removed deniability and it removes the idea this is still about a neat little technical deal. And it leaves you with the only question that matters now: how long do they plan to keep calling it “talks” while they set the board for war, now seemingly saying as much out loud? Right, so Donald Trump has stood there, in public, and answered the regime change question by saying it “seems like that would be the best thing that could happen” in Iran, and once a US president starts speaking like that, every other sentence about diplomacy becomes stage dressing and every “indirect negotiation” becomes a timer you can’t see, because the end-state being floated isn’t a deal, it’s a removal. That fixes a constraint on everyone else in the room, including the negotiators who are still trying to pretend this is a normal bargaining process with a normal off-ramp, and it fixes a constraint on Iran too, because there is no technical concession that answers a demand for your government to stop existing. The Pentagon is simultaneously preparing for the kind of operation that doesn’t fit inside the neat little euphemisms people use when they want audiences to think “limited”, “surgical”, “one night”, “back to normal by Monday”. The planning being described by US officials is for sustained operations measured in weeks, not hours, and the target set being contemplated goes beyond nuclear-related infrastructure into Iranian state and security facilities. That is the operational definition of escalation, because once state facilities are in scope, the action is no longer being sold as “non-proliferation enforcement”, it is being built as punishment, disorientation, and pressure against the machinery of the state. It is also being built with an assumption of retaliation, meaning the plan is not “hit and stop”, it is “hit, absorb, hit again”, and that means the real decision is not whether a strike happens but whether the United States accepts a back-and-forth cycle as a managed condition for weeks. The hardware posture has been shifting in ways that match that assumption, because a country preparing to throw one punch does not spend this much effort on shields unless it expects the other side to throw one back. The USS Gerald R. Ford is being moved towards the region to join the USS Abraham Lincoln, and you don’t do that for show. You do it because you want more aircraft, more sorties, more command-and-control depth, and the ability to keep going day after day. A second carrier isn’t about signalling politely across a negotiating table; it’s about making the threat real, and keeping it real.
