Episode Summary Public opinion surveys from every pollster have shown that Donald Trump’s political support has declined massively across the board. But one set of people that has been much more loyal (up until just very recently) has been the so-called “MAHA Movement” of former Democrat Robert F. Kennedy Jr. This is an interesting group to think about because as the Republican party has moved to the far right, it has kicked out the conservatives and moderates who once were welcomed. Instead of shrinking away, however, Republicans remained highly competitive by bringing in the MAHA crowd of hippies and naturalist obsessives who had long been associated with the far left. But that perception was an inaccurate one. These people were always conservative/libertarian. The only thing that changed was the partisan label that they wanted to wear. The anti-science and anti-institutional rhetoric that’s the bedrock of today’s Trumpism, was actually very prominent from day one in the 1960s counterculture through figures like Jack Kerouac, Timothy Leary, and Robert Anton Wilson. Aaron Rabinowitz, my guest on today’s episode, grew up on all of this stuff, so he knows it from firsthand experience, but he also knows it through his academic career—and the fact that he’s the host of two philosophy podcasts, Embrace the Void, and Philosophers in Space. The video of our conversation is available, the transcript is below. Because of its length, some podcast apps and email programs may truncate it. Access the episode page to get the full text. You can subscribe to Theory of Change and other Flux podcasts on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon Podcasts, YouTube, Patreon, Substack, and elsewhere. Related Content —Why the “naturalistic fallacy” is the basis of so much anti-science thinking —Marianne Williamson’s ineffective self-help politics —How “post left” grifters use contrarian rhetoric to push people to the far right —RFK Junior’s policies are already making Americans sicker, and things will only get worse —Quantum woo is nonsense, here’s the real science —Why fan-fiction politics leads to disappointment and how AOC and Bernie Sanders are trying to combat it —How sci-fi authors like Heinlein, Pournelle, and Rand have become the obsessions of Musk, Thiel, and Luckey Audio Chapters 00:00 — Introduction 06:54 — High weirdness and libertarianism as a conservative liberalism 10:19 — The origins of the “counterculture” 17:15 — New Thought movement and mind over matter 27:24 — Quantum physics and a new generation of pseudoscience 36:02 — Alfred Korzybski and Robert Anton Wilson 48:38 — Ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism and high weirdness 58:30 — Balancing truth and skepticism 01:07:34 — Living with uncertainty and embracing the void Audio Transcript The following is a machine-generated transcript of the audio that has not been proofed. It is provided for convenience purposes only. MATTHEW SHEFFIELD: And joining me now is Aaron Rabinowitz. Hey Aaron, welcome to Theory of Change. AARON RABINOWITZ: Hey, Matt. Thanks for having me on. SHEFFIELD: Yeah, so this is—we’re doing a double collaboration here. So if you like this episode on Theory of Change, we will be doing another one over on Embrace the Void very soon as well. So, different topic though, so if and, and if we didn’t scare you away, that is. RABINOWITZ: [00:03:00] Different, yet weirdly related. SHEFFIELD: Yes. Yes. All right, well, so for today though, we’re talking about what some people, I mean, there’s a lot of words for what we’re talking about terms. So some people call it Pastel QAnon. Some people call it conspirituality, other people call it right wing hippieism, high weirdness. There’s many, many names for this. But let’s start off first that I think a lot of people during the pandemic realized that many people who were kind of hippie coded suddenly became very—well suddenly, quote unquote—they were observed to be very anti-mask and anti-vaccine and then soon, eventually joined up with Donald Trump and RFK Jr. But what the reality is, these ideas in many ways were fundamentally right-wing from the very beginning. It’s just that people didn’t really notice. I think. RABINOWITZ: Mm-hmm. Yeah, I think there is an important history of ideas that we need to understand [00:04:00] that sort of starts in some conservative places. Like Lovecraft moves into what we think of as leftist, or they’re often leftist libertarian spaces like the hippies and high weirdness, you know, during the sixties and seventies and now has gone very broadly mainstream and I think is. You know, driving our culture kind of across the political spectrum in various ways, but has on the right, kind of metastasized into sort of the worst parts of those traditions. SHEFFIELD: Yeah. And essentially, Trump and RFK Jr. And Tulsi Gabbard, these people have kind of, they’ve sort of coalesced this, this conspiracy oriented epistemology that had kind of been in past decades, just been distributed kind of evenly across the political spectrum. And now it’s overwhelmingly gravitating toward the right and Republicans. RABINOWITZ: You can get in trouble online for sort of jumping too [00:05:00] quickly into like a horseshoe theory of like, here’s how the left and the right come back together under authoritarianism, or something like that. But I’m pretty convinced these days that there is a kind of an overlap that happens. A connecting point in the realm of naturalness and fixation on naturalness. And that combined with skepticism about mainstream narratives. So high weirdness. The term that I particularly interested in, which refers to the culture that I personally grew up in is really a culture of a counterculture in the, in the traditional sense of it is resistant to mainstream culture. It sees it as suspect, it sees it as a legitimizing myth. Often it really was to try to preserve norms that were harmful to people. And it takes a pretty radical approach to, you know, challenging and, and exploring alternatives to those mainstream norms. And that is an idea that [00:06:00] wasn’t as popular, I think amongst like what we think of as conservatism when high weirdness was sort of at its peak during that hippie era. But as you’ve seen mainstream culture trend towards neoliberalism with a little splash of progressivism, as you’ve seen conservatives come to view themselves as on the outs culturally, they have really adopted these kind of high weirdness skepticisms about mainstream narratives, which they identify with wokeness. And, you know I, I just listened to your episode actually about fit with the person who wrote Fit Nation, which I thought was really excellent on talking about this problem that like there is a overlap of people who are distrustful of conventional wisdom and that creates a space for them to spiral in lots of interrelated directions. But a lot of those spirals kind of funnel down into these far right spaces. High weirdness and libertarianism as a conservative liberalism SHEFFIELD: Yeah, they do. And and, and it is, yeah, it does go back in a lot of ways to [00:07:00] natural the belief in the natural. But there’s, there’s some epistemic standpoints that we’ll talk about as well further on in the episode. But I, I, I guess, yeah, one of the key things to think about in this context is. Libertarianism is kind of a rump liberalism, if you will rump from the political context, not used in America very, very much. But the idea that a party that sort of divides into and the, and there’s a smaller minority that claims to be the real, the real version and that is different from the main larger body. And so that’s kind of what happened with liberalism in the 20th century. Beginning, you know, roughly, let’s say with the, the, i, the, the emergence of socialism as kind of a alternative between you know, communism and liberalism is, but, but it was very much rooted in liberalism and they could point very easily to John Stewart Mill and other people like that. But there were people who had a more hierarchical viewpoint [00:08:00] a naturalist viewpoint, if you will, about truth and about politics, about poverty. And those are the people who became the libertarians later. RABINOWITZ: Yeah. Yeah. We don’t want to, like, it’s hard because these are such large milieus of concepts, you know, there’s no easy line to trace, like, here’s when things went this way or here’s when things went that way. You know, you have a lot of like broader cultural shifts happening. You have, you know, civil rights conflict, you have, you know, red scare, anti-socialist stuff. You know, the increasing, I, you know, one would argue increasingly predatory nature of, of capitalism. Sort of just embodying the colonialism of the past and all of that sort of disillusions a lot of people, right? So a lot of these movements I do think start in a kind of disillusionment a, a break with the narratives that [00:09:00] were making. One’s sense of purpose and meaning, feel sustained. And then in the absence of that, there are attempts to try to explain why this is happening and attempts to try to see if there’s a better alternative. And a lot of that ends up, you know, like we want to say, a lot of that is very valuable, right? A lot of this leads to. Social progress that we now take for granted, sexual social progress and racial social progress. but it also leads to, you know, increases in conspiratorial beliefs or distrust of the government in ways like that aren’t actually constructive or valuable. Right? There are reasonable times to be distrustful of governments and then there is a kind of more all consuming version of that that can lead one astray, epistemically, so, yeah, I think, Yeah, I think there’s a lot of different threads here that we can kind of pull on and then you add, you know, then you add in like ma
