Global Tantrum! with Steve Palley and Prof. Galen Jackson

Steve Palley, Galen Jackson

Two International Relations PhDs help you make sense of the post-postwar era. globaltantrum.substack.com

  1. Nov 14

    Dems X Trump: Foreign Policy Edition

    A change in control of Congress does not automatically change American foreign policy. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson examine what the midterm results could mean for the final two years of Donald Trump’s presidency, starting with the effort to impeach Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Would removing an official change the policy, or simply change who carries it out? Congress has war powers, control of spending and the ability to investigate. Presidents have considerable room to act, and a veto can put legislation beyond the reach of an ordinary majority. We discuss why the War Powers Resolution has so often disappointed its supporters, what past fights over war funding reveal, and where oversight can still impose costs on an administration. Trade may offer a different opening. Tariffs have domestic constituencies, economic consequences and political liabilities that do not always follow party lines. We consider whether opposition to particular tariffs could draw enough Republican support to matter, and how restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports fit into the struggle over China policy. The discussion also covers Ukraine, executive power and the limits of congressional influence over diplomacy. Drawing on James Lindsay’s argument about why Capitol Hill matters and Daniel Drezner’s discussion of the next two years, we ask where legislators can shape the choices available to a president, even when they cannot force a wholesale reversal. NVIDIA’s leadership crisis adds a corporate dimension to the China debate. We discuss the uncertainty surrounding the company at the time of recording, and why a firm’s commercial interests, export restrictions and national-security concerns can pull in different directions. Show notes Recorded November 11, 2026. Election counts and expectations in the discussion reflect that date. The Council on Foreign Relations’ November 10 election overview provides contemporary context. A clarification on congressional thresholds: ordinary legislation, including export-control legislation, does not inherently require two-thirds support in both chambers. That threshold applies to overriding a presidential veto. Impeachment requires a simple House majority; conviction requires two-thirds of senators present. See the Senate’s constitutional text, its impeachment guide and CRS’s export-control overview. A funding cutoff is also more than a question of delayed pay. The legal effect depends on available appropriations, statutory prohibitions and applicable exceptions. See GAO’s appropriations-law resources and its decision on spending prohibited funds. Update, November 12: after this episode was recorded, NVIDIA announced that Jensen Huang had resigned and Colette Kress would serve as interim CEO. The leadership change does not itself establish espionage or a compromise of company secrets. NVIDIA’s November 8 board statement described an investigation and said it had no reason at that time to believe company secrets or national security had been compromised. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Dems X Trump: Foreign Policy Edition
  2. Nov 7

    Can America Defend Space?

    Space is becoming a battlefield, but what does that actually mean? Steve Palley and Galen Jackson start with the United States’ acknowledgment of weapons in orbit and work through what satellites do for surveillance, communications and precision strikes. We also explain why conventional weapons in space raise different legal questions from the nuclear weapons barred by the Outer Space Treaty. Then we revisit the long American search for missile defense, from Reagan’s Star Wars to Golden Dome. Drawing on Frank A. Rose’s From Star Wars to Golden Dome, we ask why defending against shorter-range missiles is a different proposition from stopping a large nuclear attack. Orbital mechanics, brief interception windows and the number of satellites needed for coverage help explain the Congressional Budget Office’s enormous cost estimates. Those estimates describe illustrative systems and design assumptions, not a settled Golden Dome architecture. But satellites are targets as well as tools. Would losing them cripple the United States in a conflict over Taiwan? Zachary Burdette’s The U.S.-China Military Balance in Space offers a more resilient picture than the familiar Achilles’ heel argument. We discuss smaller satellites, larger constellations, terrestrial backups and the danger that debris from an attack could damage the attacker’s own systems. Resilience helps, but degraded targeting could still consume scarce missiles and narrow America’s margin. Finally, we turn to the politics of relying on commercial space networks. The senators’ questions about Starlink and Starshield restrictions in Ukraine expose unresolved issues about control, reliability and accountability. We distinguish those allegations from an established explanation of the outage, and close by asking which space-enabled capabilities would hurt most to lose. Plus: our preferred space movies, and a farewell to Patrick Stewart. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

  3. Oct 31

    Can AI Save the Internet?

    A quiet success in cybersecurity can look a lot like a crisis. Researchers find a dangerous vulnerability, governments and companies scramble to patch it, and websites go offline as a precaution. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson examine PHP2Shell, the flaws in a widely used programming language that exposed just how much modern life depends on software most people never think about. The PHP Foundation’s account tells a story of AI-assisted discovery, difficult engineering tradeoffs and a coordinated defense that ran into disclosure problems. Amazon’s early attack detections make the timing even more unsettling: attackers were trying the vulnerability before its public release, although how they obtained the information remains unknown. Does AI make offense easier to organize than defense? Steve argues for a Manhattan Project for cybersecurity, with resources and authority equal to the stakes. Galen pushes back on what centralizing that power could mean for privacy, oversight and the companies being protected. The discussion draws on John West’s account of fragile internet infrastructure and the question of who should pay to maintain the open-source foundations underneath it all. The PHP Foundation supports professional development and security work, alongside the much older PHP community. There is also a less glamorous problem: people still leave default passwords unchanged. Drawing on Michael Sulmeyer’s chapter on AI and the offense-defense balance, we ask whether better technology can compensate for poor security habits and incentives. Protecting hospitals, power systems and financial networks takes both sophisticated defenses and basic upkeep. Getting those two things to work together is harder than it sounds. Show notes Further reading: OpenAI’s coordinated-disclosure account, Calif’s PHP2Shell technical report, AWS’s temporary mitigation guidance, CrowdStrike’s investigation of AI-assisted attacks on South Korean finance, and the House report distinguishing CISA’s FY2027 budget request from other funding figures. A few distinctions matter when reading the incident reports. Remote code execution does not automatically grant root privileges. PHP usage estimates refer to sites whose server-side technology can be identified. CrowdStrike’s assessment of the attacker’s language and motivation was qualified; the age and identity were not conclusively established. The PHP Foundation was created in 2021, while PHP and its community are much older. On the surveillance discussion, the New York Times report concerning Jensen Huang does not establish Section702 as the specific collection mechanism. The Intelligence Community’s Section702 explanation provides background on the distinction between foreign targeting and incidental collection. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Can AI Save the Internet?
  4. Oct 24

    Can France Break Europe?

    France’s political stalemate has become a financial problem, and its financial problem is becoming Europe’s. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson look at the protests, the resistance to pension and spending reforms, and the pressure building on a country that wants to preserve its social model without a clear way to pay for it. The European Commission’s forecast shows why the argument over the budget will outlast any single government. The last eurozone crisis offers a warning, but France is a different proposition from Greece. Its economy is larger, its political weight is greater, and its borrowing problems would be harder for the rest of Europe to contain. We discuss the limits of a common currency without a common budget, the painful tradeoffs behind a rescue, and why the ECB’s bond-purchase tools do not make the political choices disappear. What happens if voters turn to Marine Le Pen or Jean-Luc Mélenchon? We consider whether the demands of governing might pull a populist leader toward the center, or whether a change in Paris could weaken support for Ukraine and deepen Europe’s divisions. The presidential polling makes the question immediate; it does not settle the outcome. France’s history inside NATO helps explain why its choices matter beyond its borders. We end with the harder question: can aging democracies make changes their voters do not want? Immigration, faster growth and AI-driven productivity each promise an escape from the arithmetic, with very different costs and uncertainties. Meanwhile, Britain’s renewed discussion of its long-term relationship with the EU adds an irony to a moment when the European project’s future looks unusually unsettled. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Can France Break Europe?
  5. Oct 17

    Is China Winning the Cyberwar?

    China’s hackers have reached deep into American networks, but what would it mean to be winning a cyberwar? Steve Palley and Galen Jackson take up Anne Neuberger’s argument that America needs a new strategy of deterrence and The Cyber Gap, by Matthew Ferren, Adam Segal and Rush Doshi. We ask whether weak defenses tell us enough about the larger strategic balance, especially when so much of the offensive side remains classified. One proposed answer is to build digital twins of critical infrastructure: virtual systems where defenders can test changes without disrupting the real thing. The idea has roots in NASA’s use of models and simulators during Apollo. Could AI make these systems easier to build and useful enough that companies adopt them for their own reasons? Or does the political problem survive the technical solution? That brings us to regulation, business incentives and the limits of federal action. We revisit the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy’s push to shift responsibility toward technology providers and discuss the new government-supervised program for private cyber operations against foreign criminal groups. That program requires government oversight and mission approval; it does not grant companies a general license to retaliate on their own. We close with a question familiar from nuclear strategy: how much relative advantage matters if each side can still impose unacceptable costs? Espionage, theft and a destructive attack during a Taiwan crisis present different problems. The distinction between Salt Typhoon’s telecom espionage and Volt Typhoon’s infrastructure targeting matters here. Better defenses remain worth pursuing even if the claim that China is winning turns out to be harder to establish. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Is China Winning the Cyberwar?
  6. Oct 10

    Can Distance Still Protect America?

    Two new papers point toward different strategic futures. Eli Sanchez argues that emerging technology is unlikely to make the oceans transparent. Steve Palley and Galen Jackson discuss what that means for submarine survivability, nuclear deterrence, and the political conflicts that a stable balance of terror cannot settle. Erik Sand’s study of the new missile age presents a more unsettling prospect: precision conventional ICBMs could become militarily relevant within a decade. What happens if distance stops protecting bomber bases and other vulnerable targets? We examine the incentives to strike first and the danger of mistaking a conventional launch for a nuclear attack. Missile defense offers another complication. The physics of intercepting an ICBM does not become easier because its warhead is conventional. We consider what renewed investment might achieve, what it could do to nuclear stability, and why a successful test or a theater-defense system cannot settle those questions. The discussion also draws on reported threats against US bombers in Britain and the implications of drones reaching aircraft far from a frontline. Can nuclear deterrence remain robust while conventional warfare becomes more tempting? We close with that tension and a recommendation for The Myth of Military Victory, by Stephen Biddle, Sam Winter-Levy, and Yuri Zhukov. Military capabilities shape the bargaining environment; whether they resolve the political dispute is another question. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Can Distance Still Protect America?
  7. Oct 3

    Who Can Control AI?

    The White House has brought leading AI companies together around voluntary safety commitments. But what does self-policing mean when the same companies are racing to build more capable systems? Steve Palley and Galen Jackson look at the promises, the incentives, and the gap between corporate oversight and public control. The administration’s new terminology order adds another wrinkle: calling everything superintelligence does not settle what the technology can do. Anthropic’s analysis of GLM-5.3 sharpens the problem. A downloadable model can develop sophisticated cyber exploits, while its safeguards can be weakened or removed. We discuss what those results establish, what they leave uncertain, and why the spread of capabilities changes the choices facing governments and defenders. We then take up Hal Brands’s argument about America’s superintelligence dilemma, listed in his Foreign Affairs bibliography: pursue supremacy, seek shared development, or try to suppress the technology. Each route has costs. Nuclear and biological arms control offer useful comparisons, but AI’s civilian benefits and wider accessibility make the analogy incomplete. Recent US-China trade arrangements do not amount to an AI governance regime. Finally, we separate the risks of human-directed attacks from models acting outside their assigned limits. OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident account and Australian incident review make containment a practical question. Alongside the Council on Foreign Relations’ cyber resilience report, these cases raise a harder question: can institutions improve fast enough to handle the systems they are already building? This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Who Can Control AI?
  8. Sep 26

    Saudi Arabia's Worst-Case Scenario

    The Houthis have rapidly expanded their control along Yemen’s western coast, seizing Mocha and strategically important Red Sea positions. That advance gives them more leverage around the Bab el-Mandeb just as a reported Iran-aligned militia attack put Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline under pressure. Riyadh wants help. Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asked Donald Trump to intervene against the Houthis, but the White House held off. Saudi Arabia still has money, reserves, and time, but its reliable ways to move oil around the Strait of Hormuz are narrowing. Andrew Leber joins us to explain why the Houthis are a harder problem than a conventional Iranian proxy. They receive Iranian support, but they have their own political goals, their own local base, and their own reasons to push for control of Yemen. That independence makes a broader deal with Tehran harder to translate into a durable settlement. The episode also looks beyond the immediate crisis. The new Makkah defense agreement links Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, but it does not guarantee that either partner would fight Iran. The United States remains powerful in the region, yet its military capacity and political appetite are both more limited than Gulf allies once assumed. We ask what Saudi Arabia can still do, whether a renewed bombing campaign would change anything, and whether the least bad option now runs through another uneasy accommodation with Iran and the Houthis. Further reading: Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner, “The Impacts of the Houthis’ Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi Arabia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 23, 2026. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit globaltantrum.substack.com

    Saudi Arabia's Worst-Case Scenario
5
out of 5
3 Ratings

About

Two International Relations PhDs help you make sense of the post-postwar era. globaltantrum.substack.com

You Might Also Like