In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Brian Carlson, a research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies for the China Landpower Studies Center, on Central Asia. The conversation highlights two drastically different engagements Carlson recently had, one in Kazakhstan and the other at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in southern Germany. The discussion explores the nature of China-Russia relations and the significance of the Central Asian states in the context of great-power competition. Keywords: Central Asia, China-Russia Relations, Great Power Competition, Color Revolution, Kazakhstan, Foreign Area Officer Brennan Deveraux Hello. Welcome to SSI live. I’m your guest host, Major Brennan Deveraux. I’ll be filling in this year for Dr. John Deni while he’s on sabbatical finishing his book. I’m joined today by Dr. Brian Carlson. He’s a research professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies for the China Landpower Studies Center here at the Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Carlson received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and his expertise lies in the China-Russia relations. For this conversation, we’ll be diving into Brian’s recent travel and engagements abroad, with the aim to dive a little deeper into some of the nuance of studying Russia-China relations. And I’ll jump right in. You recently took a trip to Kazakhstan. Can you tell me about the event you attended and its significance to your work? Brian Carlson Sure. I went to Kazakhstan to attend the capstone conference for a program called US CARNet, that’s CARN Central Asia Research Network, and it’s sponsored by the State Department. The goal of this program is to build a network of Central Asian scholars who study China’s activities and influence in their region, and then to connect that network with American scholars who study similar topics. And I’ve been involved with this program for about three years now. In April of 2023, before I was working for the Army War College, this program sent me to the region, and I went to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. And I was one of four American scholars who went there during that period. We went at different times. We all spoke about China’s activities in the region. I spoke in particular about China-Russia relations in the region because that’s my research focus. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I was able to speak at universities. In Tajikistan, the government wouldn’t allow that. I could only have individual meetings with scholars. And that’s probably because of all the Central Asian countries Tajikistan is the most “captured” by China. So that was two years ago. Another part of this program is that they select four Central Asian scholars who focus on China’s activities in their region, and then they connect them with American scholars who also focus on such topics. And in this case, there were four scholars, two from Kazakhstan, two from Kyrgyzstan, and all of them spent one semester in the United States working with an American professor and then coauthoring an article. I wasn’t able to take part in that part of it, but one year ago I went to [Washington] DC and met with them when they came to the United States at the start of their program. And so I’ve been familiar with their activities. This was the capstone conference. So all four of the scholars presented their research findings along with their coauthors. And so that was the first day. On the second day, we had discussion roundtables about various topics in the region. Deveraux What were some of the major takeaways of the conference? Big points for our listeners. Carlson It was interesting on the first day to hear about some of the research that the scholars were doing. They were looking at topics like China’s investment in infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan, and to what extent that helps along China’s interests of expanding connectivity and serving the interests of the BRI [Belt and Road Initiative], and to what extent it helps Kyrgyzstan with its own economic development. And the finding was that this infrastructure is really helping China with its goal of using Central Asia as a transit corridor, but it isn’t really benefiting Kyrgyzstan’s economic development to the extent that has been promised. So that’s just one example. Other topics looked at China’s use of history to try to support its narrative in the region, China’s use of Instagram in the region to promote its image, and then China’s use of education to try to expand its soft power in the region. And so those were some interesting research projects. And then I’ll skip ahead to the third day, because the scholars talked about how they are facing an increasingly constricted environment in the region. It’s more and more difficult for them to speak openly about China and Russia and what they’re doing in the region. If they publish research that is in any way critical of China or Russia, they’re likely to face some resistance from the government. And this is different from the way it was a few years ago. So the environment is becoming more constricted, and so that that is a concern. And that was one big takeaway of the conference. And also, that there is a kind of division among Central Asian scholars who look at China in the region. The ones who took part in this program are naturally a little bit more pro-Western. But there were also scholars in attendance who are more pro-Chinese and apparently in some of the side conversations, some of the more pro-Chinese scholars were critical of their pro-American or pro-Western counterparts for being true to pro-Western. So you see a real division emerging in the region. So that was a big takeaway. And then, I can go ahead and talk next about the presentation that I gave. Deveraux Yeah, sure. I am going to want to pull on that thread. But real quick, why don’t you talk about your presentation that you did at the conference. Carlson I spoke about China-Russia relations in Central Asia, and some of the basic points I made were that, number one, a lot of people have said that Central Asia could be a real source of tension in the China-Russia relationship. But so far, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over those tensions and working together. And I would argue that this is because, number one, their interests in the region largely coincide. They have some potential sources of friction. But they have a lot of shared objectives, like limiting American influence in the region, promoting stability, preventing color revolutions and so forth, and counterterrorism, of course. And secondly, they share an overriding objective of opposing the United States and trying to revise the international order. And so they don’t want to let possible sources of tension like Central Asia interfere with the pursuit of that larger objective. I would say that some trends that we have seen recently are that China’s influence in the region is undoubtedly rising. And as I say, they’ve done a pretty good job of smoothing over any possible sources of tension with Russia that might result from this. But, at the same time, there are indications that Russia’s influence might be weakening a little bit. It’s distracted by the war in Ukraine. It’s not necessarily able to play the main security role in the region that it’s always played. And so over time, the question is whether China will want to get more involved in regional security. And if they do that, how will Russia react? Right now, China’s regional security presence is rather small. It’s confined mostly to a couple of military installations in eastern Tajikistan that are mostly designed to protect China’s western border and make sure that sources of instability don’t flow from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and on into China. So that’s the big question for the future. How much will China’s influence in the region expand? How much will they use that influence to try to become more powerful in the region? And how will Russia respond? And will they continue to maintain a good relationship, or will there be tension that will emerge? Deveraux Okay. A lot to unpack there. It sounds like it’s a really fruitful event. There’s one thing I really want to kind of pull on [that] you talked about. First, you use this term captured, which I think is a really interesting thing. I’d like [for] you to talk a little bit more about that. But we talked about this idea that we’re having different conversations in the West than they might be able to have in Central Asia. Western analysts and venues have long discussed the implications of the potential strengthening of Russia-China relations. We often use powerful words like partnership, collusion, although we never really say allies. How is this discourse surrounding the relationship being handled in Central Asia? You kind of already talked about the limited ability in certain places and the differing perspectives. But more generally outside of the conference. Any thoughts on that distinction? Carlson Yeah. First, on the question about Tajikistan being captured by China. I think this is apparent in a number of ways. When I went there two years ago, I saw the new Parliament building that’s being built there in the capital, Dushanbe, and it’s being built by China. China is funding the construction of Tajikistan’s new parliament building, which is an amazing thing. China has invested heavily in Tajikistan. They have gold mines and other mining operations there. They’ve built a lot of roads and tunnels and other infrastructure. And of course, as I mentioned already, they also have this, military presence in eastern Tajikistan, which is, by the way, is for the People’s Armed Police, not for the, main military force, not for a People’s Liberation Army base, but a PAP, Peopl
