The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Brad Neal

A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

  1. 17h ago

    Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC

    Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC | 11/10/26 | Docket #: 25-966 25-966 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC DECISION BELOW: 148 F.4th 121 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION PRECLUDES THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FROM ADJUDICATING PROCEEDINGS TO COLLECT MONETARY REMEDIES FROM EMPLOYERS WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF H-2A WORKERS AND DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CORRESPONDING EMPLOYMENT. 2) WHETHER 8 U. S. C. §1188(g)(2) AUTHORIZES THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO ADJUDICATE PROCEEDINGS TO COLLECT MONETARY REMEDIES FROM EMPLOYERS WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF H-2A WORKERS AND DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CORRESPONDING EMPLOYMENT. CERT. GRANTED 4/27/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The H- 2 A visa program grants U.S. employers the privilege of "import[ing]" foreign aliens into the United States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188 (a)( 1 ). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers' living and working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure employer compliance with those "terms and conditions." 8 U.S.C. 1188 (g)( 2 ). The question presented is: Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary remedies from employers who violate the terms and conditions of participating in the H- 2 A visa program. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-2608

  2. 1d ago

    Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.

    Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. | 11/09/26 | Docket #: 25-159 25-159 HOFFMAN V. WBI ENERGY TRANSMISSION, INC. DECISION BELOW: 132 F.4th 1058 CERT. GRANTED 6/29/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Natural Gas Act authorizes private companies to condemn land in order to build certain natural gas infrastructure, but it says nothing about how to determine the amount of just compensation owed for the property taken. 15 U.S.C. § 717f. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that compensation awards in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act must therefore be determined by reference to state law, which often mandates higher compensation than the floor set by the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the Eighth Circuit expressly split with its sister circuits and instead held that the Natural Gas Act permits only the constitutional minimum of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question presented is: In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1693

  3. 1d ago

    Nielsen v. Watanabe

    Nielsen v. Watanabe | 11/09/26 | Docket #: 25-417 25-417 NIELSEN V. WATANABE DECISION BELOW: 115 F.4th 1034 CERT. GRANTED 6/22/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case concerns the judicially created damages remedy first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court extended Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison officials failed to address an inmate's acute asthma attack and exacerbated it, causing his death on-site within hours. Since then, this Court has emphasized that the creation of damages actions rests with Congress, not courts. The judicially created Bivens remedy thus cannot be ex-tended to any "new Bivens context" if any "special factor counsel[s] hesitation" in doing so. Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U.S. 120, 139-140 (2017). "[T]he new-context inquiry is easily satisfied," encompassing cases with '"meaningful[ly]"' different facts, or "'potential special factors' "-including "alternative remedial structures"-" 'not consider[ed]"' in the Court's prior cases. Egbert v. Boule , 596 U.S. 482, 492-493 (2022). "[A] court may not recognize a Bivens remedy" if "there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy." Id . at 492. In this case, respondent alleged that he suffered a fractured coccyx in a prison gang fight, causing chronic pain, but was not sent to a hospital. The Ninth Circuit held the suit did not present a "new" context from Carlson -not-withstanding an alternative remedial scheme this Court did not consider in Carlson , and despite significant factual differences such as the immediacy and severity of the harm alleged. The question presented is: Whether the Ninth Circuit here erred in recognizing a Bivens cause of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-15605

  4. 6d ago

    Guerrero v. Johnson

    Guerrero v. Johnson | 11/04/26 | Docket #: 25-1003 25-1003 GUERRERO V. JOHNSON DECISION BELOW: 23-70002 CERT. GRANTED 6/15/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applications by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, including for claims that "rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language allows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. § 2255(h)(2). The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on "a new rule ... that was previously unavailable" when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have succeeded. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits hold that whether a claim would have been meritorious does not affect whether the rule was previously available. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its view (and that of the Ninth Circuit) that a claim was previously available only if it had "some possibility of merit" based on the evidence available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition. The question presented is: Whether a claim relies on a "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable" when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70002

  5. Nov 3

    St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy

    St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy | 11/03/26 | Docket #: 25-581 25-581 ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH V. ROY DECISION BELOW: 154 F.4th 752   THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.   CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Colorado's so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an "equal opportunity" to enroll regardless of, inter alia , race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only "children of color," "gender-nonconforming children," "the LGBTQ community," low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gender. The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado's decision to exclude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Division v. Smith , it held that Colorado's secular exemptions and discretion did not undermine general applicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minority position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7 -4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion undermine general applicability. The court also eschewed Carson v. Makin , concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado's exclusion was not "on the explicit basis" of religion. The questions presented are: 1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct. 2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions. 3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1267

  6. Nov 2

    Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office

    Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office | 11/02/26 | Docket #: 25-352 25-352 YOUNGE V. FULTON JUDICIAL CIRC. DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 974309 CERT. GRANTED 3/30/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party "must" plead "any" affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-11418

  7. Nov 2

    Maxwell v. Dinis

    Maxwell v. Dinis | 11/02/26 | Docket #: 25-5930 25-5930 MAXWELL V. THOMAS DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 453 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3624(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief. Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit. Sua sponte , the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court ’ s decision in Jones v. Hendrix , 216 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (2022), and contrary to nine other Courts of Appeal -- see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2025); Jiminian v. Nash , 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Hernandez v, Campbell , 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hutchins , 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir, 1987); Montez v. McKinna , 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Little , 392 F.3d 671, 678- 79 (4th Cir. 2024); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus. - Suncoast , 851 F.3d 1076, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2007) ( en banc ); United States v. Barrett , 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999); and Valona v. United States , 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) --that its bright-line rule adopted in Melot v. Bergomi , 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) controlled. There the Fifth Circuit held that unless a favorable determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release from his sentence, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed. I. The question for this Court is whether disputes regarding the calculation of an inmate's earned First Step Act time credits, enabling the inmate to transfer into halfway house or home confinement earlier, similar to parole, are actionable under 28 U.S.C. §2241, II. The question for this Court is whether, given all the obstruction of the administrative remedy process that took place in this case, under Perttu v. Richards , exhaustion of administrative remedies is interwoven into the underlying claims themselves, creating a fact issue for a jury, and whether the trial court must make that determination in the first instance LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40699 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A CLAIM REGARDING APPLICATION OF TIME CREDITS UNDER THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 , 132 STAT. 5195 – 5208 (CODIFIED IN RELEVANT PART AT 18 U. S. C. §§ 3631 – 3635 ), SEEKING ACCELERATED TRANSFER TO A HALFWAY HOUSE OR HOME CONFINEMENT, CAN BE BROUGHT IN A HABEAS PETITION UNDER 28 U. S. C. § 2241 . ORDER OF June 16 , 2026 : BRIAN W. BARNES, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW.               CERT. GRANTED 6/1/2026

  8. Oct 14

    Salazar v. Paramount Global

    Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459 25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642 CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED:       The Video Privacy Protection Act (“ VPPA ”)  contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “ video tape service provider ”  from “ knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider. ”  18  U.S.C. §  2710 (b)( 1 ). The statute defines “ consumer ”  broadly to include a “ subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id.  §  2710 (a)( 1 ). It defines “ personally identifiable information ”  to include information that “ identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id. §  2710 (a)( 3 ). And it defines “ video tape service provider ”  to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id . §  2710 (a)( 4 ).        Paramount is a “ video tape service provider. ”  Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount ’ s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar ’ s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “ personally identifiable information. ”  Again, both courts below assumed as much.       The question here is whether the phrase “ goods or services from a video tape service provider, ”  as used in the VPPA ’ s definition of “ consumer, ”  refers to all of a video tape service provider ’ s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!

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