Ask Carlo™ | Private Equity, Simplified

Carlo Schneider

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Investing
Updated weekly

How do investors turn millions into billions? Every Tuesday, one real deal - the strategies, the industries, the outcomes. From leveraged buyouts to venture capital. Manufacturing to fashion. Infrastructure to classic cars. Thirty years inside European private markets, now shared through storytelling.

14 Sept

Episode #21: How Aurelius bought The Body Shop for £207 million and lost it in 7 weeks

A beauty brand that stood on every European high street. Roughly 3.000 shops at its peak. Founded in Brighton in 1976 by a woman who believed cosmetics could be ethical. In November 2023, a private equity firm bought it, at a headline value of roughly 238 million euros. Ninety days later, the British business was insolvent. More than 80 stores closed. More than 750 people lost their jobs. And this August, the administrators confirmed that the suppliers, the landlords, even the charities, will recover between 16 and 27 cents for every euro they are owed. The buyer? According to reporting by The Telegraph, it had paid roughly 4 million euros upfront. This is special situations investing: who buys companies in trouble, what they actually pay, and who carries the loss when the plan fails. And then, the second act: the rescue nobody expected. Season 3 of Ask Carlo starts now. Episode 21: The 90 Day Collapse.
20 Jul

Episode #20: How a Family Sold 80 % of Rimowa to LVMH and Won

In April 2026, LVMH reported falling sales in its fashion and leather goods division, and one maison was singled out for growth: Rimowa, the 128-year-old suitcase maker from Cologne. In the Season 2 finale of Ask Carlo | Private Equity, Simplified, Carlo Schneider tells the story of the family that self-funded for 118 years, never took a minority investor, and then sold 80 % to LVMH in 2016 for 640 million euros, on its own terms. This episode explains growth equity: the private equity strategy that buys minority stakes in proven, profitable, fast-growing companies. Why founders take it, what it costs them, and why the Morszeck family chose a strategic buyer instead. With the LVMH pattern (Loro Piana, Rimowa), the financial-buyer pattern (Eurazeo and Moncler, Exor and Christian Louboutin), and the transformation that followed the deal: the 2018 rebrand, the wholesale cull, the Supreme collaboration that sold out in roughly 35 seconds, and prices up roughly 74 % on the classic aluminium cabin case. ----------------------------------------------------- Inside this episode: • The April 2026 quarter in which only one LVMH fashion maison grew • Act One: the 4 ways a winning family company can fund its growth, with 2025 European market figures • Act Two: Rimowa from 1898 to the 640 million euros deal and the LVMH transformation • Act Three: the pattern: Loro Piana, Moncler, Louboutin, and what the market says in 2026 • Jargon Buster: the strategic buyer versus the financial buyer • Ask Carlo: Maria in Madrid on why the family sold a majority, not a minority • The Numbers: the organic growth rate, decoded with LVMH's 2025 figures • Closing: the Season 2 finale insight, and a first look at Season 3 ----------------------------------------------------- This is the final episode of Season 2. Ask Carlo returns with Season 3 after a holiday break. Season 3 opens with special situations investing: the story of a European high-street beauty icon that met private equity and was insolvent within 3 months. Subscribe for a new episode every Tuesday at 6:00 AM CET, and find the written edition on Substack: askcarlo.substack.com Questions for the Ask Carlo segment: leave a comment or reach out on LinkedIn or Instagram. ----------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer: This content is educational only. It is not investment advice. Carlo is not recommending you buy anything; he is showing you how professional investors think. Always consult qualified professionals before making investment decisions.
6 Jul

Episode #19: The 1.000 Euro Share (Porsche)

In April 2026, Porsche Automobil Holding SE, the family holding that owns the majority voting rights in Volkswagen, reported a quarterly loss of 923 million euros on a single 1,3 billion euros writedown of its Volkswagen shares. It followed a 20 billion euros full-year loss in 2024. The Porsche and Piëch families are approximately 25 billion euros poorer on paper than they were 24 months ago. They have not sold a share. The structure that produced this loss was designed in a 5-day window in October 2008. Porsche disclosed 42,6 % of Volkswagen in direct shares plus 31,5 % through cash-settled options. Combined with Lower Saxony's 20 % voting stake, only 5,9 % of Volkswagen remained in the market. The share price ran from 210,85 euros to briefly above 1.000 euros in 48 hours. Volkswagen became the most valuable listed company in the world. Hedge funds lost approximately 22 billion euros. One of the most expensive single trades in stock-market history. Porsche's own 13 billion euros of debt then forced the reversal: Volkswagen absorbed Porsche AG in 2 tranches from 2009 to 2012 for approximately 8 billion euros. The family holding, Porsche SE, kept its 53,3 % voting control of Volkswagen throughout, and still holds it today. This episode uses the Porsche-Volkswagen arc to teach mezzanine finance, the capital layer that sits between senior debt and equity, and the debt-to-equity ratio as the discipline that separates surviving structures from collapsing ones. ----------------------------- Inside this episode Block 1: A 923 million euros quarterly loss and a 25 billion euros paper hole, held without a share sold Block 2: From Paris to Stuttgart, the opposite scale of the same idea BlaBlaCar taught last week Block 3: The 5-layer capital stack, the October 2008 short squeeze, the reversal, and what the family holding preserved Block 4: Mezzanine finance, explained with typical European mid-market LBO benchmarks Block 5: Andreas in Zurich asks why the Porsche-Volkswagen case teaches mezzanine Block 6: The Numbers: the debt-to-equity ratio, from Porsche AG in 2008 to Porsche SE today ----------------------------- Disclaimer This content is educational only. Not investment advice.
29 Jun

Episode #18: The 100 Million Euro Pivot

In August 2025, India became BlaBlaCar's largest carpooling market in the world. 2 million passengers in a single month, growing 50 % year on year, accounting for one third of the company's global activity. BlaBlaCar had walked away from India 7 years earlier, in 2018, after years of losses. The comeback was financed by a single transaction made in April 2024. Instead of raising another equity round at a flat 1,85 billion euros valuation, BlaBlaCar took on approximately 100 million euros of venture debt from a 5-bank syndicate: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Citi, JPMorgan, and HSBC. No new shares issued. No dilution. No valuation reset. The deal was only possible because BlaBlaCar had reached its first full year of profitability in 2023, with revenue of 253 million euros, up 29 % year on year, and a negative burn multiple. Venture debt lenders only fund companies whose unit economics already work. This episode uses BlaBlaCar's 2024 to 2025 arc to teach venture debt, the burn multiple as the qualifying metric, and the cohort of European unicorns choosing this instrument over another equity round. __________________________________ Inside this episode Block 1: India, an August 2025 milestone, and the 100 million euros that financed the comeback Block 2: From Northamptonshire to Paris, the opposite financing choice Block 3: The 3 capital choices, BlaBlaCar's pivot to debt, and the India return Block 4: Venture debt explained, with the European market context Block 5: Sanne in Rotterdam asks why more European founders do not use venture debt Block 6: The Numbers: the burn multiple, applied to BlaBlaCar's 2023 profitability __________________________________ Disclaimer This content is educational only. Not investment advice.
22 Jun

Episode #17: The Boot That Fell 80%

On 29 January 2021, the London private equity firm Permira listed the British boot maker Dr. Martens on the London Stock Exchange at a valuation of approximately 4,2 billion euros. The IPO was 8 times oversubscribed. The shares closed the first day up 22 %. It was the cleanest private-equity-to-IPO exit in European footwear of the decade. 5 years and 5 profit warnings later, the same company trades at approximately 0,87 euros per share, roughly 80 % below the IPO price of 4,20 euros. Behind the collapse, the textbook Permira playbook. In January 2014, Permira acquired R. Griggs Group, the maker of Dr. Martens, from the founding family for approximately 360 million euros. 7 years of LBO Value Creation followed: direct-to-consumer rose from 10 % to over 50 % of revenue, geographic expansion across the United Kingdom, the Americas, and Asia-Pacific, revenue tripled. The 2021 IPO returned Permira roughly 7 times its equity, a top-decile European LBO outcome. Then the public market began grading the same company by a different rulebook. A US wholesale collapse. An inventory crisis. A CEO change in April 2024. A turnaround under new CEO Ije Nwokorie, formerly of Apple, that has just delivered a 61 % rise in adjusted pre-tax profit in the year ended March 2026. The market is still waiting. This episode uses Dr. Martens' 2014 to 2026 arc to teach the 3 levers of LBO Value Creation, and what does not survive the transition from private equity ownership to listed-company governance. __________________________________________ Inside this episode Block 1: A 4,2 billion euros IPO, an 80 % share-price collapse, and a turnaround under way Block 2: From Solomeo to Northamptonshire, the textbook exit followed by the textbook unravel Block 3: The 3 levers, Permira's 2014 to 2021 playbook, and the 2024 to 2026 collapse and rebuild Block 4: Multiple expansion, explained with the Permira entry at 8 times EBITDA and exit at 16 times Block 5: Luca in Naples asks whether the IPO was mispriced Block 6: The Numbers: Free Cash Flow Conversion, with European consumer sector benchmarks __________________________________________ Disclaimer This content is educational only. Not investment advice.
14 Jun

Episode #16: Cucinelli: The Anti-Portfolio Company

Every serious private equity firm with a European luxury mandate has wanted to buy Brunello Cucinelli S.p.A. for 33 years. None has managed it. He passes the textbook screen at the top of the European luxury league. 2024 revenue 1,28 billion euros, up 12,2 %. EBIT 211,7 million euros at a 16,6 % margin. Net profit 128 million euros, up 19,5 %. EBITDA approximately 280 million euros, against zero net debt. More than 3.000 employees, roughly 700 in Solomeo paid 20 % above the regional wage. More than 110 mono-brand stores in more than 20 countries. Q1 2026 revenue 369,1 million euros, up 14 % at constant exchange rates while Kering's Gucci shrank 14 %. This episode opens a concept private equity firms keep to themselves: the anti-portfolio, the list of deals they wanted, made offers on, and could not close. The episode teaches the 5 criteria PE uses to screen targets, scores Cucinelli against each, and shows the structural mechanism by which a 25-year-old cashmere designer who started in 1978 has remained the most coveted and the most uncatchable European luxury company of his generation. ------------------------------------------------- Inside this episode Block 1: Every PE firm has wanted him. None has bought him. Block 2: From the World Cup to Solomeo, the opposite end of the same spectrum Block 3: The 5 PE screening criteria, scored against Cucinelli, and the structural block Block 4: Dual-class shares, explained with founder-versus-public voting power Block 5: Klaus in Vienna asks whether minority shareholders can still benefit Block 6: The Numbers: leverage ratio (net debt to EBITDA), and the 1,4 billion euros of untouched LBO capacity ------------------------------------------------- Disclaimer This content is educational only. Not investment advice
8 Jun

Special Edition: The 11-Billion-Euro FIFA World Cup: Follow the Money

More than half the planet will watch this summer's World Cup. Far fewer will notice who owns the machine beneath it. In this special edition, timed to the opening match, Carlo Schneider follows the money behind the world's greatest sporting event: the four streams that fund it, and the private investors who now sit inside each one, from the company selling the finest hospitality seats to the sovereign wealth fund close to the prize money, to the buyout firms that own the clubs themselves. No single deal. Just one question: where does the World Cup's fortune come from, and who really owns the pipes? This is education, not investment advice. _________________________________________________ CHAPTERS 00:00 The hook: the money behind the show 01:15 Welcome and disclaimer 02:10 Where the World Cup's money comes from 04:45 Three investors, hiding in plain sight 10:00 What it actually means 11:40 Jargon Buster: Permanent capital 13:00 Ask Carlo: Can I invest in any of this? 14:00 The Numbers: CAGR 15:00 Closing #PrivateEquity #WorldCup #Football #SovereignWealth #AskCarlo #Finance #EuropeanBusiness
17 May

Episode #15: The Battle for Florence

On 5 January 1999, Bernard Arnault, the chairman of LVMH, the world's largest luxury group, began buying Gucci shares quietly across the open market. By 27 January, LVMH owned 34,4% of the Florentine fashion house. He asked for 3 board seats. Gucci's chief executive, Domenico De Sole, refused. What followed was 75 days of corporate warfare. On 19 March 1999, François Pinault, the French billionaire behind PPR, the predecessor of Kering, agreed to take 42% of Gucci through a defensive capital increase, for approximately 2,75 billion euros in cash. The Dutch courts upheld the deal. Arnault settled in 2001 for approximately 890 million euros. PPR completed its takeover of Gucci in March 2004 for a total bill of approximately 7,5 billion euros. For Investcorp, the Bahrain-based private equity firm that had bought Gucci between 1987 and 1993 for roughly 260 million euros and listed it in 1995, the exit delivered roughly 7 times its money in cash. The cleanest LBO exit in European fashion. This episode uses Gucci's 1989 to 2026 arc, including the present-day chapter under Demna, Luca de Meo, and Francesca Bellettini, to teach how leveraged buyouts in luxury actually work. Inside this episode Block 1: 5 January 1999, a phone call in Paris, and 75 days of corporate warfare Block 2: From Vilnius to Florence, two very different speeds of capital Block 3: The Investcorp chapter, the takeover battle, and the present-day Kering reset Block 4: White knight defence, explained with a champagne house Block 5: Margaux in Geneva asks why private equity does not own more luxury today Block 6: The Numbers: Public Market Equivalent, or PME, applied to the Gucci deal Disclaimer This content is educational only. Not investment advice. Where to find Ask Carlo Subscribe on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, and Amazon Music. Substack: askcarlo.substack.com. Stay Sharp. #privateequity #gucci #lvmh #kering #askcarlo

How do investors turn millions into billions? Every Tuesday, one real deal - the strategies, the industries, the outcomes. From leveraged buyouts to venture capital. Manufacturing to fashion. Infrastructure to classic cars. Thirty years inside European private markets, now shared through storytelling.

Creator

Carlo Schneider
Years Active

2026
Episodes

23
Provider