LessWrong (30+ Karma)

LessWrong

Audio narrations of LessWrong posts.

  1. -3 ч

    “How the American Executive Could Control AI Companies” by caiitlinm, Anders Cairns Woodruff

    Some of the most notable American AI policies to date have been enacted by unilateral executive branch action. Consider the Department of Defense's spat with Anthropic, and the resulting threats from Pete Hegseth to invoke the Defense Production Act (DPA) against them. Or the fleeting export controls on Claude Fable/Mythos 5, manifested as a vaguely worded, threatening letter from Howard Lutnick, which might not have been legally sound but were effective anyway. The executive branch of the United States government has numerous powers that can be used to unilaterally control AI companies. We think the US executive is likely to remain heavily involved in AI governance, because the national security and foreign policy narratives about AI that empower the executive will endure. Additionally, if AI progresses very quickly, the executive will be further emboldened because it is particularly quick to respond and often entrusted with crisis management. In instances where the executive acts beyond its lawful powers, we think checks from Congress and the courts will be unreliable in restraining the executive. In this post, we: Identify and explain particular federal statutes and laws that permit the executive to act unilaterally in ways that influence—if not directly control—US [...] --- Outline: (02:45) Executive power over goods and resources related to the AI industry (09:18) Executive power over foreign transactions can impact domestic AI companies (12:11) The executive might make threats to coerce actions it can't directly elicit (15:02) Inter-branch constraints on executive power are weak (15:37) The judiciary may be permissive in matters of AI governance (16:13) Passivity (16:56) The court empowers the executive in national security (18:48) Failed enforcement of court rulings (19:22) Congress controls money and legislation (19:36) Nationalization and appropriation require congressional approval (22:29) Congress could amend delegations of executive power (24:52) Conclusion The original text contained 3 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. --- First published: August 14th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ynstBNgLQzEBiEpLs/how-the-american-executive-could-control-ai-companies --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

  2. -6 ч

    “Frontier agents don’t comply with standards, even when instructed to” by Daan Henselmans, Arno Libert

    TLDR: Our open testbed LARA examines the behavior of frontier LLMs in realistic agentic deployment contexts. Previous results showed all models routinely take actions that would violate EU law. This post follows up by addressing the obvious objection—why should an unrestricted model follow EU law?—with two studies: Study 1 asks whether a conscientious deployer can improve model compliance with legal standards by instruction: provided with the jurisdiction, the statutory text, and worked examples of the exact breaches to avoid, average legal compliance rate rises from 31% to 44%. The best model reaches 70%; open-weight models plateau at 39%. Study 2 asks whether models at least follow their own providers' usage policies, which prohibit aspects of every scenario we tested. All tested models perform actions their own maker forbids, at rates ranging from 2% (Opus 4.8) to 79% (Grok 4.3), with 9 of 16 doing so in the majority of runs. Together, that is a structural problem. Providers prohibit illegal uses but rely on deployers to avoid them; deployers cannot instruct their way to compliance, and liability lands on the deployer regardless. Nobody is holding the line. Neither instruction, statute or a provider's own policy binds behavior. Introduction On 27 [...] --- Outline: (01:42) Introduction (04:16) Study 1: the powerless deployer (06:28) Study 2: the models break their own makers' rules (10:48) The compliance gap (13:07) References --- First published: August 14th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/a5aAjdKzL7XvSLKWL/frontier-agents-don-t-comply-with-standards-even-when --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. --- Images from the article: Apple Podcasts and Spotify do not show images in the episode description. Try Pocket Casts, or another podcast app.

  3. -15 ч

    “How to Answer a Question Without Answering The Question” by Kabir Kumar

    Basics: Answering something other than the question,  Either making something up that they want to answer instead or going back to an easier to answer question. Or back to a question that lets them repeat a talking point Common phrases: - "to go back to your previous question" - "to take a step back a bit" - "if we look at the bigger picture" - "this feels like a question about [thing the question isn't about]" - "you raise an important question more generally" → turn the question into one which you more want to answer Make it *feel* like you answered a question without answering it. Examples Done for comedic effect: https://youtu.be/fhEakqJJUng?si=GBEvYBXcaEsb6F2_ How this works: Questions, especially ones people care a lot about, tend to have two main components: - the request for information - the emotion which makes then want that information When someone doesn't want to tell you some information, but also doesn't want to tell you 'I won't tell you', something they can do is detect what kind of emotion is driving your question, or if it's in front of an audience, what kind of emotion is driving [...] --- Outline: (00:10) Basics: (00:14) Answering something other than the question, (00:48) Make it \*feel\* like you answered a question without answering it. (02:08) The Defense --- First published: August 13th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g9PNBCkfHAcyMcobz/how-to-answer-a-question-without-answering-the-question --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

  4. -17 ч

    “Some Ways I Think About Evaluating Grant Applications” by sarahconstantin

    Rider-Waite Tarot, 6 of Pentacles I’ve done enough grant evaluations so far (for ACX grants and SFF) and been involved in philanthropy in various other contexts, at work and informally, that I have developed some idea of how my opinions and intuitions differ from other people's. I thought it might be interesting to share some of my “tastes”. Not everybody has to have the same tastes or funding philosophy, but these are mine. #1: It's The Donor's Money In my worldview, charitable donation is optional. Generally praiseworthy, but optional. And the purpose of donation is to buy outcomes that the donor wants to see in the world. You donate to make the world more like the one you want to live in. Generally, a reasonable person's values go beyond strictly personal consumption; one also cares about what kind of a society one lives in, what other people's lives are like, what sorts of institutions exist, what sorts of things humanity has created or discovered, and so on. As an agent doing research or evaluation on behalf of a donor, I try to find opportunities that fit in the intersection between my own values and the donor's. If there [...] --- Outline: (00:41) #1: It's The Donor's Money (02:02) #2: Importance, Neglectedness, Tractability (03:23) #3: Yay Community Infrastructure (04:51) #4: Yay Niche Topics (05:37) #5: Yay "Technical" Work (07:03) #6: Yay Straightforward Public Information Resources (08:00) #7: Yay "Cool Shit" (08:41) #8: Two Cheers for Meta (11:27) #9: Gumption Counts (12:33) #10: Yay Personal Relationships (13:46) #11: Check For Ideological Orientation (14:43) #12: Filter Slop Aggressively (15:54) #13: Yay Outcomes (16:38) #14: Why Donate Rather Than Invest? The original text contained 6 footnotes which were omitted from this narration. --- First published: August 13th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CuNtKAuLDGxNeanBi/some-ways-i-think-about-evaluating-grant-applications --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. --- Images from the article: Apple Podcasts and Spotify do not show images in the episode description. Try Pocket Casts, or another podcast app.

  5. -17 ч

    “Features that current AIs don’t have that future AIs will have” by Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel

    Features that current AIs don't have that future AIs will have: Continual Learning [& long-term memory] Every second humans update their brain weights. The brain autonomously decides what to update on. Humans can also consciously decide to curate their data sets - eg by deciding to go to college. Current LLMs do not continually update their weights. Instead, they occasionally get a large update based on datasets curated by a team of humans. This is alleviated somewhat by the ability of AIs to do in-context learning but nevertheless it seems to be a major limitation. Note that this is an especially large limitation in domains with sparse data. In domains where all of humanity has an enormous amount of data eg math, programming, physics, anime trivia, trials and tribulations of English kings - AIs dominate. In areas where there is little data: the weird idiosyncracies of a particular job, boss, people, colleagues etc it can struggle. Note that this restrictions also interferes with AIs from effectively 'learning to learn' & caps its long-term memory. Neuralese Current AI's CoT is (mostly) English. But it plausible this is not the most efficient way to structure thoughts. Instead of english [...] --- Outline: (00:16) Continual Learning \[& long-term memory\] (01:24) Neuralese (01:41) Telepathy (02:01) ClaudeGlobal --- First published: August 13th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NyEM3FtgL7XkbfCXy/features-that-current-ais-don-t-have-that-future-ais-will --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

  6. -20 ч

    “Measuring Activation Control in LLMs” by Marek Kowalski, Joshua Fonseca Rivera, Uzay Macar, David Africa

    TL;DR Inspired by the introspective awareness and CoT controllability papers, we made a benchmark to measure how well models can control their activations while completing a simple task. We are motivated by the concern that highly introspective models could control their activations, confounding probes and other monitors, and potentially even influencing their own training.We ran this on 25 open weight models ranging from 4B to 744B. We find that most language models are able to not only increase the salience of a concept in their residual stream on command, but also dial its strength up and down, including during specific intervals relative to the duration of the task. We also find that models are unable to control at which specific layer this is done.Counterintuitively, we find that within five of the seven model families we tested, the newest model scores lowest. For some reason, one of the oldest and smallest models of the panel, Llama 3.1 8B, performs best.It's not clear to us that newer models should have poorer control over their internal representations. More likely, where they “think” stops being the activation space, and becomes something else. We are looking for feedback (and other possible [...] --- Outline: (00:13) TL;DR (02:01) Methods (08:58) Results (15:41) Discussion (16:29) Acknowledgements --- First published: August 12th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HgvwxjzgwvsEvAiBH/measuring-activation-control-in-llms --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. --- Images from the article: Apple Podcasts and Spotify do not show images in the episode description. Try Pocket Casts, or another podcast app.

  7. -1 дн.

    “How My Students Think About AI” by dvd

    Context: I am an instructor at a public university in the United States. This reports how students at my institution appear to be thinking about AI as of spring/summer 2026. This is drawn mostly from interaction with my own students (both in spring semester classes and a summer class) as well as from a day-long workshop on AI that I moderated for a student organization. Input from my students took the form of universal, written, pre-class submissions plus self-selected participation into discussion. What I present below mostly takes the form of a synthetic consensus from these discussions. There were obviously a range of views on any given issue. Student Background: The students from my courses who participated in these discussions have moderate exposure to AI agents via those courses. All of them had nearly completed a Claude Code project by the time of the discussions and had extensively used AI for other coursework (in addition to whatever personal use predates that). They had done readings (which varied across the courses) establishing baseline knowledge on AI, the geopolitics of AI, and AI risk. I had also lectured on these topics. The students participating in the workshop had self-selected into [...] --- Outline: (02:52) Perspective #1: There has not been rapid AI progress (06:14) Perspective #2: Impressive progress or not, AI is going to wreck their lives, the economy, and the social contract.  They may well die as a result. (08:54) Perspective #3: Support for a different pause (11:13) Perspective #4: Catastrophic/existential risk arguments are sci-fi distractors from the urgent social/economic/political problems associated with AI. (12:55) Perspective #5: If AI leaders genuinely believe the technology is existentially risky, that's a good thing. (14:21) Perspective #6: AI will not go rogue because AI does not have, and is likely incapable of having, desires. (18:01) Perspective #7: The Hugging Face Incident (summer students only) (18:30) Perspective #8: This is definitely a bubble and it's about to pop. (19:34) Perspective #9: They're worried about the youth (i.e., the preteens) --- First published: August 13th, 2026 Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ySXuvJcqRindQwAk7/how-my-students-think-about-ai --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

Об этом подкасте

Audio narrations of LessWrong posts.

Вам может также понравиться