Centre for Independent Studies

The Centre For Independent Studies

Let’s share good ideas. 💡 The Centre for Independent Studies promotes free choice and individual liberty and the open exchange of ideas. CIS encourages debate among leading academics, politicians, media and the public. We aim to make sure good policy ideas are heard and seriously considered so that Australia can prosper.

  1. 10 MAR

    Why We Should Not Increase Capital Gains Tax by Robert Carling | Research Collection

    Read the paper at www.cis.org.au  Executive Summary. This paper is an expanded version of a submission to the Senate Select Committee on the Operation of the Capital Gains Tax Discount. The author gave evidence to the Committee at a hearing on 25 February, 2026. Although there is much public discussion of the capital gains tax discount, there is no proposal from government on the table for us to respond to — only rumours and speculation — so our comments are broad-ranging and not confined to housing. As well as the submission, there have been three relevant research publications on CGT issued by the CIS in 2009, 2015 and 2019. Perusal of those publications will show that we do not think much of proposals to reduce the CGT discount. If three publications looks like an obsession, we have had a lot to say on the issue because calls for the discount to be cut or eliminated have been a persistent theme of tax policy debate ever since the defeat of the Howard government, which put the 50% discount in place in 1999. Along with superannuation concessions and negative gearing, the discount has been a favourite whipping boy. Cutting the discount is variously seen as a key plank of tax reform, a revenue-raising measure, the key to lowering house prices, and a solution to intergenerational and vertical inequality. Our submission argues that it is none of those things, or at least not in significant measure, and that the 50% discount is justified. In brief, we make the following points: The principle of taxing nominal capital gains at lower rates than ordinary income is unexceptional and was recognised in Australia’s first model of CGT in 1985. The 50% discount in 1999 replaced what was essentially a different form of discount in the 1985 model based on indexing the cost base of assets to CPI inflation combined with an averaging scheme that limited the effect of lumpy capital gains pushing taxpayers into higher tax brackets. The pre-1999 arrangements produced a variable discount, but for average rates of return on assets and inflation rates and various asset holding periods it can be demonstrated that the effective discount often fell in the 30–45% range — and that is leaving aside the additional benefit of averaging. The point is that the 50% discount is not much more generous than the average result of the policy it replaced. To those who say the 50% discount over-compensates for inflation, in some cases it does and in some it compensates or even under-compensates, but the key point is that it was never intended solely to compensate for inflation. It was meant to be a general incentive for saving and investment, which is needed now more than ever in view of stagnant productivity. On housing, several researchers have estimated that cutting the CGT discount would reduce house prices by a few per cent while increasing rents by a similar amount. These effects are tiny relative to other influences on prices and rents. CGT affects much more in the investment world than housing, so housing considerations should not drive CGT policy. The claimed revenue costs of the discount vastly overstate the revenue that could be gained from any reasonable change. The claimed distribution of that revenue cost across income deciles is meaningless. Cutting the CGT discount would barely move the dial on income and wealth distribution. Changing the CGT discount on its own is not tax reform, but it could have a place in broad tax reform that substantially reduces marginal rates and reduces the large disparities in the tax treatment of different forms of saving. However, nobody in government is talking about that. The key conclusion is that there is a very strong case for some form of tax concession for capital gains relative to full marginal rates. This concession should go beyond simply allowing for inflation. While various structures are possible to satisfy this condition, the current 50% discount (and one-third discount for superannuation funds) has the advantage of being simple and well understood. It has been the basis for investment decisions over the past 26 years and is therefore entrenched in the accumulated stock of investments. There is no strong case for changing it. Read the paper at www.cis.org.au

    39 min
  2. 4 MAR

    Growth that Builds: Beyond the immigration blame game by Marian Tupy | Research Collection

    Immigration and housing affordability have become politically inseparable in contemporary Australia. With rents high, home ownership increasingly out of reach, and housing supply persistently undershooting official targets, it is tempting to conclude that fewer migrants would mean lower prices. That argument has intuitive appeal. More people require more homes. In tightly-constrained markets, additional demand pushes up rents and prices. But intuition is not policy. The evidence suggests a more nuanced reality: migration increases housing demand, yet whether that demand translates into sustained price pressure depends fundamentally on the responsiveness of supply. Where planning systems restrict land use, delay approvals, and cap density, even modest demand shocks quickly become price shocks. Where supply is flexible and institutions allow building to respond, the long-term affordability effects are far smaller — and can even be offset by stronger economic and housing growth. This paper argues that Australia’s housing crisis is primarily a supply failure, not simply a headcount problem.  It examines international and Australian evidence on migration and housing markets, including research on zoning restrictions, supply elasticity, and labour bottlenecks in construction. It also considers the role of skilled migration in strengthening the productive capacity of the economy — particularly in the very occupations needed to design, approve and build more homes. The central point is straightforward. Australia does not face a binary choice between skilled migration and affordable housing. It faces a policy choice between maintaining restrictive land-use systems that convert growth into scarcity, or reforming those systems so that population growth can be absorbed through construction rather than capitalised into higher prices. In short, the housing shortage is not an inevitable consequence of migration. It is the predictable result of constrained supply. The choice is not ‘immigration or affordability’In Australia today, mass immigration is a political non-starter partly because many voters see the increased cost of housing as one of the country’s most urgent cost-of-living problems. A more plausible approach to immigration is narrower and more practical: a focused intake of skilled migrants who can help Australia innovate, raise productivity, and fill capability gaps without automatically worsening housing shortages. True, a growing population raises housing demand, but the size of the cost effect depends on whether supply can respond. Skilled migrants can strengthen the supply side of the economy, including the people and systems needed to approve, design, and build more homes. In that sense, the real choice should not be ‘immigration or affordability’.  It should be whether Australia combines skilled immigration with faster homebuilding and better land-use rules. Australia’s housing shortage and the concomitant affordability decline is real, as Sam Fox and I noted in a recent CIS report. But it does not follow that more skilled immigration must make matters worse. The key word is must. In a city where housing supply is fixed, adding more people pushes up rents and prices. In a city where supply can expand, the same population growth can be absorbed with much smaller price effects; especially over time. The research supports both parts of that claim. The argument is not that demand disappears. The argument is that policy and supply response decide whether demand becomes a lasting affordability problem.Start with the point that critics get right. Albert Saiz’s well-known U.S. study finds that immigration inflows raise local rents and housing values in destination cities, with an estimated effect of about 1% on rents and values for an inflow equal to 1% of a city’s population. That is a real demand effect that no serious account of the housing problem should deny. But Saiz’s broader work shows that housing supply differs sharply across cities because of geography and regulation. In plain language, some places can build — but don’t. If a city’s house building program is constrained by planning rules, height limits, approval delays, and political veto points, then any demand shock, including migration, turns into a price shock faster. If supply is flexible, more of the shock turns into construction. Read the whole paper at www.cis.org.au

    17 min

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Let’s share good ideas. 💡 The Centre for Independent Studies promotes free choice and individual liberty and the open exchange of ideas. CIS encourages debate among leading academics, politicians, media and the public. We aim to make sure good policy ideas are heard and seriously considered so that Australia can prosper.

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