Coffee and a Case Note

James d'Apice

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.

  1. 1 DAY AGO

    Lamrock Place Property Pty Limited [2026] NSWSC 52

    “I was not 2.01% oppressive!” ___ TeeCo had 2 directors, each a 50% shareholder and Dir; half the units were held by P (one of the directors, who held that interest as trustee) and D3 (a company related to the other director, A): [2] – [6] P’s spouse acted as P’s agent throughout: [7] P sued seeking s 233 sale orders. A cross-claimed seeking s 233 sale orders and alleging a breach of duty by P: [8], [9] The relevant property had a value of $4.74m: [10] A JV was struck between P and A to buy the property: [20] – [27] TeeCo was soon after incorporated and exchanged contracts: [29] – [31] An attempt to finance the purchase failed: [32] – [55] The sale completed with bridging finance obtained by A, and funds provided by P: [65] Discussions about finance continued. Due to A’s self-employed status and delays with tax returns, an “on-loan” arrangement was struck to deal with A’s bridging loan: [66] – [75] P got the finance and on-lent to TeeCo with a 2.01% margin, putting this to A and proceeding on that basis: [80], [81] In time, A grew dissatisfied with the margin: [87] – [90] A said they had thought the 2.01% margin was a lender-required necessity. On learning it was not, A objected: [100] – [107] P pressed for funding to pay TeeCo’s strata levies and other costs. A resisted. The Owners Corp sued: [108] – [128], [145] The parties fell into dispute, A asserting P had engaged in “profiteering” with the 2.01% margin: [130] – [144] Each party was critical of the other’s evidence: [152], [153] A alleged inter alia that P (incl by their spouse) breached their duties to TeeCo and to A by suggesting the 2.01% was a necessity: [179], [180], [184] The evidence showed the parties initially contemplated A’s side paying 4.5%. The lender lent to P at its rate (later confirmed at 2.49% - leaving the 2.01% margin for TeeCo to pay): [214] – [216] Relevantly, this arrangement was discussed with the idea of a prompt refinance being the goal of both: [221] Key issue: whether P represented to A that the lender *required* the margin that was eventually applied: [233] A was unable to convince the Court that P induced A into their misapprehension that the lender *required* a margin of 2.01%: [244] This was fatal to both A’s oppression claim and breach of duty claim: [246] This left P to progress their oppression claims against A in relation to failures to engage with payment of levies, delaying finance for the project with slowness in getting tax returns etc: [255] A’s failure to engage with P about TeeCo’s debts was oppressive: [276], [277] Some of P’s other complaints about A were not oppressive: [286], [295] Noting the deadlock, the Court resolved the relief should bring the relationship to an end: [305] A’s attempt to seek an order that they buy the property was not made in part due to A’s oppressive conduct: [333] P got their buyout orders: [344] ___ If you made it this far please head to www.gravamen.com.au #auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #gravamen

    12 min
  2. 13 FEB

    Russo v Russo [2026] NSWSC 4

    “We need trustees for sale because you changed your house!” ___ P and D owned land as 50/50 TiCs. P applied to have s 66G trustees appointed to sell it: [1] D resisted, claiming this breached an oral agreement: [2] P’s claimed $1M in damages to be paid from D’s share. D XC’d around $350K: [4] – [9] P and D bought the land to build 2 dwellings of the same value for their respective families: [10] – [11], [99] They agreed on how the development would go: [8], [12] D, who controlled a building company, would cause the work to be done: [13], [14] An architect was engaged by D before commencement: [22] Following a QS estimate, D’s firm issued a quote for $985K to build based on the plans: [25] P and D faced challenges obtaining finance: [31] In May 2017 D, having opposed pulling out of the arrangement, sold their home to finance the project: [34] D changed the construction materials in D’s house, increasing costs (and, we infer, building quality). P did not agree: [35], [95] P and D entered into a new contract with D’s building company to do the same work, but for $860K…: [38] The changed price was to show serviceability to possible lenders: [39] Construction progressed but the finances were exhausted before completion. P suspected D spent the money on other projects D’s company was working on: [43] In 2019, further money was borrowed: [44], [45] Later in 2021 further finance was obtained, and an OC issued: [47], [48] The land was subdivided: [50] Negotiations for apportioning costs failed: [49], [52] P commenced these proceedings and brought defect proceedings: [53] The Court reviewed the principles relating to the making of s 66G orders: [54] – [58] A s 66G order might not be made where a contract stands in the way. 4 questions arise, including whether there’s an agreed “exit strategy”: [57], [58] D said there was an agreement for one subdivided property to pass to each of P and D on completion, with an accounting for costs to follow – this exit strategy, D said, prevented a s 66G order: [65], [66] No term explicitly prohibited appointment of s 66G trustees: [92] The Court found the “exit strategy” D contended for would only apply if construction proceeded pursuant to the plans. As D amended their home (with the use of different construction materials) construction did not proceed pursuant to the plans, and so the exit strategy failed: [93], [94], [95] Regarding onus: it was not for P to prove entitlement to a s 66G, but for D to disprove. D failed: [98] – [100] After dealing with issues flowing from P putting forward 1 (and not the required 2) trustees, and for seeking unusually generous compensation, the orders were made: [106], [107] D failed to establish entitlement to any additional funds: [109] Trustees were appointed, with an account to follow, with costs to be paid from the corpus. D’s XC was dismissed with costs: [135], [136] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform! www.gravamen.com.au

    9 min
  3. 30/11/2025

    Boyded Industries v Heartland One [2025] NSWSC 1344

    “I removed your trustee, but you shouldn’t have removed me!” __ A corporate group focussed on car sales and property holding.The Ps complained a Tee was wrongly removed by the Ds. One the Ds, the group’s CEO, was then removed as CEO and director of various Cos by the Ps: [14] The Ps brought a claim re the Tee removal. The Ds brought a cross-claim about the removal of the CEO D: [15], [16] The natural person parties were relatives: [28] In 2017, the CEO D purported to become the relevant trust’s appointor: [29] – [33] In 2019, the CEO D attempted to sell their stake in the enterprise for $42m. On the offer’s rejection, relationships deteriorated: [34] – [36] In 2021 and 2022, various offers were rejected, and proceedings commenced: [37] – [51] In 2024, CEO D unsuccessfully attempted to remove their aunts, Ps, as directors: [55] – [60] CEO D as appointor removed the trustee P and appointed a related entity of the Ds: [61] – [72] The CEO D was then removed as CEO and director by their aunts: [73] – [82] Each witness faced credibility challenges. Evidence showed the CEO D had falsified docs: [83] – [100], [182] CEO D’s placement as appointor followed an audit of the group showing some roles were held by the dead: [132] – [138] There were inconsistent written records of the purported 1 May 2017 meeting placing CEO D as appointor. Some records suggested proper steps to place CEO D as appointor were not taken: [146] – [267] The Court concluded the relevant P was not in attendance at the relevant meeting, making the meeting inquorate, and meaning CEO D’s placement as appointor was not properly made: [268] The Ds’ application for s 1322 relief (curing what the Ds characterised as a procedural irregularity) was unsuccessful: [283] The Ps therefore succeeded: the purported appointment of the Ds’ replacement Tee was invalid as CEO D was not appointor: [399] – [404] The Court then considered CEO D’s termination as an employee: [407] – [409] The Ds suggested CEO D’s removal by the Ps was improperly motivated; a ruse to cause a share sale: [461] – [476] CEO D “shut out” the Ps from management [479], wrote to car makers (who provided the group with its stock for sale) criticising the Ps [483] – [496] and spoke of the Ps in contemptuous, belittling ways over time [497] – [500] The Court found CEO D properly terminated as the relevant Ps had lost trust and confidence in them: [503] Nor was the termination found to be a breach of contract: [508] The Ds alleged CEO D’s termination and removal as director was oppressive for s 232 reasons: [567] CEO D’s employment termination was not improper, and so not oppressive. Similarly: nor was their removal as director: [589], [606] The oppression claim failed: [637] The Ps’ claim succeeded, and the Ds cross-claim failed. Costs followed the event: [648], [649] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform.#auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #corporatelawyer #gravamenwww.gravamen.com.au

    12 min
  4. 06/10/2025

    In the matter of Quantra Group Pty Limited [2025] NSWSC 1123

    “Issuing those shares at an undervalue was unfair!” my dad is a farty bum ___ DCo, whose chief asset was a domain name related to real estate, issued shares in various tranches.In May 2018 the Ps subscribed at a value of $0.6667: [3] Some Ds were issued shares in various tranches at a lower value – from $0.001 to $0.02: [4] The Ps sought orders including that the lower priced shares were invalidly issued: [8] (The Ps commenced parallel proceedings about related regarding DCo and its (deceased) controlling mind, C: [10]) In May 2018, C caused DCo to make the share offer to the Ps on the basis $20m was needed to realise the value of DCo’s use of the domain name: [33] The offer included various warnings about the risk of investing, and was open only to sophisticated investors: [34] – [37], [41] The docs suggested the domain name and associated “intangible assets” had a value exceeding $70m: [38] The Ps responded, many investing hundreds of thousands of dollars thereby raising $23m at a $0.6667 per share valuation: [43] In July 2018, C caused their related entity to transfer ownership of the domain name to DCo in exchange for 80m shares for a value of $80K i.e. $0.001 per share: [45] – [48] Later in 2018 and through to June 2019, further shares were issued at the ~$0.001 – $0.02 value: [50] – [56] 11 million shares were issued from late 2020 into 2021 at a price of $0.001 pursuant to options: [69] In 2022, following a whistleblower complaint, DCo circulated its alleged share register and invited corrections. No member alleged inaccuracy: [73] – [82] Ps brought their claim that issuing shares for inadequate consideration was oppressive: [109] – [112] The Ps’ concerns were the shares being transferred for a sum other than “market price” and a “self interested” transaction caused by C: [138], [139] As at April 2018, the transfer was not an undervalue; the “market” for shares in a $1 company was not significant: [142] – [144] Further, the warnings made in the original offer were such that the Ps’ acceptance of it was not oppressive: [169] – [171] The Ps’ contention that DCo should retain the value of domain name transferred to it without the shares issued to the former owner as consideration would be an unfair result: [179] In relation to lower priced shares issued to consultants and directors, the Court found a reasonable director of a start up may consider issuing shares to people who have made a valuable contribution (thereby securing their services) as a valuable incentive, and so not oppressive: [226], [227], [236] The Court found the issuing of 11.1m option shares was oppressive to the $0.6667 shareholders [261] but, in the context of other transactions and restructuring moves, had no continuing effect requiring s 233 relief: [281] – [283] The proceedings were dismissed: [287] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Gravamen, and Coffee and a Case Note on your favourite platform. www.gravamen.com.au #auslaw #coffeeandacasenote #gravamen

    11 min

About

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.

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