Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Gareth Lock at The Human Diver
  • 5.0 (13)
  • Education
  • Updated Semiweekly

Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver. Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.

  1. 1d ago

    SH298: Beyond the Floor: Why Meeting the Standard Isn't the Same as Being Safe

    This episode challenges the common belief that following diving standards automatically makes diving safe. It explores how industry standards, while important, can create an illusion of safety when compliance becomes the main goal rather than improving real-world performance. The discussion examines how many diving standards are written and assessed by the same organisations they are meant to guide, creating a closed system that can protect institutions legally while limiting opportunities for deeper learning and improvement. It also looks at why accident investigations often focus on individual mistakes rather than questioning whether the procedures, training, or standards themselves are fit for purpose. Drawing on research from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the episode argues that safer diving requires more than rule-following—it needs independent oversight, greater transparency, and a willingness to learn from outside safety science. True progress comes not from assuming yesterday’s standards are enough, but from building systems that can recognise their own limits and continually improve. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floor Links: Diving Talks: 'Compliance provides an illusion for safety in diving InDepth article: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/ Suggested further readingAmalberti, R. (2001) The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science, 37(2–3), pp. 109–126. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092575350000045X Carpenter, D. and Moss, D. (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture (Cambridge University Press, 2014). https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/preventing-regulatory-capture/ Dekker, S., The Safety Anarchist (Routledge, 2018) and Compliance Capitalism (Routledge, 2022). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Safety-Anarchist-innovation-bureaucracy-compliance-ebook/dp/B0FCCZCTG5 Dixon-Woods, M., Yeung, K., & Bosk, C. L. (2011). Why is UK medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving “bad apple” doctors. Social Science & Medicine, 73(10), 1452–1459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.08.031 Hopkins, A., Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster (CCH Australia, 2008). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Failure-Learn-Texas-Refinery-Disaster/dp/1921322446 Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., and Hollnagel, E., What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find: The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals, Safety Science 47(10), 2009. https://www-sciencedirect-com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/science/article/pii/S0925753509000137 Meyer, J. and Rowan, B., Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83(2), 1977. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2778293.pdf Rae, A., Provan, D., Weber, D., and Dekker, S., Safety Clutter: The Accumulation and Persistence of 'Safety' Work That Does Not Contribute to Operational Safety, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 16(2), 2018. https://doi.10.1080/14773996.2018.1491147 Thompson, D., Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands, American Political Science Review 74(4), 1980. Tags: THD-English| THD-Operations & Procedures

    SH298: Beyond the Floor: Why Meeting the Standard Isn't the Same as Being Safe

  2. 5d ago

    SH297: CRM, ISO 8804, and Scientific Diving: Opportunities and Existing Materials

    This episode explores the growing recognition that safe and effective scientific diving depends on more than technical skill, equipment, and certification. Prompted by new research into applying Crew Resource Management (CRM) to scientific diver training, it examines why communication, leadership, teamwork, and decision-making are essential in complex underwater operations where divers must manage both life support and scientific tasks under pressure. Drawing on lessons from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the discussion highlights key challenges such as cognitive overload, distributed situational awareness, and authority gradients that can prevent divers from speaking up or adapting effectively when conditions change. It also reviews the existing research, training tools, and practical frameworks already available to support this shift, while recognising that long-term improvement depends on treating diving safety as an ongoing process of learning rather than a box-ticking exercise. The message is clear: true safety is built through the conditions teams create, the culture they sustain, and how they respond when concerns are raised—always striving to be better than yesterday. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/CRM-and-Scientific-Diving Links: Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/raymond-arce-528304355_cd37166-scientificdiving-divertraining-share-7460336156979888128-ASrc/?utm_source=social_share_send&utm_medium=member_desktop_web&rcm=ACoAAAELqPcBwf1_VKIPpplosn5XZ02d6xlOzRs 9th Annual European Conference on Scientific Diving: https://ecsd9azores.com/ Resilient Performance Model blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-model Outcomes are a Function of…..: https://youtu.be/nkdVHBDnCjc?t=2293 Looking at CRM relevant failures: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteot Guide to Diving Crew Resource Management: https://www.thehumandiver.com/commercial-occupational-diving Moving beyond the position that compliance means safety: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/ ReferencesCaramanna, G., & Strickland, B. (2023). Risk Management for Diving Operations: How to enhance the safety and proficiency of diving teams. Self-published. ISBN: 979-8988399612. CSA Group (2026). CSA Z275.2: Occupational Health and Safety Code for Diving Operations. Toronto: CSA Group. Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350–383. Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 32–64. Flin, R., & Maran, N. (2004). Identifying and training non-technical skills for teams in acute medicine. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13(suppl 1), i80–i84. Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non-Technical Skills. Farnham: Ashgate. Health and Safety Executive (2011). Research Report RR871: Assessment of Manual Operations and Emergency Procedures for Closed Circuit Rebreathers. London: HSE Books. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2018). Report 503: Introducing Behavioural Markers of Non-Technical Skills in Oil and Gas Operations. London: IOGP. Lock, G. (2019). Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors. Milton Keynes: Human in the System Consulting. Lock, G. (2023). Human factors and rebreather diving. In: Pollock NW, ed. Rebreather Forum 4. Proceedings of the April 20-22, 2023 workshop. Valletta, Malta; 2024. p. 57–69. O'Brien, E., & Caramanna, G. (2017). Human factors in scientific diving: an experimental approach. In Proceedings of the AAUS Diving for Science Symposium 2017. Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary: American Academy of Underwater Sciences. Piispanen, W., Lundell, R., Tuominen, L., & Räisänen-Sokolowski, A. (2021). Assessment of alertness and cognitive performance of closed circuit rebreather divers with the Critical Flicker Fusion Frequency Test in Arctic diving conditions. Frontiers in Physiology, 12, 722915. Reader, T. W., & O'Connor, P. (2014). The Deepwater Horizon explosion: non-technical skills, safety culture, and system complexity. Journal of Risk Research, 17(3), 405–424. Reitz, M., Nilsson, V., Day, E. and Higgins, J. (2019). Speaking truth to power at work. Hult Research. Sinek, S. (2019). The Infinite Game. New York: Portfolio/Penguin. Stanton, N. A., Stewart, R., Harris, D., Houghton, R. J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Salmon, P., Hoyle, G., Walker, G., Young, M. S., Linsell, M., Dymott, R., & Green, D. (2006). Distributed situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics methodology. Ergonomics, 49(12–13), 1288–1311. Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: effects on learning. Cognitive Science, 12(2), 257–285. Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., & Maran, N. (2006). Development of a rating system for surgeons' non-technical skills. Medical Education, 40(11), 1098–1104. Tags: THD-English| THD-CRM, Leadership & Teamwork

    SH297: CRM, ISO 8804, and Scientific Diving: Opportunities and Existing Materials

  3. Jul 15

    SH296: When 'I'm Fine' Isn't True: Speaking Up and Ending the Dive

    This episode explores a diving incident where nothing officially “went wrong,” yet a series of small decisions and social pressures nearly led to tragedy. A newer CCR diver and his wife joined more experienced divers on an unfamiliar shore dive, and although they surfaced safely, the dive revealed how easily people can ignore warning signs when they feel pressure to fit in, avoid disappointing others, or challenge more experienced teammates. Drawing on research into speaking up, psychological safety, and stop-work authority, the episode examines why divers often stay silent even when they feel uncomfortable, and why near-misses are rarely reported or discussed. It argues that the absence of accidents does not mean a system is safe, and that real safety depends less on rules and policies and more on leadership, team culture, and how people respond when someone calls a dive. The discussion highlights the importance of curiosity, open communication, and creating environments where stopping a dive is treated as good judgement rather than failure, helping divers and teams learn before luck runs out. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-im-fine-isnt-true Links: Resources page including the DEBrIEF guide and building psychological safety: https://www.thehumandiver.com/resources Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH296: When 'I'm Fine' Isn't True: Speaking Up and Ending the Dive

  4. Jul 11

    SH295: Four Ways We Talk About 'Human Factors' in Diving

    This episode explores what people really mean when they talk about “human factors” in diving—and why the term can sometimes create more confusion than clarity. It looks at four different ways the phrase is commonly used: blaming “the human factor” when something goes wrong, focusing on what is happening inside the diver such as stress or decision-making, examining the external conditions that shape performance like equipment, procedures, and team dynamics, and finally viewing diving as a complex socio-technical system where people, technology, organisations, and the environment all interact. While the first three approaches can offer useful insights, they often miss the bigger picture. Real learning and lasting safety improvements come from understanding how the whole system works together, not just identifying individual mistakes. By shifting from blame to systems thinking, instructors and divers can better understand why outcomes occur and make meaningful changes that help everyone become better than yesterday. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/four-ways-of-hf Tags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type

    SH295: Four Ways We Talk About 'Human Factors' in Diving

  5. Jul 8

    SH294: Clickbait, trolls and comments. How dive incident posts can teach us — if we let them

    Discussions about diving incidents on social media often follow a predictable pattern: a short, simplified post describes what happened, and comments quickly focus on blaming the individual involved, creating a sense of clear-cut failure and easy lessons. This happens not because people have bad intentions, but because simple, linear stories and knowing the outcome push our brains toward hindsight judgement, making complex situations seem obvious after the fact. As a result, important factors like conditions, pressures, communication, and decision-making context are ignored, limiting real learning. Over time, this blame-focused culture encourages people to share less detail or avoid posting altogether, which removes the very information needed to understand incidents properly. To improve learning, the community needs to shift from asking “what went wrong” to “why it made sense at the time,” and respond to posts with curiosity rather than judgement, creating an environment where fuller, more useful stories can be shared and understood. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/clickbait-trolls-and-comments Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH294: Clickbait, trolls and comments. How dive incident posts can teach us — if we let them

  6. Jul 4

    SH293: Why does nothing change? Why do the same failures keep happening?

    Over the past decade, diving fatalities have remained stubbornly consistent despite better equipment, more training, and growing participation, suggesting the problem isn’t just technical or individual error. Current safety approaches focus on equipment, skills, and counting deaths, but often ignore deeper issues like communication, teamwork, decision-making, and the wider system divers operate in. Research shows that most contributing factors in incidents come from these “upstream” conditions—such as training culture, social pressure, and organisational practices—rather than the diver’s final actions. A major gap is the lack of training and assessment in non-technical skills, which are critical for managing real-world situations under pressure. At the same time, diving lacks an effective system for learning from incidents, as divers are reluctant to report issues to organisations they believe won’t act on them. To improve safety, the industry needs a shared language around human performance, better systems for collecting and learning from data, and a culture that supports open, blame-free discussion—because without addressing these deeper factors, meaningful change is unlikely. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-does-nothing-change Links: Rebreather fatality documentation from RF4.0: https://indepthmag.com/rebreather-forum-4-proceedings-are-available-for-free-download/ DCS study from DAN: https://journals.viamedica.pl/international_maritime_health/article/view/108038 If Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonly Linnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lens Divers Alert Network reporting: https://dan.org/research-reports/research-studies/diving-incident-reporting-system/ BSAC reporting: https://www.bsac.com/home/ DOSA reporting: https://duikongevallen.nl/ LEODSI and PETTEOT: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteot Blogs about learning from incidents: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/category/learning-JC-incidents Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH293: Why does nothing change? Why do the same failures keep happening?

  7. Jul 1

    SH292: Learning or Blaming: The Choice the Diving Industry Needs to Make. Part 3 of 3.

    This final blog explores what the research means and how the diving community can realistically improve learning and safety. It argues that the problem is not broken individuals but a system that quietly encourages blame and silence, making it hard for divers to share honest stories about mistakes and near-misses. Fear—of legal action, criticism, or damage to reputation—plays a big role, even when that fear is not based on real outcomes. The result is weak feedback loops, where lessons from real experiences never reach the people who design training or shape the culture. The blog suggests shifting focus from the idea of a formal “just culture” to a more practical “culture of justness,” where fairness, understanding, and learning are encouraged at a local level by respected leaders. It also highlights how sharing more context reduces blame and improves learning, but notes that most divers are never taught how to do this. While there is no single fix, the way forward includes clearer language, better-designed reporting systems, role modelling by instructors and experienced divers, and introducing honest discussions about incidents into training. Ultimately, meaningful change will come from gradually shifting behaviours and norms, so that sharing real experiences becomes normal, supported, and valued across the diving community. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-3-the-outcomes Links: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-space Part 2: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-results The full thesis, Storytelling to Learn: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater, was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Human Factors and System Safety at Lund University, 2024. Gareth Lock is the founder of The Human Diver References:Dekker, S. (2009). Just culture: Who gets to draw the line? Cognition, Technology & Work, 11(3), 177–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-008-0110-7 EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission. Exley, S. (1986). Basic cave diving: A blueprint for survival. National Speleological Society – Cave Diving Section. https://nsscds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Blueprint-for-Survival.pdf Heffernan, M. (2011). Wilful blindness: Why we ignore the obvious. Simon and Schuster. Hoffman, B. G. (2012). American icon: Alan Mulally and the fight to save Ford Motor Company. Crown. Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem. Safety Science, 27(2–3), 183–213. Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH292: Learning or Blaming: The Choice the Diving Industry Needs to Make. Part 3 of 3.

  8. Jun 27

    SH291: What the Data Told Us: Fear, Trust, and the Stories That Never Get Told. Part 2 of 3.

    This blog explains how a mixed-methods study explored why divers struggle to share honest, learning-focused stories about incidents. Using a large international survey, focus groups, and expert interviews, the research found that storytelling is strongly shaped by organisational culture, fear, and trust. Many divers—especially instructors—fear legal consequences, criticism, or damage to their reputation, which stops them from speaking openly, particularly in public settings. At the same time, there is confusion about key ideas like what counts as an “incident,” what “risk” really means, and what a “just culture” looks like, with very few divers linking incidents to learning. The study also showed that when stories include more context, people are less likely to judge and more likely to learn, but most divers are not taught how to do this. Overall, the findings suggest the diving community knows that sharing near-misses and building a just culture would improve safety, but lacks the trust, understanding, and organisational support needed to make that happen. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-results Links and references: British Diving Safety Groiup: https://bdsg.org.uk/ Chan, W. T.-K., & Li, W.-C. (2023). Development of effective human factors interventions for aviation safety management. Frontiers in Public Health, 11, 1144921. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1144921 EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission. Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543 Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH291: What the Data Told Us: Fear, Trust, and the Stories That Never Get Told. Part 2 of 3.
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Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver. Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.

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