Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Gareth Lock at The Human Diver
  • 5.0 (13)
  • Education
  • Updated Semiweekly

Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver. Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.

  1. 20h ago

    SH310: 2. More Than a Deep Dive: What a WWII Bomber Recovery Can Teach Us About Human Factors

    This episode explores what really makes complex technical diving successful: not just helium, decompression and equipment, but the people using them. Using the recovery of the WWII B-24 Liberator Tulsamerican off the island of Vis as a case study, we look at how communication, teamwork, workload management, clear goals and psychological safety can make the difference between a team that simply completes a dive and one that achieves its mission safely. The project brought together divers, archaeologists, historians, military agencies, local authorities and vessel crews from different backgrounds and countries, creating the kind of complex environment where human performance becomes critical. The story shows how small mistakes can quickly become team problems, why anyone should be able to speak up or call a dive, and how focusing on the wider mission can help prevent individual ambition from driving poor decisions. Ultimately, the Tulsamerican recovery demonstrates that technical diving is about far more than what we carry into the water—it is about how effectively we work together. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/more-than-a-deep-dive Tags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type| THD-HFiD-Conference

    SH310: 2. More Than a Deep Dive: What a WWII Bomber Recovery Can Teach Us About Human Factors

  2. Sep 23

    SH309: Change around Safety Culture is Really Hard

    In this episode, Gareth Lock reflects on why improving diving safety requires more than telling people to follow the rules. Drawing on his experience in aviation, diving, and safety science, he explains why incidents are often blamed on individuals while the wider system escapes scrutiny. The discussion explores how culture, reporting systems, commercial pressures, and training standards shape diver behaviour, why many divers avoid formal reporting channels, and what other high-risk industries have done to build real learning systems. Gareth also shares how The Human Diver, the LEODSI investigation framework, and new industry standards are helping shift the focus from blame and compliance to understanding context, building trust, and creating lasting improvements in diving safety. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/cultural-infleunce-is-really-hard Links: Developing competencies and capacities for resilient performance: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-model Diving Talks: https://youtu.be/fUSD9gPZ-x0 Work as Imagined vs Work as Done: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtgIwHrUWVQ&list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&index=24 Standards: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floor Gareth’s Thesis: https://youtu.be/DRXqeQvRFK0 Flavours of Human Factors: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/four-ways-of-hf LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteot Chac Mool fatalities: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatality Human Diver Conference: https://www.hf-in-diving-conference.com/ Rebreather Forum 4: https://youtu.be/nkdVHBDnCjc?t=3015 Maldives fatalities: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-not Events that happen without fatalities: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-know-and-we-say-nothing Agencies using HF language: https://www.tdisdi.com/sdi-diver-news/how-serious-are-you-about-safety/ Levels of training available: https://www.thehumandiver.com/your-learning-journey Tags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type

    SH309: Change around Safety Culture is Really Hard

  3. Sep 16

    SH308: We Know, and We Say Nothing

    This episode explores why experienced divers still die in situations that seem predictable, using the tragic 2026 Maldives cave accident as a starting point. It looks at how outcome bias, the normalisation of deviance, nitrogen narcosis, group dynamics, and silent drift can gradually erode safety margins without divers realising it. Rather than focusing on individual mistakes, the discussion explains how everyday decisions, accepted norms, and human psychology combine to create risk over time. It also examines what divers, teams, and the wider diving community can do to recognise these patterns, challenge unsafe habits, encourage open communication, and build a culture that learns from accidents instead of simply accepting them as bad luck. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-know-and-we-say-nothing NotesConcept formalised by Baron, J. & Hershey, J. C., "Outcome bias in decision evaluation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (1988), p. 569-579. PDF available: https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/papers/outcomebias.pdfVaughan, D., The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, University of Chicago Press, 1996. Publisher page: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo22781921.htmlLock, G., Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors (2019); see also The Human Diver (https://www.thehumandiver.com) and the documentary If Only… (https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonly).First systematic experimental demonstration: Behnke, A. R., Thomson, R. M. & Motley, E. P., "The psychologic effects from breathing air at 4 atmospheres pressure," American Journal of Physiology 112(3), 1935, p. 554-558. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1152/ajplegacy.1935.112.3.554For an overview, see Nitrogen Narcosis In Diving on StatPearls (NCBI/NIH): https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470304/; and Clark, J. E., Moving in extreme environments: inert gas narcosis and underwater activities, Extreme Physiology & Medicine 3 (2014), which establishes that narcosis directly contributes to up to 6% of diving deaths — free full text: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4337274/Hamilton, K., Laliberté, M. F. & Fowler, B., "Dissociation of the behavioral and subjective components of nitrogen narcosis and diver adaptation," Undersea & Hyperbaric Medicine 22(1), March 1995, p. 41-49 (PMID 7742709): https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7742709/ BibliographyDecision biases, normalisation of deviance, human factors Baron, J. & Hershey, J. C., "Outcome bias in decision evaluation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (1988), p. 569-579. PDF: https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/papers/outcomebias.pdfVaughan, D., The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, University of Chicago Press, 1996. Publisher page: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo22781921.htmlLock, G., Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors, 2019. The Human Diver: https://www.thehumandiver.com. Documentary If Only…: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonly Physiology of narcosis Behnke, A. R., Thomson, R. M. & Motley, E. P., "The psychologic effects from breathing air at 4 atmospheres pressure," American Journal of Physiology 112(3), 1935, p. 554-558. First systematic experimental demonstration of the narcotic effects of compressed air at depth. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1152/ajplegacy.1935.112.3.554Kirkland, P. J., Mathew, D., Modi, P. & Cooper, J. S., Nitrogen Narcosis In Diving, StatPearls (NCBI/NIH), last updated 2023: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470304/Clark, J. E., "Moving in extreme environments: inert gas narcosis and underwater activities," Extreme Physiology & Medicine 3 (2014). Free full text via PMC: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4337274/Hamilton, K., Laliberté, M. F. & Fowler, B., "Dissociation of the behavioral and subjective components of nitrogen narcosis and diver adaptation," Undersea & Hyperbaric Medicine 22(1), March 1995, p. 41-49. PMID 7742709: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7742709/ Diving accident research Divers Alert Network, Annual Diving Reports (long series, 1988 to 2021). Full collection consultable online: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK481542/Exley, S., Basic Cave Diving: A Blueprint for Survival, National Speleological Society — Cave Diving Section, Branford (FL), 1979. Official NSS-CDS PDF: https://nsscds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Blueprint-for-Survival.pdfBuzzacott, P., Zeigler, E., Denoble, P. & Vann, R., "American Cave Diving Fatalities 1969-2007," International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education 3(2), 2009, p. 162-177. Free full text: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare/vol3/iss2/7/Potts, L., Buzzacott, P. & Denoble, P. J., "Thirty years of American cave diving fatalities," Diving and Hyperbaric Medicine 46(3), September 2016, p. 150-154. PMID 27723015: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27723015/ Tags: THD-English|a href="https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/category/learning-JC-incidents"...

    SH308: We Know, and We Say Nothing

  4. Sep 9

    SH307: 1. The 2026 HF in Diving Conference - What Did You Miss?

    This episode explores how a restorative just culture can help the diving community respond to incidents in a way that promotes learning rather than blame. Instead of focusing only on who broke the rules, it looks at who was harmed, what they need, and how trust can be rebuilt while addressing the wider conditions that contributed to the event. The discussion covers the impact on everyone involved, the role of accountability, compassion, and forgiveness, and why repairing systems is more effective than simply punishing individuals. It also introduces Professor Sidney Dekker's Restorative Just Culture Checklist as a practical tool for turning difficult events into opportunities for meaningful learning and safer diving. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/2026-hfid-conference-what-did-you-miss Tags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type| THD-HFiD-Conference

    SH307: 1. The 2026 HF in Diving Conference - What Did You Miss?

  5. Sep 2

    SH306: Restorative Just Culture: Repairing Trust After an Event

    This episode explores the difference between a retributive approach to diving incidents, which focuses on blame and punishment, and a restorative just culture, which focuses on learning, repair, and preventing future harm. It explains how incidents affect not only those directly involved but also instructors, organisations, and the wider diving community, and argues that real accountability means understanding what happened, supporting everyone affected, rebuilding trust, and fixing the conditions that allowed the event to occur. The discussion also introduces Professor Sidney Dekker's Restorative Just Culture Checklist as a practical tool for helping individuals and organisations move from blame to meaningful learning and lasting improvement. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/restorative-just-culture Links: The PDF checklist: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Vkg0o4Fc8XWsAul-mkXNqD5lwokQ0ntP/view?usp=sharing Tags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type

    SH306: Restorative Just Culture: Repairing Trust After an Event

  6. Aug 26

    SH305: Cause Reason. Excuse. Three Words Doing Three Very Different Things.

    This episode explores an important distinction that is often missed when discussing diving incidents: the difference between a cause, a reason, and an excuse. A cause explains what contributed to an event, a reason explains why a person's actions made sense to them at the time, and an excuse uses those reasons to avoid accountability. Understanding these differences helps us learn from accidents without simply assigning blame or letting people off the hook. The discussion shows why complex incidents usually have many interacting causes, why understanding local decision-making is essential for improving safety, and how separating learning from punishment leads to better conversations, stronger investigations, and safer diving for everyone. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/cause-reason-excuse Links: Accountability blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountability RaDonda Vaught case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-not Stop rules blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-investigations-stop-where-they-stop Richard Cook’s diagram: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/joining-dots-is-easy-if-you-know-the-outcome More about the RaDonda Vaught case: https://humanfactors101.com/2022/05/08/is-human-error-a-crime/ The eight question review: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accident “Learning” the same lessons: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-does-nothing-change Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH305: Cause Reason. Excuse. Three Words Doing Three Very Different Things.

  7. Aug 19

    SH304: Why Investigations Stop Where They Stop

    This episode explores why accident investigations often stop long before they uncover the full picture. Drawing on research from safety science, it argues that the “cause” of an incident is not simply discovered—it is shaped by who is investigating, what they are able to change, and what explanations their community accepts. In diving, investigations often focus on the actions of individual divers or instructors because these are the easiest problems to address, while deeper issues such as organisational culture, commercial pressures, and industry practices are left unexplored. The episode examines how different people can interpret the same event in very different ways, why every investigation helps shape the community’s understanding of safety, and why asking “Why did the investigation stop here?” can lead to far richer learning than simply accepting the reported cause. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-investigations-stop-where-they-stop Links: The most complete data on diving fatalities from 2008: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19175195/ Blog exploring the purposes of running an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigation LFEO program: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeo HFiD conference: https://www.hf-in-diving-conference.com/ What you look for is what you find: https://doi-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1016/j.ssci.2009.01.004 What you find is what you fix: https://doi-org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1016/j.aap.2010.07.003 Blog about agency/organisation standards: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floor Speaking truth to power: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-im-fine-isnt-true Structural conditions that produce decisions: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-not Other references: Blazsin, H. & Guldenmund, F. (2015). The social construction of safety: Comparing three realities. Safety Science, 71, 16–27. Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2009). What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find — The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals. Safety Science, 47(10), 1297–1311. Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C. & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix — How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 42, 2132–2139. Rasmussen, J. (1990). Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 327, 449–462. Rochlin, G. I. (1999). Safe operation as a social construct. Ergonomics, 42(11), 1549–1560. Shreeves, K., Buzzacott, P., Hornsby, A., & Caney, M. (2018). Violations of safe diving practices among 122 diver fatalities. Int. Marit. Health, 69(2), 94–98. https://doi.org/10.5603/imh.2018.0014 van der Schaaf, T. W., Lucas, D. A. & Hale, A. R. (1991). Near miss reporting as a safety tool. Butterworth-Heinemann. Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH304: Why Investigations Stop Where They Stop

  8. Aug 12

    SH303: The Structure of This Diving Tragedy Was Not Abnormal. The Scale Was.

    This episode explores why diving accidents are so often explained by individual mistakes instead of the wider conditions that made those mistakes possible. Using the case of a fatal medication error in healthcare alongside the recent Maldives cave diving tragedy, it examines how hindsight, blame, and our natural tendency to focus on people rather than systems can prevent meaningful learning. The discussion highlights how unsafe practices can become normal when they repeatedly appear to work, and why serious accidents often reveal long-standing weaknesses that existed long before the final event. Rather than asking "Who is at fault?", the episode argues that the better question is "What conditions made these decisions seem reasonable at the time?"—because understanding those conditions offers the best chance of preventing similar tragedies in the future. Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-structure-is-normal-the-scale-is-not Links: Martin Anderson’s write-up: https://humanfactors101.com/2022/05/08/is-human-error-a-crime/ Andrzej Gornicki’s Eight Question Review: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accident Gareth’s blog about accountability: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountability Assumptions and worn paths: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-broken Consensus is because people don’t want to disagree: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floor Conditions produce outcomes: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditions Useful illegality in action: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-broken Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture

    SH303: The Structure of This Diving Tragedy Was Not Abnormal. The Scale Was.
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About

Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver. Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.

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