Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Modlin Global Analysis Podcast. This week, we're going to be focusing on Vladimir Putin and the bomb. We're going to consider the national discussion and global discussion on the ramifications of Putin’s references to nuclear posture and what are perceived as nuclear threats and the war in Ukraine, and how we as a society grapple with that. But perhaps most importantly, how do we think through what Vladimir Putin as the singular actor may be considering these questions? I'm glad to be joined by Dan Modlin as always and some questions that he has on this important issue. Dan And obviously this is an issue that concerns a lot of people, not just in the United States but around the world, obviously one of the changes that some people have remarked on in Putin's approach to the discussion of nuclear weapons or possible use of nuclear weapons is that in the Cold War. Era. Both sides tended to take the position they didn't want to be the first to use a nuclear weapon. How has Putin's approach changed? Kevin Yeah, that's a great point. And that goes right into the weeds of this question. Both sides during the Cold War, after they both acquired weapons, realized that they were better off not first using them because of the retaliatory nature of the weapons, especially the threat of retaliation, was so undesirable that both sides decided not to escalate tensions and a lot of times it may have helped quell some fears throughout the Cold War. So in a sense, even though weapons are very damaging and of course, deadly to some people analyzing it, it created a degree of stability because both sides had a sense of what the other side would do and a retaliation part of that aspect was an understanding by both sides that they would not be the ones to start a war. They would not be the ones to escalate it and that helps also contribute to some semblance of stability. Again, it's kind of contrarian to think that stability comes from these terrible, destructive weapons, but many people came to that conclusion when gaming out in various scenarios. Part of that has been a position that both sides, after the end of the Cold War. Reduce their nuclear stockpiles and in fact. Even Putin was part of the range of treaties that reduced weapons, but there is an evolution in discussion on what that doctrine looks like, and there's two components on that. One is the suggestion that they may escalate by their own decisions and that they have a mindset or an argument, especially people in the US think tank community emphasizes this idea that Russia may escalate a situation in order to deescalate. So they may uilized nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, with the goal of using that as a way to get out of a conflict. This is troubling to a lot of analysts and therefore they emphasize this aspect, but I think what's important in this is also to realize that both of those components emphasize the singular decision making of a president. So a policy that is retaliatory or says that they will not be the first one to use that actually puts less responsibility and decision. By that country, right? That would just mean that they would have to retaliate if they were attacked. So that puts less decision weight on that. But this change in policy puts greater emphasis for us to consider how Vladimir Putin thinks, and I think this is very important as it. As a conversation, as you mentioned, because I hear a lot of people ask questions about this. This is when the war started. This was what a lot of people were concerned about, and I hear people continue to be concerned. Whether it be my students or friends I run into, they ask about this question. So it's important for us to think about what Putin is thinking about. But it's also important for us to pause. And recognize all of the flawed analysis that has preceded this conversation. A lot of people have basically baked in their own assumptions of how Putin thinks. is he rational? Is he hypermasculine? Is he insecure? Is he risk averse? Well, many of these assumptions have been shown to not hold up much weight. So how can we instead of try to package information of how we see Putin? How can we instead pull back and provide some analysis, and recently Foreign Affairs came out with an article by Rose McDermott, Polly and Slovic on Putin in the psychology of nuclear brinksmanship. And what they help us see is a different way of examining this instead of us trying to. Package Putin as how we see him, they instead look at the psychology and rationales that people in general look at questions around nuclear brinksmanship. And then use that to then contextualize how Putin may be. Thinking so, this is a very engaging article. I think it will be very helpful for us to look into. Dan Maybe you can help to describe again what the significance of that article might be and what we should take away from the research by McDermott, Pauline slogan. Kevin First off, it's available on the Foreign Affairs website, so you can pull it up to read. It's available for free on their site. So First off they emphasize the fact that people have difficulty with making decisions, and this is a broad statement, but the individuals have difficulty with that. And of course they have difficulty weighing nuclear decision. And because of the complexities involved, they will seek to simplify choices, right? So then that starts to narrow that choice, and then they start to not only simplify choices, they start to prioritizing what's most important. So is that the survival of a state, Is it the survival of the Person, is the survival of an idea? These become aspects that are most acute that so I think it's important for us to recognize that and that plays a lot into the conflict that we're seeing right now. Has not been successful in this military operation. In fact, it's been a disaster. Recently, Secretary Blinken made the remark that the Russian military was rumored or discussed to be the second leading military in the world. And then it's cutting statement after that was is it is actually the second leading military in Ukraine, they have not performed as expected, but what's important in thinking about this is that if Russia has objectives, and specifically Putin has objectives and is not able to meet those objectives, what tools will he consider? What options will he consider? In this so regardless if the whatever the West’s posture is, if he doesn't achieve his objectives, what tool set will he consider when trying this? So it's this is very complicated for thinking about how the West may respond because. Even if he's defeating himself, that could still be escalatory. So this again, is it has presents some unique challenges in this situation. Dan It seems like it would always be difficult to get in someone's head and really understand exactly what they're thinking, but he's perhaps a more. Complicated figure then many other world leaders that people have tried to analyze in the past. Kevin He is complicated. It's also again worthwhile to note how many times our analysis of leaders is wrong. So our analysis of Putin is wrong. Our analysis of many leaders has been wrong, so it's probably good again to take this framework. That they apply with this and consider what they point to as the number of surveys done of the general public and of leaders and the trade-offs they're willing to. Take when considering nuclear actions and basically they find that individuals are. And be less willing to trade the lives of their own citizens. Versus others and the ratios in that death affected are pretty startling in these surveys. Now, are these sentiments held closer, are they not? But you have to consider that politicians would weigh the similar types of questions, and that would be just as startling what they would consider so. If a loss is too great for Russia. What would they consider it's also worth noting that Putin can always revisit what he defines his loss. He is in Exterritorial and is defending. In parts of what they occupy in Ukraine, is he going to claim that as a success and go forward with that with continuous fighting? On both sides. That's worth considering also. So again, it's really hard to know what's in that mental space of where he is, but it is worth noting. Because he is a centralized. Leader what unique role? That since plays in and of course his sense of Russian nationalism, and increasingly, when listening to Putin, the sense of victimhood he has when discussing these issues. Dan Again, the article that prompted today's discussion is in foreign affairs. It's titled Putin and the Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship, the war in Ukraine hinges on one man's thoughts and feeling by Rose McDermott, Reid Pauly and Paul Slovic. Kevin, in closing, any any comments you'd like to share? Kevin You know, there's two things that I think that are important. Again, building off of what the authors discuss here. And again, I encourage people to read the article is there is a growing perception in the West. This is a note of caution that because Putin has not escalated relative to NATO. Whenever the West provides assistance to Ukraine that the perception is because that has been not been seemingly escalatory, that each additional thing made is going to be less threatening or less problematic for them, when in fact it accumulates differently on Russia's side. So at one point it may actually be seen as unfeasible that it is threatening, so from different perspectives, how these incremental changes are weighed are very different and people are actually probably not looking at the lessons properly. Again, a few examples of one act should not be viewed as. Examples of how they will. Go forward the other thing that I think is really important when listening to Putin's speeches, whether it be around the annexation of territories or whenever he talks about the conflict, is both his rhetoric and how
