Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

  1. 3D AGO

    [25-95] Pung v. Isabella County

    Pung v. Isabella County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.Respondent: sabella County, Michigan. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded.   Question 1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction? 2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?

    1h 45m

  2. 4D AGO

    [24-783] Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

    Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties. On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge. After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court. Question Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?

    1h 3m

  3. 5D AGO

    [24-699] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.

    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day. Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods. The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery. Question Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

    1h 32m

  4. 5D AGO

    [24-983] Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises

    Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019. The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001. Question Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?

    1h 33m

  5. JAN 21

    [25A312] Trump v. Cook

    Trump v. Cook Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: Lisa D. Cook, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None

    1h 58m

  6. JAN 20

    [23-1209] M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund

    M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: M & K Employee Solutions, LLC.Respondent: Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund. Advocates: Michael E. Kenneally, Jr. (for the Petitioners) John E. Roberts (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) M&K Employee Solutions operated three facilities that participated in the IAM National Pension Fund, a retirement plan jointly funded by multiple employers whose workers were represented by the International Association of Machinists union. In late 2017, the Fund’s actuary valued the plan’s unfunded obligations at about $448 million. Shortly after, in January 2018, the actuary met with the Fund’s trustees and decided to change key financial assumptions used to calculate how much departing employers owed the Fund. Most importantly, they lowered the assumed investment return rate from 7.5% to 6.5%, a change that would significantly increase the bills for employers leaving the plan. M&K had already begun pulling out of the Fund when two of its facilities stopped participating in 2017. When M&K completely withdrew in 2018, the Fund calculated what M&K owed based on financial data from December 31, 2017, but used the new assumptions adopted in January 2018. This resulted in a withdrawal liability bill of over $6 million. Ohio Magnetics, another company in the Fund, faced a similar situation when it withdrew in mid-2018 and received a bill for about $447,000 calculated the same way. Both companies challenged their bills through arbitration and won, with arbitrators ruling the Fund could not use assumptions created after the December 31, 2017 measurement date. The Fund then sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to overturn these arbitration decisions. The district court sided with the Fund, ruling that actuaries could adopt new assumptions after the measurement date as long as they were based on information available at that time. The court remanded the cases to the arbitrators for reconsideration. Both employers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Question When a pension plan calculates how much a departing employer owes “as of the end of the plan year,” must the plan use the financial assumptions it had already adopted by that date, or can it use new assumptions created after that date if they are based on information that was available at year-end?

    57 min

  7. JAN 20

    [24-1046] Wolford v. Lopez

    Wolford v. Lopez Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: Jason Wolford.Respondent: Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii. Advocates: Alan A. Beck (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2023, Hawaii and California enacted new laws, Act 52 and Senate Bill 2, respectively, that significantly restrict the public carry of firearms. Both laws prohibit individuals with carry permits from bringing firearms into numerous specified “sensitive places.” Hawaii’s list includes fifteen categories, such as bars, restaurants serving alcohol, parks, beaches, and banks. California’s list is broader, covering more than two dozen types of property, including hospitals, public transit, playgrounds, libraries, museums, places of worship, and casinos. Both states also changed the default rule for private property open to the public, generally banning firearms unless the property owner expressly permits them. Hawaii allows owners to consent verbally, in writing, or via a posted sign. California’s rule is stricter, permitting consent only through the posting of a specific, state-mandated sign. Plaintiffs in both states include individuals who hold concealed-carry permits and various gun-rights organizations. They filed lawsuits alleging that these new restrictions violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Plaintiffs in both actions sued their respective state attorneys general, and federal district courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking enforcement of many of the new provisions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases, affirming the injunctions in part but reversing them in large part. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling allowed many of the challenged restrictions to remain in effect but agreed with the district courts that the states could not, for example, ban firearms in banks or hospitals. Question Does a law that makes it a crime for a licensed concealed carry permit holder to bring a handgun onto private property open to the public—such as a store or restaurant—unless the property owner gives “express authorization” violate the Second Amendment?

    1h 51m

  8. JAN 14

    [24-1021] Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp.

    Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2026. Petitioner: Cedric Galette.Respondent: New Jersey Transit Corporation. Advocates: Michael Zuckerman (for New Jersey Transit Corp., et al. (Respondent in No. 24-1021, Petitioners in No. 24-1113)) Michael B. Kimberly (for Galette and Colt, et al. (Petitioner in 24-1021, Respondents in 24-1113)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on Market Street in Philadelphia when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). Galette suffered physical injuries as a result of the collision and brought a negligence lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court against both the vehicle’s driver, Julie McCrey, and NJ Transit. NJ Transit responded by asserting that it was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and therefore immune from private suit in Pennsylvania under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied NJ Transit’s motion to dismiss, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that NJ Transit qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. Question Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes?

    1h 10m
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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

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