Paul Krugman Podcast

Paul Krugman
  • 5.0 (16)
  • Politics

Notes on economics and more paulkrugman.substack.com

  1. 3d ago

    Lisa Graves on the Supreme Court

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. Lisa Graves is the author of Without Precedent, a history and analysis of the Roberts Court and the expert on how the Federalist Society has been working to undermine democracy. Yesterday this happened: So I managed to arrange a conversation with Lisa about what is happening: . . . TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Lisa Graves (recorded 6/29/26) Paul Krugman: Hi everyone. This is a bit of an emergency recording and podcast because today, which is Monday as we’re recording this, the Supreme Court has just handed down several decisions, of which one was really alarming. And I had talked earlier with Lisa Graves, head of True North Research, and Court Accountability who had been warning about all this stuff when I talked with her previously and on other occasions. And I wanted to get somebody who’s actually following this to weigh in. So, hi Lisa. Lisa Graves: Paul, thank you so much for inviting me back on. I really appreciate it. Krugman: Yeah. So, there were obviously several decisions that came down, but Humphrey’s Executor… This is absolutely mind-boggling. So why don’t you talk about Humphrey’s Executor and then we’ll talk about the background and what this says about the Roberts Court? Graves: Yes. Today’s Slaughter case involving the FTC, is a case where the Roberts Court has overruled nearly a century of legal precedent which prohibited presidents from firing commissioners, specifically on the Federal Trade Commission, the case that you mentioned, Paul. Humphrey’s Executor was specifically about the FTC. It was about this provision that barred FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, from firing someone whom Hoover appointed to that commission. When Congress created the FTC, it set a standard that required that you would have to have cause to fire someone outside of their term. The way the FTC is set up is that it has five commissioners by statute. Three of those commissioners are appointed by the president, two from the president’s party, and two are not from the president’s party. What’s happened over the past year is since Donald Trump became president again, he fired the Democratic commissioners on that commission. And so for the last 15 months, that commission has had only two commissioners, two Republican appointees, which has meant there hasn’t been a Democrat even in the room to consider these cases that are brought to the FTC, which relate to the power of huge corporations to merge with one another or not. And so, in essence, the FTC investigates proposed mergers and other things that might be considered a restraint on trade or affect the ability of consumers to get a fair price on things, for example. And what Trump has done is that he’s basically dominated that board in defiance of the plain language of the statute. So any legal action by Donald Trump that has been countenanced by this Supreme Court, which allowed that firing to stand, in essence, did not allow the lower courts to reinstall Rebecca Slaughter to that post while the case was pending, and then just today ruled that, in fact, under their new approach to the Constitution, Donald Trump has the power to fire anyone at any independent agency—other than the Fed, it seems—no matter what Congress has said. And this is the result of an invention of a theory from the Reagan revolutionaries back in the day to try to aggrandize presidential power through what they describe as “the unitary executive theory.” So the bottom line is that this ruling by the Roberts Court will allow more of the corruption that we’ve seen going on by this administration in terms of people who may be donors to Trump seemingly getting out of investigations or having their mergers go through, and we will not have a commission at the FTC that has any independence—just loyalists for Donald Trump for the foreseeable future. Krugman: And it applies obviously not just to the FTC but to any agency except not the Federal Reserve. But the FDA—if there’s an FDA official who is viewed as being too hostile to RFK Jr’s vaccine doctrine or something, then Trump can fire him. And the Supreme Court has said, “Well, yes, the president has that power. Congress cannot set any ground rules that can’t be overruled by presidential edict.” Is that a correct interpretation? Graves: Well, that’s the broad strokes of it, but just to add a little bit of gloss to that, which is that Roberts has been pursuing this agenda for years now. And he accomplished part of it through a case called the Seila Law LLC case, where he allowed Trump to remove the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And the CFPB also had restrictions on whether that person could be fired without cause, and Roberts already moved the ball forward on that. And that has had a cascading effect along with the terrible, unprecedented immunity decision, where the Roberts Court gave Donald Trump immunity from criminal prosecution for any of his so-called official acts, which included directing agencies like the Justice Department to do his bidding. And so, up until now, what was left was this notion that if Congress created a board that specifically had limits on how a person could be removed from that board because of its regulatory function to implement congressional will to act in a legislative way, boards like the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor Relations Board could not be swept of their members. But before this decision, through the machinations of John Roberts, in essence, Donald J. Trump was already exerting a power to fire anyone within the executive branch, whether they were on an independent board or not. Krugman: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau felt like it was a little bit different. It was basically Elizabeth Warren’s creation. It was a relatively new agency. But this now generalizes it to everything, and it goes back to the FTC, which is a very, very old institution and is where this whole Humphrey’s Executor comes from. So now that’s everything. Graves: Yes, except for the Fed. That is correct. And I think, as you were describing it at the outset, Paul, this has enormous implications for the American people and American consumers, because, in essence, consolidating power in this way in a president is not required by the Constitution. Although Roberts is somehow claiming it is, it’s not. This is part of this invention of this so-called “structural Constitution” under this very rigid notion of separation of powers, which basically guts some of the core powers of Congress and vests those powers, in the views of this court, in the hands of the president and the president alone. And this ignores the reality of what’s happening, which is that you have a president who’s not actually executing the laws passed by Congress; who’s thwarting those laws. When you look at Article One and Article Two of the Constitution, what you see is that the president’s primary job is “to faithfully execute the laws of the United States.” And what’s happening here is that the president is circumventing those laws, thwarting those laws, and doing so in ways that raise serious questions of corruption or potential corruption or undue influence. And the area of trade and mergers is one of the most, you know, potentially profitable areas for people trying to curry favor with Donald Trump. And what we’ve seen over the past fifteen months is that the FTC under the control of two Trump loyalists has dismissed more than thirty-three investigations into mergers that were begun before Donald Trump took over. Krugman: This is basically a Federalist Society thing, and when they began pushing this, they probably had in mind that we would be pursuing an ideological agenda, that this would be something that would allow a right wing president to essentially just overrule Congress when it was doing things that weren’t sufficiently right-wing, or weren’t sufficiently “Reaganesque,” since this goes way back to the 1980s. But now it’s very much personalist. We’re talking about this as what one guy gets to do, which might not even be ideological. As you say, it might just be corruption. Graves: Yeah. I think it’s both, right? So there is this throughline from the Federalist Society that helped get these judges on the court. These six members were all either active members or noted to be members of the Federalist Society. They were part of the pipeline to power that the Federalist Society was created to accomplish. Roberts and Alito and the three Trump appointees, they were all appointed in the aftermath of the “No More Souter” campaign by Federalist Society activists who said they didn’t want judges who were going to follow the precedent. They wanted people who were going to basically be ringers and change the law to reverse the progress of the 20th century. And this attack on what they call the administrative state is really an attack on expertise. It’s an attack on the ability of agencies to do the job Congress has entrusted them to do, which is to faithfully implement those laws in defense and in pursuit of the public interests of the American people. So you now have this convergence between a president who is so determined to take cash, in many ways, out of other people’s pockets, including the pockets of the taxpayers, in order to advance himself, to aggrandize himself. And this has come to a head at a time when the court has the majority. So this captured court has the majority it needs to accomplish its long-term ideological agenda. And what a lot of people don’t realize is that when you look at the Supreme Court, this nine-member court, and the six members in the Republican-appointed majority, five of those six members were executive branch attorneys. They were people who cut their teeth for years in advancing presidentia

    36 min
  2. The Court Sides With Dictatorship — and Chaos

    4d ago

    The Court Sides With Dictatorship — and Chaos

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. Note: It’s Lisa Cook, not Lisa Graves. Talking to Lisa Graves shortly. Earlier today, the Supreme Court declared war on U.S. democracy. It also declared war, basically, on modern society, on everything it takes to function in the 21st century. And I’m not sure that people understand that yet. Hi, Paul Krugman with a quick video update. I’ll have more on this tomorrow. Really shocking decisions handed down by the Supreme Court. There were a couple that were not awful. Lisa Cook gets to stay at the Federal Reserve, although that in itself is a huge contradiction to the important stuff that the court did. I mean, Lisa is important and the Fed is important, but much more important is Humphrey’s Executor, which is the generations-long precedent that says that when Congress creates an independent agency, it is independent. It’s able to make decisions. Of course, the president has some role. Typically, the president can choose the agency’s head subject to congressional approval, but the president can’t just go and fire officials that he doesn’t like for whatever reason or for no reason, because the agencies that operate the U.S. government and basically run our society are supposed to be professional. They’re supposed to be following their legal mandate. They’re not supposed to be personal tools of a dictator in the White House. Well, the court just scrapped that. Now, lawyers, people who are legal experts, can do a better job of explaining just what went down. But what I think is important to understand is not only does this give essentially dictatorial powers to the occupant of the White House, but it also makes it extremely difficult for the economy to function. It makes it extremely difficult for society to function. We live in a complicated world, a world of technology, where there are all kinds of spillovers, all kinds of ways in which it’s important that there be well-established ground rules. If you’re a business, take the example of medicines and foodstuffs, where we have an FDA, Federal Drug Administration, that is charged with ensuring that products that people consume are safe. We do that for very good reason. We know that not just that that there have been examples, historically, of products that were foods, medicines that were not at all safe, but also that people want some assurance. The fact that something has been FDA approved is a bit of a warranty, that it might turn out to be very harmful, but probably not. Businesses that want to invest in developing stuff need to know that there are some ground rules that determine what they can and cannot sell. Now imagine that all these decisions are made by political appointees who are loyalists to the president, who basically do whatever the president wants, whatever the people around the president want. Do you want to invest in something where you have absolutely no idea what the ground rules will be, whether it will be approved or not? Do you want to invest in a whole business line when, for all you know, the White House will abruptly decide that your product isn’t safe and that a competitor’s product is, based on spurious grounds? And what would cause those decisions to happen? Well, how about the fact that some businesses are better at the business of bribing the president and his family than others. And if you think that this is outlandish — you know, a few years ago you might have said this was outlandish, things like that wouldn’t really happen — well, as we speak, these things are happening all the time. So you are setting up a situation in which, you know, it’s a little bit like traffic laws. Traffic laws, yeah, they can be annoying, but aren’t we all kind of glad that there are in fact rules about when you can turn and when you can go through an intersection? In order to function, in order to drive your car around you need to have a set of stable traffic rules, not a situation in which a police officer can decide you broke the law and the other guy did not because I say what the law is. And especially not where the police officer does that based upon who’s been paying him off or who he expects to be paid off. The real world is far more complex than traffic rules but we need those rules and we need some stability and those rules cannot be specified with every letter, every punctuation mark set by Congress. The world is too complicated and changes too much. You need to have standing ethos, standing doctrine at the agencies that make modern life possible. Now all of that is gone. Now, it just adds to it that all of this is being done to empower a president who is the worst possible person for this job. This is not somebody you want supervising anything, everything that Trump touches turns to crud because he doesn’t care and he doesn’t actually understand or recognize that there’s such a thing as expertise as knowing what you’re doing. So this would be terrible even if we had a temporarily competent administration. But now you’re doing all of this, the Supreme Court is doing all of this to empower the guy who brought you the Reflecting Pool, who brought you the Iran war. Utter nightmare. Now, what will happen, hopefully, we emerge at the other end having fended off dictatorship. Then, I mean, as everybody knows, this Supreme Court is not actually empowering the presidency. It is empowering this president. And as soon as there’s a Democrat in the White House, suddenly there will be all kinds of restrictions on what that person can do. Well, this cannot go on. This is a clear argument that says we have to one way or another disempower the Supreme Court. I don’t know enough to tell you what is the best route to do that but court packing or something else is going to have to happen. Because this has been the clearest signal yet that we have six people (there are three who are not part of it, but we have six people) who are fundamentally hostile to democracy, fundamentally hostile to the modern world and determined to put the catastrophically bad leader that we currently have sitting in the White House in charge of everything, which is a nightmare scenario on every level. Take care, I guess. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    8 min
  3. Corruption for Make Benefit Glorious Family of Trump

    5d ago

    Corruption for Make Benefit Glorious Family of Trump

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. Transcript It’s kind of hard to believe, but the original Borat movie was 20 years ago. It’s time for a second sequel. And I already have the title. It would be Corruption for Make Benefit Glorious Family of Trump. I hope that some of my listeners are young enough to not remember the original Borat movie. But it was a mockumentary, a satire, in which Sacha Baron Cohen pretended to be a journalist from Kazakhstan investigating and interviewing Americans about American mores. It was not about Kazakhstan, although he did insult the country along the way. The reason I think about it is that today’s New York Times has a piece that reports, investigative reporting, on an immense mining deal in Kazakhstan, which, what do you know, turns out to be a big profit center for the Trump sons and also the sons of Howard Lutnick, the Commerce Secretary. Check out the investigative reporting for the details, but basically here’s another one, another big one. It’s part of an immense series of corrupt deals, often with petrostates — which Kazakhstan is — that financially benefit Donald Trump and his family and some of his cronies and cabinet members as well and their families. It’s all on a truly epic scale. This is a message I have been trying to get across. I don’t think many people even now understand just how much of a departure what’s happening now is from past US history. I still see people saying we might be, could be heading for another Gilded Age. But we have a level of concentration of wealth in the hands of a few people that is something like three times what it was at the peak of the Gilded Age. We’re in a super duper Gilded Age. And I sometimes hear people say, well, could we be returning to old kinds of corruption? Might we have another Teapot Dome scandal? Well, my God. Teapot Dome was a scandal actually involving mineral rights and bribes during the Harding administration, although not bribes to the president’s family, which is, again, something entirely new. The scale of the bribes was about $500,000: adjusting for inflation, that’s something like $9 million today. So how much has Trump enriched himself since returning to the White House about 500 days ago? The answer is certainly more than four billion dollars, almost certainly more than four and a half, maybe five billion dollars. Divide that by 500 and we basically have a Teapot Dome sized corruption scandal on an average day under Trump. So it’s basically day after day of scandals as big or bigger than Teapot Dome. Our corrupt grandfathers, great-grandfathers were pikers compared with this, just as the Gilded Age robber barons were pikers compared with the modern-day tech bros. This is obviously not good. It’s actually quite horrifying. How did we so quickly descend into becoming a truly massively corrupt country on a level that we used to think of as being associated only with tinpot dictators in the third world? And yet here we are. This ought to be a political issue and it ought to be a legal issue as soon as the government is back in the hands of people who actually take the rule of law seriously. Again, without going into the details of the deal, it’s surely illegal. I mean, it’s illegal under the Emoluments Clause. Probably since there are definitely Kazakhs on the take as well, it’s illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This is just, it’s illegal up the wazoo. Of course, it will not be prosecuted as long as Trump is in the White House. But forget any Democrat who isn’t promising to go after this massive corruption when they regain power. If they don’t, then none of this matters, but that should be a core part of anybody’s platform. I’m not a political expert — sometimes I think nobody is — but my God, again, this corruption is so blatant. And it does resonate with people. It’s really clear that corruption at the top and the sense that ordinary people are paying the price while people with power enrich themselves is an effective popular issue. That is actually the issue that brought Viktor Orban down in Hungary, which is one of the hopeful signs for what may happen to America going down the pike. So here we are, just to remind you that this scandal, it’s a huge thing. It’s page one in the New York Times, but in a way it’s actually kind of ordinary, since even this size of scandal is happening every few weeks these days. Do not make the mistake of treating what’s going on as in any sense normal. This is hugely abnormal, and I believe that the American people will understand that it’s abnormal even if pundits get bored of talking about the corruption. So drive it home, maybe for make benefit American people instead of the Trump family. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    6 min
  4. On Holding Elon Musk Accountable

    6d ago

    On Holding Elon Musk Accountable

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. Transcript For most of last year, Elon Musk was the second most powerful man in America. He was running a large part of the government’s budget. And during that time, he established a track record of evil incompetence. I mean, really evil and really incompetent on enormous scales. And why aren’t people talking about it more? Hi, I’m Paul Krugman, doing a brief follow-on to my discussion that was posted earlier today with Ro Khanna, the Congressman from Silicon Valley, who’s a very interesting guy in many ways. One of the things that has made him especially interesting in the last few days is that he said something entirely reasonable, which is that if Democrats retake Congress, they should hold investigations into the role of Elon Musk as head of DOGE, the sort of not exactly but effectively government agency, in destroying USAID, the agency that was the principal channel for aid to the most desperate, poorest people in the world. That’s entirely reasonable, and Khanna went on to say that there are credible estimates that the cancellation, the destruction of Doge has led to millions of unnecessary deaths, including millions of children — which is exactly true. There are studies that say that there is both in the field evidence of widespread death as a result of the cancellation and, of course reasonable health models. Because what do you think happens when you cut away tens of billions of dollars of aid to people who are living right on the edge? So of course it’s a reasonable thing to say. Musk, of course, responded not by saying, no, it’s not true or something like that. He did say that not a single person has died because of those cuts, which is utterly implausible. But he also went on to say that he was going to sue Khanna, though he hasn’t actually so far, and that Khanna should be in prison for saying — not even saying that Musk killed people, but that there are studies that say that he killed people. It’s quite evil and so much for free speech. Musk is very much like Trump, somebody who can dish it out but can’t take it, can’t even handle the kind of criticism that any public figure should expect to receive. Honestly, you shouldn’t be at all in the public domain unless you’re prepared to deal with a lot of insults and accusations. When you have the kind of role that Musk did that would come with the package even if he had done a decent or non-catastrophic job. But of course he didn’t. And so let’s talk first about the evil. It’s not just that Musk more or less personally set out to destroy this aid agency set out to cut off healthcare, nutritional assistance, just basic necessities of life for millions and millions of extremely desperate people. But he did so callously, carelessly, he even actually tweeted out, oh, “I just fed USAID to the wood chipper and I could have gone to some great parties instead.” What can you say? This is an extraordinarily evil act. It came in the context of somebody who made enormous promises about what he was going to do. People have kind of forgotten that Musk came into DOGE promising to find trillions of dollars in waste, which he would eliminate, none of which happened. Overall, it’s pretty clear that DOGE actually worsened the budget deficit at least a little bit. He also made specific claims along the way, most notably his claim that there were something like 20 million dead people receiving Social Security benefits. That was because the 19-year-olds that he put in positions of great influence, the Muskrats, whatever you want to call them, didn’t understand government databases. You know, you get parachuted into an agency with access to the computer system but absolutely no knowledge of what the agency does or how it does it and then couple that with a kind of arrogance — believing that these people must all be stupid and I can just sit down for a day or two with their data and find vast waste and fraud. Well, nobody in a position of responsibility should believe that kind of thing. It’s possible that Big Balls and his other hench people actually believed that they knew what they were doing. But my god, if you’re put in charge of a hugely important government function, you don’t assume that everybody there is an idiot and that your neophyte attaches have somehow stumbled on things that nobody else noticed. And of course, Social Security is so pervasive, such a large part of everybody’s life, that the idea that there could be tens of millions of dead beneficiaries and nobody has noticed it, that’s completely crazy. You even wonder, did Musk really believe that? Does he even have a notion that some things are true and some things are not? But in any case, there you are. And so it was a total disaster. He left the government not, clearly not because Trump thought that he was too extreme, too bad a guy, but because it was so clear that he did not know what he was doing. And the reports of alleged savings from DOGE: it was starting to get embarrassing because it was so easy for news organizations to find out that the claims were utterly false, that none of what they claimed was happening was actually happening. So he left. and then he goes back to his companies and becomes at least temporarily a trillionaire with an enormous public offering. Why didn’t people think that his record with enormous public responsibility was somehow relevant to his financial future? I mean, if a guy who can convince himself that there are 20 million dead Social Security recipients, who can convince himself that you can massively slash foreign aid and it’s all waste and fraud and nobody will be hurt — why would you trust that person to run a company? And furthermore, the character flaws that are revealed here — flaws is what too weak a word, but anyway — when you have somebody who refuses to acknowledge uncomfortable reality, refuses to acknowledge error, who responds to any perfectly truthful statement that reflects badly on him by saying, I want that guy put in jail. — those are not the character traits that make for an effective manager. If you can’t accept that you are ever wrong, how are you ever going to get things right? Because things will go wrong, and you will make mistakes. We all do. So all of this seems terribly relevant, and yet it says something, I guess, about America that people piled in to SpaceX stock, although some of that has come off now. It really was clearly an early frenzy, a fear of missing out frenzy. There are now reports that SpaceX also sold bonds, which itself is a little troubling. Why should they be needing to go into debt right away? What is that about? And those bonds have already lost some of their value, which is much more serious than the stock coming down. When bonds lose value, that’s because people think that there is now a risk that this company might default, might not be able to honor its promises. So seeing those bonds start to trade at a discount almost immediately is a pretty bad sign for the company. But again, why did anybody believe any of this? Musk is a horrible, terrible person and has the blood of millions of children on his hands. Let’s be clear. Yes, it’s not something that has been proven, but it’s close to. It’s so overwhelmingly likely that it clearly has to be true. And he’s also a weak personality — very much like Trump again — he can’t take criticism, he can’t admit error. So what does it say ultimately about our society that so many people are willing to throw money at this guy and that they’re so willing to forgive the incredible failures that he carried out, the incredible disaster of his time in a position of public responsibility. And I don’t really know the answer to that. There’s a real question about how it is we got at our current age of irresponsible oligarchs and with so little public backlash. And it’s starting to develop. But still, the fact that Elon Musk is still in business, let alone the world’s richest man, is in some sense an indictment of all of us. On that happy note, take care. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    10 min
  5. Catching Up With Ro Khanna

    6d ago

    Catching Up With Ro Khanna

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. Ro Khanna represents a large part of Silicon Valley, and not surprisingly is a very smart guy. Perhaps more surprisingly, he’s also a very interesting progressive, who has drawn considerable ire from the tech lords, with Elon Musk most recently calling for his imprisonment. I caught up with him Friday: TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Congressman Ro Khanna (recorded 6/26/26) Paul Krugman: I’m talking again to Rep. Ro Khanna, the Representative for Cupertino, as it were, representing the heart of Silicon Valley in ways that don’t always please the tech oligarchs. I had planned to ask about AI, but there’s so much going on and Ro is right in the middle. So, welcome to this interview. Ro Khanna: Well, I’m honored to be back on. I usually just read you to learn, but I’m glad we’re going to get to have another conversation. Krugman: As it happens, tech-related politics is really central now. And you seem to be in the middle of at least three big issues: Elon Musk, AI generally, and the California Wealth Tax Initiative. I want to talk about all of those, but maybe let’s start with Elon Musk, who has called you evil, which is a great honor. Do you want to talk about that controversy and where you came in here? Because I think it’s very interesting. Khanna: Well, he’s called me evil, he’s threatened to sue me, and he’s threatened to jail me. I have this quaint idea, Paul, that in a democracy, Elon Musk should have one vote. He doesn’t seem to think that, and the reason he has been so triggered is that I not only cited a Lancet study—which said that his USAID cuts could potentially lead to the deaths of 4.5 million children and over 10 million adults—but I also cited an Atul Gawande/ Boston study showing that some of these deaths have already taken place. This triggered him, not just because I cited these studies, but because I said he’s going to have to come before the House Oversight Committee when we take back the majority; we’re going to have the power to subpoena him. And, of course, defying a congressional subpoena could lead to contempt of Congress and penalties. And so he’s been spending the last few days obsessively tweeting about me. You would think if you had $1 trillion, you’d have better things to do, but this is what’s occupying him. Krugman: Yeah, let’s back up a bit. One of the things that I found really kind of astonishing in the whole discussion—and obviously, SpaceX went public and there was amazingly little discussion of Musk’s role at DOGE where he was a quasi-government official. I guess it was kind of weird what the legal basis for all of that was—but this had immense impacts. And as you say, one of them was that he just, more or less by personal fiat, eliminated USAID, which is our premier aid agency. Do you have any thoughts just generally about what Musk did at DOGE? I think it’s a hell of a story, so let’s start with that. Khanna: The keywords you used were “by personal fiat.” I mean, he literally went there, didn’t consult Congress, didn’t report to Congress, and just started cutting programs that Congress had explicitly authorized. And no one stopped him. We voted to subpoena him, but he defied coming in and explaining anything to Congress. By some accounts, he cut 83% of the programs that were at USAID. And some of these programs are to feed some of the poorest people in the world; some are to provide medicines to some of the poorest people in the world. So, you literally had the world’s richest person hurting the world’s poorest people. And he was doing it with no accountability, in defiance of Congress. Congress then fortunately restored some of these programs, so he was not able to end all of them. But the USAID programs are a shadow of their former self. They now are scattered in administration, and many were so disrupted that these academic studies have shown that it potentially could—or in some cases already has—led to the deaths of some of the poorest people and children in the world. Krugman: Yeah, the important thing is what he did. But the attitude also at the time... I think he said something like, “Oh, I just fed USAID to the wood chipper, and I could have gone to some great parties instead,” as if it was, you know, annoying that he had to go out there and cut off medical aid for millions of children. Khanna: Yeah, it was total arrogance. He said it was all fraud, but of course, he then didn’t have the guts to come before Congress or the American people and explain where he found fraud. He didn’t consult any of these programs. It’s not like he was on a plane to Africa or a plane to other parts of the world where these programs were being administered. And for someone who was going to go after cuts to the federal budget, instead of starting at the Department of Defense, which is 65% or so of the discretionary federal budget, he decides to start with an administration with less than 1% of the federal budget. It was a purely ideological agenda that, turns out, has real-world consequences—especially with this Ebola outbreak. I mean, one of the things he cut was the oversight and testing in places like the Republic of the Congo, and now we’re seeing the consequences. Krugman: And his reaction has been really quite over the top, considering, you know, if you’re any kind of public figure, you expect to be facing criticism. Khanna: It’s just denial, right? I think he said that not a single person has died because of his cuts, which is totally implausible. He said, “there’s not a single documented case.” And he said that everything he cut was simply a fraud, and that these academic studies are totally fraudulent. Granted, the Lancet study is a model of what could happen, but the Atul Gawande study is actually a documentation of actual deaths that have taken place. And there are a lot of anecdotal statements which Nicholas Kristof and a lot of people have reported on. Krugman: And now he’s threatening to sue you. Presumably, I don’t think we’re that far gone that there’s any chance that such a suit would prevail, but how much of that is an actual burden on you? Khanna: Well, I put it into Grok to see how strong a case Elon has, and Grok doesn’t think he has a very strong case. So there’s that. Krugman: In case anybody doesn’t know, Grok is Elon Musk’s or xAI’s LLM. It’s a competitor to ChatGPT and Claude, except it’s not really a competitor because it’s awful, right? But yeah. Khanna: I would have a better case of defamation given what he has said about me. But, of course, I believe in free speech, Paul. I thought he did, too, and I would never think of suing someone for calling me a robber or calling me names. That’s the First Amendment. But I’ll tell you what it does: it creates a doubt in other people who are on the Oversight Committee—you know, “Is this really worth the bother? Should we really criticize Musk?” So that’s one thing. Obviously, Musk has more than one vote. He’s got millions of dollars that he can spend on candidates, but now it turns out it’s not enough for him to just have the ability to support Super PACs; he also wants to be able to intimidate any public official who dares to go against him. It’s not just that he would spend money against them, but that he could actually sue them. And so if you’re a member of Congress, you’re thinking, “Well, do I really want this fight? Or maybe we could just focus on the hundred other issues.” So, it’s less about the headache for me and more about the signal he’s sending to other elected officials. Krugman: So you aren’t trying to do a GoFundMe for a legal defense or anything like that? Because I know people who have faced other spurious lawsuits and it’s actually cost them money, even though there’s no chance of it prevailing. They feel that they do need to hire people, but you’re not in a position where you are personally feeling liable? Or are you just well-positioned to sort of weather this? Khanna: Well, he hasn’t sued yet. If he does sue, it will be a drain on resources and we would have to raise funds. We would. But I don’t want to have people do something before there is an actual lawsuit. We’ll see what he does. But that’s exactly what his strategy is, whether it’s against someone like me or just a message to others that he has unlimited resources and he can make your life very, very difficult. Krugman: Okay. And he’s also called for you... I guess there was nothing specific about why, but for you to be put in jail, which is even more amazing. Khanna: Yes. And ordinarily you would kind of laugh it off because he’s a private person with no power. But of course, in this administration, him calling for that and the way the Justice Department works—there are political motives to how they’ve been operating. I mean, they have the governor of California and his wife that they’re threatening along with Adam Schiff... the list is long how they have operated. Krugman: Yeah. I’m a friend of Lisa Cook at the Federal Reserve and for her, this has been much more. She was, in fact, targeted and all of that by essentially the same gang. So yeah, it’s quite something. Just the last bit: Musk has also then gone out with this claim that USAID somehow is responsible for COVID, and also went full-in on the conspiracy theories about COVID. Do you have any comment on that, just since it came up in this context? Khanna: It’s so nonsensical. I don’t even understand what he’s talking about. I think what he is trying to argue is that the lab that some people believe was the testing ground for the virus somehow is connected to USAID, but he just puts these things out there with no evidence and for ideological reasons. The reality is t

    48 min
  6. The Chips Are Down

    Jun 24

    The Chips Are Down

    For all my interviews and more, subscribe on YouTube. A short talk in lieu of a post. Back on full duty tomorrow. Transcript: Hi, Paul Krugman here. I’m recording this on Tuesday afternoon. I just won’t have time to write a normal post for tomorrow when you’ll see this. And I would take the day off, except it seemed to me as if people might want some reaction to the carnage that’s been going on, at least in part of the tech sector and stock markets around the world, which has been pretty remarkable. It’s really tempting to say that it’s deeply meaningful. But in general, you want to be very cautious about putting too much stake in stock market events. I’ll come back to that in a minute. But it is striking enough that it does seem to be worth commenting on. So what’s happened? There’s been a fall in tech stocks very much concentrated in semiconductors. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index was down almost 8%. on Tuesday. The KOSPI Korean Index, which is largely a semiconductor index, was down just about 10% sort of the previous day or the same day, you know, time zones. And there was a 2.2% fall in the NASDAQ. We’ve seen a lot of decline in tech stocks, things related above all to chips. What’s going on there? Part of the answer is that trying to understand why the market does what it does is, generally speaking, a mug’s game. In this case, however, it does seem that part of what’s happening, probably a large part of what’s happening, is that the tone, the rhetoric surrounding use of AI, and hence the demand for compute, has really shifted quite a lot just very recently. All of a sudden, we have a spate of studies that seem to show that, yeah, AI models allow people to churn out a lot more stuff, but the actual payoff to that stuff is much, much smaller than the volume of stuff that they’re churning out, most obviously lines of code, but just in general. AI lets you do much more, but how productive that is in terms of the ultimate goals of a business, let alone economic growth and quality of life is much more doubtful. On top of that you have a rather abrupt, jarring turn in business strategy. Up until just the other day a lot of businesses were more or less whipping their workers into using AI — you know, we’re going to judge you on how much you’re using AI whether or not you really want to whether or not you yourself think it’s valuable. We’re actually going to score you, we’re going to require that you do tokenmaxxing. And then, with compute getting scarce and with the price of chips having gone through the roof, suddenly the AI companies began charging and the marginal cost of using a lot of tokens became really, really very high. And suddenly companies were saying, oh wait, stop. We want you to economize on your use of tokens and hence to ultimately reduce the demand for compute. And that’s a sudden U-turn. This is part of a broader phenomenon, which I’m going to write about very soon, which is that there is a kind of lack of organicness to the AI boom. There are people who are using it because it looks great. They’re using it because it’s fun. I have colleagues who are just mucking around with Claude and finding some uses for it. But there’s also a large amount of Corporate America that thinks that this is the way it has to go. Fear of missing out, not by the individual investor, but by the corporate bureaucracy. And then pressure from the financial markets, saying, you know, your company better be on the cutting edge of AI or else. All of which is very fragile. It’s a kind of a bubble, but not in the normal sort of asset price form. It’s more of a kind of fad, almost a social delusion. And that, it seems likely, certainly got ahead of itself. Now, I’m reading way too much into these stock prices. And so let me give you a little bit of a caution on all of that. So yeah, the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index was down 8% in a day, which is one hell of a drop. But it was up 157% over the past year. So you want to have some perspective here. This is a stunning setback, but the fact of the matter is that over the course of a year, these stocks have been incredibly high-performing. The KOSPI, the Korean index, was down 10%, strictly speaking, 9.99%. But anyway, it was down 10%. But after that 10% fall, it was up 172% over the year. So we’re not talking about a catastrophe. We’re not yet talking about, we aren’t even talking about a Bitcoin level of disappointment for investors. But okay, it’s a break in the trend. The other thing we should say: the famous old line by my teacher and colleague, Paul Samuelson, was that the stock market had predicted nine of the last five recessions. There’s many more than that now. In fact, just over the course of the past year and a half, we’ve had two major stock market declines that turned out to be false alarms. There was a big decline in April of 2025 after Liberation Day, the Trump tariffs, because there was a lot of people just sort of, it’s chaos, terrible things may happen. While the tariffs have been a bad thing, they did not cause an economic catastrophe and stocks recovered the losses that they experienced then. And then there was another round of major stock declines associated with the Iran war. Of course, the Iran war has been a complete debacle and a disaster, and we’ll be paying a price for that for a very long time. But the consequences for short-run macroeconomics were more modest than many people, myself included, expected. And it appears that the Strait of Hormuz is going to gradually open because the United States basically said, okay, you win. It won’t literally say that, but in practice, that’s what we’re doing. So that is going to be over. So it’s not that uncommon for the markets to react as if something terrible is about to happen and be wrong. And so you really don’t want to assume — there’s a real temptation to assume — that because there’s so much money involved, a big decline in markets must be signaling that something is really very much amiss in the fundamentals, that where there’s smoke, there’s fire. And sometimes, no, there’s just smoke, no fire. So this might not be that big a deal. But it comes at a moment when the rhetoric really has shifted. You can see that there’s just a kind of a walking back. There was a really striking interview just the other day with Satya Nadella of Microsoft. Microsoft is actually a consumer of AI, rather than a producer. They have tools you can use within Microsoft products, but I think they run basically off OpenAI. And Nadella was pretty scathing about saying, you know, we can’t give all of this power and all this money to the big AI companies, and we should be using cheaper models. And hinted that Microsoft may start making use of DeepSeek, the Chinese model, which is less comprehensive. In general, the Chinese models are less comprehensive, but immensely cheaper, and among other things, just do a lot less computation. That’s kind of the core of why they’re cheaper. And in that case, the picture changes a lot. What bearing does all of this have on AI and the future of the economy and AI and the future of humanity? Well, part of what we’re seeing may not be so much disappointment in what AI can do as realizing that this extremely compute-intensive AI is not essential. And maybe you can still get whatever the big productivity benefits are and still possibly the big labor-displacing effects without quite so much compute. But it’s not entirely separate either. I think we need to be saying that this is what a quasi-bubble quasi-bursting might look like. Take care. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    11 min
  7. Arindrajit Dube on Wages

    Jun 20

    Arindrajit Dube on Wages

    I often think of labor economics as a role model for the field: a subfield in which theory is disciplined by evidence and (most) researchers are willing to listen to that evidence even when it challenges their preconceptions. And hardly anyone does modern labor economics as well as UMass Amherst’s Arindrajit Dube, who has an excellent new book out. I talked with him about that book and the state of labor more generally. . . . TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Arindrajit Dube (recorded 6/18/26) Paul Krugman: One of the most satisfying parts of economics, which doesn’t get as much attention as it should, is labor economics. It’s obviously important. Most of us work for a living, or at least pretend to work for a living. But also it is a field, a subfield you might say; more scientific than almost anything else in economics, really evidence-based. You’ve had multiple revelations where the data have actually changed the way people, myself included, have thought about stuff. And among the most effective, prominent practitioners of modern labor economics is Arin Dube, who has a new book called The Wage Standard. And I thought we’d take a break from all the other stuff going on and talk about Arin’s work. So hi, Arin. Arindrajit Dube: Hi Paul, nice to see you. Krugman: Yeah, welcome to my virtual studio. Why don’t you talk just a little bit about The Wage Standard and what you’re trying to do, and then we can get into the broader labor economics issues? Dube: Yeah. So, I wrote a book. Here it is. Krugman: By the way, we mostly don’t do that in economics; we write 5,000-word articles. Dube: Exactly. Paul, of course, you’ve written many amazing books. But economists don’t usually write books. We publish articles. Krugman: That’s right. Dube: And so it was actually a big deal for me to sort of think about, did I want to write a book? And I kind of went for a number of years and I said, like, “Oh, well, I’m not writing this book for other economists as a main audience,” though of course, I’m very happy for other economists to read it, but I wanted to try to have a broader conversation, and I needed to be clear that I wanted to know what I was going to say in that conversation. And so here’s basically the main point of the book. The main argument is that Americans deserve a raise, that most American workers actually could get paid more and should get paid more. And there are really good reasons to think that. You know, the market has not delivered what could be a sustainable but higher wage for those in the bottom and lower part of the income distribution. So that’s basically the core idea. And I try to bring in what we know about the research that I think has really blossomed in the last decade or two decades on a bunch of topics when it comes to understanding the labor market. I was writing this book at the beginning of the pandemic and especially 2021. And it was really interesting because this was one of the more remarkable episodes in the labor market that really highlighted a lot of things that I was actually talking about in the book. Of course, it did it in a very messy way, because there were lots of things happening during that time. But it made for a very interesting process where I felt like I was writing the book and the world was writing itself outside, which was both exciting and challenging. Krugman: Okay. I said that labor economics has been revelatory. When I was not young, but younger, I think most economists circa 1990 would have thought of the labor market as just being a market of supply and demand. And where they crossed determines wages, and there’s nothing much you can do about it. And if you try to change it, you do so at your peril; bad things will happen. And as you say in the book, and in many of your writings that I’ve been following on all this stuff, that’s something that really, really changed. You want to talk about what happened? Dube: Yeah. So, one really interesting thing is to think about how wages are set. And we could start with the basic supply and demand story, which basically is that there’s demand for workers of different skills and then there’s supply. And depending on the supply and demand conditions, you’re going to have different wages, a different skill price. And let me be clear, I think there’s a lot of important aspects of that that actually matter, but it’s also incomplete. Because here’s the thing: if the market really worked like the textbook supply and demand story, basically workers of a particular type would just get paid the same—that’s the skill price. But in reality, it turns out companies have a substantial degree of discretion in setting pay. And you can start to see this by just looking across companies hiring similar workers, but choosing to pay someone different. One simple example to start with is FedEx and UPS. Workers may be driving very similar routes delivering similar packages, but it turns out FedEx pays lower than UPS. UPS has maybe 37% of the workers; a few years back, they were paying less than $20 an hour. For FedEx, it was more like 60%. And so, of course, that’s just one example, but you have others. Like, look at Walmart versus Target. It turns out that Walmart tends to be paying somewhat lower than many of its other similar, large retail competitors. And the list goes on. But this is not a new observation. Labor economists who were studying this in the mid-20th century had gone and collected surveys and understood that, you know, factories in the same labor market could be paying different wages. But here’s what was not fully convincing: how do we know that it’s not maybe somewhat of a different skill mix? Maybe these companies are similar, but they’re hiring somewhat different types of workers the pay difference reflects that. So that argument held sway for decades until we had better data. And this is where what you say about labor economics, I think, really is right. And part of that has been our ability to really get much more granular and high-quality data, including administrative data linking pay for virtually most people in the labor market. And you can track them as they go from company to company. So you could say, “Hey, actually, what happens if the same person moves from Walmart to Target? Do you see they’re getting a higher pay?” Because you’re holding their skill set constant there. And so this kind of data and this sort of research design helped establish that actually, no, it turns out there is a substantial amount of variation in pay that comes from companies choosing different types of pay policies. And that’s a big part of the argument in my book, more broadly, that there are choices we have made. You know, if we wanted to go back and look to see what’s happened to productivity and what’s happened to wages since 1980, productivity has grown much more strongly than wages—maybe not as strong as it did in the postwar era, but nonetheless, it grew a lot more than the pay for the typical worker, certainly pay for those at the bottom. And one of the arguments that I make is that this reflects choices made in a variety of places, and that starts from choices at a corporate level, different companies choosing different pay policies, all the way to policies that are being made by state and federal government. But the core part of it is like, why does that make any sense? It doesn’t make much sense to talk about companies choosing pay policies if the market is just your supply and demand. There’s no role for saying, “Are you doing the high-wage strategy or a low-wage strategy?” That’s a nonsensical question in a perfectly competitive market. But it’s an absolutely sensible question to ask when companies have some degree of wage-setting power. You know, economists have a funny word for this, right? Monopsony. It’s a funny word. But the basic idea is really straightforward. You know, companies are making a choice there. You could go for a higher wage strategy or you could go for a lower wage strategy. Now, if you’re paying lower wages, you are going to have some more people quit and you’re going to have a somewhat harder time recruiting new workers. But the key thing is, it doesn’t mean that if you pay below a hypothetical market wage, everyone bolts, right? So you actually face a meaningful tradeoff of exactly how much more to pay or how much less to pay, and different companies end up choosing different amounts. And this is also where—and this is even more recent, really in the last, you know, 5 to 7 years—we have seen a really big increase in research on the topic of monopsony, so we can really better understand exactly how much wage-setting power companies have. And it just sort of turns out that if a company’s choosing to pay, let’s say, a 10% lower wage, they’re going to have higher quits. Maybe about 14% higher quits. I just finished doing a review for the Journal of Economic Literature, and that’s basically where it sort of lands, and the quit rate is just not super sensitive to wage. So this gives employers a degree of discretion. And they’re going to do a couple of things that are important. First, different companies may choose different strategies. That is what creates these differences across companies. And the way companies have made those choices has really been different in the arc of history. Krugman: Okay. So that’s where actually I came in on this topic, which was a classic paper by Claudia Goldin and Bob Margo. You know, I grew up in a world very different from the world where you grew up, with much more equal wages than we have now. But it turns out that wasn’t something that gradually evolved. It happened in a few years, basically during the New Deal and World War II: the Great Compression. Dube: Absolutely. Yeah. And so that’s a story that h

    54 min
  8. Power and Geopolitics After Trump

    Jun 18

    Power and Geopolitics After Trump

    Transcript Hi everyone. Instead of a regular post today, I’m going to put up a video. There are a number of reasons why I feel like doing that instead of the usual. One of them is that this is a dry run for a talk that I will be giving virtually later today. There’s a conference on the economics of digital transformation taking place in Croatia, although I’ll be doing it remotely. And they have asked me to talk about global power, geoeconomics, and Europe. Those are all themes that I’ve been thinking about quite a lot. And today’s miniature talk is an opportunity to try talking through those themes. And the way I want to structure it is as what has changed, at least in the way that we all now understand the world, since, well, basically since Donald Trump returned to power. That’s an American-centric point of view, if you like, but it’s kind of a natural bracket. And of course, everything really has changed, mostly not for the better, under Trump. And it has, as it turns out, big implications for Europe as well. So let me just try to get into that. Start by talking about the world as it seemed to be at the beginning of 2025. There were, and still are, three great economic superpowers in the world: China, the United States, and the European Union, in that order. If we measure GDP in 2024 at purchasing power parity, which is basically just adjusting for differences in national price levels, you had China with a GDP of something like $37 trillion, the United States with something like 29 trillion and the EU with something like 28 trillion. That last bit may be a bit of a surprise — maybe all of it is a surprise to some people — but yes, in terms of the actual amount of stuff it produces the Chinese economy is now substantially bigger than the US economy. And the European economy is almost the same size as the US economy. If you think that Europe is backward and poor and helplessly dependent, it’s not. It is an economic superpower. And in fact, by this measure, Europe has basically maintained this position of being about comparable to the United States for a long time. This is a whole other topic that I’ve been writing about and will continue to write about in the future. In that world, basically, two things were really kind of striking. One is that the United States seemed to perceive itself as being a dominant power, even though China was bigger and even though Europe was about the same size, and Europe acted as if it seemed to perceive itself as not being in the same league, as being not a superpower at all. All of that may be changing, and events are part of the reason, so let’s talk about the events. Now, the most obvious: the United States just lost a war. Just lost it bigly, as Trump used to say. It’s an astonishing story. We went up against Iran, which was definitely not a major military power or a major economic power, a sort of middle-ranked power, if that, and utterly failed to achieve our war goals. In the process, we inflicted a lot of damage on the world economy and depleted our stocks of high-tech weapons that will take years to replace. Altogether, immense damage was inflicted on Iran, but Iran has clearly emerged stronger. The United States has emerged humiliated. The attempts by Trump and minions to pretend that it was a victory don’t help. They only make the United States look not just humiliated but delusional. So that’s a big deal. It has large implications for US power and influence going forward as well. To explain those implications, it’s helpful to talk about one of the other things that really dramatically changed with Trump coming back into office, which was trade policy. The United States began really seriously trying to throw its weight around. Liberation Day, the tariffs on everybody, basically trying to pressure all of the world into giving us various kinds of concessions. Give us what we want or we won’t let you sell in our market and everybody needs to sell in our market. Okay, what we learned from now well over a year of trade war is that U.S. power in that dimension is substantially less than certainly than Trump appeared to believe it was. And just in general, trade, leverage and trade negotiations, leverage in trade disputes has less to do with market access than a lot of people assumed and more to do with supply chains, with getting stuff that you use in your economy, means of production, not in the sense of capital, but intermediate inputs or just inputs in general. The nation that has more ability to strangle its rivals by cutting off supply chains is the one that has the upper hand. So it turns out, and we had already learned this from the trade stuff, that China with its dominant position in rare earths and some other crucial industrial materials actually had a stronger hand than the United States. Yes, we have a big market, but loss of a market can be offset to some extent by domestic stimulus, domestic support programs. Not having crucial industrial materials is not so easy to make up for. So we learned that the power in international trade disputes in a fundamental sense reflects power over supply, not power over demand, which is something economists have always tried to say. The point of trade is not to sell. The point of trade is to get stuff. You sell as a way to pay for things that you get from other countries. But now we have it demonstrated very obviously in real life. So that in itself meant that we’ve had a blow to the perception of US power. It turns out the US market is not almighty; access to the US market is not anything like as powerful a tool as we thought and Chinese strangleholds over key inputs are much more important. And then of course we’ve seen that even more graphically demonstrated by war with Iran and it turns out that Iran’s ability to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was a really huge empowering point, and it was the kind of thing that the United States really didn’t think about, and certainly the Trump administration didn’t think about. And it shows the true rules of global economic power, because largely Iran was able to win this war through economic power rather than strictly military action, the rules of economic power are not what a lot of people thought they were. Who benefits from that? Well, obviously China. What we’ve seen now is that in terms of a global power competition, China has demonstrated that they have substantial power over supply chains. They’ve also demonstrated that they can weather a cutoff of oil pretty well. And global power is a zero-sum game. So the United States, by weakening itself, by showing that we don’t have the ability to impose our will militarily, we don’t even have the ability to keep international shipping routes open, has emerged as just a much less formidable player, which means that China by comparison looks better. Add to that the fact that the United States has been erratic and unreliable. Our current leadership just doesn’t understand that a reputation for doing what you promised, honoring your agreements, is itself a source of power, and we have done an enormous amount to undermine that. Not news to anybody. Trump looks much weaker. America looks much weaker. To a certain extent, China is the beneficiary of all that, at least in terms of power. Now, of course, life is not all about power. And in the end, you don’t run a country to maximize global power. Maybe the Chinese do. I’m not sure about that. But in any case, it’s not a zero-sum game in terms of living. But in terms of power, it is a zero-sum game. And the United States share of that power, however you measure it, is clearly down as a result of the war. Europe is a little bit interesting here. Europe played essentially no role in any of this. Europe wasn’t involved, obviously, in the war. Europe didn’t do very much at all except to suffer. Still, one thing that is kind of important is that Europe — at least to some degree, not really through emergency responses but just through the general way that the Hormuz shock played out — Europe demonstrated or some European countries demonstrated that they can be much more independent of global hydrocarbon resources than they have been. Europe is not a major oil producing area. It has some, but not a lot. It’s not a major gas producing area anymore. It’s essentially a very resource poor economy relative to the size of its GDP, relative to its population. But it is an economy that increasingly relies on renewable energy. And those countries that have gone especially far in relying on renewables weathered this really well. That’s the lesson of Spain’s ability to ride through this with very little rise in electricity costs compared with some other countries. Italy, which has very little in the way of renewables and is very heavily reliant on natural gas for electricity generation, Italy did much worse. But Spain has given an illustration of how the renewable energy revolution — solar plus batteries is what really runs Spain now — has made Europe more independent and can make it more independent still in a world economy where control of natural resources used to be really critical and it’s becoming increasingly less critical. So that’s actually a point in Europe’s favor. That’s one piece Another piece of this is that Europe has always, in my lifetime, literally, and from a bit before my lifetime, Europe has always been far less of a global power player than you would expect given its sheer economic weight. Now that’s partly because Europe doesn’t exist as a political entity. though it’s more of one than it used to be; the common market has gradually turned into something more than that and Europe is able in some important ways to operate as one and is finding ad hoc ways of cooperating more. But it was always in a secondary position very much — or tertiary position given the rise of

    22 min
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