The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Brad Neal
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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

  1. MAR 4

    Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

    Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | 03/04/26 | Docket #: 24-1238 24-1238 MONTGOMERY V. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC DECISION BELOW: 124 F.4th 1053 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The common law permits a cause of action for negligent selection. For example, a person injured in a truck crash has a cause of action against someone that negligently selected the truck driver to transport property. A federal statute expressly preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The statute has a safety exception, providing that the statute "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Id . § 14501(c)(2)(A). The question presented is: Does§ 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1192

  2. MAR 3

    Hunter v. United States

    Hunter v. United States | 03/03/26 | Docket #: 24-1063 24-1063 HUNTER V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 5003582 CERT. GRANTED 10/10/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This Court has recognized that "no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims." Garza v. Idaho , 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019). But the Court has "ma[de] no statement ... on what particular exceptions [to appeal waivers] may be required." Id . at 238-39 & n.6. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent, holding that there are only two grounds on which defendants who sign general appeal waivers may challenge their sentence on appeal: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) claims that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopt a similarly narrow view of the exceptions to general appeal waivers. In stark conflict, the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit defendants who sign general appeal waivers to raise a broad range of constitutional challenges to their sentences beyond the limited exceptions recognized by the Fifth Circuit and the other courts on its side of the circuit split. The Fifth Circuit below also reaffirmed its precedent holding that an appeal waiver applies even when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object to that advice. Although other circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit squarely holds otherwise, releasing defendants from appeal waivers in identical circumstances. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 2. Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-20211

  3. MAR 2

    United States v. Hemani

    United States v. Hemani | 03/02/26 | Docket #: 24-1234 24-1234 UNITED STATES V. HEMANI DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 354982 CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who "is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance," violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-40137

  4. FEB 25

    Pung v. Isabella County

    Pung v. Isabella County | 02/25/26 | Docket #: 25-95 25-95 PUNG V. ISABELLA COUNTY, MICHIGAN DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 318222 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Isabella County confiscated the Pung Estate's private home for approximately $2,200 in taxes and fees (that were never actually owed). The lower courts used the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property's fair market value as the starting point for its damages calculation. The Sixth Circuit and others have held that the "fair market value" taken is not what is owed to begin to fulfill the constitutional compensatory obligation imposed by the Fifth Amendment. That defies this Court's precedents. And if it is not taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, it is otherwise an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment by imposing a punishment by pilfering far more than ever needed to satisfy a small debt. The questions presented are: 1. Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when the compensation is based on the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the property's fair market value? 2. Whether the forfeiture of real property worth far more than needed to satisfy a tax debt but sold for fraction of its real value constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the debt was never actually owed? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1919, 22-1939

  5. FEB 24

    Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

    Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel | 02/24/26 | Docket #: 24-783 24-783 ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP V. NESSEL DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 958 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1671

  6. FEB 23

    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.

    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. | 02/23/26 | Docket #: 24-699 24-699 EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. CORPORACION CIMEX DECISION BELOW: 111 F.4th 12 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against "any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11), and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government," id . § 6082(d). The question presented is: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020

  7. FEB 23

    Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises

    Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises | 02/23/26 | Docket #: 24-983 24-983 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. V. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES DECISION BELOW: 119 F.4th 1276 CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The LIBERTAD Act is an essential pillar of United States foreign policy toward Cuba's hostile and anti-American regime. Title III of that Act creates a private right of action for United States nationals who have a claim to property confiscated by that regime against persons who traffic in that property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act specifies that such trafficking "undermines the foreign policy of the United States" by, among other things, "provid[ing] badly needed financial benefit" to the Cuban regime. Id . § 6081(6). The question presented here applies in every case brought under Title III, and will determine whether that provision continues to advance U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba: whether a plaintiff must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim (as the statute requires), or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation" (as the divided Eleventh Circuit panel held below). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10151, 23-10171

  8. JAN 21

    Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook

    Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312 25A312 TRUMP V. COOK DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786 THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026. JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

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