The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Brad Neal
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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

  1. Oct 14

    Salazar v. Paramount Global

    Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459 25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642 CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED:       The Video Privacy Protection Act (“ VPPA ”)  contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “ video tape service provider ”  from “ knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider. ”  18  U.S.C. §  2710 (b)( 1 ). The statute defines “ consumer ”  broadly to include a “ subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id.  §  2710 (a)( 1 ). It defines “ personally identifiable information ”  to include information that “ identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id. §  2710 (a)( 3 ). And it defines “ video tape service provider ”  to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id . §  2710 (a)( 4 ).        Paramount is a “ video tape service provider. ”  Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount ’ s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar ’ s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “ personally identifiable information. ”  Again, both courts below assumed as much.       The question here is whether the phrase “ goods or services from a video tape service provider, ”  as used in the VPPA ’ s definition of “ consumer, ”  refers to all of a video tape service provider ’ s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

  2. Oct 13

    Beaird v. United States

    Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343 25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410 THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Order of May 6 , 2026 ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.         CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that  has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764

  3. Oct 7

    Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

    Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579 25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089 CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq ., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. 2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental- review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq ., before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613

  4. Oct 6

    Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee

    Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498 25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV. DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022). The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark." LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268

  5. Oct 5

    Johnson v. United States Congress

    Johnson v. United States Congress | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-735 25-735 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES CONGRESS DECISION BELOW: 151 F.4th 1287 CERT. GRANTED 4/6/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this Court in Johnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10682

  6. Oct 5

    Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County

    Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170 25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE. SEPTEMBER 28 , 2026 : JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.   CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

  7. Apr 29

    Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

    Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889 24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC. DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169

  8. Apr 29

    Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe

    Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 25-1083 25-1083 MULLIN, SEC. DHS V. DOE DECISION BELOW: CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A952) PRESENTED TO JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AND BY HER REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A999) PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS ALSO DEFERRED. THE APPLICATIONS ARE ALSO TREATED AS PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT (25-1083, 25-1084), AND THE PETITIONS ARE GRANTED. THE CASES ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 3/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-2995

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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

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