Decisive Point Podcast

U.S. Army War College Public Affairs

Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

  1. Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-2 – Neil N. Snyder and Charles “Chuck” Allen – The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States

    FEB 2

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-2 – Neil N. Snyder and Charles “Chuck” Allen – The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States

    In this episode, Colonel Neil Snyder and Charles “Chuck” Allen discuss declining patriotism in the United States, highlighting generational and veteran–nonveteran gaps revealed in Snyder’s research. They explore how patriotism influences trust in the military, the challenges of building that trust, and the roles of leadership, communication, and shared values in bridging divides. Both emphasize that leaders must make people feel valued, engage authentically across generations, and anchor service and purpose in the Constitution and the American people. Host (Stephanie Crider) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Colonel Neil Snyder, and Charles “Chuck” Allen is joining us remotely. Snyder is the author of “The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Allen culminated a 30-year Army career as [a] director [in] leader development, and retired as the professor of leadership and cultural studies in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the United States Army War College. We are exploring today what shifting attitudes toward patriotism mean for trust, service, and leadership and how leaders can respond constructively. Neil, Chuck, what’s the one insight you hope leaders take away from the podcast today? Colonel Neil Snyder Well, first off, I want to thank you for having me on, and for Chuck Allen for doing this. It’s an honor to be with you, sir. I would just say for me, I’m a social scientist. People fascinate me, and I suspect that for a lot of the listeners, they’re super interested to know what makes other people tick. And, that’s what I’m interested in. Today, we seem to be living in fairly divisive times. And so, I’m interested to know what are the things that are dividing Americans. And so, my research in this article is about Americans’ values. And candidly, what I was hoping to find were sources of unity—the ties that bind us all together. And in many ways, that’s what I did. However, I also found that our values may be dividing us in some fundamental ways, the old from the young and the veterans from nonveterans, over a key issue that is truly important to national identity [and] to our national security. And that’s the value [of] patriotism. And so, if there’s one thing that I would hope listeners would take away, [it] is [that] I hope to inspire some curiosity. I hope that we can have conversations in an open, respectful way about values, to find those things that unite us and to find ways to bridge those things that divide us. Host Love that. Charles “Chuck” Allen I’m glad to be with you, Stephanie and Neil. It’s a great day to talk about this idea of patriotism and also our national values. My primary insight would be the importance of understanding that civil-military relations in the United States includes the connection of our military institution to society and to our nation. The US military, we must remember, exists to protect and serve the American people and its government as a first principle, and that requires trust, a trust which is grounded in the United States Constitution. So, that’s the one takeaway I think we want to focus on—trust in the Constitution and our responsibilities as a protective force for our nation. Host Neil, your article shows patriotism is declining among some groups. What surprised you most about these trends? Snyder Yeah. This is a . . . it’s a good question. And like I said, this article is really about curiosity, and the article itself is about values. And so, [we will benefit] if we operationalize or conceptualize values as our beliefs about ideals, but also ideals that can motivate our behavior, how we act. And a key insight is that traditionally, Americans have had two kinds of values that are at tension. We seem to simultaneously value our individuality and our autonomy, the things that make us unique as people but, we also are fiercely American. We are proud of being American, [so much so] that even going back to the early period of our country before the Constitution, you know, there was this observation that Americans were united as a people—even before we were a country. And so, it’s this interesting thing that patriotism, or a common love for the country, is something that should unite us, and that value has traditionally been a key source of motivation for military service. Like Chuck talked about, Americans’ trust in the military as a key aspect of the bond between the people and their military servants, and part of the glue that makes that work is patriotism, a common love for country. And so, I was curious about patriotism. And there had been data out of Pew Research [Center] and some other places that suggests that the share of Americans that feel strongly patriotic seems to be in decline, and that that share seems to be in particular decline among young Americans. It’s this riddle. We’ve always had patriotism as a source of unity. But in fact, it may be a dividing value right now in separating young from old or veterans from nonveterans. And so, in the article, I look specifically at patriotism to see if it correlates [or] if valuing and showing importance for patriotism or love for country, if that correlates with either trusting the military or for young people, for Generation Z—so at the time of the article, [for] 18-to-28-year-old adults—whether patriotism correlates with having considered military service, being open to serving in our military. And my idea was that for Gen Z, low patriotism might be part of an explanation for why there appears to be less service interest among young people, which, for the reasons that Chuck talked about, has some profound implications. Low patriotism could also be, in an interesting way, a source of less trust in the military. And my logic kind of goes like this: If most people see the military as a symbol of our country, as a bastion of the country, a key part of our democracy . . . well, if you’re feeling less love for the country overall, that might result in less trust in this thing that people conflate with the country. And so, Americans’ trust could be, in the military, could be somewhat of a victim of generally less identification with the trust, with the country overall. And so, I wanted to see if that was true. I worried that there would be a veteran’s gap, which is to say that people who feel particularly patriotic may be more likely to join and, also, serving in uniform can cause people to feel more patriotic. And the net result of those two forces, selection and socialization, would result in veterans appearing way more patriotic than their nonveteran fellow citizens. Plus [we must consider] the generational gap between Gen Z and their elders. And so, we fielded this very large national survey to test the ideas, along with some others, and I was really surprised by the degree of unity over values that we saw among the respondents. And so, you asked what surprised me. And we looked at a really large battery of different kinds of values, and for the most part, Americans agree. It doesn’t matter whether you’re young or old, veteran, nonveteran, minority, white, male, female, political left, political right, there’s strong agreement on all kinds of values. But, patriotism was one that really stood out, and there was really this huge gap. And what we see is that far fewer young people and nonveterans value patriotism than older elders and veterans. And that really, really surprised me. I mean, I think the data showed something like 76 percent of Gen Z nonveterans think patriotism [is] important, [which] contrasts with 92 percent of older nonveterans and 96 percent of veterans. So, virtually every veteran feels patriotic, but if you ask a young person or a young nonveteran, you’re going to get a very different answer in the percentages. And, the percentages, you know, in the abstract, don’t mean anything, but when you extrapolate those percentages across 260 million adult Americans, those are huge social divides about a value, a fundamental idea about what is ideal and which should motivate people’s behavior. And so, those gaps were surprising. The size of the gaps were surprising to me. Host What happens when the younger generation, less than 50 percent, has patriotism? Is there a tipping point? Snyder It’s a great question, and we should be thinking about two things. What are the consequences of declining patriotism? Does it mean that fewer young people will serve? While the data seem to bear that out. It could be a threat to the viability of the all-volunteer force if we can’t bring enough young people in [to the military] out of the spirit of volunteerism. The other thing is, and I really would like to hear Chuck Allen’s wisdom on this, is what do we do about it? We have leadership intuitions about how to build trust in small organizations, but I don’t know how we scale that up across the country. I don’t know what kind of policy interventions can lead to higher levels of patriotism and higher levels of trust. That’s a really wicked problem that national security leaders should be dealing with. Host What are your thoughts, Chuck? Allen Well, my first thought is that Neil wrote a great paper, which provides a lot of fodder for discussion and, I think, exploration. When I think about military service, why people come into the military, [I think about my personal experience]. Many years ago, I was a garrison commander over in Germany, and every two weeks or so, I would give the intake briefing to new members of the community. And, I would ask the same question, “Why did you join the mil

    36 min
  2. Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-1 – Neil N. Snyder – Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda

    JAN 6

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-1 – Neil N. Snyder – Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda

    Presidential management style, foreign policy preferences, and domestic political interests all affect the national security agenda. International crises, however, are particularly likely to garner the attention of the National Security Council. This podcast analyzes a novel data set of all the issues raised at National Security Council meetings from 1947 to 1993 and finds that contemporaneous crises are very likely to be discussed, but that crisis management attenuates the Council’s attention to noncrisis national security matters. The results suggest presidents focus on crises at the expense of other strategic matters, and they do so when political conditions favor crisis management. Keywords: national security, presidency, international crises, political science, strategic studies Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Colonel Neil Snyder, author of “Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters. Snyder is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Strategy at the US Army War College. Let’s just go ahead and get started. You describe in your article how international crises dominate presidential attention, often at the expense of broader strategic issues. What are the long-term risks of this crisis-driven focus for US national security planning? Colonel Neil Snyder  If I could, maybe I’ll back up and just kind of start with my intuition and my curiosity and why I was doing this research at all. And, it’s something that my guess is that many of the Parameters readers and [Decisive Point] listeners will relate to, which is the simple intuition that crises can dominate your life. When you are attending to crises, it seems to crowd out all of your other priorities, and I think leaders have this natural intuition whereby when you’re stating priorities, you’re actually talking about the things that . . . It’s a choice. You’re stating which you’re not going to do, what you’re going to defer or just table completely. And, I had this abiding curiosity of whether or not that was happening to us in the national security and strategy realm, too. It’s kind of like this tyranny of the inbox where, maybe how you and I might manage our e-mail, where if you just answer every e-mail that comes in, in the order in which it comes in, it’s not exactly a dominant strategy for managing your e-mail, right? You’re not choosing to spend your time on those important messages—the ones from family or the ones about your bank accounts or something that might matter the most. You’re just sort of managing the flow that comes in. That tyranny of the inbox can happen two ways—[by] attending to the things that are unimportant or, alternatively, focusing on only the most urgent thing that popped into your inbox at the expense of everything else that might matter to you. Eisenhower had this concept of Eisenhower’s window [The Eisenhower Matrix]. I’m sure many of the readers have seen it, where it’s this matrix, a two by two of the urgent versus the important. And, I kind of had this intuition that, in the national security world, we focus almost exclusively on the things that are urgent and important to the expense of those things that are important but not urgent. And, I wondered whether that was actually true or not. So, my curiosity started [not] with a question of whether or not [but] how the US relates to the world. And how we manage national security is affected by a kind of crisis myopia by which we are exclusively attentive to national security [issues] that are urgent. And so, it’s a matter of almost strategic discipline, which is a phrase, a term of art, that we hear a lot now, which is to say, do we have the discipline to attend to a broad range of topics, to have a breadth of our national security agenda, or do we sacrifice that breadth to attend to crises? And it’s a dilemma—like, we can’t not deal with crises—that’s the nature of a crisis. It’s urgent. It’s a high stakes, [and includes] high risk of use of military force. How do you not deal with that? And that, I see, as a kind of persistent problem. And so, my research is on the presidency. I look at all the presidential national security meetings from 1947 to 1993, the entirety of the Cold War, using primary-source records. And I looked at the post–National Security Council (NSC) meeting accounts of what topics they looked at—so, issues or topics that actually got [a] president’s attention in formal meetings of the NSC. And I looked for patterns, and I used a kind of algorithmic, computational text analysis to figure out whether or not those topics dealt with contemporaneous crises—things that were happening at that time—or other national security issues. And, I had a few expectations. One is, I thought style would matter, that presidents would vary. You know, Johnson did his Tuesday lunch clubs, whereas Eisenhower had large numbers of very formal NSC meetings. And Nixon was different. He chose to centralize things with Kissinger. And Reagan was certainly different. So, style matters. Every president would likely have different policy views and preferences and preference for either formal meetings or not, and that would determine whether or not they held meetings at all and whether or not they were attending to crises a lot when they did so. The second expectation I had was that conditions kind of matter. So, I had previously written a piece, in an academic journal called Presidential Studies Quarterly, which basically showed that NSC meetings become more likely during crisis periods. And so, not only do crises drive attention to national security, generally, because of linked threats, [for example] a crisis in the East might have impacts on security interests elsewhere because of forced trade-offs and these kinds of things. You know, the conditions themselves could drive interest in national security, but the problem with it is that those conditions that cause presidents to pay attention to things can invoke the threat of opportunity costs that, just by taking on an issue, it may trigger public opposition, congressional opposition, Congress may have partisan differences or policy differences with the president over an issue, or perhaps, alternatively, may simply use the opportunity of a president taking on an issue to take the opposite position for horse trading. And so, you know, when presidents are choosing whether to answer that e-mail in the inbox or not, what they’re actually doing is choosing whether to take resources on or to use resources to take on an issue and potentially overcome congressional opposition. And so, what are the risks, you ask, like, what are the long-term risks of a crisis-driven focus for US national security planning? Well, if we come back to [a] president’s logic about why they would take things on, they have incentives to deal with crises because it’s a chance for policy gains or political gains, potentially, but also, it comes with a cost. And so, that calculus in my data seems to suggest that presidents are particularly likely to take on crises, and that when they do so, they pay less attention to all other topics. The president is the most powerful person in the world [and] has a massive range of national security issues that presidents deal with. The challenge of that is that when you focus on one thing, the Ukraine today, the Taiwan today, the Gaza today, you’re not doing the other things. And so, the risk is agenda breadth. The long view tends to suffer. We tend to get crisis myopia, and it’s a question of how this gets extrapolated over time. In an era when crises are particularly prevalent, what we likely see is that attention to all other things drops off, and that compounds over time as crises last longer and become more frequent, which really reduces our strategic breadth. That’s concerning. It’s concerning for me when I can’t manage my e-mail, and it should be concerning for everybody else who would want our national security system to have a really broad view—because Americans have lots of interests. Host How do domestic political dynamics shape the way presidents prioritize national security issues? How about an example for the audience? Snyder I’m a social scientist by training. My work isn’t commentary. It’s certainly not a commentary on partisan positions or polarization or anything like that in a contemporary environment. And I’m speaking to data from the Cold War. So, it’s largely retrospective. But what my take is, is that I focus on institutions and incentives. Kind of the way I was describing it earlier is that when presidents make a choice to chart an agenda, they’re taking on issues, and the simple choice of taking on issues is also the choice to take on opposition or to take on the resource costs necessary to either drum up public support for an issue or drum up elite support for an issue or overcome elite opposition to an issue. You ask, like, what is the domestic political dimension that’s affecting this? Well, my view is that the domestic and the foreign are not separate [and] that [a] president’s decision making is conditional both on international conditions (like crises) and also on the array of partisan forces through our institutions—be that in Congress, in the House and Senate, or [in] the potential for bureaucratic opposition within the executive branch agencies, which has its own kind of bureaucratic domestic politics. The institutions, the separation of power system, the shared power system between Congress and the presidency for certain national security in

    23 min
  3. Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-35 – Shang-Su Wu and Collin Koh – The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China’s Rising Threats

    11/14/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-35 – Shang-Su Wu and Collin Koh – The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China’s Rising Threats

    Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh discuss the ties between the Philippines and Taiwan and how the Philippines would be affected in a conflict between Taiwan and China. Their discussion also delves into topics such as military modernization in the Philippines and US involvement in the Philippines. Keywords: Philippines, Taiwan, China, Philippine-Taiwan relations, security, military modernization   Disclaimer: This transcript has been edited for clarity. Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me virtually today are Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh. Wu is the author of “The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China's Rising Threats,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. He's an assistant professor and research coordinator in the Homeland Security Program at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi. Koh is [a] senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) based in Nanyang Technological University. He primarily researches maritime security and naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on Southeast Asia. Welcome to Decisive Point.   Dr. Shang-Su Wu Thank you   Dr. Collin Koh Thank you   Host Tell me about the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan. What are the likely scenarios that might play out in Taiwan, and how would these different scenarios impact the Philippines?   Wu Generally, if China wants to use force against Taiwan, there's probably two most likely scenarios. The one is a blockade, then another—of course, after a blockade or certain fire projection—[is to] try to eventually do the invasion. So, deployment of the US military near to Taiwan, no matter in Okinawa or in the Philippines, they [are a] dilemma [for] China because China, on the one hand, if they want to constrain the conflict [bilaterally], just go straight. Yes, they would not like to attack, but on the other hand, that means their flanks are opened for the intervention for the attack. On the other hand, if you want to extend the conflict, then, of course, the scale will be much bigger, the outcome will be much worse, or the risk much higher. In that case, they have to pay very [close] attention on military deployments. And, in the past, of course, the Philippines remained less relevant because most invasion [scenarios] remain focused on Taipei, the northern part of Taiwan. So, Japan’s side will be important, but nowadays, if they are doing a blockade (of course, if they are surrounding the island), they would also [employ] the longer range of the weapon systems for the munitions. So, even the northern part [of Taiwan] would be under the firepower [deployed from] the Philippines. That’s why the US military deployment in the Philippine would matter a lot. But, on the other hand, the Philippines have various weakness. The one weakness is their armed forces haven’t been modernized since, generally, between the 1980s to the 2000s or early 2010s. So nowadays, their capability is still weak, especially compared to China. And, you know, they have the maritime disputes over various islands, and China may use that to press the Philippines. Another issue is [that] the Philippines likes to export the labor force for their economy. And in Taiwan, they [have] at least 154,000 Filipino workers. China may use these people as a kind of hostage to threaten the Philippines. And in 2003, the Philippines quit Operation Iraqi Freedom [because] al-Qaeda threatened the Filipino workers overseas, and there could be a similar situation [in Taiwan someday]. So, that makes the US deployment in the Philippines, and overall, the security connection with Taiwan, significant.   Koh Yes, thank you. I think, first of all, allow me to first comment [compliment], Shang-Su, on the new publication. Congratulations. And, it's a great honor to be here to share about what I feel to be the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan. This is a very timely discussion we are having because the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Eastern Theater Command started a whole new series of [exercises], and one of the itineraries that was being exercised was the blockade [in] some parts of the waters around Taiwan. As Shang-Su has rightly pointed out, in the past, it used to be that the invasion would have focused on the northern part of Taiwan—and particularly around Taipei. I do understand that there is still an emphasis on the defense around the Tan-shui River area, but now, given that the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has been maneuvering more frequently around Taiwan, it's not [an] “around Taiwan” issue. So, the conception has all changed. The south of Taiwan, which is right close to the doorstep of the northern Philippines, has become increasingly more saliant. The Bashi Channel, which is the channel—the waterway—just in between southern Taiwan and northern Philippines, is a key waterway for the transit of various forces, not just for the PLA, but also for US and Allied forces. So, it will be a contested waterway in times of conflict, and the Philippines will find it rather difficult to stay out of it completely. So that's one. Second is with the [Ferdinand] Marcos Jr. administration, in recent times, there has been a boost to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries. Under this agreement [signed in 2014], which is, in fact, dated all the way back to the late [Benigno Aquino III] administration, there [have] been moves to reinvigorate the bases and other access arrangements centering around [the] northern Philippines. Those exercises that we see, for example, [in the] exercise Balikatan, they actually have a focus on the northern area of the Philippines in mind, and that actually has Taiwan right in the crosshairs without being them actually naming Taiwan as the area of focus. But, clearly, the intent is to boost the forces—both the American forces and the Philippine forces—to deal with a Taiwan contingency. So, whether or not the Philippines like it or otherwise, being involved in some way or another in a Taiwan Strait conflict might be a higher possibility these days. I remember Marcos Jr. did mention that it will be inevitable for the Philippines to be involved in one way or another. The question here is: If the US has to be involved in direct combat operations around Taiwan, and if the Philippines would opt to stay out of direct combat operations around Taiwan, then it would mean that the Philippine forces will have to take on the primary mantle of safeguarding its waters in the South China Sea. And that, in itself, is going to be a tall order for the Philippines, as Shang-Su rightly pointed out. The armed forces of the Philippines is still currently in the midst of modernization, and there is much to be done before they become a more credible deterrent force going forward.   Host Regarding the balance of forces, what impact does America’s involvement in the Philippines and Taiwan have vis-à-vis China’s threat?   Wu Because [of] the Philippines very limited capability—there’s just one squadron of fighter jets and, and maybe it will expand to four very soon, this year—[it] has a very limited capability to defend itself. So, if the armed conflict happened—and in the Philippines—then US detachments would have to shoulder most [of the] responsibility of the missions because the Philippines itself only can protect very key locations, very few—even [in] most of [its] territory. Regarding this imbalance, of course, we have to mention [the] Philippines since 2012, because the Scarborough Shoal incident, they indeed put the effort into modernization, but unfortunately, they face China, the quickest expanding (or military increasing), the rising power. So, [the] Philippines’ effort compared to China is very limited. It’s very insufficient. So, if anything, the US will play a very key factor [in bringing] balance. But, on the other hand, it also means the US knows [it has] to handle different locations—so, how [many forces the US can provide to the] Philippine regarding defense—and that will be challenging.   Koh If I could chime in quickly on that. Shang-Su, you rightly pointed out the current modernizational challenges faced by the AFP—the Armed Forces of the Philippines—and, I think one thing to also point out is that the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, has multiple maritime areas of interest. And, given that it doesn’t just have the West Philippine Sea, which is the area within the South China Sea that they claim under their sovereignty and jurisdiction, other than the West Philippine Sea, we have also the eastern seaboard of the Philippines, which, of course, [centers] around what they call the Philippine Rise, which is an underwater submerged feature that is considered resource rich. And not to mention that there are key waterways that run through the Philippine archipelago that actually allow access right into the open western Pacific Ocean. Now, one example would be that in recent times we have seen PLA Navy ships actually transiting some of those waterways, for example, the Basilan Strait, which is in the southern part of the Philippines. And, it also could mean that in wartime, those waterways could be contested, largely because the Philippine armed forces on its own might be unable to, in fact, police effectively those waterways, much less to even think about defending them in times of war. So, it will really depend on the US, but what I do tend to see is that the war in Ukraine might actually offer some very important lessons. For example, Ukraine was derided as having no Navy to talk abo

    21 min
  4. Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-34 – Michael Fitzpatrick and Hugo Harvey-Valdés – On “Korea and the Arsenal of Democracy” and “Allies, Partners, or Puppets?: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69”

    11/14/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-34 – Michael Fitzpatrick and Hugo Harvey-Valdés – On “Korea and the Arsenal of Democracy” and “Allies, Partners, or Puppets?: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69”

    In this episode, authors Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick and Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés compare the transatlantic partnerships between the United States and West Germany in the 1970s, the US and South Korea in the 1970s and 80s, and the US and Chilean armies’ relations in the 1960s. They discuss the successes and struggles of those partnerships and the strengths and limits of American influence during these time periods. Keywords: history, partnerships, Cold War, Post-Cold War, Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, Chile, foreign policy, defense industry, political indoctrination     Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m speaking remotely today with Hugo Harvey-Valdés and Michael Fitzpatrick. Both were authors of articles featured in the Historical Studies forum in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés, full professor and researcher at the University of Los Americas Santiago, held a variety of field and academic positions during 27 years of active military service before retiring in December 2020. He is the author of “Allies, Partners, or Puppets: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69.” Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and supports the Defense POW-MIA Accounting Agency. Fitzpatrick wrote “Korea, Germany, and the Arsenal of Democracy.” Welcome to Decisive Point. Thank you for joining me.   Michael Fitzpatrick Thank you for having me.   Hugo Harvey-Valdés I appreciate the invitation. Thanks a lot for having me.   Host What drew you to study these particular aspects of US foreign military policy?   Fitzpatrick I was drawn to this subject because I think the relationship between the US and its allies is so important to the crafting of contemporary foreign policy. I think, in the last several presidential administrations, Americans have really tried to reconsider their alliance relationships. And, I think that the actual mechanics of these relationships are often understudied in the historiography. And, I think that this is such an important subject and an interesting subject because I see a lot of overlap between the West German situation in the 1970s and the South Korean situation. The strategic outlook in both of those regions is very similar. And yet, American policy and American actions in those countries—and the result of American policy and action in those countries—is often radically different. And so, this creates an interesting opportunity for study and an interesting opportunity for comparison.   Host Hugo, what was your inspiration? Harvey-Valdés When I was working on my doctoral dissertation that was about President [Eduardo Frei Montalva’s] foreign policy between 1964 and 1970, I analyzed many declassified documents from the United States and Chile, which showed that Chile was not above its state—I mean that Chile didn’t follow the US guidelines in foreign or domestic policy. Despite the millions of dollars that Frei Montalva received from economic aid plans and that supported his presidential campaign in his first years in office. Then, I asked myself, “If the politicians developed independently, why would the military have faithfully followed US demands?”    Furthermore, in my own exchanges and training with the US Army, I never felt any intention to influence or ideologize my military thought. Therefore, I realized that there was a need to reassess prevailing narratives that have depicted the relations between American and Chilean armies during the Cold War, especially during [the] Kennedy and Johnson administrations.   Host Michael, give us an overview of US military involvement in Korea and Germany. What were the strategic priorities in each case, and what time frame are we talking about here?   Fitzpatrick So, the time frame of the article is actually quite broad. I started looking at the immediate post-war and the onset of the Cold War through to the current day. But particularly, I like to focus on the period of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s, which I think is a very dynamic period in the three-party alliance. The strategic priorities, generally, are very similar, I think, between South Korea and West Germany. Both countries were divided. East and West in the case of Germany [and] North and South in the case of Korea. The American allies in each country, their allied nations, were confronted by kind of aggressive neighbor states on the border, who looked to, at some point in the ambiguous far future, to try and end this artificial division and bring Marxist Leninism to these divided situations. So, for the United States, deterrence is an incredibly important component of their strategic outlook in these regions. Third, in the case of both divided situations, both sides of the division were backed by outside superpowers. The United States backed West Germany and South Korea, China backed North Korea, and the Soviet Union backed East Germany. And so, there was a tremendous amount of outside military aid, economic aid—support that flowed into these divided situations—which only exacerbated inflamed tensions. So ultimately, I would argue in both cases that the US pursues a policy of deterrence, and they focus on maintaining the status quo in each country—that they prefer the status quo situation rather than some kind of very violent attempts to realize it. The issue for American foreign policy, and I would love to talk about this more, is that in Germany the status quo for most of the period that we’re talking about is a pretty positive one. Germany remains democratic. It remains committed to the kind of government that’s created in the aftermath of World War II and is committed to a very specific interpretation of the aftermath of World War II. But in South Korea, particularly once you get into the 1960s and ’70s, the situation is undemocratic. There are significant problems in South Korea. And so, American commitment to the status quo in South Korea actually becomes very problematic to South Korean politics.   Host How was US military assistance to Chile in the 1960s different from Korea and Germany?   Harvey-Valdés US military assistance to Chile, during the 1960s, contrasted a lot with its relationships with Korea and Germany. While the US involvement in Korea and Germany included three kinds of relations—extensive long-term military alliances, operational developments, and joint technological developments—US and Chilean interactions remained just educational and professional. Military exchanges with Chile involved mainly training and limited equipment transfers. In fact, when the United States sold weapons to Chile within the Mutual Assistance Pact, in order to give stabilization within the region, similar equipment was transferred to neighboring countries [such] as Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Furthermore, US policy toward Chile was a joint effort complementing civilian-driven economic initiatives like the Alliance for Progress.   Host What determined whether the United States treated a country as an ally, partner, or puppet?   Harvey-Valdés The distinction between what was considered an ally, partner, or puppet rested on the degree of autonomy first and then, the mutual benefits perceived by both countries. In Chile’s case, the relationship reflected mutual professional interests rather than a mere subordination. My research shows that Chile maintained significant autonomy in decisions regarding military cooperation, and these were always made by civilian authorities [and], thus, aligned with Chilean foreign policy. Chile’s refusal to fully support US policies during the Cuban Missile Crisis and then, during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965, reinforced this position as a sovereign partner, rather than being a recipient or a puppet state. The nature of the relationship was based on the willingness and then capacity of recipient nations to exercise independent decision making.   Host Was military aid meant to build independence or was it a tool for American influence in Korea and Germany?   Fitzpatrick The historian’s answer is that both, I think, are true at different times as we look through the timeline. Ultimately, for the US, I think, military aid is a tool for independence, generally, and it’s a tool to secure deterrence. I think that, especially for Army planners in the Pentagon itself, military aid was necessary in order to produce the strategic outcomes that they were looking for. And, American influence was secondary to that—or a vehicle—in order to get the situation that they were looking for. Like I said, I think in both cases, but especially in South Korea, there was a desire to maintain the status quo. Using American influence to achieve that strategic outlook was something that was sometimes palatable, but I think that there’s significant variation from period to period. For example, in Germany in the 1950s, US aid was an important tool to the remilitarizing German Bundeswehr, which began to rearm in 1954. After that, American arms sales were important because they could keep Germany in the Western sphere. They could rapidly militarize, remilitarize, especially the German land army. Of course, weapon sales to the West German army were profitable for American companies, using that as a tool to try and support the US’s own deterrence and production posture. But ultimately, I think, also, in the 1950s, there’s still a concern about democratic backsliding in West Germany and the fear that a revived army could, in fact, follow some of the mischief, we’ll call it, of the German armies of the previous decades. I think in that case, it’s definitely a tool for American infl

    25 min

  5. 09/17/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-33 – Justin Malzac – Korea: The Enduring Policy Blindspot

    The threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a neglected and under-prioritized problem across the US government, requiring a dramatic change of approach. Most proposals for Goldwater-Nichols reform focus on geography, either increasing or decreasing the number of geographic commands. Based on our personal experience as Joint military planners at strategic-level headquarters, we argue that the change needs to go further, focusing on global national security problems instead of geography. This article’s analysis and conclusions will provoke conversation across the national security enterprise about how the United States competes with multiple global threats. Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, Goldwater-Nichols reform, National Defense Strategy, force structure Disclaimer: This podcast was recorded March 28, 2025, prior to the election of South Korea’s current president, Lee Jae Myung, in June of 2025. Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking remotely today with Justin Malzac, coauthor with Rene A. Mahomed of “Korea: The Enduring [Policy] Blindspot,” which you can find in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Malzac is a senior information planner and policy adviser for the Department of Defense in Korea. He’s also a historian with a focus on East Asia. His history work on Korea has been published in the International Journal of Korean Studies and other venues. Welcome to Decisive Point, Justin. Justin Malzac Thanks for having me, Stephanie. Unfortunately, my coauthor, Rene, could not be here today due to scheduling issues, but I’m going to try to make sure that I bring up some of the points that he wanted to mention here. Host Set the stage for our listeners, please, and give us a brief overview of the article. Malzac So, our article looked at Korea—North Korea, in particular—as a policy problem, and argued that it is a under-prioritized issue. We did a comparison of North Korea and the issues and the threats emanating from North Korea and also Russia and the degradation of Russia in Ukraine, making an argument that strategic prioritization needs to be shifted and that North Korea needs to be elevated as a more severe threat. We also provided one recommendation on how you might do that through restructuring the combatant commands. For today, I wanted to really focus on the problem-framing piece of it—understanding the North Korea problem and understanding how we got here. Host Let’s start with the impeachment issue. Can you put the current South Korean impeachment issue into context for us? Malzac Yes. So, obviously one of the biggest news events coming out of South Korea recently is the impeachment of President Yoon [Suk-Yeol]. It’s hard to talk about South Korea as an ally or the Korean Peninsula as a strategic battle space without addressing that elephant in the room. There’s a lot that has been published on the impeachment issue in a variety of media with a lot of very, I don’t want to say inflammatory, but headlines that are there to draw attention. So, for example, in January an article was released in Foreign Affairs entitled “Can South Korea’s Democracy Survive?”—very provocative title. But if you actually open up the article, the author says [that] South Korean democracies—the institutions—are healthy and sound. And the author actually goes into showing that South Korea faces a lot of the same problems that most modern democracies are facing today, things like polarization, extremism, misinformation, and those types of problems. So, the problems faced by South Korea’s democracy are not exactly unique to it. However, to understand the impeachment issue, you really have to jump back in time and you kind of need a little bit of a historical framework. South Korea is a very young democracy. The current system, where popular elections that have been legitimate, really only goes back about 30 years. You go back to the end of the Korean War [and] the first South Korean president, Syngman Rhee, was really forced upon South Korea. He was, you know, the one that the United States side had chosen to lead. He survives as president until around 1960–1961, and then, there are scandals, corruption, and vote-rigging scandals; and protests—large protests—[and] public pressure. He’s removed from office. There’s a power struggle, and then in 1961, General Park Chung-Hee launches a coup and initiates a military junta at the end of 1961. And that’s actually what I wrote about in my historical article. Park Chung-Hee rules for about 20 years. In 1979, he is assassinated in another period of turmoil and another coup d’etat, and General Chun Doo-Hwan comes into power. Particularly in the ’70s and the ’80s, South Korea is really an authoritarian police state. Protests are brutally suppressed, student protesters are disappeared, the intelligence services are watching everybody. It’s a very rough time. And then, towards the end of the ’80s, South Korea starts to come out of it. And, after Chun Doo-Hwan (he’s replaced by the election of Roh Tae-Woo in 1987), it was a transition period—you really weren’t at democracy yet. Then in 1992, with the election of Kim Young-Sam, that’s the first civilian elected to the ROK (Republic of Korea) presidency. So that’s the period where the modern South Korean democracy really takes off is 1992. From then, it’s been relatively stable. And you wouldn’t know by watching on TV because you see things like ROK lawmakers in the parliament building setting off tear gas grenades and things like that—really flashy politics. But the systems and the institutions have been very stable. The first Korean president [impeached was] in 2016. That was Park Guen-Hye, and it was a significant vote—234 out of 300 lawmakers voted to impeach, and then they went to the Constitutional Court and [the vote] was upheld. So, it’s only ever happened one time before. She was removed from power. There was another election. There was a transfer of power. The system was working. I think, really, when you look at South Korea today, the signs that democracy is healthy is the reaction to President Yoon’s martial law declaration. The reaction was immediate. The public came out in droves to the streets to protect the parliament building and to protect the lawmakers. Senior level—not the top generals who were initiating the military activities, but people right under them—were refusing orders to arrest lawmakers and do other things. So, Koreans have seen this movie before. They know what martial law means, and they weren’t going to take it. And across the layers of society, they resisted it. And then the institutions took over, and the Parliament voted to impeach. It got referred to the Constitutional Court. [An] interesting nuance about impeachment in South Korea is that extra layer of the court review, the judicial review, that we don’t actually have in the United States. So, really, in the United States, there isn’t something that can prevent, you know, a political party who has a super majority in both houses of Congress from just wielding impeachment as a political weapon and just impeaching and impeaching and impeaching. There’s no check on that. In South Korea, all the impeachments have to go to the court and get validated. And we saw that working out with, most recently, the vice president’s impeachment, Vice President Han Duck-Soo. His impeachment was overruled. The Constitutional Court said it wasn’t valid. Yoon was impeached, removed from power, Han took over as the interim president, and the opposition party in the legislature wanted him to do very specific things. And, when he didn’t do those things, the court said that’s not valid. That was a political move. All in all, the country is in a period of transition because they don’t have an elected president. But soon the court is going to very likely rule that the Yoon impeachment is valid, which is going to trigger a new election which is going to trigger a transfer of power and all the systems are gonna come back into balance, I highly suspect. There’s gonna be some protests, probably, but I highly suspect anything that’d be disruptive. So, our ally is here. Our ally is still engaging with US whole-of-government agencies that are here. Host In your article you suggest deterrence has failed. Why? Malzac In the article, this is actually Rene, my coauthor’s, major part of the paper. So, I’m going to do my best to respond for him here. I’m going to start very quickly with a quote from the US Northern Commander’s recent posture statement to Congress where he said, “Regime rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim [Jong Un] is eager to transition his strategic weapons programs from research and development to serial production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North Korea’s inventory and narrow my confidence in NORTHCOM’s existing ballistic missile defense capacity in the coming years.” So NORTHCOM is basically saying, “This problem is getting out of hand, and we can’t handle it anymore.” How has that come about? Well, North Korea has not been a strategic priority for a very long time. The DoD [Department of Defense] official media announcement of the 2022 National Security Strategy didn’t even mention Korea. It’s been something that we have, for a long time, kind of neglected and ignored. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons [and] ICBMs [and] continues to engage in other gray-zone activities. Really, the core of the problem, in my opinion, is that the US policy towards North Korea is a requirement for complete, verifiable, irre

    24 min

  6. 09/15/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-32 – Hamid Lellou and Amin Tarzi – US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War

    As a key battleground in the global struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, Africa offers US policymakers insights to navigate competing interests and power dynamics. For a comprehensive view of this competition, this article analyzes American, Chinese, French, and Russian geopolitical strategies; employs a geopolitical analysis of current events, diplomatic maneuvers, and historical lessons; and uses policy documents, expert opinions, and case studies of geopolitical engagements. It then provides actionable policy recommendations for fostering stable, long-term US relations in Africa and offers strategic perspectives on managing the global power competition applicable to broader national security and diplomatic contexts. Keywords: US policy in Africa, global order and power dynamics, strategic insights for policymakers, Russia-China relations in Africa, proxy conflicts and diplomatic maneuvers Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. My guests today are Hamid Lellou and Dr. Amin Tarzi. Lellou is the author of “US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War,” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Lellou is an independent analyst specializing in conflict resolution and regional dynamics in the Middle East and Africa. Tarzi is the professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps War College. His teaching and research include the Middle East, hybrid actors, major power competition in the region, and evolving competition and contestation in the Red Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean regions. Welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Amin Tarzi Thank you for having us. Hamid Lellou Thank you. Host Hamid, give us a brief overview of your article. Lellou My article discusses evolving dynamics between the United States and the African nations in a very particular area and time. We have [the] United States, and in the title, as you saw, I added “and the new Cold War,” referring to other [superpowers] including Russia and China. When you invited me to this podcast, and I looked back to my article, I thought if I had to change or add something, I would do it in the title. And rather [than] saying, “US-Africa relations,” I would say “US-Africa Win-Win Relations.” In the paper, I talk about the approaches [to Africa], mainly the Chinese approach and the Russian approach. On the one hand, I described the Chinese approach as development/infrastructure diplomacy and, on the other hand, we have [Russian] security diplomacy. As the US, what should be our approach, knowing that the interests are different, approaches are different, values are different, which [puts] the United States in a very unfair situation. And, whatever things we’ll be talking [about] on Africa, in the back of my mind, I look at two different Africas. I look at the Africa from the academic and official point of view, the formal Africa, but there is also the informal Africa. Host Hamid, please outline how African nations are addressing their security issues. Lellou That’s a great question. Again, [regarding] African nations, if I said that they are doing it in a very specific way, it means I will imply that they’re doing it together. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. So, I would frame it in two dimensions: the global, international, continental dimension, and the local dimension. I will start with the local [dimension] because it has also some implications [for] the regional aspect of it. Internally, they are working on developing their military infrastructure capabilities, trying to develop some economies, and so forth. The problem that I see in Africa is that when it comes to, for instance, developing the military there, we see a lot of arms [races] rather than developing their capabilities in ways that will lead to a better development and protection of their countries. And, I’m saying this because, as I said before, I look at the informal side of Africa-Africa [relationships]—and, unfortunately, African countries don’t necessarily have great [relationships] between them. So, even if you look at it from the internal standpoints, it has an effect on the trans-border relationship. For that, I can give you examples. There are many countries where [the] United States has interest in working with different countries and yet, these same countries, they don’t necessarily have great [relationships]. Take the case of Algeria and Morocco. [They are] great partners, already having [a] great relationship with Morocco, developing [a] great relationship with Algeria—and yet, these countries, don’t have [a] diplomatic relationship. How can we work with countries like this? [It is the] same thing when you look at Central Africa [and] what’s going on between DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] and Rwanda—and even with Uganda, and you name it. There are many examples. This is one. The problem that I see, though, with many of these countries—and this is the caveat in the official Africa when I talk about “official” and “nonofficial”—is that using, for instance, the fight against terrorism for regimes means instead of state security. And, I will leave it there because I’m sure Dr. Tarzi will have to add [to my thoughts]. Host Dr. Tarzi? Tarzi First of all, thank you for having me on Decisive Point. You know what, I’ll respond [to] your question, first and foremost, by challenging a prevalent assumption that we, specifically the United States, have regarding African states, and namely that is that we assume—and I think my colleague said that—that they act collectively, in tandem. You never hear us saying “How are the Asian states?” It’s just never happened. We specifically refer to either a specific country, whether it’s India or Pakistan or China—or even the smaller ones—or at least the region, [such as] the Middle East [and] South Asia. Somehow, we do that with Africa as if the 55 countries work together. We use the word “Africa” as if it’s one place. It is not. There are 55 countries there, or 56 if you count some countries that are not official, or [it] could be 57, you know. We could go on, but [there are] at least 55 officially, according to the African Union. I think this homogeneity applied to Africa makes our decision making also based on this idea that they all work together. They don’t, and it’s not because there’s something wrong with them, it’s just that they [have] different issues. You heard about Algeria and Morocco. They have their problems. That is totally apart from their [relationships] with [the] United States. Also, I deal with countries such as Egypt. Egypt and Madagascar, what [do] they have in common? They are very different. And, in [the] case of the United States’s [relationships], Egypt actually happens to be not even dealt with [by] AFRICOM. It’s still sitting in Central Command for various reasons because Egypt’s trajectory, security, [and] relationship [are] much more connected to its Middle Eastern neighbors than it is with their African neighbors. They still have a lot of [relationships]. They are in Africa. Most people think Egypt is not in Africa. I would challenge that before we even start talking about outlining how African nations address their security, [let us] underline the idea that there is no such thing as African nations because of a continent—they are different countries, groupings, [and] historical realities. And, I think if we start dealing with them in that way, we might get a lot more traction than [by] looking at it holistically as a homogeneous continent. Thank you. Lellou It’s a perceived homogeneity. It’s also part of my policy recommendations, if you go back to my paper. Instead of looking at Africa as a whole continent holistically, look at it as blocks. This is what I recommended. [Look at it] in blocks that naturally exist right now. But, we will discover later that, actually, there are some missing legs, which means we need to have maybe more blocks in Africa to make them much more homogeneous. That will ease any relationship with [the] outside—and between them, to start—and with outsiders, including the United States. Host In your view, how could NATO learn from the African model, particularly in terms of respecting sovereignty and empowering local leadership? Lellou Sovereignty. That’s the keyword here. Sovereignty. And I will add another word—antagonism—which we were talking about—the different interests and approaches due to competing interests. But, when it comes to the United States, it doesn’t stop there. You have Russia and China, who have their competing interests, including economy, politics, and resources. But, when it comes to [the] United States, we cannot stop there. We have values, and that is a huge disadvantage. When you compare [the] United States’s engagement with Africa [or] you compare it to [Russian] and Chinese engagement with Africa, there are some existing institutions. We’re not saying this to describe Africa as everything is black and bleak, and everything is bad. No, there are some strong foundations like [the] AU [African Union], which originally existed since 1963 as [the] African Organization Union, which turned to AU, I think, in 2002. We have, for instance, a regional block, [the] ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States]. ECOWAS is the most successful, despite some hiccups with the Sahel. We should take this AES, which is the Alliance [des] États du Sahel [Alliance of Sahel States]. People may look at it as a bad idea [saying,] “It is a bad idea because military coups led to this because of what’s going on in the Sahel.” But let’s take it from the other side. Instead of fighting agai

    32 min

  7. 02/20/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-31 – Michael P. Ferguson and Richard Kohn – The American Way of Studying War: What Is It Good For?

    Academic military historians, government institutions, and defense practitioners have unique purposes for advancing the study of war that influence the way they consume and produce history. Although there is substantial scholarship covering how the discipline of military history has changed since the late nineteenth century, the literature surrounding why it changes and how it is used is less plentiful. Using primary and secondary sources to contextualize debates between historians, this study traces major developments in military historiography, considers the US Army’s relationship with its history, and explores potential connections between a history’s purpose and its use for military professionals. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Keywords: Whig history, New History, American Historical Association, US military history, Society for Military History Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with US Army Major Michael P. Ferguson and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Professor Richard Kohn about military history. Ferguson is a PhD student and advanced civil schooling participant in the Department of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He’s coauthor of The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great: Lessons for the Information Age, published in 2024. He’s also the author of “The American Way of Studying War: What Is It Good For?” and that’s what we’re here to talk about today. Kohn has focused on military history generally, emphasizing national security and military policy strategy and the American experience with war making and the connections between war, the military, and American society. In recent years, his concentration has been on current civil-military relations, particularly civilian control of the military. Thank you for joining me remotely from North Carolina today. Major Michael P. Ferguson Thanks for having us. Richard Kohn Special pleasure. Host We’re here to talk about why military history remains relevant, and we’re going to talk about its values for individuals, institutions, and society. Why has military history been so controversial? Ferguson It’s probably something that’s not as well known outside the halls of history departments on universities. Military history in general has a pretty turbulent background, and the way I open up the article, which I thought was kind of a fitting alpha, or beginning, to the story of military history is looking at the turn of the century in 1900 and Edward Eggleston, who was the president of the American Historical Association at the time. And, in 190Z, he drafted a speech to be given at the annual conference. Unfortunately, he was never able to deliver it because he fell ill and passed away the following year in 1902. But, his speech touches on this concept of new history and a lot of [lines ] from the speech really reflect this movement of new history—of looking at the smaller things and moving away from classical history, which was essentially “Ivory Tower” history looking at big policies and wars and politics. But, it also reflects this turn-of-century way of thinking at the time, where we’re on the back end of the Enlightenment. Mankind had supposedly liberated themselves from the shackles of predestination. And, you had Darwin’s theories taking traction, and it came out in 1859 on the origin of species. And then, you also had this massive progress in terms of art and science and industry, where it seemed like the sky was the limit at the time. And, one of the outgrowths of this period in the history that Eggleston touches on in his speech is this belief that militarism, in general, and war, specifically, could be something that humankind would essentially evolve out of. It was this anachronistic relic of a past form of human life; this barbaric form that they could educate civilization away from it. That leads into a lot of the themes of why do military historians do history? What’s the purpose of history? And, I want to read one line real quick from his speech because like in any written work, a lot of it ends up on the chopping room floor. But, this is according to Edward Eggleston. This was his purpose, the object of history: Man is such a savage that until the lifetime of the present generation, he has insisted on settling everything by the gauge of battle. But the brute age and age of heroism in the contest with the brute must pass. We cannot always cover our pages with gore. It is the object of history to cultivate this out of man, to teach him the wisdom of diplomacy, the wisdom of avoidance. In short, the fine wisdom of arbitration that last fruit of the human experience, End Quote. The object of history to Eggleston and many other of his contemporaries was, essentially, to weed these remnants of militarism out of human beings. Kohn I would say that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a time when war was being praised as the highest form of human behavior. Heroism changes history. It makes contributions to society. And, it wasn’t really until after World War I, with the horrible killing and no real decision for most of the war that there was a change, I think, in public opinion and among scholars—that war was to be avoided, that it was a mistake. And, it’s controversial because often there are many mistakes made in war. British generals came in for huge criticisms for just wasting human lives by the hundreds of thousands. There was really a turn, I think, in Western society after World War I, that experience that made and still makes war a controversial human endeavor, even though it might illustrate some positive human characteristics. Mike, why don’t you talk about new history because you’ve [covered the] subject so much in your very, I hope, influential article in Army circles. Ferguson Absolutely. New history is kind of a misnomer because it’s not really new at all, but it’s still referred to as “new history.” And, as I mentioned, in Eggleston’s draft of his speech that he was going to give in 1901, he started using this term “new history.” And, he cited, going back to the sixteenth century, a couple examples of other historians who had looked at what he called “the little things in life.” So, social interaction, the everyday life of Americans—from what their bedrooms look like on to the ornate details in their kitchen and their everyday patterns of life. And, part of that concept of new history was that focusing on these things would help create a better citizen. And, that was another thing he mentioned in his speech was that the purpose, the object, of history, was to create good citizens (good men and women) who could contribute to society. And, obviously, the conduct of war and study of war didn’t really fall within that bailiwick of good, kind, productive citizens, especially at a time when a lot of intellectuals were of the mind that they could use reason and logic to essentially extinguish war from the human existence. Kohn I think, [at] this time, military history was equated with war history and with battle. And so, it was being studied, really, once wars began. Perhaps [there was] some study on the causes of war amongst states. And, it was almost considered to be war among states. And that, of course, just touches the most prominent part of military history. It’s as though you can understand elections—we just had one in this country—by only studying the elections. What are the results? Why did someone do this? Why did someone do that? I mean, you can’t understand an election unless you know who’s running, what the issues are, what the background is, what the strategies were, what’s the electorate, what’s at stake. “War is an extension of politics” said the great nineteenth-century student of Carl von Clausewitz. If you don’t understand what’s at stake in a war, if you don’t understand why the sides are fighting each other, how they’re using military institutions, and so on, you really won’t understand war. So, [I think] there was a sense of the need that developed over time in the twentieth century, and what became known as the new military history after World War II, is that if you don’t study it, as Sir Michael Howard said, in length, breadth, and depth, you really won’t understand it. It’s just military institutions clashing and trying to eradicate each other, or at least wound some so that the one side can win and the other side would lose, or there’d be a compromise. Win what? I mean, if you don’t understand, Clausewitz said, the kind of war you are in then you are really lost as military officers and as political leaders, which, in most Western societies now, are the ones that determine the making of war and peace. Ferguson And, I would add to that as the concept of new military history grew in the mid-twentieth century, particularly after 1973 and the institution of the all-volunteer force, a lot of educational institutions and scholars started looking at the question of why serve? Why serve, not only in a peace time when there’s no war being fought? Why serve in an all-volunteer military when there’s no forcing function to get you to put on the uniform? That led to military historians wrestling with a lot of new concepts that really forced them to ask some new questions. And, what it did was broaden the aperture into other disciplines, whether or not internal to the field of history or external to history and political science and communications and other fields, where they started looking more at subjects that were adjacent to military history, not necessari

    29 min

  8. 01/14/2025

    Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-30 – Regan Copple – “The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning”

    The Indications and Warnings subfield of intelligence has traditionally divided warnings into a dichotomy of “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” that gives policymakers a false sense of security. In this episode, Regan Copple examines why unambiguous warning has become an inadequate planning tool that can lead to dire consequences in the quest for certainty. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article. Podcast record date: November 20, 2024 Keywords: intelligence, military planning, warning, decision making, strategic planning Episode Transcript Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am talking with Regan Copple today, author of “The Fallacy of Unambiguous Warning,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 issue of Parameters. Copple is a research associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, where her work focuses on strategy development and war gaming. She is also a doctoral student at George Mason University. Welcome to Decisive Point, Regan. Regan Copple Thank you. Thanks for having me. Host What are the working definitions of ambiguous warnings and unambiguous warnings in the context of your article? Copple For ambiguous warning, the easy way to break it down is the idea of you know something’s coming, but you’re not quite sure what or when. In practice, this would look like seeing some sort of mass mobilization but not knowing where those forces were mobilizing to or where the first attack might occur. Whereas unambiguous warning, you know something’s going to happen. You know what’s going to happen, when is it going to happen, and how is it going to happen. It sounds super simple, but in reality, this is a really high bar to be able to pin down the exact when and how. A good example of unambiguous warning is the ideal conceptualization of tactical warning about two to three days or a week before an attack would happen. Host How has the traditional distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous warnings contributed to a false sense of security in military planning, and how might this thinking be revised? Copple This distinction isn’t so much of what’s creating the false sense of security, it’s the expectation that you’re going to receive unambiguous warning, which both very recent events like Ukraine and the Hamas attack on Israel, and modern history more broadly—like Pearl Harbor, the Korean War and [the Yom Kippur War] show—is that what’s creating the false sense of security is the idea of we will know when this is going to happen. And, we will know exactly what is coming and when, which hasn’t been true. In terms of how can we reverse this thinking, I’d say we need to start thinking about writing. When we write about unambiguous warning in plans and in our day jobs, rather than think about it as a necessary condition, [we should] start treating it as a “nice to have” rather than a “must have” to further confirm our existing assumptions. Because if we’re waiting for the confirmation that we’re right, that confirmation normally comes in the form of being attacked, which, needless to say, is not a preferred outcome. Host Your article discusses the failure of Israeli intelligence during the Yom Kippur War due to their expectation of unambiguous warnings. What lessons can modern military strategists learn from these kinds of historical intelligence failures? Copple The biggest reason Egypt succeeded in obfuscating their warnings was because they employed an especially well-thought-out deception plan. I think the biggest lesson from this conflict is that adversaries understand the victim state might be watching, so they have an incentive to obscure what they’re actually doing and misrepresent what they’re doing, which means planners and strategists have to factor in responses to deception or contingency plans and think about what happens if the opponent would try and execute some sort of deception. What might this look like? How might we be able to counter that? Basically, the bottom line is don’t expect the enemy to make it easy for you because they have a vested interest in not doing so. Host How can military planners better utilize ambiguous warnings in their intelligence collection and analysis process to avoid surprises like Pearl Harbor or the Yom Kippur War? Copple The biggest take away from Pearl Harbor wasn’t that we didn’t have most of the information we needed to make a decision. We did. The bigger issue was that the right people didn’t have the right information at the right time, in no small part due to security classification issues. Now in 2024, a lot of this has been fixed by technology because now we don’t need to burn letters flown halfway across the world minutes after they’re read. But, the underlying message that remains for today is that information sharing is hard. We shouldn’t assume that everyone gets every piece of information they need the second they need it—and plan around that—and basically understand that institutional bureaucratic stove pipes can get in the way of information sharing and those things are difficult to break down over time.– Host The article suggests that the Intelligence Community’s process is not designed to predict specific events but to assess probabilities. How can decision makers ensure they act on high-probability intelligence without over-relying on the elusive certainty of unambiguous warnings? Copple Much like how lots of the solution rests with changing the way that planners and strategists think about warning, this requires educating decisionmakers inside—but also, mostly outside—the Department of Defense on what do we mean when we say “warning?” Because the DOD has its own very specific language where things that we may say in our day-to-day jobs may mean something very, very different to a person with no previous defense experience or very little defense experience. We also need to talk about what a given probability means. What does a low-confidence assessment mean? What does a high-confidence assessment mean? What are some of the implications of that? And also, educate that just because we don’t have unambiguous warning, that doesn’t mean something isn’t going to happen. That just means that we don’t have a crystal-clear picture on what we think is going to happen next. Both the beauty and the curse of this problem is primarily that it’s a solution that’s driven by a mindset change. It’s a beauty in that it doesn’t cost us any money or people to make this change, which is nice. But, at the same time, it’s a curse in that entrenched beliefs within the DOD and the national security establishment are incredibly hard to dislodge once those beliefs have been established. Host We have a few extra minutes if you’re willing to entertain another question or two. I’d love to know what inspired you to write this article. Copple A few years ago, I was sitting in some planning discussions out in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], and some of the planners at the table looked around and they said, “Hey, you know, maybe we should define unambiguous warning in the document so that way everybody in the future knows and it’s clear, that they understand what we meant when we wrote this.” Everybody at the time thought that was a great idea. So, then everyone started to share what to them looked like unambiguous warning. And, what started off as a very civil, casual discussion very quickly turned into a very acrimonious argument, and by the very end, everyone was further apart in understanding what unambiguous warning meant, not closer together. That sort of prompted me to think if there are so many different views on what unambiguous warning is, is it really unambiguous? And, that’s what really sparked my research—and looking at case studies and realizing that there’s a trend here. What I experienced wasn’t just a one-off conversation. Host Once you started researching it, did you find any surprises or unexpected information? Copple I think the underlying thread that I found the most was that a lot of the most successful surprise attacks have a very big deception component where it’s not just that the victim state misses something altogether. That’s normally not what happens. There’s normally some sort of active deception and obfuscation going on on the part of the attacking state. Host Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share? Copple Bottom line: warning is hard, and I think we forget that sometimes. We tend to think as long as we check off every box on a list of things we observe, that means we have a certain level of warning, and we know what’s going to happen based off of that list. It doesn’t. We not only have to think about what we’re seeing, but why are we seeing what we’re seeing? What other explanations or adversary motivations could be out there that’s driving the adversary to make those decisions, or those maneuvers, and figure out are we falling into some sort of mental trap? Are they doing what we expect them to do? And, if they’re not, maybe why not? And, think through all of this because once we do, we’re going to get a little bit closer to understanding the true picture of what’s going on. Host Thank you for making time to speak with me today. I really enjoyed it. Copple Thank you. Pleasure to be here. Host Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 54, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

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Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

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