Cosmopolitics by Elise Labott

Elise Labott

An insider's guide to understanding your world and the people who run it. www.cosmopolitics.news

  1. The deal Iran really wants

    MAY 8

    The deal Iran really wants

    If you’re trying to follow the current state of the Iran war without losing your mind, retired military officers, former officials or Washington journalists are probably not the people to call. You call Arash Azizi. Because while Washington is busy arguing over whether a naval skirmish in the Strait of Hormuz counts as a ceasefire violation, a “love tap,” or the opening act of World War III, Arash is focused on something more useful: what Iran actually wants. And right now, that may be the most important question in the region. When we spoke this week — a follow-up to our conversation last month about Iran as a regime in transition — Arash argued that despite the missile exchanges, maritime confrontations, Trump Truth Social posts written in what increasingly feels like ALL CAPS diplomacy, and the general fog-machine atmosphere surrounding this conflict, both Tehran and Washington are moving toward the same conclusion: Neither side actually wants to go back to full war. That does not mean peace is imminent. It means reality is beginning to intrude. The latest sign came this week as reports emerged that the United States and Iran are inching toward a short memorandum of understanding that would effectively freeze the conflict and open a 30-day negotiating window on the harder issues: Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, frozen assets, and future security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. In other words: after months of maximalist rhetoric, threats of capitulation, and military escalation, everyone may be slowly rediscovering diplomacy. Which, awkwardly, is where this probably was always headed. That tension — closest to renewed fighting and closest to a deal at the same time — has become the defining feature of this moment. The military phase of the conflict has not produced decisive victory for either side. Iran absorbed enormous damage but did not collapse. The United States demonstrated overwhelming military superiority but failed to force capitulation. And “Project Freedom” — the Trump administration’s latest attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz through naval escort operations — now appears suspended after only a few days of operation amid continued confrontations in the Gulf. Trump, meanwhile, continues to oscillate between threatening Iran with devastating force and hinting at imminent breakthrough agreements. One day the ceasefire is under strain. The next day the latest exchange of fire is merely “a love tap.” It is all very confusing. Which, to be fair, may not entirely be an accident. But underneath the chaos, Arash sees a more coherent logic emerging. “Success for Iran,” he said, “looks like preservation of the regime, but also recognition of Iran’s role in the region.” That word — recognition — came up repeatedly in our conversation. Not domination. Not conquest. Not some endless revolutionary project stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean. Recognition. Iran wants sanctions relief. It wants economic normalization. It wants acceptance as a legitimate regional power with acknowledged interests and influence. And, crucially, Arash believes significant parts of the Iranian leadership — including elements of the Revolutionary Guards — may be willing to make meaningful concessions on the nuclear issue to get there. That is not how this conflict is typically framed in Washington. American debate tends to oscillate between two poles: either Iran is on the verge of collapse, or it is an irredeemably expansionist power that only understands force. What gets lost is the possibility that parts of the Iranian system may actually want integration more than permanent confrontation. “I think they want integration,” Arash said. “They want to be recognized as a major power in the region.” He is careful to note that this in no way makes the regime benign. Iran has backed militant proxies, fueled regional conflicts, and helped sustain Bashar al-Assad’s brutal war in Syria. He describes the Islamic Republic as containing contradictory impulses — part ideological revolutionary project, part traditional nation-state seeking stability and influence — and argues the second is now ascendant. One theory — increasingly visible in some parts of the Gulf — is that integrating Iran into a more stable regional framework could actually moderate its behavior over time. Another theory is that normalization would simply empower Tehran to pursue the same destabilizing policies with more money and legitimacy. As implausible as it sounds, Arash leans toward the former as the best way of restraining Iran. That argument will make many people deeply uncomfortable, particularly in Israel and among hardline Iran hawks in Washington. But it also reflects a reality becoming harder to ignore after months of war: Iran is not Libya. It is not Iraq. Despite immense economic pressure, assassinations, sanctions, cyber operations, and sustained bombing, Iran has not folded. Which raises an uncomfortable possibility for the Trump administration: maybe Iran cannot simply be bludgeoned into submission. That does not mean Tehran is winning. Far from it. Iran’s economy remains under severe strain. Inflation is soaring. The currency continues to weaken. Regional proxies like Hezbollah have been degraded. The regime itself remains deeply unpopular with much of its own population. But Arash argues that many in Washington fundamentally misunderstand how the Islamic Republic absorbs pressure. The question is not whether Iran is suffering — it clearly is. The question is what suffering produces politically. For years, American policy has operated on the assumption that enough pressure would eventually force either regime collapse or unconditional surrender. Two months of war appear to have complicated both theories. “What led to this particular war,” Azizi said, “was this temptation Trump had that he could dramatically change everything through military action. And that’s proven not to be the case.” Which helps explain why diplomacy — however chaotic, contradictory, and half-denied by all involved — is creeping back into the picture. The emerging framework reportedly under discussion would pause enrichment for more than a decade, require Iran to move highly enriched uranium out of the country, and create a broader negotiating process tied to sanctions relief and maritime security. It is not a peace treaty. It is barely even a roadmap. It is, essentially, an acknowledgment that nobody has found a military solution to the underlying problem. And perhaps that is the real story here. Not the skirmishes. Not the Trump posts. Not even the endless speculation over whether the ceasefire technically still exists. The real story may be that after all the fire and fury, everyone is slowly arriving back at the same uncomfortable conclusion: this ends with negotiation. The question is whether the politics — in Tehran, Washington, and across the region — will allow anyone to admit it out loud. As promised, Arash’s latest: Iran War -- deal or conflict Iran’s Leaders Mostly Want a Deal Is a Militia Running Wartime Iran? and don’t forget to subscribe to Arash’s Substack There’s no shortage of shows built around people confirming what their audience already believes. That’s good for engagement. It’s not always good for understanding the world. What I try to do here is something different: conversations with people like Arash Azizi, whose understanding of Iran comes not from cable news panels or think tank groupthink, but from deep historical knowledge, real sourcing inside the country, and a willingness to challenge easy narratives. You may not always agree with what you hear. But ideally, you’ll come away thinking about these issues a little differently. That’s the point. If you value that type of coverage, I hope you will consider becoming a paid subscriber. Thank you Herman Jacobs, Linda Perry, Mara, Patty VanDyke, and many others for tuning into my live video with Arash Azizi! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    41 min
  2. APR 30

    Live with Elise Labott: Lebanon on the edge

    Iran, Lebanon, the King’s speech, the WHCD shooting and more…. Danielle Pletka and I are back in full force! Join us TODAY at 5:30 ET for some cocktails and what promises to be a lively discussion. We had an audio glitch at the very end of the last question, but by then the essential point was clear: Lebanon is not just another front in the Iran war. It is where that war’s contradictions are most exposed — and where any real resolution will be tested. In a wide-ranging conversation with former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman, one theme kept resurfacing: across the region, there is motion without clarity. Ceasefires, negotiations, military pressure — all of it suggests activity, but not direction. Nowhere is that more true than in Lebanon. The war with Iran has settled into a strategic stalemate. Both Washington and Tehran face the same constraint: compromise looks like weakness. So nobody is compromising. Meanwhile, Iran has discovered leverage it didn’t know it had. The Strait of Hormuz — long a theoretical choke point — is now central to the conflict. As Feltman put it, the nuclear file concerned a handful of countries. Hormuz concerns the world. Tehran has noticed. It is against that backdrop that Lebanon matters — and why President Trump’s push for a ceasefire there is about more than Lebanon. Feltman’s read: the president didn’t want an additional reason for Iran not to negotiate. Whether that’s grand strategy or triage is an open question. What’s not in question is that this moment has produced something genuinely unusual: direct talks between Israel and Lebanon, conducted openly and over Hezbollah’s explicit objections. One Hezbollah spokesman reminded President Aoun of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s fate after talking to the Israelis. Aoun proceeded anyway. For decades, that would have been unthinkable. That alone marks a shift. And while the Lebanese state is negotiating, it does not control the forces driving the conflict. Hezbollah is not simply a militia and a terrorist group. It is a political party, a social services network, and a military force whose capabilities rival the Lebanese Armed Forces. It answers to Tehran. And since its leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death, even more so — his successor Naim Qassem is, in Feltman’s words, essentially a fully owned subsidiary of Iran, without Nasrallah’s ability to balance Lebanese politics against Iranian demands. But Israel’s continued occupation of southern Lebanon risks handing Hezbollah back the resistance narrative that made it powerful in the first place. This is the same ground Israel occupied from 1982 to 2000 — and Hezbollah was born in the rubble of that occupation. It knows how to tell that story. It’s been telling it for forty years. There is one shift working against Hezbollah from within. The war has displaced more than a million people from the Shia south — the very constituency Hezbollah claims to protect. The group no longer has the deep pockets it had after the war in 2006 to rebuild and buy back loyalty. That erosion of support is real. Whether the Lebanese government can translate it into political movement before the moment passes is another question entirely. The Aoun government is attempting something genuinely difficult: asserting sovereignty without triggering collapse. Push too hard against Hezbollah and you risk fracturing Lebanon’s sectarian balance. Move too slowly and you hand Israel and Washington the argument that Lebanon cannot act — which, Feltman notes, they are already making. The Lebanese Armed Forces are part of the problem. It is not just capability — though a soldier earning $200 a month is not rushing into a fight with Hezbollah’s drone units. It is cohesion. Any direct confrontation risks the army splitting along sectarian lines. The opportunity, if there is one, exists not because these problems have been solved but because the political space for incremental movement may briefly exist. The Aoun government’s best path, Feltman argues, is not sweeping declarations but tangible steps that are hard to dismiss — replacing Hezbollah’s social services with state services, implementing the goverment’s security plan and eroding the political narrative that sustains the group’s legitimacy. None of it will happen quickly. None of it without significant support. And the risk, as always in Lebanon, is that pressure outruns capacity — that Israel and Washington lose patience before Beirut has had time to show what it can do. If this effort fails, the outcome is unlikely to be a return to the status quo, but could be a broader, more destructive conflict. If it succeeds — even partially — it could begin to shift the balance toward a Lebanese state that actually governs its own territory. For now, Lebanon remains suspended between those two outcomes. Balanced, precariously, on a line that has broken before. There’s no shortage of podcasts where two people who already agree sit down and spend an hour being outraged together. It’s good for the algorithm. It doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t already know. That’s not what we’re doing here. I’m convinced the people worth talking to are the ones who make you reconsider something — not the ones who confirm what you already think. That means serious conversations with diplomats, intelligence officials, and policy architects who’ve actually been in the room. People like Jeff Feltman, who was there for the 2006 war in Lebanon, survived an assassination attempt by Hezbollah, met with the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and has spent twenty years watching the same dynamics repeat themselves. You might not always agree with what you hear. You’ll probably learn something anyway. That’s the point. If it sounds like your kind of show, I hope you’ll subscribe. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    37 min
  3. Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

    APR 18

    Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

    Lebanon is having a moment, people! After decades of successive government failures, Hezbollah’s stranglehold on the country, and Iran pulling the strings of its very own “Party of God” terrorist army — complete with missiles tucked behind hospitals and under UN posts — there may finally be a window. Trump picked up the phone, brokered a ceasefire (for now), and told Netanyahu and Lebanon’s new president to get in a room, which could help the President in negotiations with Iran. Whether this is an Abraham Accords moment or just a diplomatic sugar high remains to be seen, but we’ll take it. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz standoff continues to be both entirely about nuclear leverage and somehow also not about that at all — depending on which hour of the day you’re reading the president’s Truth Social feed. The Saudis, bless them, are quietly rerouting their pipelines and taking the wind out of Iran’s sails. Literally. And Orban lost! The man who turned Hungary into MAGA’s favorite field trip destination — who got CPAC, JD Vance, and a Trump phone-in rally — got voted out. Turns out gutting democratic institutions is fine until the economy tanks and people actually have to live there. Who knew. Bottom lines: Lebanon has a window, but don’t redecorate yet. Iran negotiations are murky and the Strait is murkier. Orban is out, but the MAGA-Hungary romance tells us something interesting about where Vance wants to take this party by 2028. And Pete Hegseth quoted Pulp Fiction thinking it was scripture. We can’t make this up. A final note for this week We know a lot of people spend their days doom-scrolling and venting about the politics of the moment — and honestly, sometimes we do too. What we try to offer here is something different: a dispassionate look at the administration’s foreign policies, the week’s news, and the geopolitical forces shaping what comes next. Despite having plenty of our own outrage, we’ll leave that to everyone else — understanding the forces at play feels a lot more useful than preaching to the choir. We don’t always agree, but we disagree agreeably — with respect, some experience, and occasionally some humor. We hope our community appreciates what we’re trying to build here. And if this isn’t your thing, no hard feelings — there are thousands of other Substacks out there to scratch your particular itch. We do hope to see you next week! Preamble, A slap in the face for the right Cosmopolitics Live with Steven Cook #WTH The Hormuz blockade, and podcast with Miad Maleki #WTH A ceasefire with Hezbollah, for now, Cosmopolitics, Ceasefire selfies in the Strait, For those interest in energy, read this Substack by Robert Bryce Vice President JD Vance speech to Turning Point Hegseth quoting the “bible” sure does sound a lot like the Pulp Fiction version Thank you Cash Flow Collective, Marcie Alexander, Herman Jacobs, Sanlugonena@25, and many others for tuning into my live video with Danielle Pletka! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    31 min
  4. Economic chicken with a side of nuclear talks

    APR 16

    Economic chicken with a side of nuclear talks

    Seven weeks in, the war with Iran has morphed into an economic game of chicken — with a side order of nuclear negotiation. Having failed to get Iran to capitulate on the battlefield, the United States is now trying to squeeze Tehran into submission financially. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent this week called the naval blockade “the financial equivalent of the bombing campaign.” Iran’s answer was to threaten to shut down trade across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Red Sea entirely. Both sides are turning the screws. Neither is blinking. And somehow, in the middle of all this, the two countries are also trying to negotiate a nuclear deal. I sat down with Steven A. Cook, one of the sharpest Middle East analysts working today, to make sense of the current moment — the collapsed talks in Islamabad, the blockade, the nuclear negotiation that has somehow materialized in the middle of a war about a strait. His bottom line was not reassuring. Trump backed himself into this war convinced Iran would fold in days. When it didn’t fold on the battlefield, he sought negotiations. When those broke down, he escalated. “This,” Cook told me, “is the most half-assed war ever.” No clear objectives going in. No clear theory of what winning looks like. No clear sense of what the administration is actually willing to settle for. The shrug emoji🤷🏻 he said, is basically his reaction to what the president is thinking. The problem with the blockade is that it cuts both ways. Yes, it puts economic pressure on Iran — whose economy was already teetering after six weeks of bombardment. But it also keeps the strait closed, which means oil prices stay elevated, which means Americans keep feeling it at the pump. Trump needs a deal before the midterms. Iran knows that. And Tehran has a long history of using negotiations not to reach agreements but to buy time — getting adversaries to ease military pressure in exchange for talks that go nowhere. The new old regime will run the same play. The nuclear talks, ostensibly the reason the US went to war in the first place, only complicate matters. The U.S. wants a 20-year suspension of enrichment. Iran offered five years. Those positions are far apart. But the deeper problem is that Washington is now asking Tehran for two concessions simultaneously: give up the nuclear program and relinquish control of the strait. Before this war, the nuclear program was Iran’s primary leverage. Now Iran also controls Hormuz — not hypothetically, but actually, with mines in the water and ships turning back. A negotiated settlement that leaves Iran with any formalized role over the strait puts Tehran in a stronger position than it was on February 28, before the war started. As Cook put it: who would take that deal? If you value serious foreign policy journalism that cuts through the partisan noise and smart conversations with experts like Steven, please consider becoming a paid subscriber. The ceasefire expires April 22. Three aircraft carriers are now in the region and thousands of additional troops are en route to the region. At the same time, Trump is telling Fox Business the war is “very close to over” and gas prices will be down by the midterms. Maybe. Or maybe this is what a stalemate looks like when one side needs an exit and the other side knows it. Thank you Marcie Alexander, David Galinsky, Barbara, Judy, Christopher Grassi, and many others for tuning into my live video with Steven A. Cook! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    41 min
  5. APR 8

    John Bolton on the Iran war's strategic drift

    For a brief moment Tuesday night, it looked like the Iran war might end the way it had unfolded — abruptly, ambiguously, and with more questions than answers. After a day of escalating threats — including a warning from President Trump that “a whole civilization” could be wiped out — the United States and Iran agreed to an 11th-hour cease-fire. The deal, brokered through intermediaries including Pakistan, pauses hostilities for two weeks and allows conditional passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the artery through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil flows. Markets rallied. Oil prices dropped. The immediate crisis passed. But the larger question remains unresolved: What, exactly, was this war meant to accomplish? That question sat at the center of my extensive conversation with former National Security Adviser John Bolton — a longtime Iran hawk who supports regime change but is sharply critical of how this war has been executed. His critique is not that the United States acted. It’s that it acted without clarity. “It was just a big jumble,” he said of the administration’s objectives. Tactical success, strategic drift By conventional military measures, the United States and Israel have been effective. Iran’s military infrastructure has taken significant damage. Senior leadership figures have been killed. Its nuclear and missile programs have been degraded. But wars are not scored on damage alone. Six weeks in, Iran has demonstrated something more consequential: it can still shape the strategic environment. It has disrupted global energy markets, imposed costs on U.S. allies, and turned a long-hypothetical threat into reality — closing the Strait of Hormuz. That shift, Bolton noted, matters more than any single airstrike. The cease-fire appears to accept a version of that reality — one in which Iran retains influence over the flow of commerce through the Gulf. The United States may be winning tactically while conceding strategically. The missing objective From the outset, the administration’s goals have been fluid — sometimes expansive, sometimes contradictory. At various moments, the war has been framed as eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat, degrading its military capabilities, deterring regional aggression, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and even regime change. Each objective implies a different strategy, a different timeline, and a different level of commitment. Pursuing all of them simultaneously risks achieving none fully. Bolton, who has consistently argued that regime change is the only durable solution, was blunt: without a clearly defined objective, military gains are inherently temporary. He points to the Israeli habit of “mowing the lawn” — a cycle of degrading capabilities that can be rebuilt. As long as the regime survives, it adapts, rebuilds, and returns. Despite weeks of bombardment, Iran continues to operate, negotiate, and project leverage. Its leadership may be weakened, but it is not gone — and may be hardening. “If regime change was ever part of the plan,” Bolton said, “three weeks to put it together wasn’t enough.” A serious effort would have required months of groundwork: organizing internal opposition, encouraging defections, and coordinating pressure from within as well as outside. “That’s how you do regime change,” he said. “Nobody thought this through.” A cease-fire, but no resolution The cease-fire is not a negotiated settlement. It is a pause mediated through intermediaries, with each side interpreting its terms differently. The United States sees it as a step toward reopening global commerce. Iran presents it as a validation of its demands — including its role in managing access to the Strait. Even the mechanics remain unclear. Is passage through the Strait truly free, or contingent on Iranian approval? Early indications suggest the latter — a development Gulf states view with alarm. The cease-fire buys time. It does not resolve the underlying conflict. The cost of improvisation The president’s rhetoric has oscillated between declarations of victory, threats of overwhelming destruction, and appeals for negotiation — sometimes within the same news cycle. At one point, Trump warned that “a whole civilization will die tonight.” Hours later, he announced a cease-fire. Bolton’s assessment was direct: there was no strategic communication behind it. “Presidents… should speak only in aid of a larger strategic plan,” he said. “I don’t think there’s any strategic thinking behind what is being said.” That inconsistency is not just stylistic. In a conflict where signaling shapes escalation, it creates real risk — of misinterpretation by adversaries, of misalignment within the administration, and of undermining U.S. credibility abroad. “There’s no filter between Trump’s brain and his mouth,” Bolton said, describing a pattern he observed during his time in the White House. Bolton argues that Trump’s domestic political considerations — fuel prices, political fallout — may now be driving decisions as much as strategic ones. The cease-fire, in that sense, may be less an endpoint than a pivot. Cosmopolitics depends on your support. If you value serious foreign policy journalism and interviews with newsmakers like John Bolton, please consider becoming a paid subscriber. The alliance problem Unlike previous major conflicts, the United States did not build a broad international coalition before launching military action. Allies were not meaningfully consulted. European partners kept their distance. Gulf states, while aligned against Iran, now find themselves exposed to the consequences of a partial outcome. You have to make the case,” Bolton said. “If you don’t… it’s going to cost us. It already has.” That absence of alignment limits leverage, complicates enforcement, and raises a fundamental question about U.S. leadership in a conflict with global implications. “The United States does think in global terms. We don’t have any choice,” he said. “What happens in the Gulf means a lot to the Europeans, even though they don’t take much oil directly from it… Iranian terrorist attacks have occurred all over Europe… Europe is within range of Iran’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles.” Both sides, he suggested, misread the moment — Washington by failing to consult, Europe by failing to engage. “They should have gritted their teeth,” he said, “and not responded to Trump’s juvenile taunts in a juvenile fashion.” The war that continues The cease-fire may pause the fighting. It does not end the war. The core issues remain: Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its regional posture, and its demonstrated ability to disrupt the global economy. The regime — weakened but intact — continues to calculate its next move. Regional actors are recalibrating. China and Russia are watching. And the United States faces the same unresolved dilemma it did at the start: What is the objective? Bolton says until that core question is answered — clearly, consistently, and credibly — the risk is not just that the war will continue. It is that it will continue the way it began: without direction or an endgame. It is hard to win a war when you are not entirely sure what winning looks like. As promised, here are few of Ambassador Bolton’s latest pieces: Regime change in Cuba is different to Venezuela and Iran, The Australian Financial Review Nato is in peril. Europeans must stay calm in the face of Trump’s baiting, The Sunday Telegraph Finish the Job: How Trump Can Still Win in Iran The New York Times And don’t forget to join me and Danielle Pletka for Hot Takes Happy Hour tomorrow at our regular 5:30 time. LOTS to discuss! Thank you Suzette Jensen, Lulu Lew, Donna Krause, Mary Virginia Hughes, Becky, and many others for tuning into my live video! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    33 min
  6. What's next for the Iran war with Mark Kimmitt

    APR 1

    What's next for the Iran war with Mark Kimmitt

    As a former Assistant Secretary of State and senior military officer who served in Iraq and at CENTCOM, he has watched campaigns that looked decisive on paper but far less so in practice — wars where early battlefield success masked a much harder question: what comes next? That’s why it was worth talking to him this week, at a moment when the conversation around the war with Iran is increasingly dominated by noise, rhetoric, and a striking lack of clarity about where this is actually going. By any conventional military measure, the United States has done what it set out to do in the opening phase of the war. Air and naval dominance are firmly established. Hundreds of strike missions have been carried out. Iranian military infrastructure has been significantly degraded. Not a single U.S. aircraft has been lost. On paper, it looks like a clean success. In reality, it looks like the beginning of a much more complicated problem. Because for all that operational progress, the central question remains unanswered: where is this headed? Kimmitt’s answer is telling. So far, he says, the war has been defined by Israel’s attempt at leadership decapitation and a massive U.S. bombing campaign. What we are entering now is something far less defined — a transition point where military pressure continues, but strategic clarity does not. That uncertainty isn’t a sideshow. It’s the story. The administration has been careful — almost to the point of semantic gymnastics — in how it describes the deployment of ground forces. They provide “options.” At a certain point, though, you wonder if “options” are flexibility or a placeholder for a decision that hasn’t been made. To Kimmitt, what makes this conflict particularly difficult is that the United States and Iran are not fighting the same kind of war. America is fighting a war. Iran is playing for time. The U.S. approach is familiar: degrade capabilities, destroy infrastructure, reduce the adversary’s ability to fight until it concedes. Kimmitt describes it as a war of “annihilation” — in its reliance on overwhelming force. Iran, by contrast, is fighting something closer to a war of endurance, or what he calls a war of “exhaustion. “They don’t have to win,” Kimmitt said. “They win by not losing. By living another day.” That distinction matters more than any individual strike. It explains why the destruction of targets does not necessarily translate into strategic progress — and why the idea of a short, decisive war may be more aspirational than real. Cosmopolitics depends on reader support. If you value serious, independent foreign policy journalism and discussions with newsmakers like Mark, I hope you will consider becoming a paid subscriber. There is a familiar trap in wars like this: the belief that if you can measure it, you’re winning. In Vietnam, it was body counts. Today, it may be the number of strikes, missiles intercepted, or facilities destroyed. But Kimmitt warns these metrics are a “fallacy.” Tactical success, he notes, can create the illusion of progress without changing the underlying dynamics. None of this is to discount the military campaign itself. By Kimmitt’s assessment, it has been extraordinarily effective — one of the most precise bombing efforts he has seen. But breaking things, as it turns out, is not the same as achieving something. That disconnect becomes most visible when you look at what “success” is supposed to mean. For Kimmitt, the answer is straightforward and consistent with decades of U.S. policy: no nuclear capability, no ballistic missiles, and no network of regional proxies. “All this other stuff is noise,” he said. Overlaying all of this is a messaging environment that is, at best, confusing. Kimmitt is careful here. There is a case for unpredictability in war — for keeping the adversary off balance. Confusing the enemy can be useful. But there is also a second audience: the American public and U.S. allies. “It’s okay to confuse the enemy,” he said. “It’s not okay to confuse your own country.” Right now, both may be happening at the same time. For now, the United States is winning the part of the war it knows how to fight. Iran is playing the part it knows how to endure. How this is supposed to end is a question neither side seems in a hurry to answer. Thank you Emily Kopp, VickijH78, Don Buckter, Herman Jacobs, Tee Ree, and many others for tuning into my live video with Mark Kimmitt! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    40 min
  7. Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

    MAR 28

    Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

    Is the war eliminating the dead wood in the Iranian regime? If the regime survives — and survival, in some form, remains likely — it may not be the same regime that went in. A different generation could emerge from the wreckage, and there’s no guarantee it will be a more moderate one. The scenario that should keep policymakers up at night is an Iran run by IRGC hardliners who are no longer constrained by the clerical establishment and have been jockeying for power for years. Be careful what you wish for. Cosmopolitics depends on support from our readers. If you value my my work, please consider becoming a paid subscriber. Then there’s the fog of spin. There’s an enormous amount of disinformation out there right now, and some of it is coming from inside the administration itself. Is Trump quietly looking for an off-ramp? Is there real daylight between him and Netanyahu? Here’s a reality check: the 15-point framework Trump presented to Iran amounted to unconditional surrender. There is no diplomatic ladder being quietly constructed. What you see is what you get. The honest answer — the part no one in the foreign policy establishment wants to say out loud — is that we don’t really know where this ends. We are spitballing. The administration has been searching for an Iranian Delcý Rodriguez: a pragmatic insider willing to deal, to pivot, to be the face of a transition. That person doesn’t appear to exist in Tehran in any position to act on it. So the goal may be something more modest for now — setting the conditions for an organic transition, fracturing the regime’s internal coalitions, creating space for something different to emerge from within Iranian society. Achievable? Possibly. On what timeline? Nobody knows. As Dany put it — channeling Churchill in that way she has — “We are at the end of the beginning. We are not, at the beginning of the end.” Check out our conversation below with…..🎶 shownotes. We’ll be back next week, and yes — we are taking reservations for Dictator’s Café. Recipes welcome. See you there. * The UAE stands up to Iran – Ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba (Wall Street Journal) * No, Trump is not losing his nerve on Iran – Marc Thiessen (Washington Post) * #WTH: The Iran War: All the details * #WTH: Trump’s Iran endgame: podcast with retired General Jack Keane * Cosmopolitics: Iran is fighting a war - and itself: podcast with Arash Azizi and…as promised.. * Iran war – the movie trailer Thank you David Galinsky, Michael Martineau, Hava Salita, and many others for tuning into my live video with Danielle Pletka! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe

    32 min

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