The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Brad Neal
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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

  1. 1D AGO

    Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara

    Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara | 04/01/26 | Docket #: 25-365 25-365 TRUMP V. BARBARA DECISION BELOW: CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those "born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship , which restores the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the Order's effective date. The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-1861

  2. 2D AGO

    Pitchford v. Cain

    Pitchford v. Cain | 03/31/26 | Docket #: 24-7351 24-7351 PITCHFORD V. CAIN DECISION BELOW: 126 F.4th 422 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70009 QUESTION PRESENTED: District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments taking place on February 6. After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the plausibility of the prosecutor ’ s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans ’ s reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court ’ s reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi ’ s waiver jurisprudence comports with Batson. This opinion in Pitchford v. Cain confirmed the Fifth Circuit ’ s disavowal of earlier circuit jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ( Miller-El II ), capital petitioners had been unable to “ waive[] any Batson claim based on a comparison analysis, ” Woodward v. Epps , 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit ’ s split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of Batson . This petition presents the following questions: 1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other circuits require reversal of a state appellate court ’ s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor ’ s discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine “ the plausibility of the reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it ”? Miller-El II , 545 U.S at 251–52. 2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court ’ s clearly established federal law under Batson ? 3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing Batson objections, defense counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court ’ s express assurance the issues were preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts? GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK JURORS. ORDER OF MARCH 30 , 2026 : THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED.           CERT. GRANTED 12/15/2025

  3. 3D AGO

    Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

    Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-83 25-83 JULES V. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1201914 CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 10 applications. In Badgerow v. Walters , 596 U.S. 1, 4, 9-11 (2022), this Court held that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question jurisdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that the underlying dispute, save for the arbitration agreement, would have been justiciable in federal court. See id . But what happens when a court initially exercises jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, stays the case pending arbitration, and is later faced with an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award in the same case? The courts of appeals have sharply divided on the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. Several courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit below, have held that the initial exercise of jurisdiction creates a "jurisdictional anchor" that confers jurisdiction over a subsequent Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate, even if jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court must establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over a Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate. The question presented is: Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1253, 23-1283

  4. 3D AGO

    Abouammo v. United States

    Abouammo v. United States | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-5146 25-5146 ABOUAMMO V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 122 F.4th 1072 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose nonpublic Twitter account information to foreign actors, San Francisco-based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo at his home in Seattle. While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs and emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr. Abouammo's only interaction with the agents occurred in Seattle. A grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then agreed to toll the statute of limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day the tolling agreement expired, the government filed a superseding information adding various felony counts. Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four months after the limitations period had expired, the government dismissed this placeholder information and replaced it with a superseding indictment containing the same charges. The questions presented are: 1. Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there. 2. Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an "information charging a felony" that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-10348

  5. MAR 25

    Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock

    Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | 03/25/26 | Docket #: 24-935 24-935 FLOWER FOODS, INC. V. BROCK DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 753 CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce-but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders-"transportation workers" "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1182

  6. MAR 24

    Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado

    Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado | 03/24/26 | Docket #: 25-5 25-5 NOEM V. AL OTRO LADO DECISION BELOW: 138 F.4th 1102 CERT. GRANTED 11/17/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq . , provides that an alien who "arrives in the United States" may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1225(a)(1) and (3). The question presented is whether an alien who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border "arrives in the United States" within the meaning of those provisions. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55988, 22-56036

  7. MAR 24

    Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

    Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | 03/24/26 | Docket #: 25-6 25-6 KEATHLEY V. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC. DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 673434 CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed '"to protect the integrity of the judicial process' by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions"' to gain an unfair advantage. New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The doctrine targets those who "'deliberately"' mislead courts, not those whose inconsistent positions stem from "inadvertence or mistake." Id . at 750, 753. Courts regularly apply judicial estoppel when a debtor-plaintiff pursues a claim he failed to disclose to the bankruptcy court. The Eleventh, Ninth, Seventh, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits require courts to look at the totality of the circumstances and find that a debtor subjectively intended to mislead the bankruptcy court before applying judicial estoppel to bar a claim outside of the bankruptcy. In stark contrast, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have embraced a "rigid" and "unforgiving" judicial estoppel rule in the bankruptcy context that bars claims regardless of whether there is evidence that a plaintiff actually intended to mislead. App. 55a. In those circuits, a debtor's failure to disclose a lawsuit to a bankruptcy court triggers judicial estoppel whenever the debtor knew the facts relevant to the undisclosed claim and had a potential motive for concealment-which is virtually always present in the bankruptcy context. The question presented is: Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60025

  8. MAR 23

    Watson v. RNC

    Watson v. RNC | 03/23/26 | Docket #: 24-1260 24-1260 WATSON V. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 200 CERT. GRANTED 11/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The federal election-day statutes-2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1-set the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the "election" day for federal offices. Like all other States, Mississippi requires that ballots for federal offices be cast-marked and submitted to election officials-by that day. And like most other States, Mississippi allows some of those timely cast ballots (mail-in absentee ballots, in Mississippi's case) to be counted if they are received by election officials a short time after election day (in Mississippi, within 5 business days after election day). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15- 637(1)(a). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the federal election-day statutes require that ballots be both cast by voters and received by election officials by election day and thus preempt Mississippi's law. The question presented is whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60395

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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

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