The Eastern Front Week by Week

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Join us as we delve into the gripping events of the Eastern Front during World War II, week by week. Each episode uncovers battles, strategies, and personal stories, providing a detailed narrative of this pivotal theater in history. Tune in for insightful analysis and captivating tales from the frontlines.

  1. 4D AGO

    Eastern Front #36 Who is Circling Who?

    Last time we spoke about the Rzhev Meatgrinder. On the Volkhov Front, General Meretskov launched bold offensives to relieve Leningrad, penetrating German lines but facing coordination failures and brutal attrition in the "Meat Grinder's Neck." Soviet advances created vulnerabilities, with troops raiding behind enemy positions amid horrific casualties, as described in soldier accounts. Southward, the Demyansk Pocket saw 96,000 Germans encircled, surviving on meager air-dropped supplies, while the Kholm siege endured Luftwaffe support and fierce close-quarters fighting. In the central sector, the "Rzhev Meatgrinder" erupted as Konev's forces clashed with Model's defenses, resulting in piled bodies and desperate counterattacks. In Ukraine, Timoshenko's offensives faltered against fortified villages and snowstorms, leading to disastrous raids. Crimea remained stalled, marked by Soviet landings crushed at Sudak and Nazi atrocities against civilians.  This episode is Who is Circling Who? Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As the month of January gradually shifted into February, the extensive Soviet Winter offensive continued to unfold with considerable force across various fronts. In the northern sectors and within the Crimean region, the momentum of this offensive had significantly diminished, leading both the German and Soviet sides to dedicate their efforts toward recuperation and the formulation of new strategic initiatives. In the Ukrainian theater, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock directed operations aimed at launching counterattacks against the notably overextended military formations under the command of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. At the same time, the Northwestern Front concentrated its activities on establishing sieges around the isolated German forces that opposed them. Nevertheless, a highly intricate and disorganized situation persisted within the area controlled by Army Group Center, where both the German and Soviet armies found themselves in advantageous positions that could potentially allow for the creation of substantial encirclements targeting large segments of each other's forces simultaneously.  By the commencement of February, historical records compiled by Kershaw indicated that the German forces had incurred severe casualties since the initiation of their invasion: specifically, 200,152 personnel had been killed, 681,236 had sustained wounds, and 43,814 were listed as missing in action. On the Soviet side, analyses by Lopukhovsky revealed that the Red Army had experienced 552,000 casualties throughout December and an additional 558,000 during January, which added to the already staggering total of 3,337,000 casualties accumulated between August and December of the previous year. This composition meant that the cumulative German casualties equated to the loss of approximately 57.1 divisions in terms of officers, 70.2 divisions regarding non-commissioned officers, and 53.8 divisions when considering the enlisted soldiers. These numbers underscored the immense human cost of the conflict, illustrating how entire units were effectively wiped out multiple times over in the brutal exchanges on the Eastern Front. The attrition rates highlighted the desperate need for reinforcements on both sides, as divisions were often reduced to shadows of their former strengths, with officers and NCOs being particularly hard-hit, which disrupted command structures and morale. Across numerous locations along the extensive front lines, only a comparatively minor forward movement was required to achieve the encirclement and subsequent destruction of significant portions of the opposing armies. As a result, Adolf Hitler and the OKH started to identify potential opportunities to retrieve some form of triumph from the catastrophes that had unfolded during the winter months. In contrast, the Soviet High Command, known as STAVKA, began to exhibit signs of desperation in their pursuit of the decisive victory they perceived to be tantalizingly close at hand. STAVKA also grew increasingly conscious of the swiftly deteriorating condition of their military units and the progressively reduced ability of those forces to sustain offensive operations. This awareness stemmed from reports of exhausted troops, depleted supplies, and the harsh winter conditions that exacerbated every logistical challenge, making even basic movements a test of endurance. In an endeavor to reduce the mounting pressure on the central forces operating within the Soviet Union, General Eduard Dietl, who served as the commanding general of the Army of Lapland and had in fact voiced objections to his own appointment back in November, made attempts to convince Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim to commence an offensive directed toward Belomorsk. Dietl's role involved commanding the Army of Lapland, which had been formally established on January 14th to oversee the German military contingents in Finland and Norway that were positioned against the Soviet Union. This army was officially placed under Mannerheim's authority, who was recognized as the supreme commander within Finland. The intention behind this subordination was to enhance diplomatic relations with Mannerheim and to exert influence in compelling him to launch an assault on the Murmansk Railroad. Mannerheim managed to avoid issuing a direct rejection but expressed that Finland would possess much greater capacity for conducting offensive actions if the city of Leningrad were to be captured. The internal political dynamics within Finland imposed additional constraints on their potential for offensive engagements, as the general population held the belief that the war was approaching its conclusion and that merely a slight further exertion would suffice. The successful seizure of Leningrad would liberate Finnish troops from their current commitments and elevate national morale to a level that could support a major offensive by Finnish forces. However, there existed an emerging and foresightful apprehension that any forthcoming German spring offensive would primarily target Ukraine, thereby leaving the northern areas of the Soviet Union to deteriorate without significant attention. This concern was rooted in intelligence assessments and strategic analyses that suggested a shift in German priorities toward resource-rich southern regions, potentially abandoning the frozen north to a war of attrition. The Finnish Army allocated a substantial portion of early 1942 to comprehensive reorganization efforts. It was segmented into three distinct fronts: the Maaselkä Front, the Aunus Front, and the Isthmus Front. Moreover, approximately 100,000 older soldiers were released from military service, with plans in place to progressively reduce divisions to brigade-level formations. The personnel liberated through this process were intended to be reintegrated into the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy. In actuality, only two divisions underwent this conversion by the month of May, at which point the program was discontinued. The principal responsibilities for Dietl's forces during January and February involved restructuring their front-line positions and transferring the Finnish units within their operational area back to Mannerheim's direct oversight. Additionally, they were compelled to broaden their front line to encompass the territory formerly managed by the Finnish 3rd Corps, an area that Mannerheim declined to continue covering. This expansion necessitated the importation of two fresh mountain divisions from Germany. These mountain troops were specialized for harsh terrains, but their deployment highlighted the strain on German resources, as units were being pulled from other theaters to plug gaps in the far north. Within this organizational framework, the commander of the Mountain Corps Norway, Ferdinand Schörner, rapidly earned a reputation for being unpopular among his subordinates due to his motivational speeches, such as encouraging his troops to adopt the mantra “The Arctic does not exist” amidst the harsh, freezing conditions of the Lapland winter. Predictably, Schörner's stringent attitude endeared him to Hitler, who valued such unyielding discipline in his commanders, even if it alienated the rank and file. The offensive launched by the Volkhov Front in January, supplemented by supporting assaults from the Leningrad Front, had predominantly resulted in failure. The singular noteworthy accomplishment was the formation of a salient extending 75 kilometers deep at Lyuban, achieved by the 2nd Shock Army. However, as February began, the German 1st Corps had succeeded in isolating the northern flank of this salient utilizing six divisions, albeit at the expense of thinning out their positions at Kirishi and Leningrad. To the south of the Lyuban salient, the 38th Corps had accomplished a comparable containment with five divisions. Furthermore, the entry point of the salient had remained constricted owing to the shortcomings of the armies on the flanks. Field Marshal Georg von Küchler initiated planning for an offensive intended to seal off the salient's entrance, designated as Operation Raubtier. This operation was conceiv

    44 min

  2. JAN 29

    Eastern Front #35 The Rzhev Meatgrinder starts

    Last time we spoke about the Model’s Model Counterattack. Following retreats to the Königsberg line, Stalin's scattered assaults face coordination woes, supply shortages, and German resilience. Near Lake Ilmen and Volkhov, Meretskov's Volkhov Front advances slowly, capturing points like Pogostye but failing breakthroughs against Küchler's defenses. Soviet cavalry disrupts German logistics, yet encirclement efforts stall. Southward, Timoshenko surprises Bock in Ukraine, breaching lines at Izyum and threatening Kharkiv encirclement. Paulus deploys reserves to counter, while Manstein pursues shattered Soviet armies in Crimea, stabilizing at Parapach Narrows. Walter Model performed a daring counterattack with the 9th Army south of Rzhev. Defying Hitler's orders, Model assembles battlegroups to seal a 27km gap, trapping Soviet 39th and 29th Armies plus cavalry. Amid -50°C freezes, Germans relieve besieged Suchinitschi and Kholm, holding "fortresses" despite frostbite and attrition. This episode is Rzhev Meatgrinder starts Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we left off from last week, the Volkhov Front and the German 18th Army were caught in a high-stakes impasse, with each side positioning itself to potentially deliver a decisive strike against the other. General Kirill Meretskov, who was in command of the Soviet forces in this sector, was not one to let such a standoff linger without action. On January 27th, he issued a series of precise and comprehensive orders designed to shatter the deadlock and advance toward the long-awaited relief of the besieged city of Leningrad. To understand Meretskov's mindset, it's worth noting his background: a seasoned commander who had survived Stalin's purges in the late 1930s, he was acutely aware of the political pressures from Moscow and the dire need to break the siege that had already claimed hundreds of thousands of civilian lives through starvation and bombardment. Meretskov's strategy was nothing if not bold and multifaceted. He directed the 59th Army to launch an offensive aimed at capturing Tregubovo, with the ultimate goal of encircling the German positions around Chudovo. The 2nd Shock Army was split into three distinct operational groups to tackle different objectives. Group Korovnikov was assigned the task of eliminating the German strongpoints along the Leningrad road, specifically targeting areas near Spasskaia Polist' and Liubino Pole. Group Privalov received orders to push forward as rapidly as possible toward Chervino. Group Zhiltsov was to assault the German defenses at Zemtitsy and Liubtsy, with the intention of cutting off the crucial Leningrad-Novgorod railway line. In addition, the 13th Cavalry Corps was instructed to continue its advance toward Liuban, while the 52nd Army was to secure the Bolshevodskoe region in order to safeguard the overall flank of the operation. Meretskov held an optimistic view that all these goals could be accomplished by January 30th. This optimism stemmed partly from intelligence reports suggesting German supply lines were overstretched, but it underestimated the Wehrmacht's ability to improvise defenses in the harsh winter terrain. However, the execution on the battlefield proved to be far more complicated and fraught with challenges than the plans suggested. Coordination among the Soviet units was severely lacking, leading to ineffective deployment of artillery and tanks. Many of the attacks degenerated into straightforward, unimaginative frontal charges that unfortunately aligned perfectly with the strengths of the German defensive positions. Despite these difficulties, there were notable successes. General Klykov succeeded in creating a significant penetration between the enemy strongpoints at Spasskaia Polist' and Zemtitsy. This breakthrough enabled elements of the 2nd Shock Army to advance a remarkable distance of 75 kilometers, eventually linking up with the Cavalry Corps that was already positioned in the area. As a result, up to 100,000 Soviet troops suddenly found themselves operating behind the German lines. But this achievement came with a critical vulnerability: their supply route was extremely narrow, threading through frozen swampland that could easily become impassable with the arrival of a thaw. This narrow corridor, often referred to as the "Meat Grinder's Neck" in later accounts, would become a focal point of brutal attrition warfare as both sides fought to control it. To help you grasp the sheer desperation and horror of the fighting here, let's draw from a firsthand account preserved in historical records. German soldier Albert Neuhaus wrote in a letter home dated January 30th: "The Russians send infantry troops against German artillery and die in huge numbers. It is craziness from the Russians to run against such a well defended line … But the Russians possess so many human resources that it is nothing for them to daily send a whole row to a sure death." This kind of observation contributed to the enduring myth of inexhaustible Soviet manpower, but in reality, it highlighted the Red Army's grim determination to incur massive casualties in pursuit of territorial gains, no matter how small. It's a stark reminder of the human cost of Stalin's "not one step back" philosophy, which often prioritized ideological fervor over tactical prudence. Shifting our attention a bit southward within the same theater, the 11th Army continued to maintain its encirclement of Staraya Russa, though it struggled to completely sever the town's supply connections. The German 18th Motorized Division was responsible for defending the city proper, while the 290th Infantry Division held positions on the eastern bank of the Pola River. Between these two forces, there existed a gaping 32-kilometer void along the Redya Valley, which represented a serious weakness that the 16th Army Headquarters was acutely aware of. In an effort to mitigate this risk, small battlegroups, each roughly the size of a company, were quickly assembled to protect key road junctions and ensure that supply lines remained open. These ad-hoc units exemplified the German concept of "Kampfgruppen," flexible combined-arms groups that could respond rapidly to threats, a tactic that would become a hallmark of Wehrmacht operations throughout the war.   The challenge of supplying a force of 96,000 men and 20,000 horses through a single dirt road was nothing short of a logistical catastrophe. Rations for the troops had already been reduced by one-third, limiting daily intake to a meager 1¼ ounces (that's 36 grams) of dried vegetables and 2 ounces (60 grams) of horse meat. In some cases, soldiers were forced to consume oats that were originally intended as feed for the horses. Ammunition stocks were also dwindling dangerously low. To address this, two transport groups from Luftflotte 1—I./KGzbV 172 and KGrzbV 9—were conducting regular flights into the airfield at Demyansk. However, by the end of the month, only 30 Ju-52 aircraft remained operational, capable of delivering just 60 tons of supplies per day, which included 54 tons of food and 21 tons of fuel. This amount was woefully inadequate, representing only about one-fifth of what was truly required to keep the encircled forces functioning effectively. The Demyansk Pocket, as it came to be known, would later inspire the ill-fated airlift attempts at Stalingrad, highlighting the Luftwaffe's overconfidence in sustaining large forces solely by air. The arrival of the 1st Shock Army at the Northwestern Front on January 26th offered the promise of fresh reinforcements, but this new formation would not be fully assembled and ready for combat until February 12th. In the interim, the siege of Kholm persisted with unrelenting ferocity. The German garrison there consisted of just over 3,000 men, but they were relatively well-equipped with artillery support, including three 75mm infantry guns and 18 mortars. Later, additional weaponry such as 3.7cm, 4.2cm, and 5cm PaK guns was delivered via gliders. These defenders were holding off repeated assaults from elements of the Soviet 3rd Shock Army. The defense of Kholm under General Theodor Scherer would become legendary in German military lore, earning him the nickname "Lion of Kholm" and serving as a propaganda tool to boost morale back home. The Kholm garrison depended heavily on daily supply drops from the Luftwaffe, but these proved insufficient to meet all needs. From January 29th to February 1st, there were 42 successful landings at the small airstrip, which also allowed for the evacuation of several hundred wounded personnel. Rationing measures were implemented right from the start, and the situation was worsened by a fire that destroyed warehouses containing half of the garrison's food reserves. The Soviet forces, commanded locally by General Makarev, intensified their efforts in the northern part of the town between January 24th and 26th. These attacks were spearheaded by tanks and involved brutal, round-the-clock fighting with grenades in close-quarters engagements. The Soviets even managed to capture the airfield temporarily, but a swift German counterattack drove them back. This back-and-forth c

    39 min

  3. JAN 22

    Eastern Front #34 Model’s Model Counterattack

    Last time we spoke about the retreat to Königsberg. Stalin's bold general offensive pushed the Red Army to hammer away at German Army Groups North and Center, with the goal of encircling and exhausting enemy forces before the spring thaw. Building on earlier victories at Moscow and Rostov, the Soviets launched scattered assaults across frozen landscapes, but they struggled with coordination issues, supply shortages, and overextended lines. Intense fighting erupted around Lake Ilmen, the Volkhov River, Staraya Russa, and Rzhev, where General Meretskov's Volkhov Front made gains like capturing Pogostye thanks to stronger artillery, yet couldn't fully break through German defenses. Up north, Field Marshal von Leeb's Army Group North was on the brink, prompting his replacement by Küchler as Hitler stubbornly refused retreats. The Germans held firm at Staraya Russa through air drops and counterstrikes. To the south, Zhukov and Konev's forces pressured Vyazma and Rzhev, forcing Hitler to allow a pullback to the shorter Königsberg line, which trimmed fronts by about 100 kilometers. This episode is Model’s Model Counterattack Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Disaster continues to loom over Army Group Center. Even more Soviet forces are pouring through the gaps in its lines, posing a real threat of encirclement. And the German response? Launch an attack! This week, we're diving into the events from January 18th to January 24th, 1942, where Timoshenko catches Bock off guard in Ukraine, and Army Group North keeps getting hammered from every direction. Following yet another brief lull, Klykov launches a fresh assault on January 21st, targeting the strongpoints near Mostki. But this push advances at an agonizingly slow pace. The 4th and 59th Armies have massed 12 divisions and 400 guns across a 12-kilometer sector, yet the attack crumbles against the four reinforced German divisions holding the line. This setback prompts Meretskov to request permission to scrap the assault altogether, redirecting resources to bolster the more effective 2nd Shock Army instead. Under this plan, the 4th Army would stick to carrying out pinning attacks, while the 59th Army gets reinforced and shifts to strike from the right flank of the 2nd Shock Army. Stalin gives his approval, but he insists that the 2nd Shock and 52nd Armies keep up their offensives throughout the regrouping period, and that all redeployments remain strictly under wraps. On the night of the 23rd, Meretskov issued a demand for the 13th Cavalry Corps to be deployed, aiming to capitalize on the breakthroughs achieved by the 2nd Shock Army. But right as the Soviet troops surged forward through the gap, a fierce German counterattack struck from the flanks, launched by the 39th Panzer and 38th Army Corps. The Germans managed to reclaim some territory and quickly dug in with strong entrenchments. Kuchler had tasked the 16th Army’s 38th Corps with defending the southern side of Klykov’s penetration, while the 18th Army’s 1st Corps handled the northern flank. This situation forced the Soviet 59th and 52nd Armies into desperate efforts to expand the narrow foundation of the Shock Army’s advance. Their inability to succeed in this ultimately brought the entire offensive to a grinding halt. Meanwhile, elements of Soviet cavalry broke through to the German rear lines, unleashing significant chaos in their logistical operations. Meretskov held the conviction that if he could safeguard the 2nd Shock Army’s supply line and broaden the foundation of their breakthrough, this unit was perfectly placed to push northward and trap a substantial array of German divisions in an encirclement. Yet, from the German viewpoint, that very same slender supply corridor presented an enticing chance for a decisive counterstrike, one that could lead to a massive encirclement of their own. At most, just 10 kilometers divided the two German Corps at the narrow neck of the penetration. Cutting right through this gap, a lone small-gauge railway line was being rapidly built to provision Klukov’s Army. At the same time, as the Volkhov Front grappled with severe supply shortages, the stream of resources moving across the Road of Life had been steadily enhancing all through the month. The Leningrad Front not only managed to meet all of their required quotas, but they were even beginning to accumulate surpluses for stockpiling once more. Glantz“By 20 January the Leningrad Front had amassed 10-11 days' worth of flour, 5 days of grain, 9-10 days of butter, 4 days of fat, and 8 days of sugar in city warehouses, at Ladoga Station on the lake's western shore, and en route across the ice.” This development made it possible to enhance rations for both civilians and soldiers yet again. During that period, 11,296 individuals were evacuated from Leningrad, though it came at a tremendous toll for those operating the Road of Life, where the informal motto of 'two convoys per driver per day' took hold. Even with all this exertion, between 3,500 and 4,000 people continued to succumb each day to starvation and illness, resulting in more than 120,000 civilian deaths in January alone. To the south, siege lines were tightening around Staraya Russa, where the 11th Army found itself unable to penetrate the defenses. The 18th Motorised Infantry had endured more than 1,000 casualties, yet they succeeded in allocating an infantry battalion, supported by a contingent of engineers, to maintain the vital Kholm road's openness. In response, the Soviets sent forward the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, though their arrivals wouldn't begin until February. At the same time, the Germans pieced together a battlegroup drawing from the Polizei-Regiment Nord, three battalions of the 81st Infantry Division, and four tanks sourced from Panzer Regiment 203. On the 24th, this force initiated a counterattack sweeping in from the northwest. It reclaimed some territory against the 84th Rifle Division but fell short of capturing the rail line.   The 11th Army did achieve a measure of success with the encircled German outpost at Vzvad, which was ultimately abandoned on the 20th. Following the destruction of Vzvad by fire, its garrison embarked on a grueling march of nearly 20 kilometers across the frozen expanse of Lake Ilman in temperatures plummeting to -50°C, finally rejoining German lines. The 3rd Shock Army had advanced to within 32 kilometers of Kholm by the 15th. Facing them, the 123rd Infantry Division had been eroded to just over 8,000 troops, with nearly a quarter of them afflicted by frostbite. Hitler had explicitly barred this unit from pulling back, but it was buckling beneath the onslaught from five Soviet divisions. In an effort to mask his maneuvers, Busch redesignated the division as Gruppe Raunch and shifted it to safeguard the southern routes leading to Demyansk. This adjustment compelled the German 2nd Corps to retract its flank in order to confront the 3rd Shock Army’s incursion. Units were pulled from its front lines opposite the relatively dormant 34th Army to bolster defenses against the 3rd Shock. At the expense of 4,000 casualties, the 3rd Shock Army secured a total breakthrough. To capitalize on this gain, Purkaev divided his army into three segments: one to pursue Gruppe Raunch, another to seize Kholm, and the final one to target Velikiye Luki. In the meantime, Kholm was already facing assaults. Early on the 18th, the 2nd Leningrad Partisan Brigade launched an attempt to overrun the town. Sentries had been quietly eliminated, the garrison's commandant was slain, and their truck park was obliterated. Nevertheless, the Germans clung on just long enough for the 800 partisans to exhaust their ammunition, compelling them to withdraw. The following day, a number of German reinforcements reached the area, swelling the garrison to 3,158 personnel. In the wake of this, Hitler proclaimed Kholm a fortress, thereby prohibiting any form of retreat. The 3rd Shock Army wouldn't start arriving until the 21st. That morning, the 33rd Rifle Division launched an all-out assault to seize Kholm but met with failure. In the aftermath, the 3rd Shock Army worked to establish siege lines encircling the town, aiming to block any further German reinforcements. Meanwhile, compact infantry units kept testing the German defenses with persistent probes, sometimes backed by tank support. Yet, the heavy snow compelled all assailants to funnel along the same pathways, which made it straightforward for the garrison to mount an effective defense. Shifting focus, the 4th Shock Army reached Toropets on the morning of the 20th. The town was defended by a mere 2,500 troops, none of them frontline combatants. Within just one day, a bolstered 249th Rifle Division overpowered the garrison entirely. The supplies stockpiled there were taken intact, delivering much-needed provisions of food and fuel. Eremenko had covered 65 kilometers in eight days, effectively cutting the link between Army Group North and Army Group Center. On the 22nd, his army was transferred to the Kalinin Front and redirected its efforts eastward. Halder would later remark that this advance was 'not an opera

    31 min

  4. JAN 15

    Eastern Front #33 Back to Königsberg

    Last time we spoke about Stalin’s General Offensive. Stalin, buoyed by early Moscow-area and Rostov successes, ordered a broad encirclement strategy across multiple fronts; Center, North, Leningrad, and Ukraine, aiming to drain German reserves before spring. Zhukov warned that concentrated reserves and heavy tank support were essential, but Stalin and Stavka pushed a wide-front offensive, overestimating Red Army strength while underestimating logistics and fuel shortages. The result was a cascade of rushed operations, poor coordination, and insufficient artillery support, tempered by pockets of resilience at lower levels. On the German side, logistical strain, winter conditions, the Luftwaffe’s varied effectiveness, and stiff Soviet pressure forced ad hoc German withdrawals and rearguard acts. Brutal fighting broke out around Lake Ilmen, Volkhov, and the Bryansk corridor, with dramatic German political-military frictions and punitive measures for commanders who disobeyed or failed.  This episode is Back to Königsberg Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The Soviet Army had launched relentless attacks across the USSR against Army Group North and Army Group Center. Both groups had been driven into crisis, with breaches opening up at multiple points along their lines. Soviet formations continued to press deep behind German lines. Army Group Center faced a serious threat of encirclement, while Manstein conducted attacks in Crimea.  After their three-day rest, the Volkhov Front had restarted their offensive on the 13th. This time, they fought with better organization and artillery support, although ammunition remained in short supply. Despite these improvements, the offensive still faced the challenge of being directed through roadless, snow-covered frozen swampland. This further strained the already stretched logistics, causing extreme shortages of all supplies. Moreover, Meretskov once again failed to concentrate strength against single points, instead dispersing his efforts over a wide area. With the offensive not meeting expectations, Meretskov continually begged for further reinforcements throughout the entire week. On the 19th january STAVKA sent 3,000 PPSh submachine guns (my favorite gun from Call of duty world at war) and 300 antitank rifles and released 9 ski battalions and an aerosleigh transport battalion to his control. The 2nd Shock Army moved to attack the junction of the 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions. The 126th had only recently arrived from France and was still acclimating to the harsh winter conditions. As the Soviet assault struck, they began to panic, allowing the 2nd Shock Army to push into the German defensive line. Yet the main strongpoints west of the Volkhov and Tigoda rivers withstood the assault. The flanking 4th and 52nd Armies achieved even less, and both units shifted to a defensive posture by the 15th. After regrouping, Klykov launched another assault on the 17th. With the support of over 1,500 sorties from the VVS, the 2nd Shock Army managed to pierce the first layer of German defenses and advanced up to 10 kilometers. Yet many vital German strongpoints remained standing, hindered by the same failures as before. David Glantz “poor command, control, and coordination, the dispersed nature of the assaults, and deteriorating weather conditions, and heavy losses.”  The Leningrad Front’s 54th Army also attacked alongside the Volkhov Front starting on the 13th. Fediuninsky repeated Meretskov’s mistake by dispersing his offensive along the entire 30-kilometer frontline rather than concentrating efforts on a single point. Despite undermining his own offensive, they managed to capture Pogostye by the 17th, confronting a heavily reinforced 269th Infantry Division. This small gain, however, did not suffice to breach the German defensive lines. The remainder of the Leningrad Front stayed relatively quiet, with only a few minor attacks mounted from Leningrad and Oranienbaum. This allowed Leeb to pull sizable detachments from three divisions on the siege lines to reinforce the divisions engaging the Volkhov Front. The Luftwaffe and SS also dispatched detachments to this sector. This setback prompted Stalin to strip the 54th Army of its right flank to expand Sukhomlin’s 8th Army. Both formations were ordered to smash the German defenses around Lodva. Afterwards, the 8th Army was to advance westward until it united with the 55th Army at Tosno. The 54th Army was still to advance to the southwest, join with the 2nd Shock Army at Liuban, and then destroy the encircled Germans. Both armies failed to gain any meaningful ground during the week. Their only benefit had been to tie down German forces in the north. As soon as the Volkhov Front had restarted its offensive, Halder immediately noted the increased pressure on Army Group North, which were already struggling with the fighting around Staraya Russa. He also recorded that Leeb wanted to withdraw, but Hitler denied permission. Halder War Diary January 13th "The southern wing of AGp. North came under heavy pressure today as the result of an attack against 123d Division by elements of four divisions across the frozen lakes. Von Leeb is at once thinking of withdrawing. Fuehrer disapproves." Halder reasoned that a withdrawal would create a massive gap between Army Group North and Army Group Center. This forced Leeb to issue an ultimatum on the 15th: either he would be relieved, or he would be granted permission to retreat south of Lake Ilmen. “Leeb asked either that he be relieved or that he be allowed to order the retreat [south of Lake Il'men'] while he still had some room for maneuver." Halder “Put all of the powers of the General Staff in motion . . . and extirpate this mania for operation. The army group has a clear mission to hold and the highest command will assume all the risk." Two days later, Hitler removed Leeb on grounds of health and replaced him with Küchler. Leeb’s chief of staff was also replaced. By the 11th, the 188th Rifle Division reached the outskirts of Staraya Russa. This move severed the only road supplying the 2nd Corps at Demiansk. They were followed by two more rifle divisions, all preparing to assault the vital town. Inside Staraya Russa stood about 6,500 Germans defending a 31-kilometer perimeter. One third were hastily armed construction or Luftwaffe personnel. The remainder came from the 18th Motorised Division and reconnaissance troops from the SS Totenkopf. Although infantry was lacking, the garrison was relatively well supplied, with 28 large-caliber artillery pieces and mortars alongside four 88mm Flak guns. However, the city’s defenses were organized to the east, north, and west; only the southern sector was held by support troops. From the 12th, Morozov attempted to exploit the situation by attempting to envelop the city with three ski battalions and a rifle regiment. On the 13th they attacked the unguarded southwestern sector of Staraya Russa. Two battalions managed to cut the main road to Shimsk and the railway line. Erdemannsdorff mounted a desperate counterattack with artillerymen and rear-area troops. This destroyed the two battalions that had entered the city but could not dislodge the troops encircling it. With the railway severed, the garrison was now entirely dependent on Luftflotte 1 for aerial resupply. Following the failure of the flanking attack, Morozov brought up artillery to shell the garrison into submission. Meanwhile, the 10th Army Corps threw every possible formation into the line to contain the Soviet advance. This included the SS police battalions normally reserved for rear-line security. Hasen also began planning a counterattack, using the slowly arriving battalions from the 81st Infantry Division. This week, the 34th Army launched its attack on the 290th Division. Its strongpoints were too widely spread to mutually support one another, allowing easy infiltration between them. Rapidly, their supply lines were cut and then picked off one by one. Once the breach in the line grew large enough, they sent the 202nd Rifle Division to cut the Lychkovo railway line. The 290th Infantry Division was now trapped between both the 11th and 34th Armies. At the same time, the 3rd Army finally managed to concentrate enough forces to make advances led by the 257th and 31st Rifle Divisions. These divisions pushed into the rear of the 123rd Infantry Division, slowly forcing it to abandon its strongpoints to avoid encirclement. This allowed the Army to press toward Kholm and compelled General Rauch to reorganize his line to cover this penetration. At Kholm, a makeshift force of infantry and SS police units was being formed. The first elements of the 218th Infantry Division arriving were rushed by truck toward Kholm, accompanied by large stocks of supplies. The rest of the division, with an attached artillery regiment, would be sent as soon as more transport became available. Meanwhile, the 4th Shock Army pressed on toward Toropets. Roughly halfway from Peno, the 60,000-strong shock army met a 3,800-strong blocking detachment from the German 189th Infantry Regiment, dug in near Okhvat to buy time for reinforcements.

    34 min

  5. JAN 8

    Eastern Front #32 Stalin’s General offensive: Reinforcing Failure

    Last time we spoke about Hitler stealing his Armies trains. The year trudged in with a cruel frost as the Eastern Front lurched into a new phase. Zhukov’s Soviet offensives pressed the German lines around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin, not with elegant strategy but with tenacious, grinding persistence. Across the German rear, Hitler’s halting edicts and internecine debates with generals sowed hesitancy, while Kluge’s cautious withdrawals offered few clear strategic answers. Yet within the chaos, a stubborn, almost improvised discipline, Auftragstaktik at the lower levels, kept pockets of cohesion, even as higher echelons floundered. Trains became lifelines and, at times, liabilities: routes clogged by civilian control, fuel dwindling, and spare parts vanishing. The front oscillated between sieges, counterattacks, and painstaking withdrawals along the central and northern sectors, as both sides endured frostbite and morale drains.  This episode is Stalin’s General offensive: Reinforcing Failure Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Stalin on January 5th, 1942 “The Germans are in disarray as a result of their defeat at Moscow, they are badly fitted out for the winter. This is the most favourable moment for the transition to a general offensive” Stavka planned once again to encircle and destroy Army Group Center with attacks launched from the North-Western, Kalinin, Western, and Bryansk Fronts. Simultaneously, the Leningrad, North-Western, and Volkhov Fronts, supported by the Baltic Fleet, were tasked with encircling and destroying Army Group North. In Ukraine, the Southwestern and Southern Fronts were directed to liberate Donbas, while the Caucasus Front would reconquer Crimea. Zhukov and Voznesenskii raised objections, arguing that the Red Army should concentrate its resources to smash Army Group Center rather than spreading strength and resources across the entire USSR. Zhukov “On the Western axis, where there is the most favourable set of conditions and [where] the enemy has not yet succeeded in re-establishing the combat efficiency of his units, we must continue offensive operations, but for successful offensive operations it is essential to reinforce our forces with men, equipment and to build up reserves, above all tank units, without which we can have no basis for anticipating particular success. As for offensive operations by our forces at Leningrad and on the South-Western axis, then it must be pointed out that our troops face formidable enemy defences. Without powerful artillery for support they will not be able to break through the enemy positions, they will be ground down and will suffer heavy, not to say unjustifiable losses. I am all for reinforcing the Western Front and mounting the most powerful offensive operations there.”  However, these objections were quickly dismissed by Stalin. In fact, Stavka had already issued directives for this offensive before that meeting began. Stalin’s detachment from frontline realities meant that the partial victories at Rostov, Tikhvin, and Moscow had led him to believe that Ostheer was on the brink of collapse. He planned to drain German manpower reserves during the winter and to raise new Soviet forces in the interior. Stalin’s 10 January directive  “Our task is to deny the Germans this breathing space, to drive them to the west without a halt, to force them to expend their reserves before spring, when we will have new and large reserves, and the Germans will have no large reserves, and to thus secure complete defeat of the Hitlerite forces in the year 1942”. Stahel later claimed that the Red Army had only 600 heavy tanks and 800 medium tanks still functional. Rather than concentrating these diminished assets in a single sector, the plan called for dispersal across the USSR. Stalin’s isolation from actual conditions caused him to overestimate the Red Army’s capabilities, attributing potential offensive failures to artillery coordination gaps rather than to broader weaknesses within the officer corps. “Often we send the infantry into an attack against the enemy’s defense line without artillery, without any artillery support whatsoever, and after that we complain that the infantry won’t go against an enemy who has dug in and is defending himself. It is clear, however, that such an “offensive” cannot yield the desired effect. It is not an offensive but a crime—a crime against the Motherland and against the troops which are forced to suffer senseless losses”. This detachment from reality was a direct consequence of the purges. No one wished to relay bad news up the chain of command. As a result, reports were sanitized and exaggerated by the time they reached Stavka and Stalin, while orders were followed blindly to avoid taking responsibility for failures. While Meretskov’s Volkhov Front had been engaged in the Tikhvin Offensive, STAVKA had been planning a far larger and far more ambitious offensive in tandem with the Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts. Soviet planning documents believed these Fronts to hold one and a half times as many soldiers as the opposing German forces. Despite the numerous problems and delays facing the combatant Front, Stalin insisted that these problems be ignored and that the rigid timetable be followed. Meretskov, however, also appears to bear partial responsibility for the rushed push, as referenced in a later conversation with STAVKA. Meretskov’s 10th January phone conversation with Stalin and Vasilevsky: "The Russians have a saying: 'Haste makes waste.' With you it is happening exactly like this. Without properly preparing the offensive, you were in a haste to launch it and wasted time. If you remember, I proposed to postpone the offensive until Sokolov's army is ready. You refused and now are reaping the fruits of your haste." The Leningrad Front had led the offensive initially. On the 4th, the 54th Army once again pushed against Kashira and the surrounding villages, managing to gain only 5 kilometers after two days of fighting. Then the 12th Panzer Division arrived and counterattacked, driving Fediunin-sky’s army back to its starting positions. The attack had been so weak that German sources barely paid attention to it. Halder’s War Diary was exceedingly dismissive.  Halder’s War Diary.  “North. Continued enemy attacks, but nothing on a major scale.”  On the 6th, the Volkhov Front launched an attack despite still concentrating its forces. It would not be until the 12th that all infantry and artillery elements of the Front completed their deployments. Infantry moved forward without adequate support, and reserves were frequently not in position to capitalize on any initial gains. The rush also caused fuel and ammunition shortages to plague the offensive. Worse still, their attacks repeatedly collided with German strongpoints, headbutting them over and over without decisive breakthroughs. Their main offensive began on the 6th and 7th. The 59th Army attempted to expand the Volkhov bridgeheads. Wave after wave of poorly supported infantry futilely attacked, yielding no gains. The 59th Army’s official history. “The regiments of the army's first-echelon divisions rose up to attack in the morning after short artillery barrages. Deep snow hindered the advance, and the subunits managed to cross the Volkhov River, whose width reached up to 400 meters, on the ice, and were immediately exposed to enemy flanking fire. The enemy met the attackers with intense fire from large-caliber machine guns from pillboxes located along the forward edge and from all of types of rifle weapons. Artillery and mortars fired from the depths. Wounded and dead began appearing in the combat ranks. However, despite the enemy's strong resistance, separate subunits managed to overcome the river and dig in on the Volkhov River's western bank. The battle lasted many hours. The soldiers rose up to attack time and time again but, after encountering destructive fires, were forced back. At nightfall, in many sectors the attacking units withdrew to their jumpingoff positions.” Yet Meretskov’s report to STAVKA was more optimistic, claiming heavy enemy losses. It does admit, however, that the 2nd Shock Army was about to launch an assault without fuel, food, artillery, or air support, among other shortages. Unsurprisingly, the 2nd Shock Army’s attack on the 7th proved disastrous, suffering 3,000 casualties in just the first 30 minutes of their assault. Stalin, however, pushed both armies onward until the 9th, after which the attacks collapsed from exhaustion and confusion. Meretskov managed to secure a three-day halt from STAVKA on the 10th. This development prompted Stalin to dispatch Mekhlis to “supervise” Meretskov. There, Mekhlis uncovered several deficiencies, such as missing artillery pieces and spare parts, and issued orders to address the problems. Another issue that became apparent was the evident incompetence of Sokolov, who was replaced by Klykov. However, Mekhlis would soon gain a reputation as a harbinger of military disaster. STAVKA had recognized that the area south of Lake Ilmen was very lightly held, and believed this pr

    37 min

  6. JAN 1

    Eastern Front #31 Hitler steals the Army’ Trains

    Last time we spoke about the beginning of 1942. The Red Army pushed against Army Group Center, with Zhukov pressing to push the front back toward pre-Typhoon positions and threatening encirclements around Kaluga, Volokolamsk, and Kalinin. Soviet offensives, however, were hampered by chaotic officer training, rapid but ill-coordinated replacements, and severe winter shortages in equipment, fuel, and winter clothing, which undermined combat efficiency and morale. On the German side, there were intense internecine frictions at the highest levels: Hitler’s halt orders, Guderian’s resistance, and Kluge’s cautious attempts to withdraw where necessary. Autonomy at lower echelons, embodied in Auftragstaktik, allowed some flexible withdrawals behind the front to avoid total collapse, but high-level indecision and miscommunications contributed to disjointed German defense and intermittent retreats.  This episode is Hitler steals the Army’ Trains Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As 1941 draws to a close, the Soviet Tikhvin counteroffensive has finally ground to a halt, exhausted from the relentless fighting. Meanwhile, STAVKA shifts its focus to attempts to encircle and destroy Army Group Centre, pressing for decisive gains even as the front line buckles under pressure. They’re hammered by crises from every side as the German defenses hold, while the officer corps sometimes resembles an amateur drama troupe under the stress. The only major German offensive on the horizon faces an additional threat from new Soviet amphibious operations around Crimea.  Since the start of the invasion, Germany has suffered 621,308 wounded, 173,722 dead, 35,873 missing and this represents  25.96% of the Eastern Army which is about 3.2 million. Soviet casualty figures are notoriously hard to pin down and remain highly contested. In Colossus Reborn, historian David Glantz puts total Soviet casualties for 1941 at 566,852 combat deaths, 235,339 noncombat dead, 2,335,482 MIA and POW. 1,256,421 wounded in action. 66,169 sick. And lastly 13,557 cases of frostbite. Other historians argue the total could be significantly higher, by several million. Civilian losses in 1941 for the USSR are unknown, but estimates suggest they were extremely heavy. Despite these staggering losses, both Stalin and Hitler remained convinced that victory would come in 1942. STAVKA’s optimism and its tolerance for high Soviet casualties were bolstered, in part, by Soviet reports that absurdly claimed 300,000 German soldiers had been killed between 06 December 1941 and 15 January 1942. The December offensives pushed the German line back across the USSR, but they failed to capitalize on any single breakthrough. Now, the Germans have reformed their front, and the push must begin again. Instead of concentrating at one focal point, the burden of the next Soviet offensives is spread across the entire Ostheer, extending the strain and the risk for the German defense. General Nikolai Khlebnikov in his memoir. “Theoretically, in principle, everyone agreed that what would provide for the success of the offensive was decisive superiority over the enemy on the decisive sector of the front. However, in practice … this axiom of military theory was certainly not adhered to in all instances. It hence often happened, that a well thought out deep thrust turned into a series of frontal attacks which only “expelled” the enemy, rather than resulting in his encirclement and destruction”.  Throughout this week, Meretskov’s Volkhov Front continued to attack in an effort to expand their bridgeheads across the Volkhov River, but the efforts met with little success. By 03 January, those bridgeheads were halted due to exhaustion and mounting fatigue. The Soviets also faced a looming logistical crisis, and Stalin’s exhortations could not push them any further. Any additional offensives would have to wait. On the positive side, they had managed to drive the Germans back to their pre-Tikhvin offensive starting points, with the exception of the villages around Kirishi. On the downside, Soviet hopes to encircle and destroy the German offensive force had failed miserably. As this unfolded, the Northwestern Front slowly prepared for its own offensive operations between Lake Ilmen and Selizharovo, and toward Velikie Luki. The plan was to capture Demiansk and Staraya Russa, then sever Army Group North’s withdrawal routes. This operation was expected to be conducted in cooperation with the Volkhov Front’s next offensive. In Leningrad, food supplies continued to dwindle inside the city, even as the flow of sustenance via the Road of Life showed some improvement. The situation reached a low point in early January, with stockpiles down to two days of food and only 217,000 tons of fuel remaining. 980 tons of flour, 2.9 tons of barley, 815 tons of soybeans, 11 tons of malt, 427.7 tons of slab fat, and 1.1 tons of bran. Frantic efforts were directed at pushing the Road of Life even further. It would not be until 18 January that the ice roads would be able to meet all of the mandated norms for the Leningrad Front. During this period, the ice roads faced increasing air attacks and small infantry raids from Finnish and German forces. As a result, the Leningrad Front was compelled to allocate substantial rifle units and naval infantry, alongside heavy anti-aircraft emplacements, to safeguard Leningrad’s lifeline. The PVO Protivovozdushnoy oborony fielded 200 mid-caliber antiaircraft guns, 50 small caliber guns, 100 antiaircraft machine guns, and 100 searchlights to defend against enemy aircraft. Logistical problems also plagued Germany. On 15 December, the Chief of Wehrmacht Transport, Rudolf Gercke, reported that the Ostheer required 300 trains per day to stay fully supplied. However, shortages of coal, personnel, and other shortfalls meant that only 122 trains could be sent per day by 17 December. That figure was grossly inflated: in reality, only 53 trains were sent each day. 1,643 trains arrived through the entirety of December (58 less than November) fpr the Ostheer. Back in November Army Group Center required 31 trains for basic subsistence but only received 16. By the end of December, Hitler would notice the stark discrepancy between promised trains and actual supply deliveries, prompted by adjutants who had visited the front. In response, all rail operations were transferred to the Reich Ministry of Transport. As a result, the Army lost control of its own supply apparatus, handing it over to civilian administrations running the occupied territories. Under the OKH, rail traffic control was chaotic at best and, at times, trains vanished as local authorities hijacked them. The wounded froze to death on stalled hospital trains, and stockpiles were raided by divisions already low on supplies. Spare parts for repairing tanks and trucks were fiercely contested, and occasionally fighting erupted between teams dispatched by different divisions. This lack of spare parts is also a large reason why so few captured soviet tanks were put into commission. Most of them needed repairs to be useful but repairing the masses of broken German vehicles took priority.  There was also a massive shortage of trucks and the fuel to move even that small number of vehicles. While each Army was estimated to need up to 3,000 tons of supplies per day, the 2nd Panzer Army was averaging only 360 tons daily, with all other armies in similar plights. This situation was worsened by trucks often being hijacked by divisions and sent back to Germany for supplies. In one notable instance, the 19th Panzer Division sent a truck all the way back to Spandau, Berlin, to bring back utterly vital equipment, sausage production machinery. Despite these supply problems, copious amounts of alcohol appeared for soldiers not on the frontline as a bitter but festive release to celebrate the New Year. Alcohol provided one of the few escapes from the horrors of the Eastern Front for many on both sides. Alcohol and drug abuse would rise in the Wehrmacht following Operation Barbarossa. 1800 would die of alcohol or drug abuse between 1939-1944. Three quarters were from denatured alcohol poisoning and 95.9% were after the invasion started. Soviets and Germans also unleashed massive artillery barrages on each other, which included flare rounds to mark the start of 1942. Diary of Franz Leiprecht “The whole section of front began a hellish shooting. Flares of all colors brightened the sky. Yes, our guns even sent a few New Year’s greetings to the enemy.” On the 28th, the Germans deployed a new shell type for the first time. With these, a Panzer IV managed to knock out two T-34 tanks at a range of 1 km with a single shell each. General Kluge had repeatedly begged for the newly developed hollow-charge warheads to be released, and it had taken until the 22nd for Halder and Hitler to be worn down. Kluge had effectively given Halder an ultimatum, insisting that unless these warheads were issued, his infantry would have no choice but to retreat from Soviet tank attacks. These shells helped alleviate the tank-panic phenomena that had plagued the German infantry in Decembe

    37 min

  7. 12/25/2025

    Eastern Front #30 Kluge’s Ultimatum, Guderian goes rogue

    Last time we spoke about the end of the first year of the eastern front. The Red Army pressed on Army Group Center, while Meretskov’s Volkhov Front prepared a Leningrad breakout despite crippled supply lines. In Leningrad, famine worsened; cannibalism surfaced and NKVD records show arrests, even as the Kirov Tank Factory kept producing tanks. The Baltic/Sevastopol fronts saw stubborn resistance: the Soviet submarine fleet, though hampered by ice and poor training, managed limited successes; five transports, a submarine, and two tankers sunk by year’s end. Army Group North protected the Leningrad corridor against repeated Soviet attempts to sever it, while Meretskov’s 4th and 54th Armies attempted operations west and south of Lake Ladoga to relieve the siege. In Army Group Center, Hitler’s retreats were banned, but local withdrawals continued, fueling a leadership crisis as Zhukov exploited gaps and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps disrupted Kaluga and Sukhinichi. Guderian’s retreat sparked relief demands and Guderian’s removal. On the southern and Crimean fronts, Sevastopol withstood heavy pressure; Kerch and Feodosia saw mixed Soviet landings and German counterattacks, with Petrov’s defense holding deep into late December.  This episode is Kluge’s Ultimatum, Guderian goes rogue  Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The early successes of the Soviet winter offensives gave STAVKA a surge of confidence and a growing sense that the war might tilt decisively in their favor. Yet these gains also created friction at the very top of the German high command, where worry and uncertainty began to ripple through the ranks. With the battlefield opening up and the prospect of a sweeping Soviet victory on the horizon, Soviet forces found themselves pressed into a brutal, grinding struggle—what many historians describe as a meatgrinder, as they pressed to push the German invaders back and potentially destroy them. The scale of the effort was immense, and the cost in men and materiel rose quickly as the fighting intensified. Hitler faced a high-stakes decision, weighing whether to back a rapid counterstroke under the seasoned general Hans von Kluge or to lean into the more aggressive, rapid-moving approach associated with Heinz Guderian. The choice would signal not only a tactical shift but a broader strategic direction for the German war effort in the east. The massive losses of 1941, followed by a rapid and extensive buildup of replacement formations, placed enormous strain on the Soviet officer corps. In an effort to accelerate commissions, the requirements were drastically lowered: six years of general education and no criminal record were deemed sufficient for a lieutenant’s bar. As a result, a large majority of junior officers lacked formal military education or professional skills. Lieutenant-General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, 10th Army, in Feb 1942 - [His Headquarters staff were] “poorly selected and of low competence. Moreover the poor tactical capabilities of forces led to many mistakes in combat: to frontal assaults, sluggish action, inadequate provision of fire-support when advancing, to inadequacies in co-operation and also to unnecessary losses. The army operated without a fully prepared rear, without regular deliveries of munitions, fuel and provisions. Divisional and army level horse-drawn transports fell behind.” Compounding the problem was the brutal pace of casualties. With so many officers killed or wounded before they could gain on‑the‑job experience, the Red Army often learned through trial and error under intense pressure rather than through thorough, prepared instruction. Personal autonomy within the Red Army was also severely restricted. A telling example: one officer attempted to delay an offensive by a single day, only to discover how little leeway there was for independent decision‑making within the command structure. Taken together, these factors help explain many of the officer corps’ failures that historians have highlighted. They also shed light on why Soviet propaganda tended to spotlight the most senior leaders, like Georgy Zhukov, who would soon become a symbol of unqualified success in the public imagination of the USSR, even as the deeper realities on the ground were more complex and contested. The mass recruitment and rapid buildup also strained Soviet logistics. Not only was heavy equipment in short supply, but shortages of essential winter gear and field kitchens began to appear as the campaign wore on. These logistical gaps further limited the effectiveness of Soviet troops in the brutal winter conditions, compounding the already severe challenges on the front. Stahel recalled “The Western Front’s initial request for 340,000 sets of winter clothing was met in full, but a subsequent request on October 29 for a further 558,000 sets fell woefully short and meant that even elite guards units were sometimes inadequately clothed.”  This week, Stalin sent a series of caustic messages to the newly formed Volkhov Front for failing to achieve the rapid and dramatic gains he demanded. STAVKA had expected the Volkhov Front to seize its jumping-off points and complete its force concentrations for the next stage of the offensive by the 26th. Spurred on by this pressure, the 4th and 52nd Armies pushed to the riverline between Kirishi and Novgorod and began expanding bridgeheads across the river by the 27th. Yet Ivanov’s 4th Army fell short of securing its objective at Tigoda station, leaving that target incomplete. At the same time, the 54th Army continued fruitless assaults on Kirishi and the surrounding villages throughout the week, yielding no gains. To strengthen the defense, Leeb reinforced the Volkhov strongpoint with the 291st and 269th divisions from Leningrad, converting the town into the linchpin of the Volkhov defensive line. Beyond German resistance, adverse weather further hampered Soviet troop movements. Acknowledging the realities on the ground, the next phase of the offensive was postponed until early January and would be launched in a staggered sequence rather than a single, sweeping push. On Christmas Day, Leeb sought to frame the events as a German victory in an address to his troops. “In the battles on and to the east of the Volkhov—as well as in the withdrawal of the front into a secure winter position behind the Volkhov — you have again met the highest requirements of defensive power and of physical resiliency in fulfilling the mission. The enemy arrives at the Volkhov empty-handed. Since 22 June and up to 20 December, Army Group North has taken 438,950 prisoners and captured or destroyed 3,847 tanks and 4,590 guns. We reverendy bow our heads to those who have given their lives. TheHomeland thanks us for having protected it and counts on us in the future. We shall justify this trust. The New Year will find us ready to repel all enemy breakthrough efforts until the Fuehrer calls on us again to resume the attack”. Yet, as had become common with German claims of success since the invasion began, the casualty tallies told a different story. The Tikhvin offensive failed to achieve its operational and strategic aims. The plan called for encircling the 54th Army, linking up with Finnish forces at the Sver river, and cutting off supplies to Leningrad. None of these objectives were completed. Historian David Glantz estimates that the Soviets suffered about 190,000 casualties across the Tikhvin offensive, the counterattacks, and the broader operations around Leningrad, drawn from a force of roughly 300,000 troops deployed since October. By contrast, the Germans employed around 180,000 soldiers in the same sector, incurring approximately 45,000 casualties. Across the frontline, many German officers used their Christmas addresses to persuade their men that the invasion of the USSR was a holy crusade, hoping to reinvigorate the troops with a renewed sense of purpose. By contrast, the Soviets treated Christmas as an opportunity to strike at German morale. One stark example was a so-called “Christmas card,” depicting a snowy landscape dominated by crosses with German helmets hanging on them, captioned simply “Living space in the east.” Halder hosted two massive Christmas parties on December 24, hosting his closest associates and enjoying a rare moment of festive cheer while the rest of the Wehrmacht endured a harsh winter as Soviet offensives raged along the front. Both sides seized any chance to disrupt the other’s calendar, turning holidays into elements of psychological and operational warfare. While Halder luxuriated at Mauerwald, the Ostheer faced empty stomachs or the daily reality of combat conditions. Despite the optimism in his speech, Leeb doubted his army’s ability to withstand a renewed major attack given the lack of reinforcements. The frozen swamps had stretched his frontline, and he lacked the troops to cover the exposed stretches. The withdrawn 8th and 12th Panzer divisions were forced to devote three battalions each to rear-area security, leaving only the 20th Motorised Division as a true reserve. Leeb feared a Soviet assault would strike the boundar

    38 min

  8. 12/18/2025

    Eastern Front #29 New Year, New Offensives

    Last time we spoke about the end of the first year of the eastern front. The Red Army pressed on Army Group Center, while Meretskov’s Volkhov Front prepared a Leningrad breakout despite crippled supply lines. In Leningrad, famine worsened; cannibalism surfaced and NKVD records show arrests, even as the Kirov Tank Factory kept producing tanks. The Baltic/Sevastopol fronts saw stubborn resistance: the Soviet submarine fleet, though hampered by ice and poor training, managed limited successes; five transports, a submarine, and two tankers sunk by year’s end. Army Group North protected the Leningrad corridor against repeated Soviet attempts to sever it, while Meretskov’s 4th and 54th Armies attempted operations west and south of Lake Ladoga to relieve the siege. In Army Group Center, Hitler’s retreats were banned, but local withdrawals continued, fueling a leadership crisis as Zhukov exploited gaps and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps disrupted Kaluga and Sukhinichi. Guderian’s retreat sparked relief demands and Guderian’s removal. On the southern and Crimean fronts, Sevastopol withstood heavy pressure; Kerch and Feodosia saw mixed Soviet landings and German counterattacks, with Petrov’s defense holding deep into late December. Overall, December 1941 ended with Soviet momentum, strained German logistics, and a desperate balance as winter intensified. This episode is New Year, New Offensives Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    January 1st arrived with a nation in flux. After 193 days of campaigning, a remarkable turn of events had unfolded: a shocking invasion pushed the Wehrmacht toward the gates of Moscow, and the closing weeks of 1941 saw the Red Army mounting a determined counteroffensive. Stalin had managed to keep the communist state intact against overwhelming odds, while his generals scrambled to reorganize both army and industry on the fly, improvising plans as new realities emerged on every front. By December, with German forces only kilometers from the Kremlin, the Red Army had carefully marshaled its resources and prepared to strike back. The invaders found themselves facing a reeling front and signs of growing disarray, and there was a rising sense that the long, grinding struggle might tilt in favor of the Soviets. Yet the Germans managed to hold the line. Despite being defeated in detail in several engagements, they reorganized around a new set of defensive positions and steadied their posture for the year ahead, ready to resist the anticipated Soviet push and to exploit any moment of weakness in the enemy’s momentum.   In Army Group North, what would come to be known as the Lyuban Offensive had been in the planning stages since the third week of December. The original start date was set for December 25, but delays in preparations pushed it back to after the new year. Meretskov was nominally in command of the offensive’s main effort with the Volkhov Front, yet Stalin had dispatched a coordinator from the Stavka to oversee the operation. This was Commissar Mekhlis, a figure infamous for his ruthless reputation and a readiness to discipline anyone he believed might be disobeying orders in spirit as well as in letter. According Khrushchev “He had a particularly strong influence over Stalin ... I had once been on very good terms with him ... But by the time he took over as chief of the Political Directorate I considered him a nitwit, and I was appalled that someone like him could enjoy Stalin's unbounded confidence. Mekhlis's influence did the army and the country no good.”    He was certainly a colorful character. From 6 September 1940 to June 1941, he served as People’s Commissar of State Control (Goskontrolya). During the 1939–40 war with Finland, Mekhlis was sent to the front to report to Stalin on why the Red Army was being driven back by the Finns. He attributed the defeats to treachery and had Alexei Vinogradov, Vinogradov’s chief of staff, and the chief of the political department shot in front of the troops.  In June 1941, Mekhlis was reassigned to his former post as head of the Main Political Administration and as deputy People’s Commissar of Defense. He was with Stalin on the day the Germans invaded the USSR, marking the start of Operation Barbarossa. Mekhlis received the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, equivalent to General of the Red Army. In 1942 he acted as the Stavka’s representative, serving with the high command. As part of the effort to find someone to blame for the Red Army’s disastrous setbacks in 1941, Mekhlis ordered the artillery commander on the North Western Front, Vasily Sofronovich Goncharov, to be shot at the front headquarters on 11 September 1941. Goncharov was posthumously exonerated in 2002.   Mekhlis personally encouraged the killing of German prisoners of war, contributing to the Feodosia massacre. Later on in March 1942, Mekhlis was dispatched to organize the defense of the Kerch peninsula on the Crimean Front, where he clashed with General Dmitry Timofeyevich Kozlov. In May 1942 the Red Army was driven out of Crimea by a numerically smaller German force. In his report to Stalin, Mekhlis attempted to shift blame onto Kozlov, but received a scathing telegram in response “Crimean front, t. Mekhlis: Your code message #254 (I) received. Your position of a detached observer who is not accountable for the events at the Crimean Front is puzzling. Your position may sound convenient, but it positively stinks. At the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but the responsible representative of Stavka, who is accountable for every success and failure that takes place at the Front, and who is required to correct, right there and then, any mistake made by the commanding officers. You, along with the commanding officers, will answer for failing to reinforce the left flank of the Front. If, as you say, "everything seemed to indicate that the opponent would begin an advance first thing in the morning", and you still hadn't done everything needed to repel their attack instead limiting your involvement merely to passive criticism, then you are squarely to blame. It seems that you still have not figured out that we sent you to the Crimean Front not as a government auditor but as a responsible representative of Stavka. You demand that Kozlov be replaced, that even Hindenburg would be an improvement. Yet you know full well that Soviet reserves do not have anyone named Hindenburg. The situation in Crimea is not difficult to grasp, and you should be able to take care of it on your own. Had you committed your front line aviation and used it against the opponent's tanks and infantry, the opponent would not have been able to break through our defenses and their tanks would not have rolled through it. You do not need to be a 'Hindenburg' to grasp such a simple thing after two months at the Crimean Front. Stalin”. So yeah he was a pretty bad guy. Back to our story, Mekhlis wasted no time in tightening the screws, ensuring that maximum effort was directed toward getting the field forces assembled and fully prepared for the offensive. His involvement signaled a shift toward tighter central control and intensified pressure to press the initiative despite the logistical and strategic challenges that had slowed preparations.   After days of delay, the first attack began on January 4th near Kirishi. The 1st Infantry Corps managed to hold the line, and soon the 12th Panzer Division arrived to counterattack. The 12th Panzer Division had been withdrawn from the line for a little under two weeks of refitting in Estonia. That short lull proved fruitful: the division’s repair depots managed to bring roughly seventy tanks back into service. Reconstituted and ready, the unit was then sent back into the line to act as a mobile reserve, poised to respond to changing battlefield conditions. The Soviet 4th Army was pushed back to its starting positions. By the end of the day, Meretskov had pleaded with Stalin for a three-day pause, but the request was rejected. Stalin had become convinced that the Wehrmacht was little more than a shell, and that the only thing preventing its destruction was a failure of will on the part of his commanders. In this, he was echoing the mistakes of Hitler from a few weeks earlier. Hitler remained confident that victory would come from sufficient willpower alone. Commanders were judged not on battlefield performance, but on whether their resolve satisfied Hitler’s mania for unwavering obedience. In a striking psychological mirror, Stalin proved similar in the war’s early years. One way historians summarize the Eastern Front is to say that Hitler trusted his Generals less and less, pulling ever more control into his own hands, while Stalin sought to rely on his commanders more, gradually delegating authority even as he tightened political oversight. If the Soviet Union was to win on the battlefield, more flexibility needed to be granted to the field commanders.   Things were going so badly for Germany, a large commotion about adopting chemical warfare heated up. The difficulties on the eastern front, together with rising nervousness within the Ministr

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Join us as we delve into the gripping events of the Eastern Front during World War II, week by week. Each episode uncovers battles, strategies, and personal stories, providing a detailed narrative of this pivotal theater in history. Tune in for insightful analysis and captivating tales from the frontlines.

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  • Creator
    theeasternfront
  • Years Active
    2025 - 2026
  • Episodes
    48
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    Explicit
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    The Eastern Front Week by Week

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