Minimum Competence

Andrew and Gina Leahey

Minimum Competence is your daily companion for legal news, designed to bring you up to speed on the day’s major legal stories during your commute home. Each episode is short, clear, and informative—just enough to make you minimally competent on the key developments in law, policy, and regulation. Whether you’re a lawyer, law student, journalist, or just legal-curious, you’ll get a smart summary without the fluff. A full transcript of each episode is available via the companion newsletter at www.minimumcomp.com. www.minimumcomp.com

  1. 7h ago

    Legal News for Thurs 6/18 - Polymarket is Gambling in Michigan, Temu Wiretap Suit Survives and a Do Not Call Class Action

    This Day in Legal History: Susan B. Anthony Fined for Voting On this day in 1873, in a federal courtroom in Canandaigua, New York, Judge Ward Hunt fined Susan B. Anthony one hundred dollars for the crime of voting. Anthony had walked into a polling place in Rochester on November 5, 1872, and cast a ballot for Ulysses S. Grant. She was arrested two weeks later under a federal statute, the Enforcement Act of 1870, that made it a crime to “knowingly” vote without being legally entitled to. Her defense was straightforward: the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified four years earlier, said that all persons born in the United States were citizens, and citizenship carried with it the right to vote. Judge Hunt did not let the jury decide. He directed a verdict of guilty without even letting them deliberate — something that would be plainly unconstitutional today — and then asked Anthony if she had anything to say before sentence was passed. She did. She told the court that it had trampled on her natural rights, her civil rights, her political rights, and her judicial rights, and that under such circumstances she would never pay a dollar of the unjust penalty. She never did. Hunt declined to jail her for nonpayment, which would have given her the path to appeal she wanted, and the case died without ever reaching the Supreme Court. The Nineteenth Amendment, which finally guaranteed women the right to vote, was ratified forty-seven years later, in 1920 — fourteen years after Anthony’s death. The lesson lawyers usually take from the case is procedural — about directed verdicts, about appellate review, about the ways a determined trial judge can keep a constitutional question off the docket. The lesson worth keeping today is broader. The legal system that one generation treats as obvious common sense is the one a later generation looks back on and cannot understand how anyone thought was just. Anthony lost in court and won in history. That happens more often than the daily case law makes it look. A federal judge in Michigan ruled Wednesday against Polymarket, a platform that lets people place bets on the outcomes of sports games. Here’s what happened: Polymarket had tried to convince Michigan’s regulators that what it does is not really gambling — it’s a sophisticated financial product called a “swap,” something only the federal government regulates. Polymarket’s argument was: we’re not a sportsbook, we’re a financial market, just like commodity futures markets. A wheat farmer, for example, might use that kind of contract to lock in a price for next year’s harvest. Michigan’s gaming regulators weren’t buying it. They said Polymarket looked and acted like an illegal sportsbook — people betting on sports without a license — and shut it down. Polymarket went to federal court asking the judge to block Michigan from enforcing the law while the lawsuit continues. The judge said no. He found that Polymarket’s argument didn’t make sense; if something is a bet on a football game, calling it something else doesn’t change what it is. The judge also said that even if Polymarket lost the Michigan market, that’s a business loss that money can compensate — not the kind of serious, immediate harm that would justify stopping Michigan from enforcing its own gambling laws. This case matters because it will help determine how the federal government and individual states regulate online prediction markets going forward. Right now, companies like Polymarket are in legal limbo, unable to operate in states that say they’re gambling, while arguing they should operate under federal financial rules. The courts need to settle which it is. Mich. Judge Opens Door For Prediction Market Enforcement An Illinois federal judge ruled Wednesday that a class action lawsuit can proceed against an advertising-technology company that allegedly snuck Americans’ personal information to PDD Holdings, the Chinese parent company of the discount-shopping app Temu. Think of it this way: when you visit websites or use apps, tracking code collects information about you — what you click on, what you buy, where you’re located. That’s normal ad-tech business. But this company allegedly took that data and secretly sent it to China for the Chinese parent company’s benefit. The lawsuit uses two legal theories. First: the federal wiretap law makes it illegal to secretly intercept someone’s communications or data without permission — and the plaintiffs argue this is exactly what happened. The company embedded invisible code on websites that grabbed user data without asking. Second: there’s a new government regulation that forbids sending Americans’ sensitive personal data to countries the U.S. government considers hostile. China is on that list. The company argued the lawsuit should be dismissed, claiming what it does is standard advertising practice and not really interception. The judge disagreed. He said the lawsuit makes plausible claims of wrongdoing and can proceed. Why this matters: this is one of the first big tests of whether tech companies can keep hiding data-sharing practices in fine-print privacy policies. The judge is signaling that burying consent in a privacy policy probably isn’t enough if you’re secretly sending data to foreign adversaries. The case will now move to discovery — where lawyers dig through company records — and that’s usually expensive enough to push companies toward settlement. Ad Seller Can’t Shake Wiretap Suit Over Temu Data Transfers A class action lawsuit filed Wednesday accuses Hilton Grand Vacations — the timeshare and vacation club subsidiary of Hilton Hotels — of repeatedly calling consumers who had registered their phone numbers on the federal Do Not Call list. This is a straightforward violation of federal law. The Do Not Call list is the registry that exists specifically so people can stop getting telemarketing calls. If your number is on that list, companies can’t call you to pitch products unless you’ve done business with them recently or given them permission. Hilton allegedly ignored that. According to the complaint, the company and its marketing contractors called people repeatedly, sometimes years after their numbers were registered on the Do Not Call list, pitching timeshare vacation packages. Here’s why the damages can be huge: the federal law lets you sue for $500 per violation — per call. If a company makes a mistake and thinks the violation was intentional, the damages triple to $1,500 per call. In a class action involving thousands of unwanted calls, those numbers balloon fast. Hilton and other timeshare companies have historically tried to escape liability by claiming their contractors made the calls, not Hilton itself. But courts increasingly reject that defense. If Hilton controlled the marketing campaign and the contractors worked on Hilton’s behalf, Hilton is responsible. The law here is actually simpler than most litigation: a company’s obligation is clear, and the violation is easy to prove if calls were made to numbers on the federal Do Not Call list. Hilton Facing Class Action Over Marketing Calls This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    7 min
  2. 1d ago

    Legal News for Weds 6/17 - Judge Dugan Loses Bid to Vacate, Goldstein Loses Acquittal Motion, Guardant Patent Loss, and Problematic IRS Data Sharing with ICE

    This Day in Legal History: The Watergate Burglary On this day in 1972, at roughly 2:30 in the morning, a security guard at the Watergate office complex on Virginia Avenue in Washington named Frank Wills noticed that the latches on a stairwell door had been taped over and called the District police. The police arrested five men inside the offices of the Democratic National Committee on the sixth floor: James McCord, Bernard Barker, Virgilio Gonzalez, Eugenio Martinez, and Frank Sturgis. McCord was the security coordinator for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Two days later, the FBI traced a $25,000 cashier’s check found in Barker’s bank account to the Committee to Re-Elect’s finance chairman. The burglary itself was a third-rate one — bad lockpicking, surveillance gear that did not work, men carrying address books that linked them to the White House — but the legal consequences took two years to play out and rewrote large parts of American constitutional law in the process. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, chaired by Sam Ervin of North Carolina, conducted public hearings in the summer of 1973 that produced the disclosure of the White House taping system. The Saturday Night Massacre in October 1973 — Nixon’s firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus — produced the legal scholarship that became the modern law of presidential removal and the Ethics in Government Act of 1978’s independent-counsel framework. United States v. Nixon in July 1974 produced the doctrine that executive privilege is qualified rather than absolute and must yield to a demonstrated need in a criminal proceeding, a holding that is still the foundational separation-of-powers case the Court returns to whenever an administration claims that internal deliberations cannot be subpoenaed. The articles of impeachment voted by the House Judiciary Committee in late July 1974 produced the modern template for impeachment-as-constitutional-remedy that has been deployed four times since. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. The constitutional residue of what began with five men and a roll of tape in a Watergate stairwell is in the Federal Election Campaign Act amendments, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Inspector General Act, the Presidential Records Act, the post-Saturday-Night-Massacre statute book that defines what limits an administration faces when it tries to use the criminal-justice system politically. Fifty-four years on, the question of how much of that residue has held up is, as the saying goes, the question. U.S. District Judge Lynn Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin on Tuesday denied former Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan’s post-trial motion to vacate her December 2025 conviction for felony obstruction of a federal proceeding. Dugan had been charged after she let Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, who had appeared in her courtroom in April 2025 on a state misdemeanor, and his attorney leave through a side door of her courtroom after Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers had assembled in the public hallway to arrest him on a federal civil immigration warrant. A jury found Dugan guilty of obstruction and acquitted her of the lesser concealing-an-individual count. Her post-trial motion pressed two principal arguments. The first was that the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Edwards — which addressed the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 obstruction as applied to interference with administrative agency proceedings — applies to ICE warrant service and so the trial court should have given a narrower jury instruction. The second was that her conduct was protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity for acts taken on the bench. Judge Adelman rejected both. On Edwards, the court held that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning addresses a different statutory provision and a different agency context, and that Dugan’s case is governed by Seventh Circuit precedent on the obstruction statute she was convicted under. On judicial immunity, the court held that the doctrine is a civil shield against private damages liability and does not bar federal criminal prosecution for affirmative conduct in aid of evading federal law-enforcement officers. Dugan’s team has announced that the case will go to the Seventh Circuit. Sentencing is now back on the calendar. The appellate question that will dominate the briefing is the one Judge Adelman teed up: whether a state judge taking administrative action in the courthouse — guiding a litigant to a back exit — falls inside or outside the federal obstruction statute’s reach when the action is calculated to defeat federal law-enforcement service. That issue has not been squarely decided in the Seventh Circuit. The case is going to be the vehicle. Ex-Judge Loses Bid To Undo ICE Obstruction Conviction | Law360 A Maryland federal judge on Tuesday denied SCOTUSblog co-founder Thomas C. Goldstein’s post-trial motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial on the twelve counts on which a jury had convicted him in February — tax evasion, assisting in the preparation of false returns, willful failure to pay over employment taxes, and false statements to mortgage lenders. The case is one of the more striking falls in modern Supreme Court practice. Goldstein had argued for years before the Court and was, for two decades, one of the most visible private SCOTUS practitioners in the country, with SCOTUSblog itself becoming the standard public-facing reference for Supreme Court news. The criminal case grew out of his recreational high-stakes poker, which prosecutors used to build out a pattern of unreported gambling income, gambling debts paid out of law-firm funds, and gambling losses claimed as business expenses. The post-trial motion principally argued that the trial court’s jury instructions on willfulness improperly conflated the negligence standard with the higher mens rea Cheek v. United States requires in federal tax-evasion prosecutions, and that the court had wrongly excluded evidence going to Goldstein’s claimed reliance on his accountants’ advice. The court rejected both. On the willfulness instruction, the court found the instruction tracked the Fourth Circuit’s pattern instruction on Cheek and made clear to the jury that a good-faith misunderstanding of the law was a defense. On the accountant-reliance evidence, the court held that the offer of proof was insufficient to establish that Goldstein had actually relied on professional advice in the particular omissions the indictment turned on, as opposed to relying on his own judgment. Sentencing is now the next event. The federal sentencing guidelines on the tax counts alone, with the loss amount the jury found, point to a substantial custodial term. Watch for an appeal that focuses on the willfulness instruction; that is the cleanest reversible-error vehicle in the record. SCOTUSblog Founder Goldstein Denied Acquittal Or Retrial | Law360 A Delaware federal judge on Tuesday denied Guardant Health’s post-trial motion to vacate, reduce, or stay enforcement of the $83.4 million jury verdict TwinStrand Biosciences won against it in late 2023 for willful infringement of diagnostic-sequencing patents covering duplex-sequencing technology used in liquid-biopsy cancer-screening assays. The court also declined to enhance the award under 35 U.S.C. § 284, even though the jury had found willfulness, reasoning that the multi-factor Read v. Portec analysis the Federal Circuit has refined in Halo Electronics and its progeny cut both ways here: Guardant’s pre-suit notice and continued use of the accused technology supported some enhancement, but its defenses on infringement and validity, while ultimately rejected, were not objectively reckless. The decision is notable for two doctrinal reasons. First, it reflects how district courts are continuing to deploy Halo’s discretion-based framework in the post-pandemic-era diagnostic-patent landscape, where the gap between objectively defensible defenses and reckless infringement is being drawn case by case in a way that is making certworthy issues for the Federal Circuit and, eventually, the Supreme Court. Second, it underscores the $83.4 million is significant but not transformative: the broader competitive question in the diagnostic-sequencing space is whether Guardant can design around the asserted claims fast enough to keep its cancer-screening assays on the market without paying a recurring royalty to TwinStrand. Guardant has indicated it will appeal to the Federal Circuit. Both the underlying infringement findings and the no-enhancement ruling are likely to be appealed in parallel — Guardant on infringement and validity, TwinStrand on the refusal to enhance. The verdict stands for now. Del. Judge Upholds $83.4M Patent Verdict Against Guardant | Law360 My Bloomberg Tax column this week argues that the IRS’s disclosure of taxpayer address information to ICE should be understood less as a narrow immigration-enforcement controversy and more as a tax-data governance failure. I argue that Section 6103 does not make IRS data impossible to share, but it does make confidentiality the default and disclosure the exception. That distinction matters because a statutory exception should not become a bulk-transfer mechanism whenever another agency wants access to IRS records. The IRS holds unusually sensitive information because taxpayers are legally compelled to provide it, so any interagency disclosure should require necessity, precision, security, and auditability on a record-by-record basis. The TIGTA report is troubling because the IRS apparently built an automated matching process that was vulnerable to bad ICE inputs, inconsistent formatting, malformed records, and weak matching rules. ICE also had unres

    10 min
  3. 2d ago

    Legal News for Tues 6/16 - SCOTUS Denies Certs on Student Speech and Gun Industry Suits, TCS' $165m Trade-Secret Liability

    This Day in Legal History: The End of Roosevelt’s Hundred Days On this day in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt signed three pieces of legislation that closed out what the country has been calling the Hundred Days ever since: the Banking Act of 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Farm Credit Act, with the Home Owners’ Loan Act having been signed three days earlier. The Banking Act of 1933 is the one most lawyers know, because the popular name attached to it — Glass-Steagall — has been doing rhetorical work in financial-regulation debates for ninety-three years. Carter Glass of Virginia and Henry Steagall of Alabama, the Senate Banking chair and the House Banking chair respectively, built the statute around two structural propositions: that commercial banks should be separated from investment banking and the speculative securities business that had helped pull the country into the Great Depression, and that depositors at member banks should be protected by a federal deposit insurance scheme so that a panic at one bank did not become a panic everywhere. The deposit insurance piece became the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The separation piece was the part that got partially repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 and then revisited in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The National Industrial Recovery Act, signed the same day, set up the National Recovery Administration and the Public Works Administration and was meant to coordinate industry-wide codes of fair competition; the Supreme Court struck the centerpiece codes provision down two years later in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States in 1935 on nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds, an opinion that nearly killed the early New Deal and prompted Roosevelt’s court-packing plan two years after that. The Farm Credit Act consolidated and refinanced the agricultural lending system that the Great Depression had taken to the brink. The legal point worth remembering is that this last day of the Hundred Days was, in retrospect, the moment the federal regulatory state of the twentieth century stopped being a collection of post-Civil-War commissions and started being the integrated structure of agencies, deposit-insurance funds, securities oversight, labor regulation, and welfare administration that the country has lived inside ever since. The fact that the Schechter Court was waiting in the wings to strike down the most ambitious piece of that day’s work is part of the lesson. The constitutional question of how much economic ordering a Congress and a President can do at once was not answered on June 16, 1933 — it was framed. The Supreme Court on Monday declined to take up E.D. v. Noblesville School District, a free-speech challenge brought by the parents of an Indiana high-school student whose school district had refused to let her post flyers for her student-run anti-abortion club on classroom and hallway walls. The student, identified in court papers by initials because she was a minor when the case was filed, had been the founder of Noblesville High School’s Students for Life chapter. The flyers she wanted posted featured images of demonstrators holding “Defund Planned Parenthood” signs. Noblesville Schools removed the flyers under a district policy giving administrators content-based authority over student materials displayed on school property, and the parents sued under the First Amendment. The Southern District of Indiana sided with the district in 2024, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2025, both applying Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 1988 case that lets public schools regulate the content of school-sponsored expressive activities if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The cert denial leaves Hazelwood intact in the Seventh Circuit and everywhere else. The piece worth flagging is Justice Alito’s dissent from denial, joined by Justice Thomas, which urged the Court to grant review and use the case to revisit Hazelwood’s framework. The dissent argues that Hazelwood was wrongly decided to the extent that it lets schools draw viewpoint-based lines under the cover of pedagogical-concern review, and that the doctrinal distinction Hazelwood draws between school-sponsored speech and Tinker-style independent student speech has become unworkable in the age of student clubs, distributed school messaging, and post-Mahanoy off-campus speech. Two votes are not five votes. But two votes naming a case as the vehicle they wanted are how the next decade of student-speech cases gets queued up. The Court has now told litigants what kind of vehicle it might be looking for. Expect a steady drumbeat of cert petitions teeing up the Hazelwood revisit over the next several terms. US Supreme Court turns away free speech claim by anti-abortion student | Reuters via Maryland Daily Record The Supreme Court also turned away on Monday the National Shooting Sports Foundation’s challenge to New York’s General Business Law § 898, the public-nuisance statute the New York legislature passed in 2021 to let the state and certain private plaintiffs sue firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers for endangering the public through the marketing and distribution of their products. The challenge was supported by Smith & Wesson, Sturm, Ruger, Beretta, Glock, and Sig Sauer, and went up on appeal from a 2024 Second Circuit decision that held the New York statute is not preempted by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, the 2005 federal statute that broadly immunizes the gun industry from civil liability arising from the criminal misuse of firearms. The Second Circuit reasoned that the PLCAA’s “predicate exception” — which preserves state-law claims when the firearms industry has violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms — covers a state public-nuisance statute that, by its terms, regulates the sale and marketing of firearms. The cert denial leaves the Second Circuit’s reading in place, leaves New York’s statute on the books and enforceable, and leaves the industry with a litigation exposure it had hoped to neutralize. The strategic part of the case is going to be the copycat statutes. California, New Jersey, Washington, Delaware, Illinois, and Hawaii have all enacted versions of the New York approach since 2021, and other states have similar bills in committee. Each of those statutes is going to invite its own PLCAA-preemption fight in its own circuit, and the cumulative jurisprudence is going to get built case by case until either Congress amends PLCAA or the Court decides one of these cases is the right vehicle to step in. Today’s denial was not that vehicle. SCOTUS Upholds NY Law Allowing Lawsuits Against Gunmakers | The Daily Signal The third notable cert denial on Monday was the end of the road for Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. in its long-running trade-secret fight with DXC Technology — the successor in interest to Computer Sciences Corporation. TCS had asked the Court to review a Fifth Circuit decision that affirmed a $168 million judgment against it for misappropriating CSC’s life-insurance-administration software trade secrets and using them to build TCS’s own BaNCS platform, which TCS then used to win a $2.6 billion contract with the insurer Transamerica. The Northern District of Texas verdict, returned in 2022, had been $56 million in compensatory damages and $112 million in punitives, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the punitives ratio in 2025 over TCS’s BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell challenge to the proportionality of the punitive award and over its Defend Trade Secrets Act extraterritoriality arguments. The cert petition pressed both points and pressed a circuit split on the standard for proving misappropriation by an independent contractor that had been given access to source code under a nondisclosure agreement, but the Court declined. The practical immediate effect is that TCS will recognize a roughly $70 million one-time exceptional charge in Q1 of its 2027 fiscal year and the total exposure on the matter — combining the affirmed judgment with previously taken provisions — settles in around $220 million. The broader effect is doctrinal stability. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis on cross-border trade-secret damages and on the extraterritoriality limits of the DTSA stand. Both questions are going to recur, and the next vehicle that brings them up may catch the Court in a different mood, but for now the law is what the Fifth Circuit said it was. US Supreme Court rejects TCS challenge in $168 million trade secrets case | Business Standard This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    8 min
  4. Legal News for Mon 6/15 - Judge McConnell Scolds DOJ, Google Sues Chinese Gemini Phishing Ring, Judge Blocks Trump's Xenophobic Parks Orders

    3d ago

    Legal News for Mon 6/15 - Judge McConnell Scolds DOJ, Google Sues Chinese Gemini Phishing Ring, Judge Blocks Trump's Xenophobic Parks Orders

    This Day in Legal History: Magna Carta Sealed at Runnymede On this day in 1215, in a meadow at Runnymede on the south bank of the Thames, King John of England affixed his seal to a document the rebellious English barons had drafted, in which the king conceded a series of limits on his own royal authority. We call it Magna Carta — the Great Charter. The immediate political context was a baronial revolt against John’s tax exactions for his disastrous French wars, and most of the sixty-three chapters as drafted in 1215 are concerned with the highly specific grievances of a feudal aristocracy: scutage, wardship, the inheritance fees of widows, the freedom of the church, the standardization of weights and measures in the king’s markets. The two chapters that the centuries have remembered are 39 and 40. Chapter 39 says that no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Chapter 40 says that to no one will the king sell, deny, or delay right or justice. The Charter was annulled by Pope Innocent III within ten weeks of sealing — the pope held that John, as a vassal of the Holy See, could not be bound by a treaty extracted under duress — and the country immediately collapsed into the First Barons’ War. But John died in October 1216, his nine-year-old son Henry III’s regents reissued the Charter as a tactical concession the next month, it was reissued again in 1217 and 1225, and by the late thirteenth century the 1225 version had been confirmed by successive kings as a foundational statute of the realm. Edward Coke, writing in the seventeenth century, transformed Chapter 39’s “law of the land” into the doctrine of due process, and the founding generation of the American Republic picked up Coke’s reading and wrote it directly into the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The phrase “due process of law” in those amendments is the most consequential American inheritance from the Runnymede document. The principle the barons were trying to extract from a beleaguered king — that the law constrains the sovereign too — is the substrate on which everything we recognize as constitutionalism is built. Eight hundred and eleven years on, the principle is still the work. The Rhode Island travel-ban lawsuit we covered on June 8 took a sharp turn on Friday. Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr., of the District of Rhode Island held a status conference in Dorcas International Institute v. USCIS at which he was openly frustrated with the Justice Department for failing to immediately implement his June 5 vacatur of the four USCIS benefit-freeze policies for nationals of the thirty-nine travel-ban countries. The judge’s message, in plain terms, was that vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act is self-executing — the moment the order was entered, the policies ceased to exist, and the agency was obligated to resume processing affirmative benefits, asylum claims, and adjudicator-instruction reviews on the prior pre-freeze basis. The Trump administration, after the hearing, told the court it would comply, restart adjudications, and clear the backlog. It also did what defendants typically do when they have lost on the merits and lost again on compliance: it filed a notice of appeal with the First Circuit and asked the appellate court to stay the vacatur pending appeal. That is the live question now. The First Circuit’s stay analysis runs through the standard Nken v. Holder factors — likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest — and the administration’s strongest argument on each is going to be familiar: the executive needs administrative breathing room to implement a travel ban, mass restoration of adjudications creates national-security risk, the harm to applicants is reversible if their adjudications are paused for a few more weeks. The plaintiffs’ strongest counterarguments are also familiar: the policies were unlawful when adopted and the agency had no business adopting them, the harm to applicants from continued delay is concrete and accruing daily, and the First Circuit is not in the business of staying vacaturs of unlawful agency action in order to let the agency continue acting unlawfully. Watch the First Circuit’s calendar this week. The stay motion is the next inflection point. Trump officials agree to resume asylum processing after being scolded by judge | The Washington Post Google filed suit on Friday in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against a China-based cybercrime network it calls the “Outsider Enterprise,” alleging that the network’s members used Google’s Gemini large-language model to generate the code, copy, and templates for a phishing-as-a-service platform that has built more than nine thousand fraudulent websites and sent two and a half million scam text messages in the two weeks ending June 1 alone. The complaint is significant for two reasons. First, it is, to Google’s knowledge, the first time the company has affirmatively sued threat actors for using its own generative-AI product as the input to a scaled criminal operation, as distinct from the more usual posture of suing scammers who impersonate Google brands. The legal theories are a mix of Lanham Act false-designation-of-origin and trademark-infringement counts, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act counts based on Outsider’s unauthorized access to Google services, breach-of-contract counts on the Gemini terms of service, and a RICO count. Second, the factual record will be a road map for the next decade of AI-misuse litigation. The complaint describes Telegram channels in which Outsider members trade prompts that get Gemini to write phishing code, a library of two hundred and ninety prebuilt templates impersonating brands ranging from the U.S. Postal Service to state DMVs to E-ZPass, and an FBI estimate that the broader campaign Outsider participates in has stolen roughly 3.87 million card numbers and caused $1.9 billion in losses since July 2023. The remedy Google is seeking is a permanent injunction shutting the operation down, plus domain seizures and account terminations across Google’s services and at major U.S. carriers, which Google says it has been coordinating with the FBI, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon. The deeper legal question the case may end up clarifying is whether and to what extent platforms can use private civil suits as the front-line enforcement mechanism against AI-augmented criminal activity that the public criminal-justice system has had trouble keeping up with. Google sues Chinese cybercrime ring that weaponized Gemini AI for phishing scams | TechCrunch A federal district judge in Washington on Friday issued a preliminary injunction barring the Trump administration from continuing to implement Executive Order 14253, the order under which the National Park Service had been scrubbing exhibits, signage, and online materials at sites administered by the Department of the Interior. The judge gave the administration three weeks to restore the materials it had already removed. The order at issue, signed in March, directed federal cultural agencies to identify and remove content that, in the executive’s view, reflected “improper, divisive, or anti-American ideology” or “partisan” framing. In the months that followed, the National Park Service had taken down or altered displays addressing slavery, the Civil Rights Movement, the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, climate change, and the histories of Native American dispossession at sites including the Stonewall National Monument, Independence Hall, and the Manzanar National Historic Site. The case is American Historical Association v. Department of the Interior, brought by historians’ professional associations and a coalition of plaintiffs that includes affected park employees and visitor-experience contractors. The legal theory pleaded was multi-strand: First Amendment viewpoint discrimination as applied to government speech that has taken on a public-forum character, Administrative Procedure Act challenges on the ground that the agency failed to provide a reasoned basis for the removals and failed to consider statutory commands under the Organic Act of 1916, and a Federal Records Act challenge to the destruction of materials that constituted federal records. The judge held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the First Amendment claim and the APA claim, found irreparable harm in the ongoing loss of public access to the underlying historical materials, and found that the public interest was best served by restoration. The administration is widely expected to appeal to the D.C. Circuit. In the meantime, the three-week restoration clock is running. Judge blocks Trump national parks order, calling it “censorship” | The Washington Post This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    8 min
  5. Legal News for Fri 6/12 - SCOTUS Saba ICA Private Suit, Judicial Estoppel in BK, and Abouammo's Twitter FBI Obstruction Conviction Tossed on Venue

    6d ago

    Legal News for Fri 6/12 - SCOTUS Saba ICA Private Suit, Judicial Estoppel in BK, and Abouammo's Twitter FBI Obstruction Conviction Tossed on Venue

    This Day in Legal History: Loving v. Virginia Decided On this day in 1967, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion in Loving v. Virginia striking down Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924 and, with it, the anti-miscegenation statutes that sixteen states still had on the books. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the Court. The case had come up from a county courthouse in Caroline County, Virginia, where Richard Loving, a white bricklayer, and Mildred Jeter, a Black and Native American woman, had been arrested in their bedroom in the middle of the night in 1958 by a sheriff acting on an anonymous tip — they had been married in the District of Columbia and returned home to Virginia, where their marriage was a felony. The Lovings pleaded guilty, accepted suspended sentences on the condition that they leave the state for twenty-five years, and lived in exile in Washington until Mildred wrote a letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that landed eventually with the ACLU, which took the case. The Supreme Court’s opinion did two things at once. It held that Virginia’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it drew an explicit racial classification with no legitimate state purpose beyond preserving “White Supremacy” — the Court used the phrase the Virginia statute itself had used — and it held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause because the freedom to marry is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” That second holding, the marriage-as-fundamental-right strand, is the through-line that runs from Loving to Zablocki v. Redhail in 1978, to Turner v. Safley in 1987, to Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015 — every one of those decisions cites Loving and treats it as the foundational case. Whether the Court’s substantive due process marriage doctrine survives the next decade is, as we discussed earlier this week, one of the open questions in American constitutional law. But Loving itself remains intact, and on June 12, 1967, the Court said something it had not said cleanly before: that the right to marry is the kind of liberty interest the Constitution actually protects. The Supreme Court on Thursday reversed the Second Circuit in FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., holding 6-3 that the Investment Company Act of 1940 does not give private parties a cause of action to seek rescission of fund bylaws or other contractual terms. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the majority. The dispute came out of a campaign by Boaz Weinstein’s Saba Capital against eleven closed-end funds — funds that, under Maryland’s Control Share Acquisition Act, had adopted bylaws limiting the voting power of any shareholder who accumulated a disproportionate stake without the consent of other shareholders. Saba sued under Section 47(b) of the ICA, which makes contracts that violate the Act unenforceable, and the Second Circuit held that Section 47(b) implied a private right to rescind the bylaws. The Court told the Second Circuit to look harder at the modern implied-cause-of-action doctrine, which since Alexander v. Sandoval in 2001 has been hostile to inferring private rights of action that Congress did not write into the statute. The opinion reads as a continuation of that line: the ICA’s enforcement structure is committed to the SEC, not to private plaintiffs, and Section 47(b) is a defense against contracts the SEC has already determined to be unlawful, not an offensive cause of action. The dissent, by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that this is a misreading of Section 47(b)’s text and that the majority is gratuitously narrowing the enforcement of the federal securities laws. The practical impact is significant. Activist investors who had been pushing closed-end funds to convert to open-end form, or to alter investment strategies, lose a federal-court tool they had been using; the funds themselves and their independent directors gain a meaningful structural defense. Expect the next round of activist campaigns to move to state-court fiduciary-duty theories instead. US Supreme Court rules against private suits brought under key securities law | US News The Court on Thursday also decided Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., vacating the Fifth Circuit 9-0 in an opinion by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. The case is small in its facts and large in its doctrine. Thomas Keathley filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2019 and failed to disclose, on his schedule of assets, a personal-injury claim he later brought against a construction company over a truck accident. The Fifth Circuit barred the personal-injury suit on judicial-estoppel grounds — the longstanding equitable doctrine that prevents a party from taking one position in one proceeding and a contradictory position in another — using a three-factor test under which a debtor’s mere knowledge of the facts plus a motive to conceal was enough to bar the later claim. The Supreme Court said no. To determine whether the omission was inadvertent or mistaken for judicial-estoppel purposes, the Court held, the lower courts must look to the totality of the circumstances, not just to whether the debtor knew of the facts and had a motive. The doctrinal interest of the case lies in two concurrences. Justice Sotomayor, concurring, wrote that judicial estoppel should likely never apply in an open bankruptcy case at all — the trustee can simply amend the schedule and pursue the claim for the estate, which solves the problem judicial estoppel was invented to address. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, went further and questioned whether federal courts have any inherent authority to apply judicial estoppel as a freestanding doctrine, period — a position that, if it ever gets five votes, would unwind a doctrine that has been part of American practice since the 1850s. None of that is the holding. But the votes to revisit one of the duller corners of equitable estoppel are now visibly on the table. Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | SCOTUSblog The third unanimous decision of the day was Abouammo v. United States, in which the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and vacated the obstruction-of-an-FBI-investigation conviction of Ahmad Abouammo, a former Twitter employee whose underlying case was one of the more striking Saudi-Arabia infiltration prosecutions of the last decade. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the opinion. The facts are simple and the constitutional point cleaner than the facts. Abouammo, while working at Twitter’s San Francisco office in 2014 and 2015, accessed and passed on confidential user information about Saudi dissidents to a Saudi official, in exchange for a $42,000 watch and $200,000 in wire transfers. The FBI eventually came to interview him at his home in Seattle, where he had moved by 2018, and during those interviews he created and emailed agents a fake invoice intended to make the wire transfers look like a legitimate consulting fee. The Justice Department charged the obstruction count along with foreign-agent and wire-fraud counts in the Northern District of California, and a San Francisco jury convicted him on all of them. The Supreme Court held that the obstruction count belonged in the Western District of Washington, not California, because the act of creating and sending the false invoice — the only act that supported the obstruction charge — happened entirely in Seattle. Article III’s venue clause and the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement together do not let the government try a defendant in a state where no element of the charged offense occurred, no matter how convenient the prosecution. The obstruction conviction is vacated. The foreign-agent and wire-fraud convictions, which had different venue facts and were not before the Court, stand. Abouammo will not walk free. But the prosecution will need to decide whether to retry the obstruction count in Seattle, and the case is now a clean precedent that the venue clause has real teeth in a multi-district federal investigation. US Supreme Court overturns ex-Twitter employee’s obstruction conviction in Saudi spy case | US News This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    8 min
  6. Jun 11

    Legal News for Thurs 6/11 - Brinkema Declines to Block Abandoned Anti-Weaponization Fund, Environmentalists Sue Over SpaceX Refuge Swap, and CA Jury Awards $198m in Ex-MLB Pitcher Case

    This Day in Legal History: Wallace Stands in the Schoolhouse Door On this day in 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace physically stood in the doorway of Foster Auditorium at the University of Alabama to block the registration of Vivian Malone and James Hood, the two Black students whose enrollment had been ordered by a federal district court. Wallace’s “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” was the culmination of a long campaign of state defiance of federal desegregation orders that ran from Brown v. Board in 1954 through Cooper v. Aaron in 1958 — the case in which a unanimous Supreme Court told the Little Rock school district, and by extension every state actor, that federal constitutional rulings are the supreme law of the land and that state officials may not nullify them. President Kennedy responded to Wallace’s stand by issuing Executive Order 11111, which federalized the Alabama National Guard, and ordering Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach down to Tuscaloosa to confront the governor. Wallace gave a long speech invoking states’ rights and Tenth Amendment sovereignty, then stepped aside, and Malone and Hood walked in and registered. That night, Kennedy went on national television and delivered the civil rights address that put the Civil Rights Act of 1964 onto the national agenda. The legal and political throughline matters: the schoolhouse door, the executive order federalizing the Guard, the televised address, and the omnibus civil rights legislation that followed were a single coordinated federal response to massive resistance, and the institutional habit they built — the willingness of the federal political branches to back federal court orders with whatever force is necessary — is the substrate on which the modern enforcement of civil rights law sits. Whether that habit holds up under contemporary pressure is one of the live constitutional questions of our moment. The “Anti-Weaponization Fund” saga we have been following all week reached at least a partial resolution on Wednesday when Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia declined to extend her temporary restraining order against the program into a preliminary injunction. The reason, in essence, is that the Justice Department has now formally represented to the court, in writing and through acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, that the $1.8 billion fund is “not going forward.” Brinkema took DOJ at its word for present purposes and dissolved the TRO, which under standard mootness doctrine is the right call when a defendant credibly commits to abandoning the challenged program. But she also did something practical: she warned the government in plain terms not to “play possum with this court,” language that gives the plaintiffs a built-in mechanism to come back fast if the fund quietly re-emerges under a different name. The substantive theory the plaintiffs were pressing — that the fund is an unappropriated expenditure of public money, that the underlying Trump-IRS settlement was a litigation in which the United States was never really adverse to the President in his personal capacity, and that the program’s payout criteria are based on political characterizations of past prosecutions rather than any neutral standard — is now preserved for another day rather than litigated to judgment. The practical lesson is the durability of voluntary-cessation doctrine: a government defendant who is willing to abandon a program in court usually wins on mootness, but the cost is real, because future revivals get scrutinized against the prior representation. Watch the Federal Register and the DOJ component-level budget submissions for the next six months — if there is a successor program coming, those are where the first signal appears. Judge declines to halt “anti-weaponization fund” since Blanche says it’s dead, but warns DOJ not to “play possum” | CBS News A coalition of environmental and tribal-nation plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Wednesday seeking to block a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-approved land exchange that would transfer 715 acres of the Lower Rio Grande Valley National Wildlife Refuge to SpaceX, in return for 683 acres of privately owned land elsewhere. The plaintiffs are the Center for Biological Diversity, Save RGV, the Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas, and the South Texas Environmental Justice Network. The legal theory of the case is unusually multi-statute: the complaint alleges violations of the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, with the central administrative-law argument being that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s environmental analysis failed to grapple seriously with impacts on endangered ocelots, aplomado falcons, and a long list of migratory species whose habitat the refuge was designed to protect when Congress created it in 1979. The plaintiffs describe this as one of the largest national-wildlife-refuge land exchanges outside Alaska, and the suit asks for vacatur of the exchange decision rather than damages — the standard APA remedy. The political and infrastructural backdrop is hard to miss: SpaceX’s Starbase facility at Boca Chica has been expanding into the Lower Rio Grande Valley for years now, and the exchange would consolidate the company’s footprint on land previously held for the protection of one of the last remaining ocelot ranges in the country. The merits of the case will turn on the rigor of the FWS environmental analysis. Expect a request for a preliminary injunction within weeks. Lawsuit challenges Trump administration’s land swap with SpaceX in Texas | The Washington Post A Los Angeles County jury on Wednesday added $22 million in punitive damages to the $176 million compensatory verdict already entered against socialite and former philanthropist Rebecca Grossman and former Major League Baseball pitcher Scott Erickson, bringing the total civil award to the Iskander family to roughly $198 million. The underlying facts of the case are stark: in September 2020, Grossman and Erickson left a Westlake Village restaurant after drinking and street-raced separate Mercedes SUVs through a residential neighborhood, with Grossman striking and killing two young brothers, Mark and Jacob Iskander, then 11 and 8, as they crossed a marked crosswalk with their parents. Grossman was convicted of two counts of murder in 2024 and is serving 15 years to life. The civil case the family brought is the wrongful-death companion, and the punitive damages award the jury added on Wednesday is the part that does the most policy work: the jury split the punitive award $21 million against Grossman, $1.17 million against Erickson, which under California’s reprehensibility-and-net-worth framework reflects both the much greater direct culpability of Grossman as the driver and the substantial disparity in their respective financial positions. The case is notable beyond the parties involved because of how clean it is on the standard punitive-damages analysis the Supreme Court laid out in BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell: high reprehensibility, a relatively modest single-digit ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages, and an underlying compensatory award that itself was supported by the gravity of the loss. Watch for an appeal that focuses on the compensatory rather than the punitive number — that is where the appellate leverage actually is. Jury Ups Philanthropist, Ex-Pitcher Crash Verdict To $198M | Law360 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    7 min
  7. Jun 10

    Legal News for Weds 6/10 - Fed Circ Nixes Purdue Purer Crush Resistant OxyContin, Anti-Weaponization Foes Question its Death, SCOTUS Relists Rundown

    This Day in Legal History: Kennedy Signs the Equal Pay Act On this day in 1963, President John F. Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act, the first federal statute aimed directly at sex-based wage discrimination. The law took the form of an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which meant that it slid into an existing enforcement framework run by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor — a deliberate choice that bypassed the need to build new institutional machinery and harnessed thirty years of FLSA caselaw and habits of compliance. The legal hook is the Act’s “equal pay for equal work” command: employers may not pay employees of one sex less than employees of the opposite sex for jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” Four affirmative defenses are written into the text — a seniority system, a merit system, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or “any other factor other than sex” — and that fourth catch-all has done more work in litigation than the other three combined, shaping how courts evaluate market-based, education-based, and prior-salary-based pay differentials decades later. The wage gap at the moment Kennedy signed was about 59 cents on the dollar; six decades on, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s standard measure, it sits closer to 84 cents. That tells you something about how a clean, structurally well-designed statute can still leave a lot of the work undone, because the gap is and always was about more than identical pairs of jobs at the same employer. The Equal Pay Act is not the whole story of American workplace-equality law; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and a long line of state-law analogues do much of the modern enforcement work. But June 10, 1963 is the day Congress, with the President’s signature, said for the first time that paying a woman less than a man for the same work was unlawful, full stop. Everything that has followed in this corner of the law has been built on top of that sentence. The Federal Circuit on Monday affirmed a Delaware district court judgment invalidating four Purdue Pharma patents covering an abuse-deterrent, low-toxicity version of the opioid OxyContin, in a decision the patent bar has been waiting on for months. The case is Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Epic Pharma LLC. The patents covered Purdue’s reformulation of OxyContin to make the pills crush-resistant and to reduce a manufacturing impurity, and the asserted innovation grew, the company said, out of its discovery of the source of a particular toxic impurity that had previously eluded chemists at competing labs. Purdue’s argument on appeal was, in essence, that the discovery of the impurity’s source was itself nonobvious, and that the resulting patents inherited that nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit said no. The panel held that the relevant obviousness inquiry asks whether the claimed reformulation — not the discovery that motivated it — would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, and that once the prior art is taken into account, the answer is yes. The practical consequence of the ruling is large. It opens the door wider for generic abuse-deterrent OxyContin alternatives and clarifies a doctrinal point pharmaceutical companies have been pressing on for years: a hard-won research insight does not, on its own, automatically save a patent from obviousness if the resulting product was within the prior art’s reach. Purdue’s options now are a rehearing petition at the Federal Circuit, a cert petition at the Supreme Court (which the company has already pursued in a related case last spring), or quiet acceptance. Expect a cert petition. Expect the cert petition to be denied. Watch the generic-drug filings that follow. Fed. Circ. Panel Backs Invalidation Of OxyContin Patent The plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Virginia lawsuit over the Trump administration’s $1.8 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” — a story we covered earlier htis week— went back to Judge Leonie Brinkema on Tuesday and asked for permission to conduct limited discovery into whether the Justice Department’s recent representation that it would stop work on the fund is a real commitment or a litigation convenience. The plaintiffs’ problem is straightforward: acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has filed papers saying the program is “not going forward,” but President Trump publicly described the fund last week as a “great idea” that many Republicans support, and the executive order that created the fund has not been formally rescinded. From a litigation-strategy standpoint, the plaintiffs do not want to walk away from a live case on the strength of a DOJ filing, accept dismissal as moot, and then find out three months later that the fund has been quietly resurrected under a different name. Judge Brinkema has a hearing scheduled for Friday, June 12, on whether to extend the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. The Tuesday filing teed up the broader mootness fight that will dominate Friday’s hearing: when does a federal agency’s promise to stop doing something actually deprive a court of jurisdiction to enjoin the underlying program, and what discovery, if any, is a plaintiff entitled to before that determination is made. The doctrine here — voluntary cessation, capable of repetition yet evading review, and the heavy burden the Supreme Court has placed on the party claiming mootness — favors the plaintiffs procedurally. Whether Brinkema agrees on Friday is the question to watch. ‘Anti-weaponization’ fund challengers question its demise – Roll Call SCOTUSblog’s John Elwood walked through a useful relist roundup on Tuesday, and the four cases sitting in the relist pile are worth flagging because each of them touches a different load-bearing wall in federal practice. The first is a prolonged-detention challenge to immigration custody under Section 1226(c). The ACLU is asking the Court to clarify that very long mandatory-detention periods trigger procedural due process review under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, picking up on the Second Circuit’s willingness to do so. The second is Newberry v. Texas, a case where Texas itself has confessed error — a rare procedural posture in which the State agrees the defendant should win — and the question is what the Court does when the parties on both sides ask for the same remedy. The third is Kian v. Florida, a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of six-person juries in serious felony cases, on the theory that the historical understanding of “jury” in the founding era assumed twelve and that the Court’s mid-twentieth-century cases approving six-person juries were wrong on the originalist analysis. The fourth is Maxwell v. Thomas, a federal habeas case asking whether the First Step Act‘s halfway-house and home-confinement provisions are properly enforceable through 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petitions, an issue with a real circuit split. None of these have been granted yet — they are relists, which means at least one Justice is interested but the Court has not yet decided whether to hear them — but the mix is the part to watch: it tells you what the Justices are circling without committing to. Expect at least one of these to be granted before the term ends. A random assortment of relists: prolonged detention, confessions of error, small juries, and new rules on habeas | SCOTUSblog This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    7 min
  8. Jun 9

    Legal News for Tues 6/9 - SCOTUS Vacates Biden Gas-appliance Reg, Campaign to Overrule Obergefell, WH Ballroom Suit Sprints Toward SCOTUS and the Poorly Draft SALT Cap

    This Day in Legal History: The Burning of the Gaspee On this day in 1772, a Royal Navy revenue schooner called HMS Gaspee, captained by a notably overzealous Lieutenant William Duddington, ran aground in shallow water in Narragansett Bay while chasing a Rhode Island packet boat called the Hannah. Within hours of the grounding, roughly sixty Providence merchants, sailors, and “Sons of Liberty” — led by John Brown, one of the wealthiest men in the colony — rowed out under cover of darkness in eight longboats, boarded the Gaspee, shot Duddington, and burned the ship to the waterline. The legal significance lies in what came next. The Crown convened a Royal Commission of Inquiry with authority to ship the perpetrators across the Atlantic for trial in England, bypassing colonial juries entirely, a procedural maneuver that the colonies read as a direct attack on the right to jury trial in the vicinage. The Virginia House of Burgesses responded in March 1773 by forming the first Committee of Correspondence, a sustained intercolonial communication network that became, two years later, the institutional skeleton of the Continental Congress. The Gaspee Affair never produced a single prosecution — the commission could not get the colonial governor or the Rhode Island courts to cooperate, and witness testimony evaporated — but it produced something more durable: the colonial conviction that the Crown’s willingness to detour around local juries was itself a constitutional grievance worth organizing against. The right-to-jury-in-the-vicinage point that Madison wrote into the Sixth Amendment seventeen years later is, in a real sense, the Gaspee Affair’s longest-lived legacy. The Supreme Court on Monday granted, vacated, and remanded the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Gas Association v. Department of Energy, sending the long-disputed Biden-era Department of Energy efficiency rule on non-condensing residential gas furnaces and commercial water heaters back to the D.C. Circuit “for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General.” That last phrase is the operative one. The new Solicitor General, on behalf of the second Trump administration’s DOE, told the Court in late April that the prior administration’s reading of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act was, in DOE’s current view, wrong, and that the rule effectively bans non-condensing units that millions of homes and small commercial properties were built around. A confessed-error from a new administration doesn’t automatically win a case, but the procedural vehicle — a grant-vacate-remand, or “GVR” — is the Court’s standard way of saying “go look at this again with the new posture in mind” without resolving the merits itself. The trade-group plaintiffs, led by the American Gas Association and the American Public Gas Association, framed the rule from the start as a de facto product ban dressed up as efficiency standards. The environmental and consumer groups that intervened to defend the rule will get another bite at the apple on remand, but their position is harder when their own client agency has switched sides. Watch the D.C. Circuit’s case calendar over the next few weeks for an expedited briefing schedule. Supreme Court Vacates Decision Outlawing Gas Stoves, Water Heaters | NewsBusters SCOTUSblog on Monday published a careful overview of an increasingly organized litigation campaign to ask the Supreme Court to overrule Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. The campaign now includes Liberty Counsel, MassResistance, and the Southern Baptist Convention, which last year voted overwhelmingly to urge the Court to reverse the decision. The underlying ground for the push is partly the Court’s reasoning in Dobbs four years ago, which gave conservative litigants a road map for unwinding substantive due process precedents, and partly the gradual erosion of public-opinion support for same-sex marriage in one slice of the polling, with Republican support falling from 55 percent in 2022 to 37 percent now. The legal headcount at the Court is, however, the part of the story that is not yet there. Only Justice Thomas has been a consistent vote to revisit Obergefell, having said so in his Dobbs concurrence. Justice Alito, despite being one of Obergefell’s original dissenters, recently emphasized in a public speech that he is not suggesting the case should be overruled, citing stare decisis. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in 303 Creative seems to concede that Obergefell is good law and tries instead to carve out specific exceptions to it. None of which is a reason for litigants on the marriage-equality side to relax. The path Dobbs opened up is wider than any single justice’s current voting pattern, and the campaign is plainly playing a long game. The next round of test cases on standing and ripeness will start to surface in the lower courts in the next term or two — that is when the campaign’s seriousness becomes measurable. The campaign to overrule Obergefell | SCOTUSblog The third and most constitutionally significant story of the day is one we’ve been watching: the litigation over President Trump’s $400 million ballroom — built on the site of the demolished East Wing — is on track to land in front of the Supreme Court, SCOTUSblog reported Monday. The D.C. Circuit panel that heard the case for more than two hours in late April has not yet ruled, but the questioning made clear that a more substantial opinion is coming and that an appeal to the Court is the likely next stop regardless of which side wins. The legal question is unusually fundamental. The plaintiff, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, argues that the President has no “free-floating” power to construct major federal buildings without an appropriation from Congress, and that the Antideficiency Act and the Public Buildings Act both require the kind of statutory authorization the East Wing ballroom never received. The administration’s response, delivered in a tone that several court-watchers described as unusually defiant, has essentially been that construction has “gone too far to be stopped” and that the courts have no role in second-guessing a presidential building decision once the steel is up. The structural separation-of-powers questions here — what does the Appropriations Clause actually constrain, and can a federal court enjoin a President from continuing to build something that is partially constructed — are large enough that the Supreme Court will almost certainly want to take the case if it reaches the high court. Construction, meanwhile, continues. The most likely Supreme Court resolution is a narrow opinion on standing or remedies, with the broader Appropriations Clause questions deferred for another day. We will see. White House ballroom battle may soon arrive at the Supreme Court | SCOTUSblog In my Bloomberg Tax column this week, I argue that the SALT deduction cap’s biggest problem is not that it is unconstitutional, but that it is badly designed. The latest failed challenge, Sims v. United States, involved two New Jersey taxpayers who claimed the cap violated the 10th Amendment, the 16th Amendment, and broader federalism principles. The federal district court rejected those arguments, finding that Congress has broad authority to tax income and decide which deductions are allowed, limited, or denied. My point is that opponents of the SALT cap should stop looking for constitutional defects that courts are unlikely to find and instead focus on forcing Congress to fix the policy it created. I explain that the cap has always been politically loaded: supporters see it as a needed limit on a deduction that benefits many high-income taxpayers in high-tax states, while critics see it as a targeted attack on those states. But unfair or politically motivated tax policy is not automatically unconstitutional. The real weakness, I argue, is the cap’s uneven design, especially the pass-through entity tax workaround. Many business owners can effectively get around the cap when state taxes are paid at the entity level, while wage earners, sole proprietors, and many individual taxpayers remain stuck behind it. That creates a serious mismatch: two taxpayers can live in the same state, earn similar income, and face similar state tax burdens, but receive different federal treatment depending on whether one has the right business structure. I argue that this kind of selective relief may be a more promising target for a narrower administrative or legal challenge than another broad constitutional attack on Congress’s taxing power. Congress partly recognized the problem when it raised the cap from $10,000 to $40,000, but I note that the fix is temporary, only lightly indexed, and still leaves major structural problems in place. The marriage penalty remains especially glaring because married couples filing jointly do not receive double the cap available to similarly situated unmarried taxpayers. I also criticize the phaseout design because it can create cliffs or marginal-rate spikes that reward tax gamesmanship rather than sound policy. A better fix, in my view, would make the higher cap permanent, index it meaningfully, eliminate the marriage penalty, smooth out the phaseout, and require Treasury to rationalize the treatment of pass-through entity taxes. The lesson from Sims is that courts may uphold the SALT cap, but that does not make it good tax policy. If the cap is unfair, incoherent, or selectively porous, Congress owns that problem. SALT Deduction Cap Falls Short in Design, Not Constitutionality This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

    9 min
4.8
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Minimum Competence is your daily companion for legal news, designed to bring you up to speed on the day’s major legal stories during your commute home. Each episode is short, clear, and informative—just enough to make you minimally competent on the key developments in law, policy, and regulation. Whether you’re a lawyer, law student, journalist, or just legal-curious, you’ll get a smart summary without the fluff. A full transcript of each episode is available via the companion newsletter at www.minimumcomp.com. www.minimumcomp.com

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